As the twin towers fell on an infamous morning in September 2001, the world was forever changed. Out of the rubble and destruction came a rush of anxiety, fear, and the incalculable threat of terrorism. While “panic” catalyzed the unravelling of legal protections against arbitrary detention in the US and UK, international human rights law remained largely fortified in preserving such rights. Although international human rights law has the potential to be undermined by powerful countries, de Londras illustrates that despite the US's and the UK's strong attempts to project panic and curtail certain human rights for suspected terrorists in the international sphere, the right to be free from arbitrary detention has remained largely preserved.

While the right to be free from arbitrary detention is embedded in the laws of the US and the UK, Chapter 1 explains how both countries utilized “panic” to circumvent these obligations. Specifically, “bottom-up” panic permitted the expansion of power because there was a public demand for action. Drawing on criminology theory, most notably David Garland's theory of “punitive segregation”, de Londras demonstrates how public support for detention measures can occur as a means of protection from perceived terrorists “incapable of rehabilitation”. Additionally, “top-down” panic is manufactured by political actors in order to expand their influence and power. For example, de Londras cites Stanley Cohen's theory of “moral panic” to demonstrate how politicians, the media, and law enforcement in the US and the UK essentially conditioned the public to desire expanded detention policies with minimal legal review.

Chapter 2 documents how the expansion of the power of both the executives and the legislatures of the US and the UK stands in direct contrast to the right to be free from arbitrary detention. The right to be free from unlawful detention has been entrenched in the US through the US Constitution (Fourteenth Amendment), the Judiciary Act, and the Habeas Corpus Act. This right has similarly been protected in the UK since Magna Carta, and reaffirmed through the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). However, unique differences exist between the US and the UK. For example, while international human rights law is not traditionally protected within US federal law, the UK has more readily incorporated established principles of international human rights law into its jurisdiction. Furthermore, the right to be free from arbitrary detention is secured throughout international human rights law, including, inter alia, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the ECHR, and the American Convention on Human Rights. Although de Londras argues that the right to be free from arbitrary detention is solidified in international law, she still notes how “it's not blind to the practical necessities of statehood”.

Chapters 3 and 4 provide an overview of the post-September 11 counter-terrorist detention policies pursued through executive and legislative actions, respectively. In the US, the executive pursued a military approach, justifying its detention policies and wide executive discretion as part of a “war” against al-Qa'ida. In this sense, the US attempted to reshape international law from “the outside”, claiming its military actions did not contravene international law. Conversely, the UK executive justified altering its domestic criminal laws, including terrorist detention, in response to an unprecedented and grave terrorist threat that left the UK vulnerable. Accordingly, the UK tried to reshape international law from “the inside”, altering its domestic policies without regard to the current international legal framework. With regard to legislative policies, de Londras posits that the legislatures of both countries have largely played the role of enablers. Specifically, both legislatures have been facilitating the post-September 11 actions of their respective executive's detention policies while simultaneously diminishing judicial oversight.

In Chapter 5, de Londras exemplifies how international law has shown a palpable degree of resilience regarding the legality of detention. Specifically, through important jurisprudence such as Chahal v. UK and the Opinion on the Legality of the Use of Threat of Nuclear Weapons, international law has insulated itself from the panic narrative perpetuated in the US and the UK. However, international law has not remained unwaveringly fortified. For example, the European Court of Human Rights has, in cases such as A v. United Kingdom, extended state discretion over detention policies. According to de Londras, international law's resilience can be captured by several general overarching themes. First, unlike domestic legislation, the structure of international law shields it from rapid alterations—states have an equal say in its formation through both customary law and multilateral treaties. Second, international law appreciates a “cognitive distance” from the “site of trauma”, and thus is less influenced by panic. Third, unlike domestic governments which must worry about assuaging the fear of the populous to succeed in future elections, international law is not bound by electoral constraints. Last, although the state views its moral obligations as varying, depending on times of war or peace, the international legal community attempts to maintain an unyielding set of global values, including the promotion of human rights.

In Chapter 6, de Londras highlights how the superior US and UK domestic courts have acted in a less deferential manner with regard to terrorist detention policies. While domestic precedent provided both courts with easy routes towards the approval of expanded governmental actions—in, inter alia, Hamdan v. United States in the US and R v. Secretary of State for Defence in the UK—instead, each court reached rights-based conclusions. Of note, both domestic courts utilized, at least in part, international law to reach their decisions. Thus, this may further demonstrate the resilience of international human rights law. While not conclusive, de Londras asserts that international human rights law may be entrenched within a larger principle of “law” composing “general institutional material” utilized by all judicial-making bodies.

Overall, de Londras provides a thorough and well-researched novel analysis in order to paint the current state of human rights law in the post-September 11 world. Generally speaking, de Londras does not seek to criticize the domestic detention policies undertaken by the US and the UK, but instead seeks to praise the international legal community for safeguarding critical human rights.