First-wave symmetrical archaeology. A ‘DIY’ approach

First-wave Symmetrical Archaeology made connections to several Continental philosophers, including Friedrich Nietzsche and Jacques Derrida (see Olsen Reference Olsen2010, 151; Olsen Reference Olsen2012a, 24; Shanks Reference Shanks2007, 6); the perspective also spotlighted the work of sociologist David Bloor, and the desire for ‘methodological impartiality’ (Shanks Reference Shanks2007, 2). Symmetrical Archaeology wanted to address ‘unbalanced and dualistic relationships, lacking symmetry’ (Shanks Reference Shanks2007, 2). Olsen spearheaded the movement by emphasising the key role archaeology could play in the emergent intellectual climate (Reference Olsen2012a, 20). Early on in the debate, Olsen (Reference Olsen2003) wrote not about the thing but more broadly about material culture, and queried why the material is always imagined as a vehicle for further meaning (even a past lifeway) rather than an entity in its own right (Reference Olsen2003, 91). Olsen’s key concern was that in such interpretations ‘matter becomes nothing but a thin transparent film situated between us and our culture’ (Reference Olsen2003, 94). A phenomenological approach was outlined, but not (and this was stated quite specifically) in the fashion that British archaeologists had espoused; instead, things – all things – even the banal or seemingly inconsequential things, could be recognized as ‘beings-for-themselves’ (Olsen Reference Olsen2012a, 29). With regard to phenomenology in British archaeology, I suspect Olsen would take issue with the post-processual technique owing to its focus on the embodied experience (thus, focus on the human) rather than the material itself (Reference Olsen2003, 90; for excellent overviews of phenomenology in archaeology, see Thomas Reference Thomas, Tilley, Keane, Küchler, Rowlands and Spyer2006; Van Dyke Reference Van Dyke and Smith2013). Despite Olsen’s rejection of post-processualism – he argued that the once radical movement became ‘normalised, mainstream and hegemonic’ (Reference Olsen2012a, 11) – when exploring the history of Symmetrical Archaeology, it is clear that Michael Shanks (Reference Shanks2007) is an important figure in the first wave, and Shanks clearly saw the symmetrical approach as an extension of the post-processual project (Reference Shanks2007, 2; see also Burström Reference Burström2012, 43).

From the outset, Latour was an important inspiration for Symmetrical Archaeology (Olsen Reference Olsen, Graves-Brown, Harrison and Piccini2013; Webmoor and Witmore Reference Webmoor and Witmore2008, 59; for a detailed explanation, see Sørensen Reference Sørensen2016, 120; Harris and Cipolla Reference Harris and Cipolla2017, 187). Timothy Webmoor, inspired by Actor–network Theory, posited the notion of mediation and presented ‘the relations of humans and things as primordial for the discipline’ (Reference Webmoor2007, 564). Critical of humanism, Webmoor argued that ‘a humanist assumption corrupts the explanatory focus before research has even begun by separating humans from things a priori’ (his emphasis, Reference Webmoor2007, 568). He argued that Symmetrical Archaeology ‘excavated beneath the duality of humans and things’ (Reference Webmoor2007, 569). Inspired by Latour (Reference Latour and Porter1993), Christopher Witmore (Reference Witmore2007) described how humans and non-humans were mixtures rather than distinct entities (see also Harris and Cipolla Reference Harris and Cipolla2017, 187; Webmoor and Witmore Reference Webmoor and Witmore2008, 57). Despite the clear influence of Latour on the first wave, the rise of Speculative Realist philosophies should not simply be seen as an extension of the Latourian project. Whilst I agree with Tim Sørensen (Reference Sørensen2016) that Latour is a key influence on Symmetrical Archaeology, Speculative Realism consciously makes a departure from Latour’s original thinking; thus, when Symmetrical Archaeology starts to draw upon Speculative Realist ideas, it is starting to do something a little different (see Harris and Cipolla Reference Harris and Cipolla2017, 187). ^{Footnote 3} Speculative Realist Graham Harman, for example, notes ‘it is widely known that OOO [Object-Oriented Ontology] owes much to Latour, specifically to his ability to account for human and non-human entities in almost exactly the same terms’; however, he also notes that Latour’s focus on the actions of the actors abolishes ‘any hidden depth in things’ (Reference Harman2019, 274; see Lemke Reference Lemke2017, 7).

During the first wave, the bricoleur (the ultimate do-it-yourselfer) epitomized the approach (Olsen Reference Olsen2010, 152; Olsen et al. Reference Olsen, Shanks, Webmoor and Witmore2012, 4). Olsen reminded the reader that ‘the feral work of bricolage avoids proceeding haphazardly, by stubbornly going where it is led by its matters of concern’ (Olsen et al. Reference Olsen, Shanks, Webmoor and Witmore2012a, 4–5). Thinking with this character, the bricoleur uses ‘whatever is at hand’, that is to say, they use a grab bag of finite tools and materials; this approach contrasts with the ‘engineer’, who uses ‘raw materials and tools conceived and procured for the project’ (Lévi-Strauss Reference Lévi-Strauss1962, 11). The engineer domesticates projects in advance with the tools and experiences to approach an endeavour. The bricoleur, however, relies on hard graft, gut-instinct and what is to hand. The promotion of this style of doing within archaeological practice was in direct tension with the post-processual and processual emphasis on theory. Instead, archaeologists were encouraged to ‘[trust] in our own perception, in things themselves, and what they articulate in their own and peculiar manner […] there are other paths to archaeological knowledge besides theory’ (Olsen Reference Olsen2012a, 24). A different iteration of this sentiment can be seen in Pétursdóttir’s (Reference Pétursdóttir, Olsen and Pétursdóttir2014) approach to the archaeological discourse (particularly her attentive discussion of a contemporary abandoned storage house in Eyri). Initially, she grounded her thinking in a particular strain of phenomenology, by observing the difference between ‘calculated thinking’ which is goal-orientated and ‘meditative thinking’, which she explains as ‘a kind of thinking that is released from such chains of anticipation, and instead waits for that which may come towards it’ (Reference Pétursdóttir, Olsen and Pétursdóttir2014, 347). In her chapter, Pétursdóttir advocates for the ‘archaeological encounter’; she describes the potency of ‘things out of hand’ and encourages the archaeologist to query their ordering of the worlds they encounter (Reference Pétursdóttir, Olsen and Pétursdóttir2014, 338). The subtext of this chapter from my perspective is the following: a turn to the pre-critical and a skeptical attitude towards the archaeological discourse (particularly the theoretical) due to its capacity to shape the archaeologist’s perception (Pétursdóttir Reference Pétursdóttir, Olsen and Pétursdóttir2014, 347). On this matter, Pétursdóttir writes:

Her comments hinted at a potential reformulation of the causality of knowledge-making, one that challenged apriority. In such a light, the archaeologist was no longer armed (or stunted, depending on your view) with preconceived ideas, principles or hypotheses. Instead, they were unleashed from the dogmatic discourse that seemed politically heavy after the years of theory wars (see Olsen Reference Olsen2012a; Thomas Reference Thomas2012).

To draw these observations together: first-wave Symmetrical Archaeology challenged the way archaeologists made sense of their experiences in the field. From the Nordic quarters, the stance was presented as a reactionary move against the processual and post-processual emphasis on theory (Olsen Reference Olsen2012a). ^{Footnote 4} The methods offered by the first wave were considered liberating, a bold move to shake off the conceptual chains of the theory-dominated discourse, and apriority was challenged via ideas such as the bricoleur, meditative thinking, and methodological impartiality. These elements collectively started to sketch out a new approach to knowledge, where archaeological thought was reformatted as an outcome of inquiry, with little being formulated in advance of approaching the subject.

Second-wave symmetrical archaeology. In the beginning, there is difference

From 2014, Witmore offered a series of publications that attempted to explain and refine the Symmetrical Archaeological approach (Reference Witmore2014; Reference Witmore, Blaising, Driessen, Legendre and Olivier2017; Reference Witmore2018; Reference Witmore and Smith2020; Reference Witmore2021a). Whilst his arguments certainly chimed with the ethos of the earlier movement, the retrospective clarity his works offered still raised further questions from an archaeological perspective (see Govier and Steel, Reference Govier and Steel2021). Witmore, like Olsen and Pétursdóttir, continued to query the role of theory in archaeology, arguing that ‘[t]here are other paths to archaeological knowledge besides prepackaged ideas to be applied in every situation’ (Reference Witmore and Smith2020, 7). The ‘thing’ continued to be granted autonomy and treated as a ‘concrete’ entity in its own right from ‘the outset of any analysis’ (Witmore Reference Witmore and Smith2020, 2). Witmore went as far as to outline the key principles of Symmetrical Archaeology: ‘symmetry, irreduction, suggestions, and positive differences’ (Reference Witmore and Smith2020, 7). However, the articulation of a set of principles seemed to contradict the approach; if Symmetrical Archaeology labours under the idea of following the thing without ‘pre-packaged ideas’, the presentation of a set of principles (i.e. pre-packaged ideas) appears counter-intuitive to their argument. ^{Footnote 5} As this is an issue that Speculative Realists address, and is linked to the ontological issues I alluded to at the beginning of this paper, I will outline the Speculative Realist arguments that help to clarify this grey area. Keen archaeologists may question my position on epistemology and ontology and why I am using ontology to explain issues that might (for some) fall into the realm of epistemology. Indeed, there is great debate on this matter (see Olsen and Witmore Reference Olsen and Witmore2021; Pétursdóttir and Olsen Reference Pétursdóttir and Olsen2018; Ribeiro Reference Ribeiro2019); my stance is this: being and knowing are entangled (Barad Reference Barad2007); however, for Speculative Realist Levi Bryant, being precedes knowing. I will detail these arguments below.

Speculative Realists argue that a wide range of theoretical positions that are broadly described as Continental Philosophy (from phenomenology to postmodernism and post-structuralism) are ‘anti-realist’ (Bryant, Srnicek and Harman Reference Bryant, Srnicek, Harman, Bryant, Srnicek and Harman2011, 3). These theories are framed as anti-realist because reality is only imagined as a ‘correlate of human thought’ and (by extension) the human (Bryant, Srnicek and Harman Reference Bryant, Srnicek, Harman, Bryant, Srnicek and Harman2011, 3); Speculative Realists refer to this as ‘correlationism’ (Meillassoux cited in Bryant, Srnicek and Harman Reference Bryant, Srnicek, Harman, Bryant, Srnicek and Harman2011, 3). Correlationism is usefully unpacked by archaeologist Matt Edgeworth. He explains that in correlationalist accounts ‘objects are invariably construed in terms of the relation between humans and objects rather than in their own right. The problem becomes how to describe the world independently of human access to it’ (Edgeworth Reference Edgeworth2016, 94, my emphasis). Thus, the Speculative Realist project is an ambitious attempt to imagine – and account for – a reality beyond the human. This style of thinking is enacted to get a purchase on reality rather than as a means to bypass the responsibilities of humans. Put simply, if you think that Planet Earth began with the emergence of the human, then correlationalist thinking will satisfy your inquiring mind; if you acknowledge there was a time when Earth was not inhabited by humans, then correlationalism is not sufficient to explain reality. ^{Footnote 6} Edgeworth contends that archaeology is ‘the closest anyone can get, in a practical sense, to the furthest reaches of the correlationist circle’ (Reference Edgeworth2016, 103), owing to our practice being enacted at ‘the edge of the unknown’ (Reference Edgeworth2016, 102). Thus, thinkers working under the Speculative Realist moniker explore the concept of a reality beyond the human (or a reality ‘independent’ of human thought) (Bryant, Srnicek and Harman Reference Bryant, Srnicek, Harman, Bryant, Srnicek and Harman2011, 3).

Bryant argues that the thinker should approach the object of their inquiry without preconceived principles; this is the area where he makes a key causal flip in terms of epistemology by arguing that ‘any secure foundation [… is] as an outcome of inquiry’ (rather than something observed from the outset) (Bryant Reference Bryant, Bryant, Srnicek and Harman2011, 263; his emphasis). Preconceived principles would link the reality the thinker describes back around to the correlationist predicament they are trying to move beyond (where reality is linked to human cognition via the principle). Thus, for consistency, the principle or proposition must come after the inquiry; the act of ‘following’ is key to their approach (and something I have queried more generally for archaeology elsewhere: Govier Reference Govier2019).

Bryant suggests a ‘neo-pre-critical’ approach that ‘bracket[s]’ the ‘project of critique and questions of access’ and, instead of securing a method of proceeding in advance of actually proceeding, reorders the position of the thinker as a knower owing to the ‘outcome of inquiry’ (Reference Bryant, Bryant, Srnicek and Harman2011, 263). ^{Footnote 7} Bryant reframes principles as hypothetical (they can change or be rejected) and suggests that principles can be observed ‘as an outcome’ and are not something that shapes inquiry from the ‘outset’ (Reference Bryant, Bryant, Srnicek and Harman2011, 263). The ontology of second-wave Symmetrical Archaeology resonates with Bryant’s philosophical outline of the ‘Ontic Principle’; by understanding this mode of being, we can get a handle on how being and reality are formatted in Symmetrical Archaeology – a style of archaeology that is already enacted in the field and achieving real world impact. Bryant’s working definition of the ontic principle is that knowledge is preceded by difference and is ‘that through which something is and that through which something becomes’ (Reference Bryant, Bryant, Srnicek and Harman2011, 264). Bryant argues, ‘The most insignificant quark on the other side of the universe makes its difference(s) without any relation to our consciousness or knowledge of that quark. Difference is thus a matter of the “things themselves”, not our relationship to things’ (Reference Bryant, Bryant, Srnicek and Harman2011, 267); succinctly put: ‘the thereness of difference is given and is what first provokes inquiry’ (Reference Bryant, Bryant, Srnicek and Harman2011, 265). A key element of the concept is the disentanglement of the thing from human knowledge-making practices through the acknowledgement that the ‘thereness’ of difference is ‘indifferent to human existence’ (Bryant Reference Bryant, Bryant, Srnicek and Harman2011, 265).

The reformulation of the causality of knowledge directly relates to Symmetrical Archaeology and its causal rejection of apriority, and offers an ontological position that helps to clarify why Witmore is adamant that Symmetrical Archaeology is not a theory. To be ontologically and causally consistent, it cannot be a theory, as that would suggest preconceived (or a priori) ideas shaping the archaeologists’ approach to the archaeological record. Equally, following Bryant, principles are hypothetical and can be rejected. Thus, Witmore’s principles for Symmetrical Archaeology do not compromise his insistence that it is not a theory (Reference Witmore and Smith2020, 2). In this light, principles are not fixed entities that inform a chain of reasoning; instead, they are fluid and mutable, and ascertained after the observation of difference (which is an unprecedented conceptual move in archaeology). A recent contribution by Olsen and Witmore (Reference Olsen and Witmore2021) adds a further nuance to their stance on theory. In their paper, they forward the concept of ‘weak theory’ and describe how such a theory ‘may involve a series of cues or guidelines’. They argue that theories are ‘responsive to the circumstances and beings with which they are brought in connection’ (Reference Olsen and Witmore2021, 71). Importantly, when working with theory, ‘its ends cannot be foretold; its significance cannot be established in advance’ (Olsen and Witmore Reference Olsen and Witmore2021, 71). As an archaeological theorist, I need more conceptual substance. I argue that Symmetrical archaeologists situate themselves in a position that is similar to Bryant’s neo-pre-critical philosopher by bracketing the archaeological discourse to date and learning through encountering things as different and autonomous entities – a type of pre-critical archaeology. To my mind, archaeology has not seen this type of reasoning before, and as archaeological theorists are introduced to the pre-critical via the application of Speculative Realism in second-wave Symmetrical Archaeology (particularly Bryant’s ontic principle), ‘neo’ appears an unnecessary prefix for the archaeological discipline.

‘Things’. Unruly and unintentional?

The question of object agency often emerges in critiques of Symmetrical Archaeology (Arwill-Nordbladh Reference Arwill-Nordbladh2012; Barrett Reference Barrett2021; Ion Reference Ion2018; Preucel Reference Preucel2016). Whilst symmetrical archaeologists are critical of anthropomorphic forms of object agency (Olsen and Witmore Reference Olsen and Witmore2021, 75), they do not relinquish the idea entirely, instead preferring a ‘pruned’ version of agency, a type that is transfigured via context (Pétursdóttir and Olsen Reference Pétursdóttir and Olsen2018, 112, 113; see also Sørensen Reference Sørensen2018, 96). On the matter of object agency, Ion notes that agency is being used ‘with a different, often ambiguous, meaning’ (Ion Reference Ion2018, 192). ^{Footnote 8} Elisabeth Arwill-Nordbladh argues that Olsen’s (Reference Olsen2012a, 21) rejection of object agency owing to its anthropomorphic tendencies is an inconsistency in his outline. If objects are ‘unruly’ (thus, disruptive), how can they not be agents (Arwill-Nordbladh Reference Arwill-Nordbladh2012, 38; see also Pétursdóttir, Reference Pétursdóttir2017, 199)? I argue that the language employed in Symmetrical Archaeology often encourages the reader to equate the approach with an intentional form of object agency (and this triggers ethical concerns); for example, in a recent response to Govier and Steel (Reference Govier and Steel2021), Witmore described things as ‘fully fledged ontological citizens’ (Reference Witmore2021b, 319, my emphasis). Whilst I suspect he is simply attempting to state that different things equally exist (though are not necessarily equal) (as noted in Olsen and Witmore Reference Olsen and Witmore2021, 70), his use of the word ‘citizens’ is problematic (and inaccurate).

How the thing is envisaged by Symmetrical Archaeology in relation to object agency is vital, especially in connection to intentionality and whether they envisage things as intentional agents. The agency of objects is outlined in a number of ways in archaeology (see Gosden Reference Gosden, Chua and Elliott2013; Harris and Cipolla Reference Harris and Cipolla2017; Ingold Reference Ingold2013; Knappett and Malafouris Reference Malafouris, Robb and Boric2008; Pétursdóttir Reference Pétursdóttir2017; Sørensen Reference Sørensen2016). Alfred Gell (Reference Gell1998) is the renowned scholar attributed with introducing the subject to anthropology and archaeology through his posthumous monograph Art and agency: an anthropological theory. In the monograph, Gell challenges the intentional aspect of agency. He argues that agency is realized after the event; therefore, intentions are not necessarily integral to being an agent, as what makes you an agent is what happens (Reference Gell1998, 20). According to Gell, things can initiate causal events if they ‘disturb the causal milieu in such a way as can only be attributed to their agency’ (Gell Reference Gell1998, 20). Gell argues that things exercise social agency in such a way that they can be described as ‘secondary agents’ (Gell Reference Gell1998, 17–18, 20). Gell’s outline is often critiqued for forwarding a type of object agency that is distinctly human flavoured (Alberti and Bray Reference Alberti and Bray2009; Jones and Boivin Reference Jones, Boivin, Hicks and Beaudry2010; Knappett Reference Knappett, Knappett and Malafouris2008; Sillar Reference Sillar2009; Sørensen Reference Sørensen2016; Tung Reference Tung2014; Malafouris Reference Malafouris, Robb and Boric2008; Webmoor Reference Webmoor2007; Witmore Reference Witmore2014).

A different stance on object agency is outlined by Pétursdóttir, who highlights that things can do more than what we expect, and as things spend time without humans (she describes a drift-matter assemblage), they are not exclusively entangled in relations with humans – these ‘a-human’ circumstances often express an agency that surpasses human expectations (Reference Pétursdóttir2017, 178, 192). Pétursdóttir argues against ascribing intentionality to objects; rather, it is the capacities of things that ‘surpass our agendas’, and things can form ‘unexpected alliances’. It is in these senses that they exhibit agency (Reference Pétursdóttir2017, 193, 195). Sørensen sees parallels between Gell’s object agency and Symmetrical Archaeology in their shared presentation of objects as non-neutral; however, he contends that Symmetrical Archaeology ‘return[s] to the ordinary definition of agency’, where intentionality is not essential to agency, which is understood as an action or intervention (Reference Sørensen2016, 118).

I think the disconnect between Symmetrical Archaeology’s position on object agency and their readers’ perception that there is an inconsistency in their approach on this matter is due to the complexities of their ontological position not being clarified for their reader (in tandem with a use of language that at times toys with the poetic). Bryant’s ontic principle can help here. If we agree that second-wave Symmetrical Archaeology is committed to moving beyond anti-realist concepts, then these thinkers need to avoid pre-formulated concepts, especially those that seem to ‘normalize’ or create a false sameness (especially ones that simply reiterate human qualities, as seen in anthropomorphic forms of object agency; see Olsen Reference Olsen2012b, 102). Symmetrical Archaeology attempts to create conceptual space for things beyond human thought (and presence); thus, to breach the problem of correlationism, they articulate things via a flat ontology and focus on the capacities of materials (see Pétursdóttir Reference Pétursdóttir2017, 193; Sørensen Reference Sørensen2016, 120; Harris and Cipolla Reference Harris and Cipolla2017, 187). Similar to Bryant’s (Reference Bryant, Bryant, Srnicek and Harman2011) stance that every difference matters, and difference precedes knowledge, second-wave Symmetrical Archaeology explores ‘positive difference’ (Witmore Reference Witmore and Smith2020, 7). If second-wave Symmetrical Archaeology embraces the ontic principle, then there is consistency in their insistence that we should recognize things for their capacities, their ‘otherness’, and their differences, and this can be achieved without committing to any form of object agency.

An important issue with the agency of objects is that it is a form of interpretation, something Symmetrical archaeologists appear sceptical of (see Olsen et al. Reference Olsen, Shanks, Webmoor and Witmore2012); instead, they offer ‘suggestions’ (Witmore Reference Witmore and Smith2020, 7). Symmetrical Archaeology moves away from questions that ask what the thing means (therefore, avoiding representationalism) to questions that ask what the thing is (Witmore Reference Witmore and Smith2020, 2). Furthermore, according to their mode of engagement, the empirical description of the thing follows after the encounter (Olsen Reference Olsen2012b, 102; Pétursdóttir Reference Pétursdóttir2017, 196). Therefore, things are named after the event (via ex post facto articulation) rather than through culture-historic classifications that shape the archaeologist’s engagement before the encounter. The former focuses on differences; the latter (through the act of classification) draws together sameness. If we think further on this matter, looking for similarities means that the analyst approaches the subject of inquiry with preconceived ideas (apriority); by focusing on difference, autonomous different entities are encountered and knowledge follows on from this encounter (cf. Ion Reference Ion2018, 199; cf. Solli Reference Solli2012, 76).

Thinking with symmetrical archaeology

An example that helps us to think through the philosophical stances outlined in this paper can be found in the case of the archaeologist using an online archive to access data. The Science Museum Group is a non-departmental public body that functions in the UK public sector. It cares for an eclectic collection of 7.3 million items linked to science, technology, engineering, medicine, transport and media. In excess of 380,000 objects and archives are currently available to search on their online archive. ^{Footnote 9} The collection contains a diverse range of items, including photographic and space travel equipment, medical tools, vehicles (including a bullet train from Japan) and a variety of archaeological artefacts. It is an archive where a ‘Posset pot with lid’ dated 1701–1800 (A636300 ^{Footnote 10} ) might appear next to a 1990 ‘Plant pot made from recycled plastic’ (1991–265) in a search for ‘plant pot’.

In terms of the causal flow of an encounter with the archive, if I were to type into the search engine a word to anchor my engagement with the archive (such as ‘pin’, or ‘neolithic’), I would approach the online archive with preconceived ideas (a priori) and echo all types of archaeology that pattern and order data via the identification of sameness. Instead, for the purpose of this paper, I simulated the Symmetrical Archaeology approach to the archaeological endeavour (a posteriori) and utilized the ‘random object generator’, a feature unique to the archive which randomly selects and displays an item from the collection every 15 seconds (Unwin Reference Unwin2018). During my encounter with the online archive, the algorithm presented a Ferranti electronic connector (Y1996.10.438); Univex light marker (1992–113); specimen illustrating the ‘best selected’ process (1889–164/590); various endoscopes, cased, English, 1865 (A633707); and 0.2-inch composition punches (1995–1108/1345). The random object generator pulsated things onto the screen, one replaced by another and another. The exploration was random and mimicked the unknown aspect of the archaeological site, where agglomerations of materials are often propelled into (and met by) an unanticipated present and a surprised archaeologist (though, it should be noted that traditional archaeological practice permits a certain degree of positioning, in the sense that I could potentially position myself in relation to a site of a particular era). My particular archaeological interests (the Neolithic) were not found in the agglomeration of things I met, though the flow of things was similar to the aggregation of materials that emerge in drift-matter assemblages or ruin archaeology. Descriptive (naming) lists are utilized by Symmetrical Archaeologists to deal with the flow of things without succumbing to classification (Witmore Reference Witmore2014; Reference Witmore and Smith2020). Moving forward with my analysis, I stayed with the stream of objects I had encountered and went back to the online archive, spending time with each piece, looking for difference not sameness, making empirical observations, noting capacities and seeing if any of the things resisted ‘naming and classification’ (Olsen Reference Olsen2012a, 22).

Bryant’s observation of the ‘thereness of difference’ was certainly present; when thinking of things in the archive, we can imagine the thereness of difference between a recyclable plastic plant pot and an endoscope, and that this thereness is given irrespective of human presence. However, when considering the things that human bodies have touched and made – concepts and practices that have shaped, formed and worked with materials – it is hard not to account for the discursive practices entwined in the material phenomena (see Barad Reference Barad2007). One can meet a thing neutrally (or ‘impartially’) if one willingly suspends disbelief, but should archaeology succumb to such theatrics? I think not. Choosing to ignore the material-discursive practices that enabled and created the thing seems counter-intuitive to the archaeological endeavour (on the ‘concerned observer’, see Malafouris, Gosden and Bogaard Reference Malafouris, Gosden and Bogaard2021). The collection of things the random object generator displayed yielded information about the species that made them: the human. A living, breathing, complex material-discursive event entwined and present in the material entities that orbit the archive, gravitationally pulled into my present presence via the help of a search engine and an algorithm. Whilst bracketing the discourse in archaeology might yield an interesting thought experiment (akin to neo-pre-critical philosophy), bracketing the past (including past individuals and communities) – which is effectively what you are doing when you embrace Symmetrical Archaeology – is a challenging intellectual move. I contend that bracketing the past is an activity that opposes an essential motive for doing archaeology: to understand the past. In this paper, I have demonstrated that it is possible for the archaeologist to be unapologetically anti-theory and still embrace a set of principles without contradicting themselves if they subscribe to a particular mode of being. However, a position that creates thingly descriptions that rely on empirical observations and, therefore, operates under the illusion that the human senses are simply receptors (rather than mediators; see Classen Reference Classen1997, Howes and Classen Reference Howes, Classen and Howes1991, Rice Reference Rice2013) sustains a contradiction that remains to be addressed.