In Emerson's Liberalism, Neal Dolan seeks to reclaim Ralph Waldo Emerson from critics and scholars, dating from Emerson's first biographers in the 1880s, who construe his political ideas in overly narrow and anachronistic ways. Dolan identifies and then dismisses the major misconceptions about Emerson's politics. Emerson is not an anarchic individualist, an unworldly introvert, or a trickster pragmatist who, in the words of Harold Bloom, exulted in a “cheerfully amoral dialectics of power” (8). Indeed, according to Dolan, Emerson is less the “father of American pragmatism” (7)—a phrase coined by Richard Poirer that still resonates after twenty years—than the offspring of two elemental and contrary forces in antebellum New England. On the one hand, the mystical awareness of Puritanism (as the scion of a family of Protestant clergy, it was a veritable birthright for Emerson), and on the other, the tough-minded empiricism of the Enlightenment. In Dolan's view, Emerson combined these paradoxical strains of New England life in his political role as a “preacher of liberal culture” (1). Emerson's liberalism is thus less that of a pioneering philosopher or far-seeing prophet than a literary evangelist. And in this engagingly argued and well-researched study, Dolan ably demonstrates why we should reconsider the significance of Emerson's self-ordained mission to serve as an explicator, and even celebrant, of liberal ideas in midcentury America.
Dolan organizes his study around nine chapters that take core liberal concepts as their title and guide, such as “Progress,” “Property,” “Limited Government,” “Natural Rights,” “Empiricism,” “Liberty, Commerce.” Within these chapters, Dolan analyzes a selection of Emerson's writings drawn from a span of forty years, including the infrequently read English Traits (1856). However, he concentrates on books, essays, and addresses from 1836 to 1850: Nature (1836), “The Divinity School Address” (1838), “Self-Reliance” (1841), “Experience” (1844), “An Address … on … the Emancipation of the Negroes in the British West Indies” (1844), and Representative Men (1850). In each chapter, Dolan alternates between an exposition of key questions or categories in Enlightenment thinking and close readings of passages from Emerson's work. Dolan's own writing is invariably logical and intelligent, and he is adept at encapsulating the history of an idea or movement, for instance, in his excellent account of slavery and abolitionism in chapter 7, “Natural Rights, Civil Society.” Dolan is also capable of fascinating insight, as when he observes in chapter 2, “Reason I, Science,” how Emerson uses the deep time of astronomy and geology as a substitute for Christian kairos or explains in chapter 4, “Property, Culture,” how Emerson exploits the linguistic richness of the term “property” in both its economic sense, as a thing that is owned, and its scientific sense, as a quality or characteristic of an object.
Dolan moves chronologically through Emerson's development as a thinker and writer, and in many ways, the arc of Emerson's career reflects the broader currents of intellectual life in the nineteenth century. Emerson embraced his secular vocation as a “liberal preacher” after renouncing his Unitarian pulpit—and in effect, his belief in Christianity—in 1832. This shift was profound but not entirely unforeseen, and Dolan excavates evidence of Emerson's liberal impulses from his early and often neglected writings. For instance, Dolan closely examines Emerson's musings about historical progress in the journals from 1820–24, which Emerson compiled in his late teens and early twenties. In these pages, Emerson espouses an “Anglo Whiggish” (35) idea that history, driven by joyful reason, is an engine of improvement: as time advances, more people across the world earn more freedom. This view of history as the natural and implacable march of liberty fueled Emerson's belief in a world-historical destiny for the United States. As an emancipatory vision of progress, it also connects Emerson to Hegel and the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, such as David Hume, Adam Smith, Dugald Stewart, and Francis Hutcheson.
Hutcheson, a major figure of the Scottish Enlightenment, insisted that individuals possess an inherent moral sense. This belief provided Emerson, as well as his Unitarian professors at Harvard, with a metaphysical alternative to the Calvinist belief in human depravity. Dolan cites the idea of a deep-seated moral intuition as a key element of the “counter-Lockean” (59) trajectory of the Enlightenment. As he argues, drawing on the work of Charles Taylor, this counter-tradition was formed by an eclectic group: the Cambridge Platonists, Rousseau, Goethe, and Kant. These thinkers rejected the self-alienation and emotional barrenness of Locke's moral philosophy, turning away from the materialism of Locke—and Hobbes and Descartes—toward an inner and nonphysical realm of moral sentiments, intuition, and knowledge. Readers can find evidence of this counter-Lockean turn in an expression of Emersonian individualism in the 1841 essay “Self-Reliance.” In one of his exemplary turns of phrase, Emerson urges, “Trust thyself: every heart vibrates to that iron string.” For many critics, especially those who see parallels between Emerson and Nietzsche, the exhortation sounds like antinomianism: the only rule we can “trust” is that we must make our own rules. But if read in light of the anti-Lockean tradition that Dolan proposes, a different sense emerges. Emerson does not advocate for an easy moral narcissism. To the contrary, the hardness of the “iron string” conveys the quality of steely discipline. Emerson alludes to the strenuous exertions by which a person—alert to his own moral sense, even when it places him in fierce conflict with social convention—strives to adhere to the immutable law that binds together the soul, nature, and the cosmos.
A universe held together by moral law, much less one where people have souls, is not an antifoundationalist or postmodern universe. And that is Dolan's point. Perhaps he undervalues the galvanic power of Emerson's language, its capacity to inspire the creative misreadings that he warns us against. But Dolan wants to estrange Emerson from contemporary readers and not accommodate him to us. And in his painstaking recovery of Emerson's political worldview, he provides a resource for specialists and nonspecialists who wish to deepen their grasp of the inseparable relationship between the literature and the liberalism of Emerson.
