Mark C. Miller's The View of the Courts from the Hill reminds readers that the role of the federal courts in the American political system has been a long-standing controversy since the founding of the country. In this study, he traces the evolution of interactions between the federal judiciary and Congress over the course of two centuries with special attention to recent efforts by members of the legislative branch to curb the power of the federal courts. While carefully documenting how decisions of the federal courts have generated a backlash in Congress at various points over the past two centuries, Miller expresses alarm that during the past decade, the threat to judicial independence from congressional intervention has reached dangerous new heights.
Miller attributes this emerging threat to efforts by the religious right and conservative members of Congress to retaliate against a liberal federal bench they deem hostile to traditional American values. Paying close attention to the House Judiciary Committee, Miller details a variety of actions initiated by interest groups affiliated with the Christian right and Republican members of the Committee to further their goal of a more conservative federal judiciary. Included among these efforts are bills to strip the courts of their authority to hear a variety of cases, especially when it comes to hot-button social issues. Additionally, high-profile threats from conservative leaders in Congress call for the impeachment of federal judges who have issued rulings contrary to the wishes of the religious right. From Miller's perspective, these attacks constitute a serious blow to the independence of the federal courts, one of the lynchpins of a healthy democratic system. While Miller concludes that some recent Supreme Court decisions have also drawn the ire of liberals, the response among Democratic members of Congress has been more muted because of their greater respect for the autonomy of the courts in the US political system. Miller lays blame for recent developments squarely at the feet of the conservative movement and envisions this war on the judiciary will continue for the foreseeable future until and unless the courts reflect a more rightward-leaning perspective.
Although Miller makes a compelling case for his underlying claims about conservative attacks on the federal courts, this study is not without its shortcomings. The book's most significant weakness is that its findings are based almost exclusively on qualitative interviews with current and former congressional staff members, lobbyists, current and former employees of the judicial branch, federal judges, and think-tank employees. Altogether, a total of forty-four separate individuals were interviewed by the author for this study. This sample is an awfully limited number of cases to draw such sweeping conclusions about the state of congressional interactions with the judicial branch of government. This study would have benefitted immensely from the addition of quantitative data to support the qualitative approach that was the core research design employed by the author. Specifically, Miller could have administered a survey to a broader group of elites to confirm that his interpretation of the interbranch dynamics he outlines in the book were not simply a function of the small sample he interviewed for the book. Had he adopted an approach incorporating multiple methods, the insights offered in the book would have been far more convincing. Advocates of the historical-interpretive school of inquiry, the description Miller applies to his work, would certainly reject this critique, discounting the need for quantitative inquiry to supplement qualitative inquiries of this kind. In spite of this view, his claims would carry more weight had he opted for an all-inclusive research strategy.
Another specific issue the book could have touched on is the emerging normative view in political science that the value of judicial accountability is just as important if not more so than the value of judicial independence. This view is best illustrated in the work of Chris Bonneau and Melinda Gann Hall calling for the election of judges as a necessary tool to hold judges accountable for their policy decisions on the bench. While their work focuses on state courts rather than the federal judiciary, it does represent an important perspective on the role of the courts in a democratic society. If judges are policymakers, should they not feel more pressure to be responsive to the concerns of the public and their elected representatives? Miller does not have to agree with this sentiment to at least address it as a part of the normative discussion in the conclusion of the book.
Despite its imperfections, The View of the Courts from the Hill represents a solid contribution to our understanding of interactions between the legislative and judicial branches in the US political system. It serves as an important reminder that the behavior of political actors cannot be viewed in isolation and has to be understood within the context of how their actions will be perceived by members of the other branches in a separation-of-powers system. Future research in this area will have to address Miller's insights on the changing dynamics of interbranch relations in a system characterized by extreme ideological polarization.
