Over the past eight hundred years, scholars have continuously been drawn to the writings of the Jewish philosopher and rabbi, Moses Maimonides. Born in Cordova in 1138, he fled persecution with his family to Morocco, and eventually resided in Cairo until his death in 1204. There he served as the leader of the Jewish community and doctor to the Sultan. As a philosopher, he is renowned for his work The Guide of the Perplexed, which became the standard for all later Jewish philosophy. His Guide became the model for demonstrating the extent to which reason can understand the claims of religion, as well as showing how religion can complement reason. The crowning achievement of Maimonides' theological thought was his fourteen-volume Mishneh Torah, which served as the first comprehensive attempt to create a rational structure for Jewish law. Medieval Christian philosophers were also influenced by Maimonides, especially Thomas Aquinas who affectionately referred to him as “Rabbi Moses.”
Joel Kraemer, professor emeritus of the University of Chicago, spent the last thirty years carefully poring over obscure primary sources found in the Cairo Genizah in order to produce his magnum opus, Maimonides: The Life and World of One of Civilization's Greatest Minds. Structured as a biography, Kraemer's work goes far beyond a mere recounting of Maimonides' life story. By incorporating copious documentation relating to Maimonides' place in the medieval world, as well as plumbing the depths of his philosophical and Jewish interpretations, this book is equal parts historical, philosophic, and Jewish. Indeed, Kraemer gives a hint to the reader about this structure in his preface where he presents himself as a student of three distinct teachers: the Mediterranean historian Dov Goitein, the philosopher Leo Strauss, and the Talmudist Saul Lieberman (ix–xi). One could say that Kraemer's book is a response to previous scholarly works that attempt to reduce Maimonides to a single paradigm. He argues that one would be diminishing Maimonides by regarding him solely as a product of his historical circumstances, or as the mere inheritor of a philosophic tradition from Plato and Aristotle, or as simply the heir of a continuous Jewish tradition stemming from Moses. By unabashedly refusing to select one of these teachers as his own model, Kraemer implicitly suggests that each approach strengthens the others.
A particularly constructive aspect of Kraemer's book is his contention that Maimonides' thought transcends the concerns of the twelfth century and can provide wisdom for the twenty-first century as well. Kraemer boldly inserts contemporary debates into the work and stakes out Maimonides' position in reference to them. While topics include euthanasia and abortion (348–51), I would like focus on three that figure centrally: Islamic radicalism, women, and the Holocaust.
Kraemer makes clear that Maimonides' views on Islamic radicalism should be first understood in light of Islam's historical relationship to politics. On the one hand, Kraemer stresses that there is a good possibility for the cultivation of a secular society in an Islamic state because the Islamic state considered the caliph a religious leader separate from the mosque. This recognition gave the caliphate its own independent authority to encourage a secular culture of scholars, poets, and scientists interested in ideas and discovery, such as during the rule of the Umayyad Caliph under which Maimonides lived during his childhood (30). On the other hand, if the caliph was not attracted to higher pursuits, such freedom could be used for persecution, especially in light of the low regard for women and non-Muslims in the Qur'an (e.g., 2:61, 2:228, and 4:34). This left the door open for a fanatically religious zeal that Maimonides witnessed in the Berber Almohad takeover of Muslim Spain. Hence, Kraemer astutely concludes that the so-called Golden Age of Jewish-Muslim coexistence in Spain was merely one of “economic and cultural coexistence, accompanied by competition, mistrust and hostility” (39). In order to counteract such fanaticism, Maimonides envisioned the best regime not as modern thinkers do by emphasizing individual rights, but by designing a model that would withstand religious radicalism by ensuring that the religious and political law contains a legal obligation for philosophizing. In this light, Kraemer brings out the apparent duality of Maimonides' religious and political stance. While the Mishneh Torah appears to impose a dogmatic understanding of a single truth, this same proof of his so-called dogmatism is contradicted by almost everything that is presented in the Guide. This contradiction implies that true knowledge is an understanding of the competing arguments for truth and that one must live with this perplexity. So long as individuals are striving for higher knowledge, this will ensure a competition of ideas, and, hence, a protected realm of freedom.
Kraemer's book also reveals Maimonides to be relatively liberal in his attitude toward women. Although some contemporary scholars have accused Maimonides of misogyny because of his frequent references to women as being ignorant, Kraemer points out that there is another side to Maimonides' views on women. He calls attention to the fact that not only did Maimonides consider the biblical Miriam to be a prophet, he also acknowledged that women have the ability to study metaphysics (335–36). Moreover, he stressed the importance of mutual respect in marriage (343) and argued for a greater freedom of movement for woman: “[S]he is not in a prison where she cannot come and go.” Nonetheless, he still supported a more restrictive role for women in the home (341). He also issued an enactment in court instituting greater restrictions on foreigners marrying in Egypt for “the benefit of young women in Israel” (288). This proposal would protect Egyptian Jewish women from being deceived into marrying foreign men who claimed to be single, but who in truth were already married. Although Maimonides was certainly not a feminist in a modern sense, Kraemer suggests he acknowledged the dignity of women in the context of the world in which he lived.
Finally, although Kraemer does not deal with it at length, he boldly proclaims Maimonides' position on the problem of evil to be more penetrating than that of most of the post-Holocaust theologians of modern times (391). For Maimonides, there are three types of evil: natural, political, and individual (389). According to Kraemer, Maimonides would understand the Holocaust as an example of extreme political evil, in which humanity failed to prevent a tyrant from committing his crimes. As such, he would shy away from placing the blame on God, arguing that “God is unique and incomparable, and cannot … share a quality with any other existent being” (156). In this regard, he would contradict post-Holocaust theologians who argue that God was hidden or lacked power. Maimonides' conception of political evil underscores the need to act politically in order to prevent such evils from returning in the future. However, Kraemer's reliance on Maimonides may be somewhat problematic theologically, in terms of his understanding the Holocaust. This perspective blurs the distinction between Hitler, whose project was to annihilate the Jewish people, and all previous tyrants who oppressed Jews. In doing so, Kraemer's interpretation of Maimonides' views fails to take into account how God's omniscience and justice are irreconcilable with such unprecedented evil.
Nevertheless, Joel Kraemer's portrait of Maimonides provides a new paradigm for the next generation of Maimonidean scholars: an equally deep knowledge of history, philosophy, and the Jewish tradition, with an emphasis on Maimonides' clear voice of moderation on contemporary issues. While this dialogue with modernity reveals the wisdom of Maimonides on certain eternal questions, it may unwittingly disclose the limits of Maimonideanism to solve all the problems of modernity.
