Karbala's Multiple Readings: Imam Husain and the Imamiya Mission in 1930s-1940s India
The martyrdom of the third Shi‘i Imam, Husain ibn ‘Ali, at the hands of the army of the ‘Umayyad Caliph Yazid on the plains of Karbala in 61ah is an event that has continued to inform and influence the lives of the world's Shi‘i peoples and societies. For South Asia, studies abound of Muharram, the ritualised commemorations of the martyrdom of Husain and his family. Its practices of mourning and sermonising have been portrayed as sectarian markers by which the Shi‘a have distinguished or even isolated themselves from other communities; or, conversely and perhaps slightly contradictorily, as part of a wider South Asian culture of cross-confessional religious participation within which the Indian Shi‘a have been able to abrogate their minority status.Footnote 1 However, the overwhelming focus in such studies upon the social location and ritual particulars of Muharram has meant that sometimes the actual ideas and meanings derived from Karbala have remained comparatively obscure.Footnote 2 As conveyed in Michael Fischer's highly influential work on Iranian Shi‘ism, the Karbala story has always existed not as a static message but as a ‘paradigm’, a highly adaptable construct able to absorb and project a variety of values and meanings depending on its contexts of transmission and reception.Footnote 3 Indeed, while different South Asian religious communities have always interpreted the message of Karbala with variant emphases, it is important to remember that the story of Imam Husain's martyrdom has always carried ‘multiple readings’ even within Shi‘ism itself.Footnote 4
This article is an attempt to focus on the esoteric meanings rather than exoteric expressions of the Karbala tragedy in South Asia, through a focus upon what one scholar has termed “Husainology”: the particular interpretation of the attributes assigned to the third Imam, and the basis of his significance for modern believers.Footnote 5 The focus here is the distinctive Husainology pioneered from the 1930s onwards by arguably the most influential Shi‘i scholar of twentieth-century South Asia: the mujtahid Sayyid ‘Ali Naqi Naqvi (1905–1988; often colloquially known as Naqqan Sahib). A descendant of the seminal ‘Khandan-i Ijtihad’ scholarly household of Lucknow comprised of the descendants of Dildar ‘Ali NasirabadiFootnote 6 , he is seen by many as South Asia's final great mujtahid. Spending much of his childhood in Iraq, and educated by many of the major scholars resident in Najaf during the 1920s, he established himself as a mujtahid of considerable public influence in Lucknow from around 1931. Over the next decade, he built up an organisation called the Imamiya Mission, which undertook widespread Shi‘i publishing and propagation. Profoundly resembling contemporaneous missionary movements in South Asia like the Tablighi Jama‘at and Hindu shuddhi movement in its language of dissemination both within and beyond its own community, it was among the most influential Shi‘i public associations of 1930s–1940s South Asia.Footnote 7
Making use of the organisation's extensive printing enterprises, ‘Ali Naqi became a prolific writer, and something of an equivalent to more heavily researched Sunni scholars such as Shibli Numani or Abu’l Hasan ‘Ali Nadwi, in his combination of clerical authority and his production of Urdu literature for a lay audience. Unusually for such a senior mujtahid, and revealing his aspirations towards public communication, ‘Ali Naqi wrote predominantly in Urdu, a fact that greatly enhanced the public reception and influence of his writings. His extensive inventory of publications, combined with his esteemed reputation as wa‘iz [sermoniser] in Lucknow both during and (atypically for a scholar of his stature) outside the period of Muharram commemorations, served to make ‘Ali Naqi one of the most visible and influential Shi‘i voices in South Asia in the decades both before and after independence.
Establishing himself as a young and fresh voice within Lucknow's clerical hierarchy before an emerging Muslim public, ‘Ali Naqi's works spanned subjects of religious instruction, law, history, biography (of both the Imams and later clerical luminaries), and social and economic development. Of these tracts, however, dozens were about, or alluded to, the ordeals of Husain and others at Karbala, and it is in this regard that he has perhaps become best known.Footnote 8 Broadly speaking, ‘Ali Naqi's Husainology was marked by several key features. One was its grounding in ‘authentic’ Arabic Traditions and other sources, something intended both to combat the alteration of the Karbala tale and also to satisfy claims to authenticity and veracity. Second was the attempt to assert Husain's ordeals and responses as part of a wider ethical paradigm, something that should inform all human actions rather than be recalled merely during the weeks of Muharram. And third, profoundly connected to the former, was the attempt to use the Karbala message as a tool for efforts at religious propagation (tablighi jad-va-jihad). This applied both to the Shi‘a themselves, but, crucially, it also entailed communicating the Karbala story to non-Shi‘as, both as a means of proselytisation and as a basis for dialogue between religious schools and traditions.
All of these features are acutely on view in the single-most comprehensive and influential of ‘Ali Naqi's writings on Imam Husain: Shahid-i Insaniyat [A martyr for humanity]. (The choice to translate the latter term as ‘humanity’ rather than ‘mankind’ is explained later). The work, which was compiled from many of his earlier tracts and sermons of the 1930s and so can be taken as a broadly representative aggregate of his thought, was intended to be a comprehensive and authoritative biography of the Imam. It was, moreover, deliberately produced as a ‘memorial’ (yadgar) to commemorate the 1,300th anniversary of the Karbala battle in 1361ah (falling in the Gregorian year of 1942). Written in accessible Urdu prose quite distinct from the Persianate character of much Lucknawi clerical writing, the text was also subsequently translated into several languages and republished in various parts of the subcontinent. Ultimately, Shahid-i Insaniyat has become perhaps ‘Ali Naqi's most popularly well-known and influential work, as well as one of the most influential Shi‘i writings of twentieth-century South Asia, as familiar and accessible to readers in Karachi, Hyderabad or Ahmedabad as in ‘Ali Naqi's native Lucknow. It therefore stands as the central focus of this article.
Focusing in particular, but not exclusively, upon ‘Ali Naqi's recasting of Imam Husain and the Karbala tragedy in the early 1940s, this article investigates ‘Ali Naqi's Husainology from three perspectives. The first section, which offers a detailed commentary on Shahid-i Insaniyat, examines the role of biographical writings in fashioning new constructs of selfhood and ethics, and hence in the making of a more temporally focused form of Shi‘ism based on a model of the demystification and moral perfection of the human condition. The second part examines the political project emerging from ‘Ali Naqi's Husainology in 1940s India, in which Husain's message was used as a basis both for covert anti-colonial protest and the articulation of a cosmopolitan politics closely aligned with the language of Indian nationalism. A third section assesses some of the legacies of ‘Ali Naqi's Husainology, assessing his key writings as a fulcrum around which questions of clerical leadership and, more recently, Iranian influence on the Indian Shi‘a, have been debated and contested.
A Martyr for Humanity: Shi‘ism and Selfhood in Shahid-i Insaniyat
The late nineteenth century onwards saw a powerful expansion, and evolution, of genres of biographical writing in India, for several reasons alongside the growing access to print. For one, the writing of lives became a laboratory for new ideas of selfhood emerging in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, ones that developed out of the encounter with Western thought, experiments with new literary genres and the fresh empowerment of individuals and new social groups.Footnote 9 Second, biographical writings became used as didactic media of instruction, with the use of ‘lives as lessons’ reflecting new senses of individual responsibility and duty placed upon communities of readers.Footnote 10 Finally, biographical writings became significant platforms for dialogue (both friendly and hostile) between those of different religious confessions. In other words, by penning ruminations on revered personages, scholars across religious traditions were able to speak in shared languages and ethical values, which could span the restrictions of the communitarian or institutional ‘paradigms of collectivity’ of organised religions.Footnote 11
‘Ali Naqi's Shahid-i Insaniyat, then, fits neatly into this established literary tradition of its time. Indeed, one may fruitfully compare the work to other, similarly influential, biographies of the key figures of Islamic history penned by influential scholars in the colonial period, among them Shibli Numani's seminal biographies of the Prophet and Caliph ‘Umar.Footnote 12 ‘Ali Naqi's account of Husain shared with Numani's works a number of features, including the choice of Urdu as medium; close attention to Arabic scriptures as a means of verifying authority; a focus on its subject's ethical perfections and worldly achievements; and the lauding of the contemporary relevance of the example to all believers. Certainly, there is little doubt that ‘Ali Naqi presented the work as having a similar level of authority and insurpassability to those prototypes. In his introduction, ‘Ali Naqi claimed to be compiling and synthesising a number of scattered, fragmented traditions relating to the Karbala tragedy. “If the unacquainted reader desires to know the historical facts and consequences and necessary details of the events of Karbala and the personality of Husain”, he writes in the introduction, “no single work exists by which they may all be known. The following work, on the 1300th anniversary of Karbala, has been written to address this need”.Footnote 13 This was, then, a complete account, superseding existing interpretations, and claiming its authenticity on the back of its heavy grounding in references to well-founded Traditions. It also seemed designed to satisfy, or perhaps recruit, a new readership, not least in its novel-like qualities, with long descriptions of key characters and rousing, drawn-out battle narratives.
Cover of modern edition of Shahid-i Insaniyat, complete with a portrait of ‘Ali Naqi Naqvi (courtesy of Mustafa Husain Asif Ja’isi, Lucknow).

What is most distinctive about the Husainology of ‘Ali Naqi's rendering? First, ‘Ali Naqi's Imam Husain is overwhelmingly a figure whose essence and message are defined in terms of his perfection of selfhood. Husain's selfhood, though, far from being conceived in the mystical, Sufi-influenced language of khudi that has dominated many academic studies of Muslim selfhood in South AsiaFootnote 14 , is instead conceived in the much more temporal language of shakhsiyat: individuality or human character. One of the book's longest chapters runs through Husain's personal attributes, complete with anecdotal illustration: among others, his independence (istiqlal), group organisation (jama‘ati tanzim), personal honour (‘izzat-i nafs), patience (sabir), bravery (shaja‘at), selflessness (isar), human empathy (insani hamdardi) and pacifism (aman pasandi).Footnote 15 The last in particular is a constantly featured trait: we are told throughout of his “devotion to peace” and his “lack of warlike purpose”.Footnote 16 Husain's significance lies not in military victories, which were always known to be impossible against Yazid's armies, but in his martyrdom and perfect self-sacrifice (qurbani), something that he sought with foreknowledge and a sense of destiny.Footnote 17
This move to considering Husain's importance as derived from his human attributes and strength of character rather than his divine constitution seems to reflect a wider trend among Muslim reformists from the late nineteenth century as part of a move towards more temporally focused ‘this-worldly’ forms of Islam which demanded worldly agency and correct action on the part of believers.Footnote 18 In this context, key archetypes of human behaviour were set down as models of accomplishment, figures to be actively emulated. Imam Husain, thus, becomes the model of the perfected human Self, and it is this that informs ‘Ali Naqi's constant emphasis on the contemporary relevance of the message: he is primarily significant not for his own seventh-century accomplishments but for the “moral and civilisational lessons” (akhlaqi aur tamaduni ta‘limat) set down for mankind in Karbala.Footnote 19 This was, moreover, a message to be received by women, as well as men.Footnote 20
Further compounding his status as moral exemplar, another major feature of ‘Ali Naqi's Husain was the complete absence of reference to Husain as intercessor or divine hero. Husain's mortal humanity was the work's dominant message. His sacrifice is predicated upon his human capacity for suffering, while never is he given any mystical qualities or intercessionary powers. This vision of Husain was certainly in contrast to many aspects of popular Shi‘ism in north India. While the worldly invocation of the Imams as charismatic intermediaries was maligned by many of the ‘ulama, who dismissed such practices as ‘Shaikhi’, Sufi or Hindu interpolations, it was commonplace for Muslims to pray to the Imams and their comrades as intercessors for the lifting of afflictions. Allusions to Husain's miraculous or intercessionary powers were also found in much South Asian Shi‘i writing of the period. Nineteenth-century Urdu marsiya compositions frequently embellished Husain with other-worldly charisma, addressing him with eulogising epithets such as “Lord of the World”, “Celestial King” and “Ruler of Creation”, all of which blurred the lines between humanity and divinity.Footnote 21 Other, lay-authored religious tracts documented popular beliefs in Husain's worldly interventions in the form of miracles, or in his presence in effigies of his tomb during Muharram, well into the twentieth century.Footnote 22 No such titles or deeds, though, are assigned in ‘Ali Naqi's work. Indeed, ‘Ali Naqi seems to have gone further than many authoritative renditions of Husain's martyrdom in his omission of any bonds between the celestial and worldly realms. One example is the absence within Shahid-i Insaniyat of any reference to direct communication between Husain and God during the former's prayer. Even such an unparalleled mujtahid as the Safavid-era scholar Muhammad Baqir Majlisi, in his authoritative seventeenth-century compilation of Shi‘i Traditions Bihar-ul-Anwar, had recorded the Prophet speaking to Husain before battle to assure him of his ultimate heavenly inheritance.Footnote 23 ‘Ali Naqi, though, omits any such reference from his own coverage of the story, and while Husain is depicted praying to God on numerous occasions on the eve of his martyrdom (with, on one occasion, his invocations and those of his followers sounding like “the humming of bees”), he receives no audible reply.Footnote 24
A useful typology for understanding this discrepancy between Husain's saintly and worldly constitutions is set by Mary Hegland's study of the changing perception of Husain's character in revolutionary Iran. Imam Husain, Hegland argues, has historically been interpreted through two “opposing ideologies”. First, “Husain as intercessor”, with his martyrdom being the basis of his status as God's witness (another meaning of the term shahid), giving him unique powers of intercession between man and God. This view underwrote beliefs in Husain's abilities to answer prayers, forgive sins and lift afflictions. Second, “Husain as exemplar”, by which his very human nature and ordeal is highlighted.Footnote 25 In practice, in both Iranian and Indian Shi‘ism, these two contrasting images of Husain have existed alongside each other, in careful balance. However, writings such as that of ‘Ali Naqi show a decisive move towards the latter. His demystified portrayal of Husain may compare to the well-documented “Protestantisation” of South Asian Sunni Islam in the modern period enacted by reformists such as those of the Deobandi or Ahl-i Hadis movements, whose rejection of shrine worship and ideas of the intercession of saints have been depicted as inculcating a fresh, this-worldly orientation. Indeed, one might speculate as to whether ‘Ali Naqi's demystified presentation of Husain may represent an early and influential precedent to the ‘Shi‘i Wahhabism’ which was to emerge in South Asia several decades later, one that denigrated popular emphasis on the divine qualities of the Imams, though of course directed towards a very different purpose.Footnote 26
If the establishment of Husain's character as a moral lesson for mankind was one of the core purposes of ‘Ali Naqi's text, then this promotion of Husain as exemplar for all humanity further necessitated a distancing from the exclusive, aristocratic social milieu in Lucknow within which Shi‘ism had often been contained. In Awadh, Shi‘ism had long been associated largely with rural landowning gentries and the Lucknawi service nobility, most of whom claimed direct descent from the Imams as sayyids. The leading roles of these sayyids in many cultural manifestations of the Karbala tragedy, from their patronage of Muharram functions to the courtly style of many gatherings for the recitation of majlis sermons, tended to reflect, or even cement, their ongoing status as the social and religious leaders of Shi‘ism. Little such social exclusivity or sayyid preferentialism is visible in ‘Ali Naqi's Husain. Particularly instructive here is a chapter discussing the roots of Husain's perfections. Good human character, ‘Ali Naqi argues, is created by three elements: “traditions of noble ancestry” (buzurgon ke qadim rivayat); one's circumstances, education and condition (mahwal, ta‘alim, tarbiyat); and third, one's “life-changing experiences” (zindagi ke ahem tajurba). While Husain's family distinctions were beyond question, ‘Ali Naqi argues, his character also reflected “mankind's highest morals and attributes” (insan ke akhlaq va ausaf), while “the adversarial experiences in his own life. . . gave him a character of strength, prudence and free-thinking” (pukhtakari, tadabur, istiqlal).Footnote 27 As well as making Husain a model for all human behaviour, then, such writings may well have carried a quiet critique of those aspects of lived Shi‘i cultural observance which often exhibited an attachment to sayyid cultural norms. They opened Husain's message not only to the leading sayyids but, significantly, to all of his followers (mominin).
A final, and important, central feature of ‘Ali Naqi's Husainology was the attempt to universalise Husain's message beyond the Shi‘a themselves, to all of humankind. In the introduction, using language echoed throughout the text, he stresses that “all the people of the world (dunyai’e insaniyat), all of its faiths and communities” (mazhab-va-millat ke afrad) can agree with the “presence of righteousness, justice and truth” (haq, insaf, sacha’i) in the message of Karbala.Footnote 28 The idea of such values inherent within Husain's martyrdom as being common (mushtarakih) to all religions is one that appears throughout the text. This take on Husain's lessons is particularly significant, for it eschews more ‘sectarian’ incantations, which asserted that the Shi‘a alone were the custodians and beneficiaries of Husain's revelation, in favour of a broader ecumenism that reaches out to other religious communities. Certainly this helps to explain why the text is largely free from the themes of munazara (religious disputation) apparent in many Shi‘i and other clerical tracts of the period.Footnote 29 But it also comprised an audacious statement on Shi‘a–Sunni unity, with the text defining the term of “Muslim” simply to refer to one who ascribes to the moral values and lessons of Husain, and hence implicitly using his message as a basis for cross-sectarian dialogue. This was, of course, an especially bold message in 1940s Lucknow. With some contemporary Sunni maulvis claiming that praise of the Sunni Caliphs (madh-i sahaba) should be conducted during Muharram, and some Shi‘a counter-advocating the cursing of the Sunni Caliphs (tabarra) as an important part of commemorating Husain, the pre-independence decade probably marked the all-time nadir in Shi‘a–Sunni relations in ‘Ali Naqi's home city.Footnote 30 ‘Ali Naqi's Husainology, in this context, appeared to contradict the more sectional tendencies associated with many contemporaneous ‘ulama, and more closely echoed the efforts of twentieth-century non-clerical intellectuals (like Iqbal or ‘Ali Shari‘ati, as discussed below) in his attempts to freely explore the more universal, expansive nature of Husain's message, unfettered by the constraints of clerical polemicism.
An important part of this attempt to promote inner-Islamic unity is the text's assignment of responsibility for Husain's death to the whims of individual, illegitimate Caliphs rather than the institution of the Caliphate itself. At one point, for instance, ‘Ali Naqi turns to the beliefs of “most Muslims” in the institution of the Caliphate, and distinguishes the “rightly guided Caliphate” of the first four Caliphs (khilafat-i rashidah – it is indeed significant that a Shi‘i scholar is willing to apply these words) from the so-called savage regime (mulk-i ‘azooz) of Mu‘awiya, Yazid and some of their successors, whose rule was marked by illegitimacy, decadence and drunkenness.Footnote 31 Without quite sanctioning the legitimacy of the Caliphate, such an argument nevertheless alludes to common ground in Shi‘i and Sunni values, and by confining criticism to individual Caliphs and officers, he perhaps relieves the earlier Sunni Caliphs and their followers from answerability for the later actions of the ‘Umayyad rulers.
‘Ali Naqi's Husainology, then, was in many ways as revolutionary as the figure it described. In effect, it appeared to speak simultaneously to audiences at different levels. Looking beyond Shi‘ism to humanity as a whole, ‘Ali Naqi's telling sought to refresh and popularise Husain's message, promoting awareness of Imam Husain's sacrifice as an embodiment of an ethical ideal common to all religions. Meanwhile, the tract actually carried various implications for belief and practice within Shi‘ism itself. Within its message were a number of veiled criticisms of features of popular Shi‘ism as lived in India, among them its beliefs in intercession and divination; its proclivities for elitist or aristocratic social settings; its tendencies towards sectional understandings of Husain's message and polemical tellings of Karbala; and the obscurantism of many of the ‘ulama.
According to ‘Ali Naqi, Husain's aim was “not to launch a material war to defeat Yazid”, which would have been militarily impossible but instead to “inaugurate a spiritual revolution” (zahni inqilab), one with perhaps three key aspects.Footnote 32 First was the role of Husain's message in exposing truth and preordaining the historical justice of the collapse of the ‘Umayyad Caliphate. Second was the propagation (tabligh) of an eternal example to all Muslims, establishing the true message of Islam. Connected with both of these was his establishment of a model for perfect human behaviour and ethical piety: all Muslims were obliged to emulate Husain's struggle against injustice in all its forms. ‘Ali Naqi firmly established Husain as a figure to be imitated rather than invoked, and his message as one to be shared rather than guarded. However, in a context as charged as that of 1940s north India, his perspective on Imam Husain as an enlightened revolutionary and fighter against oppression could readily be applied by others in more acutely political manifestations.
Husain Day, 1942: Shi‘ism and the Politics of Quitting India
The application of Imam Husain to forms of political resistance was nothing new in South Asia. Shi‘i languages of martyrology had crept into anti-colonial mobilisations in Awadh as early as 1857.Footnote 33 From the 1900s, but especially by the 1930s, a number of writers and poets, among them Muhammad ‘Ali, Muhammad Iqbal and Josh Malihabadi, were evoking the Karbala tragedy, with distinct recourse to the more political elements of Husain's struggle, as a metaphor for the ongoing existential battle between righteousness and iniquity.Footnote 34 For Iran, the recasting of Imam Husain's message as an incitement to political revolution – contradicting the use of the Karbala paradigm in legitimising the Qajar regime for much of the nineteenth century – has been widely noted for key political moments. The Tobacco Concession protests (1891–1892), the Constitutional Revolution (1905–1906), and perhaps most significantly, the stoking of opposition to the regime of the Shah in the 1960s–1970s, have all been conceived as reinterpreting Husain's struggle against injustice as one vindicating active revolution against oppressive rulers in contemporary times.Footnote 35
As argued above, ‘Ali Naqi's opus was concerned primarily with establishing Husain's worldly relevance and his status as a model for the perfected Muslim self, and contained little in the way of explicit exhortation to direct political action. Indeed, ‘Ali Naqi has sometimes been interpreted as being apolitical, perhaps on account of the absence from his thought of an agenda of political Islamisation, and the recognition of the idea of India as a secular, pluralist nation-state which flows through his writings. He was, though, also well known as a scholar keen to engage concerns and themes of contemporary relevanceFootnote 36 , and so his writings often carried implicit political connotations that could lend themselves to more explicit applications. Reflecting the proclivity of many Muslim intellectuals by the early twentieth century to draw from national and transnational political ideas from beyond the Islamic traditionFootnote 37 , ‘Ali Naqi's Shahid-i Insaniyat seemed at key junctures to allude to apparently constitutional and political terminology and rhetoric. Take, for example, the following passage: “Islam preached a message of liberty (hurriyat), equality (musawat) and fraternity (insani biradari) and, for the first time in history, it endowed upon mankind the message of civil and human rights (shehri aur insani huqooq); from this can be created the articles of community or nationhood (qaumiyat), which can vanquish all poverty and misfortune”.Footnote 38 Not only do we seem to have a vernacular rendition of the French revolutionary vocabulary that informed the liberal rhetoric of many Indian nationalists,Footnote 39 but we also see the application of the languages of rights, citizenship and nationalism which were circulating in more formal political arenas.
An overtly political application for Shahid-i Insaniyat in 1940s India was developed by a local religious anjuman (association) called the Yadgar-i Husaini, one closely associated personally with ‘Ali Naqi and his family. The organisation, which throughout the 1930s had engaged primarily with the management of Muharram rites and majlis gatherings in ‘Ali Naqi's family Ghufran-i Maab imambara, by the beginning of the 1940s turned its attention to promoting the commemoration of Husain upon the 1,300th anniversary of his martyrdom. Soon before this anniversary, the organisation established what it called a “Husain Day Committee”, with the aim of organising a public event for rumination upon Husain's modern significance. Taking its lead from Shahid-i Insaniyat, the organisation's aim was to reach out across religious boundaries, and the committee itself was comprised of a number of Shi‘i, Hindu and a few Sunni professionals, mostly Lucknawi lawyers and journalists.Footnote 40 Establishing the plan to hold “Husain Day” as a large three-day public event in Lucknow on 16–18 August of that year, the intention was to invite speakers and politicians of local and national reputation to offer speeches reflecting upon Husain's message, emphasising particularly his significance as an icon for all of humanity.
No explicit statement was made that this occasion was to be anything but a cultural event promoting cross-religious dialogue, but nevertheless all of those approached to speak at the event were senior figures from India's political life. Showing the breadth of political consensus sought around the meaning of Karbala, those receiving invitations included Nehru, Gandhi, Abu’l Kalam Azad and many other national and provincial Congress leaders, senior UP Muslim League politicians such as Muhammad Isma‘il Khan and Liaquat ‘Ali Khan (interestingly, no invitation for Jinnah), Sikander Hayat Khan of the Unionist Party, the president of the Theosophical Society and senior officials of princely states such as Bahawalpur and Hyderabad.Footnote 41 Predictably, such senior statesmen did not attend, but more minor public figures did contribute to the event and loyally rendered the event's central message of Husain's universal relevance. Such can be seen in the presidential address of Raja Maheshwar Dayal Seth of Kotra, a politician active in both UP landed politics and the Hindu Mahasabha, and one of the Husain Day Committee's most high-profile members. In his opening presidential address, he spoke of “the fundamental unity underlying the great religions of the world”, using this to claim that religious antagonism could never be justified.Footnote 42 ‘Ali Naqi's own presidential speech, ruminating again on the role of Husain as a common icon for Muslims, Christians, Hindus and others, again seemed to simply condense the central message of his own literary endeavours.Footnote 43
The activities and rallies planned for Husain Day were supervised by a band of uniformed activists (karkanan) who seemed to be inspired by a number of other Muslim volunteer movements emerging in 1930s–1940s north India, whether UP's Tanzim movement, the Punjabi-origin Khaksar and Majlis-i Ahrar movements or the Frontier's Khuda’i Khitmatgars. Indeed, even their uniforms – starred red badges (pictured) and white belts marked with the insignia of Husain's sword – seemed to be part of a wider purpose of seeking cross-religious participation. Forfeiting the traditional Shi‘i black iconography of mourning for imagery more openly valorous and triumphant, this colour scheme was more accommodating of Sunni and Hindu understandings of Husain's significance.
Design for the red badges worn by Husain Day members and volunteers, 1942 (courtesy of Mustafa Husain Asif Ja’isi, Lucknow)

In other ways, this novel forum for the memorialisation of Husain allowed equally experimental forms of dialogue between religious confessions. Particularly interesting was the attempt by a number of Hindu speakers at the events to ground the Karbala message within a Hindu context of meaning. One, Pandit Chandurkar Prasad, claimed that Husain was an “ultimate model for human agency” (insani qawwat) comparable to the role of luminaries like Krishna, Ram or Gautam Buddha in other traditions; though, according to this speaker, he was distinct from these in never claiming to be godly himself.Footnote 44 Another, Pandit Ram Charan Vidhyarti, compared Husain's personal qualities with the perfect model of behaviour laid down in Swami Dayanand's Satyarth Prakash [The light of truth], the founding work of the Hindu reformist organisation the Arya Samaj, first published in 1875. The qualities of righteousness, justice, compassion and worldly action, he argues, are much the same; the only difference being that Dayanand described these qualities as being “inseparable from dharma”, a claim disproven by Husain.Footnote 45 Another speaker, representing the Achhut [Untouchable] Conference, described Husain as a model of compassion for the oppressed.Footnote 46 All of these contributions apparently sat in an intermediate space between religious dialogue (taqrib) and, perhaps, confutation (munazara). They could be seen, and were presented, as building unity between Hindu and Muslim understandings; but at the same time, all appeared, in these references to contentious themes like idolatory, Arya reformism and casteism, to make capital out of existing controversies within Hinduism itself.
A further feature of the Husain Day Committee of great significance – and one that it was itself forced to admit – was that the body, despite its declared wishes to span the political spectrum, was dominated by local members of the Indian National Congress.Footnote 47 This apparent overlap may reflect a frequent political alignment between the north Indian Shi‘a and Congress, based largely around the former's apprehensive attitude towards the All India Muslim League.Footnote 48 Moreover, and perhaps more significantly, it may also reflect a close confluence of ‘Ali Naqi's reading of Husain – not as an icon merely for the Shi‘a but as an exemplar for all humanity – and the cross-communal, incorporative political aspirations of many Congress nationalists. Indeed, the hints at cross-confessional dialogue in Shahid-i Insaniyat were more explicitly evident in a public forum during Husain Day, when Imam Husain was obviously held up as a suitable icon for a unitary nationalism.
It was by fate rather than design that the dates selected earlier in the year for Husain Day would happen to fall in the centre of the Quit India movement, a moment that saw not just the mass imprisonment of much of India's senior nationalist leadership but the most extensive public anti-governmental dissent in years. That Husain Day in the end materialised not as the great gathering of national political figureheads as had been intended, but instead as a relatively modest event sporting only minor public figures, was attributed by the committee to the specific events of this month: political turbulence, incarceration of politicians, restrictions on travel and heavy monsoon rains. On the other hand, this coincidental timing perhaps allowed Husain Day to take on a particular significance that it otherwise may not have enjoyed, as a covert forum for anti-colonial protest. With the municipal government having given permission for the events, right down to the minutiae of facilitating transportation convoys and granting permission for poster displays and the use of loudspeakers, the functions were able to go ahead. Speeches evoking Husain's struggle against the tyranny and oppression of unjust leaders, issued by local Congress activists – clear political statements in all but name – thus went ahead at a moment representing the very height of restrictions on formal political activity.Footnote 49 Recitations of Josh Malihabadi's politicised verse on Karbala, and the presentation by lesser poets of new verse arguing defiantly for the replacement of the regime of “Yazidiyat” with that of “Husainiyat”,Footnote 50 carried an obvious contemporary message that nevertheless remained uncensored by government restrictions.
Perhaps just as useful for understanding the multifarious political applications of the Karbala paradigm in 1940s India were the declarations of support sent to the Yadgar-i Husaini by those various nationalist politicians who were invited to the event but did not attend. Predictably, such figures were usually those of the highest stature, and the different shades of interpretation of Husain's significance visible in their declarations mirror the subtle discrepancies of thought among India's key nationalist politicians. So, for instance, Abu’l Kalam Azad emphasised Husain's message of action, seeing his message as an exhortation “to fight and die” and to refuse to surrender to “despotism and tyranny”, perhaps reflecting his own experiments with ideas of jihad.Footnote 51 Gandhi's interpretation, meanwhile, rather contrarily emphasised “not the sword [but]. . . the sacrifice” of Husain, who “accepted death and the torture of thirst”.Footnote 52 Such an interpretation, of course, recast Shi‘i martyrology in a frame somewhat closer to Gandhian notions of pacifism and civil disobedience, and highlighted the close parallels between ‘Ali Naqi's Husainology, which endlessly stressed themes of devotion to peace and self-sacrifice, and a Gandhian model of satyagraha.Footnote 53 Nehru, meanwhile, took a different angle, emphasising how gatherings held in commemoration of Husain, such as Husain Day as well as annual Muharram observances, “gathered together people of differing faiths, or people of no particular religious persuasion. . . we could all join together in friendship and comradeship”.Footnote 54 Such words seemed to hint at the vision of a cosmopolitan, assimilative India that would, a couple of years later, be evoked within Nehru's own jail-authored autobiographical meditations on India's character.Footnote 55 These examples illustrate the existence of various discrepancies in the readings of Husain's significance by Indian nationalists, who were thus able to mould the Karbala message in such a way as to reinforce their own particular interpretations and methods of nationalist thought and action.
Despite rather under-reaching its own lofty ambitions, the occasion of Husain Day was nevertheless declared to represent a “brotherhood of humanity” (insaniyat ki biradari) whose crowds, gathered in Lucknow's Qaiserbagh Baradari to honour the values of truth, sincerity and freedom, resembled Husain's original followers on the hot plains of Karbala.Footnote 56 The event itself, and in particular its somewhat accidental but equally fortuitous placing of Husain's martyrdom at the heart of the Quit India movement, remains significant for several reasons. First, its activities show the continuation of an established, though often overlooked, tradition in the Awadh region of using Husain as an inspiration for political protest, one going back as far as the 1857 Rebellion. Second, for all that has been said about Congress's flirtation with an inescapably Hindu political language in late-colonial north India,Footnote 57 here we have a local Congress forum, made up of Hindus as well as Shi‘i and Sunni Muslims, communicating through an explicitly Islamicate idiom of political protest right into the 1940s. Third, and connected with this point, was the Husain Day Committee's apparent binding of the political notion of satyagraha, the Gandhian idea of purposeful and enlightened self-sacrifice, with the deliberate and foreknown shahadat (martyrdom) of Husain. A distinctly Shi‘i idiom of martyrdom, thereby, was co-opted into a Congress-led nationalist language of self-sacrifice and civil disobedience.Footnote 58 The application of Shi‘i martyrology as a tool of ‘state-making’ has been well documented for, say, post-1979 Iran,Footnote 59 but perhaps here we actually see a comparable usage in pre-independence India, with the clear incorporation of the Karbala paradigm within the rhetoric and methodology of a late-colonial Indian nationalism.
Thirst, Redemption and Revolution: The Afterlives of ‘Ali Naqi's Husainology, from 1940s India to 1970s Iran
Ultimately, so bold was ‘Ali Naqi's rendition of the Karbala tragedy that this book would become just as famous for the controversies it elicited, and the divergent uses to which is has been put, as for its original message. In this section, we turn to the text's quite unpredictable afterlife in the several decades after its original appearance, with reference both to South Asia and also to revolutionary Iran.
Shahid-i Insaniyat became open to intense confutation almost as soon as it was published. For ‘Ali Naqi's opponents, his ecumenical Husainology and attempt to reach out beyond the Shi‘i community meant that the text was marked by an understatement, perhaps even a denial, both of the atrocities of the Sunni Caliphs, and of the sufferings of Husain and his comrades. Both such features were felt to dilute the central message of Husain's ordeal.Footnote 60 Two claims in the text, in particular, were chanced upon, and became the immediate focus for this wider debate. One was his perhaps implied pardoning of the first three Sunni Caliphs from complicity in Husain's death, as discussed above. Second, and the statement receiving most attention from his detractors, was his claim that in the days preceding the battle on 10th Muharram, when Yazid's armies prevented Husain and his family from reaching the river, some of Husain's comrades did manage to evade the guards and “succeeded in bringing water for Husain”.Footnote 61 Such a statement, perhaps included to demonstrate the unfailing loyalty of Husain's comrades, was seen by ‘Ali Naqi's critics as underplaying a central pillar of Husain's sufferings – his thirst – and hence compromising the depth of his sacrifice.
The argument that emerged about this statement was a lesson in the ever fractious, complex clerical milieu of Lucknow. It was apparently stoked by a number of zakirs and ‘ulama in Lucknow, many of whom were connected to the Tanzeem-ul-Mominin, a Shi‘i activist group that had recently played a leading role in Indian political life. A number, it is said, published defamations of ‘Ali Naqi and the Yadgar-i Husaini association with which he was linked, in Shi‘i newspapers such as Sarfaraz. Some, it seems, accused ‘Ali Naqi not just of inaccuracy, but of practising a kind of ‘taqiya’: a concealment or denial of what is specifically Shi‘i, in his attempting to reach out to those of other confessions.Footnote 62 ‘Ali Naqi's supporters, meanwhile, were quick to brand his opponents as “self-important” (khud-sakta) maulvis, ill-versed in their religion and “doing the work of Yazid” in their sowing of divisions within the Muslim community.Footnote 63 So intense were the rows surrounding the book that in 1945 the Raja of Mahmudabad, north India's most influential Shi‘i landowner and politician, convened a meeting of the opposing parties at his property, facilitating an agreement to recall the publication and make appropriate amendments to the text. The row nevertheless endured. Not only was ‘Ali Naqi banned from attendance at the congregations of major Shi‘i organisations like the All India Shi‘a Conference, but over subsequent decades several maulvis in Bombay, Hyderabad and Lucknow penned pathos-laden ruminations on the unalleviated thirst of Husain, in explicit retort to ‘Ali Naqi's account.Footnote 64
Quite aside from the claims that initially sparked the row, the whole episode also reveals the extent to which such distinctions of opinion cannot be separated from the alternative issue of sheer competition for influence within Lucknow's intricate Shi‘i clerical hierarchy. The allegation is frequently heard that the row was engineered by particular clerical families in response to the young ‘Ali Naqi's quick ascendance to the status of north India's most publicly influential mujtahid. Of particular significance here was the mujtahid Muhammad Naseer, son and successor of one of South Asia's great Shi‘i luminaries, Nasir Husain ‘Abaqati. Having recently assumed the role of the leading mujtahid of the ‘Abaqati clerical family following his father's death in 1942, Muhammad Naseer is often claimed to have manufactured the row in an attempt to strengthen the ailing profile of himself and his household against ‘Ali Naqi's expanding celebrity.Footnote 65 True or not, the consequence has been that north Indian Shi‘i clerical opinion in the decades after independence has often been informally described as divided into the respective ‘Abaqati and Naqvi factions. Of these, each side adheres to the Husainology of one of 1940's Lucknow's two most influential scholars; and, correspondingly, to a more exclusivist or ecumenical approach to relations with Sunni Muslims respectively.
While these arguments festered in India, a further and perhaps surprising legacy of Shahid-i Insaniyat has been its apparent synergy with the version of the Karbala paradigm promulgated in revolutionary Iran. The book quickly appeared in Farsi translation and has circulated widely in Qom and Tehran as well as South Asia. It is an (albeit questionable) argument heard frequently in contemporary Lucknow that, since Rohullah Khomeini's family roots lay in Awadh,Footnote 66 he was particularly attentive to ideas and influences coming from Lucknawi Shi‘ism, and the close ties between ‘Ali Naqi and Khomeini's interpretations of Karbala are cited as evidence of the former's undeclared influence upon the latter. Indeed, there are doubtlessly striking similarities between the Husainology of ‘Ali Naqi and that of Khomeini and associated revolutionary rhetoricians. First, Khomeini's evocation in various speeches of Imam Husain in the 1970s as the enlightened self, one significant less for his saintly qualities and more for the temporal message of the triumph of selfhood and justice over doubt and adversity.Footnote 67 Second, Khomeini's focus on Husain as revolutionary, actively resisting tyranny and oppression, and hence a figure to be actively invoked in worldly action. Third, and perhaps most striking, was Khomeini's attempt to use Husain as a unitary bridge to construct a cross-confessional Shi‘a-Sunni entente (taqrib), and hence to bring about a global Muslim unity. Indeed, Khomeini's declared desire to “export” Iran's revolution to the global umma in the 1980sFootnote 68 rested to a degree upon the application of an ecumenical interpretation of Imam Husain that bore close resemblance to that used by ‘Ali Naqi forty years earlier to forge unity among India's cross-confessional populations.
Regardless of the veracity of the claim that ‘Ali Naqi's Husainology directly influenced Iranian revolutionary thought, the claim's very existence offers clear evidence of how, far from blindly following their counterparts in Iran or Iraq, the Indian Shi‘a have perpetually conceived themselves as developing their own religious traditions and literatures in situ, and as having meaningful influence upon religious thought and leadership in the wider Shi‘i world.Footnote 69 Furthermore, this retrospective association within modern India of ‘Ali Naqi's ideas with revolutionary Iranian Husainology has perhaps made his depiction of Husain all the more contentious. For the Shi‘a in India, as in Pakistan, the question over whether to regard the Ayatollahs of Iran or the mujtahids of Iraq as ultimate spiritual exemplars and political guides has become one of the most contentious debates of recent decades, with major Indian clerics having been widely, and simplistically, pigeonholed as followers either of Khomeini and his successors at Qom, or of Abu’l-Qasim al-Khu’i and his successors at Najaf.Footnote 70 It so happens that some later members of ‘Ali Naqi's Khandan-i Ijtihad clerical lineage, and other maulvis linked to them, have been more associated with the former, and the apparent confluence of ‘Ali Naqi's and Khomeini's Husainology is often informally cited as evidence of this apparent alliance.
We see, then, how Shahid-i Insaniyat’s afterlife has been complex and contentious. At first, an apparently trivial remark relating to Husain's thirst became a focus for competing claims to supremacy among Lucknawi scholarly families. Later, since the 1980s, the text has become embroiled within a parallel debate over the status of Iran and Iraq as competing poles of spiritual leadership for global Shi‘ism, and their relevance within India. But running through both of these sagas is a roughly comparable, and unresolved, question: that of the appropriateness of the dissemination of Husain's message beyond the Shi‘i community. Some, like ‘Ali Naqi (and for that matter Khomeini, ‘Ali Shari‘ati and most other Iranian revolutionary ideologues) have pursued more ecumenical perspectives on the Karbala message, seeking common ground within and beyond the global umma based on a shared moral vision of a righteous revolution against tyrannical despotism. Others have favoured a more exclusivist, maybe even sectarian trajectory of reading Karbala, less willing to compromise Shi‘ism's distinctive reading of Husain's ordeals and the belief in the custody of the tradition by the Shi‘a alone. It is perhaps the depth of these debates, rather than any individual claim within Shahid-i Insaniyat itself, which has ensured the text's enduring controversy.
Conclusions: Husain and Humanity
This article has shown how, drawing from an inherent flexibility and adaptability embedded within the Karbala paradigm, ‘Ali Naqi was able to formulate from the 1930s to the 1940s a distinctive Husainology that has since been endlessly influential within, and arguably beyond, South Asia. At its heart lay a fresh construct of Imam Husain's selfhood built around his worldly agency rather than intercessionary powers, and a message of temporal action that meant he was a figure to be emulated rather than merely commemorated. Equally, and perhaps most significant about this work, was the attempt to open Husain's significance to all of humanity, breaking not only the social sayyid-mominin (leaders and followers) distinctions within Shi‘ism as lived in north India but reaching out externally to other Muslim and non-Muslim communities. The organisation of the “Husain Day”, linked to but also existing independently of ‘Ali Naqi's literary endeavours, highlighted the political insinuations to be drawn from his work on shahadat, which at particular historic junctures seemed to find intellectual touchpoints with political protest movements, including at first Gandhian satyagraha, and later the Iranian revolution.
Perhaps the conceptual core for understanding ‘Ali Naqi's Husainology is his notion, and frequent evocation, of the idea of insaniyat. Like the English word “humanity” in its post-Enlightenment usage, insaniyat in ‘Ali Naqi's writing carried a similar array of meanings and insinuations. It conveyed at once two points about Husain's message: its sense of individual moral perfection and compassion, and its universal relevance to all of mankind in a way that transcended creed and culture. It is notable, also, that similar ideas of insaniyat were being simultaneously evoked by Muslim intellectuals across the spectra of persuasions and politics. Sayyid Qutb, for instance, would within a decade or two of ‘Ali Naqi's experiments be using insaniyat with a similar dual meaning, to denote both an “ethical” vision of personal moral accomplishment, and also the sense of that message being “universally human”.Footnote 71 Recent scholarship on modern Islamic political thought, meanwhile, has equally emphasised how the rubric of “humanity” has been used by an array of modern orators as a means of transgressing exclusively Islamic theological bounds, and universalising their claims within a global framework of reference and communication.Footnote 72 The language of insaniyat, then, is one that reveals ‘Ali Naqi's proclivity for experimenting with social and political ideas of global currency, many of which were being simultaneously applied by Islamic intellectuals across the spectrum in very different, and equally innovative, ways.
In addition to its tremendous influence in South Asian Shi‘ism, the book's further legacy has been one of abject controversy. It has been used as a platform to debate not only contemporary religious authority among the Indian Shi‘a but also the meanings of Husain's sufferings, the appropriateness of the dissemination of the Karbala story, the suitability of shahadat as political message and also the relevance of Iranian models of Husainology for the South Asian Shi‘a. While associations with such debates have doubtless added to the text's controversy, they have also further ensured its fame and durability. Indeed, the contestations generated by this text simply further affirm a clear and ongoing reality: that regardless of the efforts of ‘Ali Naqi or any of a number of other twentieth-century Shi‘i scholars to document a final and authoritative rendition of Imam Husain's life, the Karbala story remains a thing of multiple meanings and heterogeneity, whether in or beyond South Asia.
