The Eastern Front in World War I, relative to its vast size and scope and in comparison to the war's other fronts, remains relatively unknown and underresearched. The English language historiography of the Gallipoli campaign alone outweighs that of the entire English language historiography of the Eastern Front. Although there is material on the German campaigns in the East such as Tannenberg and the amphibious operations in the Baltic, the Austro-Hungarian and Russian campaigns remain, in a very literal sense, terra incognita. Professor Richard DiNardo aims to correct that, and his intent in this work “is to fill in part of that gap by looking at the Austro-Hungarian-German offensive against the Russians at Gorlice-Tarnow in May 1915” (2). In order to do this, DiNardo, a specialist in modern German military history, uses Austrian, Bavarian, and German military archives to produce a well-balanced, readable, and measured account of these operations. Moreover, this is an account of a genuine breakthrough followed by an operational offensive that set the conditions for a strategic exploitation into Russian Poland. Because we have come to regard the breakthrough as a function of later 1918 tactical innovation, most notably in the Kaiser's Offensives, Amiens, and Megiddo, DiNardo's work is a much-needed corrective. Another of DiNardo's aims is “to introduce the reader to a number of commanders who have remained fairly unknown, even to students of the war” (2).

Breakthrough: The Gorlice-Tarnow Campaign, 1915, is very much a classic campaign study conducted through analysis at the operational level of war. The book begins by describing the strategic setting and the strategic decision processes involved in coalition warfare. DiNardo points out that World War I was the first coalition war that Germany fought since Prussia's involvement in the Napoleonic Wars, which presented problems in strategic and operational direction. He follows this with a comprehensive explanation of the forces, plans, and preparations, which orients the reader to what the high command thought to achieve. He then thoroughly describes the initial conduct of the campaign—the recapture of Przemysl and the liberation of Lemberg, with a lucid narrative directly based on archival materials. DiNardo's approach makes this book an ideal vehicle to view how operational designs achieve strategic purposes, in this case the recovery of the Austro-Hungarian province of Galicia. At this point, the successful Gorlitz-Tarnow campaign set the conditions for the Austrians and the Germans to consider the conquest of Russian Poland. DiNardo masterfully presents the decisions, with particular emphasis on the infighting between the Austrian and German chiefs of the general staff, Generals Conrad von Hötzendorf and Erich von Falkenhayn, respectively, and the preparations that led to the six-week conquest of Poland. It is of interest that these were campaigns of maneuver and fluidity of command and control and, as such, defy our conventional received wisdom about the static trench warfare conditions of World War I.

Professor DiNardo's assessments are fascinating and dispel the notion that the chiefs of staff were the “front men” for commanders within the Austrian and German military systems. This is a pervasive myth in the historiography of the war, and DiNardo clearly identifies these campaigns as campaigns conceived and executed by commanders, with the support of their staffs. He argues this point well and also clearly explains who made which decision at what level. In this regard, DiNardo is something of a cheerleader for the talented but underappreciated August von Mackensen and his brilliant chief, Hans von Seeckt.

This is a good read as DiNardo's fine sense of humor and wit paint vivid characterizations of the principal players. His portrait of Conrad, for example, presents “a man of serial obsessions” who is distracted by his professional fixation with Serbia and his personal fixation with Gina von Reininghaus (85). He presents a memorable cast of characters, many of whom his readers will find, in DiNardo's words, to be “fairly unknown.” These include General Otto von Emmich, General Hermann von François, General Alexander von Linsingen, and many others.

Overall, Professor DiNardo achieves his intended purposes. A previous reviewer of this book commented that his treatment of the Russians lacked depth. However, this reviewer finds the analysis of the subject very balanced in the sense that this work is, by design, a campaign study from the Austro-Hungarian and German perspectives. Of note, DiNardo's work is useful as a valuable counterpoint to illustrate the success of German offensive methods of command and control against a well-prepared and capable enemy in comparison to operations of similar scale conducted by the British and French in 1915. Breakthrough: The Gorlice-Tarnow Campaign, 1915 is strongly recommended, not only for readers interested in World War I, but also as a stand-alone campaign study of the Operational Art as it was practiced in the pre-mechanized era.