Concepts such as ‘whole-of-government’, ‘comprehensive’ and ‘joined-up approaches’ have turned into a mantra among many governments and international organisations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the European Union. In short, these ideas refer to a normative and practical challenge that many international interventions encounter. Is it possible to advance both security and development objectives by improving linkages between policy fields, such as foreign, security, trade and development policy in terms of strategy-building and actors – and what are the consequences thereof? Over the past two decades or so it is particularly the African continent that has emerged as one of the testing grounds for tackling this ‘security-development nexus’.

In the aftermath of 9/11, the US administration has aimed at better links between a wide range of trade, development and security initiatives. Initiatives, such as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, aimed at preventing the emergence of terrorist safe havens in weakly governed states or in areas with reduced government control. When the US AFRICOM became operational in 2008, it was the first US military command that actively sought to integrate significant planning and policy capabilities, and personnel from other governmental agencies such as USAID and the Department of State.

This edited volume provides a compelling analysis and authoritative assessment of these institutional innovations and policy initiatives, singling out the USA's role in forging comprehensiveness in military, foreign and development policy. The contributors to this well-organised book provide cutting-edge insights into various cases of e.g. US security reform assistance and maritime security in Africa. In addition to these case studies, the authors also address fundamental questions regarding the interface of security and development policy, in particular with respect to accountability, legitimacy and civilian-military interoperability. The editor meticulously sets the stage in a focused introduction and provides well-informed conclusions and recommendations at the end.

All contributions – a challenging task which only a very few edited volumes come to master – are superbly tied together by first exploring the operation of these programmes located comfortably within the ‘security-development nexus’ and second contemplating the role and place of the US military. Ultimately, the contributions find that only a few of the programmes have been successful, with the overall performance of AFRICOM being described as mixed at best. Ultimately, the Command has reverted into a more traditional combatant command in the aftermath of the violent conflict in Libya. Given the analytical strength of the volume, one would have desired to learn more about the micro-level of the interagency experiment undertaken with AFRICOM – taking for instance a more sociological or organisational theory perspective and exploring the cross-fertilisation of knowledge and expertise (or lack thereof) between staff from different agencies in some more depth. This could have made the book – perhaps in conjunction with a broader discussion of similar approaches in other militaries –, even more relevant and pertinent to a broader audience. Still, this book is highly recommendable for all students of US military policy vis-à-vis Africa and those interested in the practical as well as theoretical dimensions of the security-development nexus.