What does the rise of China mean for the West-led “liberal” international order? Is China a rule-taker (status quo power) or a rule breaker (revisionist power)? These are questions vigorously debated by scholars of international relations, global governance and Chinese foreign policy. James Frick’s new book joins the lively debate with a careful study of China’s involvement in the World Bank Group (WBG), and International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
Early in the book, Frick develops an analytical framework that combines elements of realist, constructivist and institutionalist theories of international relations. The framework classifies four types of behaviour by states – rule-taking, rule-breaking, rule-changing and rule-making. It hypothesizes that state behaviour in a given international organization is shaped by three factors – the extent to which the organization’s policies align with the state’s interests, the organization’s “rules for control” (how much influence the rules allow the state to exercise influence), and the changing relative power position of the state. The rest of the book applies this framework to describe and explain China’s behaviour in the WBG, the IMF and WIPO.
This study covers forty years of China’s involvement in these three international organizations starting with its entry in the 1980s. It devotes two chapters to each case study, one focusing on the first two decades and the other on the next twenty years. The bulk of the data come from three types of sources: 1) archival materials, including annual reports, meeting minutes, communiques, transcripts, and historical records of the international organizations; 2) interviews with many key officials of the international organizations, Chinese representatives and other informants; and 3) secondary literature. Together they provide well-documented and coherent accounts of the evolution of China’s relations with these three international organizations and of the logic behind critical decisions.
The three cases show similarities as well as differences in the trajectory of Chinese behaviour. At the WBG, China has been a rule-taker since the beginning because of a high level of alignment of the World Bank’s policies with China’s core interests. With its growing economic weight, China has also tried to reform the Bank, but it has not sought to overthrow the existing system. At the IMF, China was initially a minimalist participant because the macroeconomic policy focus of the Fund was of limited relevance to Chinese economic needs in the early years of the reform era. Over time, China showed signs of being both a rule-taker (e.g. accepting technical assistance) and a borderline rule-breaker (e.g. rejecting advice about its exchange regime). Following the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, China took on the role of a rule-maker, motivated by its discontent with the IMF’s problematic surveillance rules and enabled by its growing financial contribution to the organization. Similar to its approach to the WBG, China has not sought to overturn the existing system. At WIPO, China has been selective in its participation in the multiple agreements under its rubric according to how much they align with its core interests. For years, it had a poor record of compliance. As its economy becomes more dependent on innovation, China has shown a stronger interest in the rules governing intellectual property rights and a desire for rule-making in this realm, including actively seeking the top leadership position in WIPO in 2020.
A particular strength of this study is its nuanced and dynamic approach to understanding China’s behaviour in these international organizations. Going well beyond the conventional dichotomy between status quo and revisionism, it presents a spectrum of China’s approach to the liberal international order, including rule-taking, rule-breaking, rule changing and rule-making. It traces how China’s engagement with these international organizations has evolved as its interests and capacity have changed. Indeed, it shows diversity of Chinese policies even within the same period and the same international organization. The result is a rich and convincing account of how and why China’s behaviour varies and changes in these economically oriented international organizations.
What are China’s aspirations as a rising power? The book is ambiguous on this question. On the one hand, it argues that the case studies demonstrate China “is maneuvering into a position of global prominence” and that “it wants to retain the current system while slowly transitioning into a leadership role” (p. 210). On the other hand, it cites existing literature on China’s ambivalent and even reluctant attitude toward global leadership (p. 210, 211).
The conclusion discusses the implications of the findings. Among other things, it states that “China’s behavior in the WB, IMF, and WIPO suggests that when a member country commits long enough to an organization from which it has benefited, and also begins contributing additional resource and effort to change that organization, it will likely stay its course in providing support” (p. 209).
Such an expectation seems highly questionable in light of the rapidly declining support of major international organizations by the United States, which has long benefited from and contributed to these organizations. Indeed, the growing US challenge to the liberal international order calls for fundamental rethinking about the fate of the existing order and the real and potential threats it faces well beyond the rise of China.
Overall, this is a thoroughly researched and well-written book on an important topic. It is a valuable resource for scholars and students of China studies, international relations and global governance.
