There has been a steadily growing trend in the historiography of Japan to acknowledge the fact that Japan is, indeed, an archipelago, and that maritime issues mattered in socio-political development. Recent works strive to refute the image of sakoku (the “closed country” policy), which has long coloured the image of early modern Japan as being xenophobic and isolated from the outside world for two centuries. Ronald Toby’s study was one of the first in English to challenge this preconception, and has been followed by other scholars who continue to demonstrate that the “closed” Japan was actually rather porous. Noell Wilson’s monograph addresses the domestic military response to foreign encounters during the Tokugawa period (1603-1868), arguing that the shogunate’s ceding of military leadership of treaty ports to domainal lords ultimately served to weaken its own authority.
Wilson makes Nagasaki the touchstone of the study, beginning with an introduction of Nagasaki’s traditional entrepôt role and how the government approached interactions with different foreign populations. The first half of the volume is devoted to understanding the shifting local and Edo-based attitudes toward maritime defence as embodied in the challenges trade through Nagasaki represented. In the first chapter, Wilson emphasizes the role of the sea itself in determining political policy. While terrestrial boundaries were clearly delineated, the ocean was less defined, resulting in an ambiguity of responsibility for defence against a potential foreign threat. The shogunate relied largely on the local domains to collaborate on coastal defence rather than establishing a centralized naval defence system, setting a precedent for domainal involvement—in particular, Fukuoka and Saga domains—in official foreign interactions.
Wilson notes in the second chapter that during the period she refers to as the “Chinese Interim” (1680-1730), with the tightening of restrictions on trade, the perceived European threat subsided as Chinese interactions increased. Coastal defence tactics shifted to address the rise of smuggling, and the shogunate continued to cede defensive control to domainal powers in these matters. In contrast to the previous period, when the domains followed Tokugawa directives to band together against the common threat posed by Western vessels near Nagasaki, the concern for smuggling that defined the “Chinese Interim” was decentralized. Less preoccupied with collaborating to defend Nagasaki, domains prioritized defence of their own nearby waters. A decrease in the number of resident shogunal magistrates in Nagasaki also contributed to the rise of domainal authority as central oversight of military details weakened.
As the Chinese threats subsided and active military threats lessened, Wilson notes that Saga and Fukuoka domains used this relatively peaceful period to strengthen their ties with Dutch contacts in Dejima. The domainal military authorities continued to demonstrate their relevance through the very visible responsibilities of guarding the Dutch. Wilson focuses in particular on the influence of Saga lord Nabeshima Naomasa, who recognized the importance of understanding and appropriating Dutch military technology. He continued to press the shogunate for permission to expand his own knowledge, from conducting an official tour of the Dutch gunboat Palembang to establishing his own iron foundries to cast cannon for local defence. Wilson continues to explicate the ramifications of Naomasa’s forethought in the following chapter, as the shogunate began seeking his input on tactics and technological production for their fortifications and defence of Edo Bay. In particular, Wilson highlights his tendency to collaborate with other domainal lords and his skilful manipulation of marriage politics that strengthened not only his personal and political influence, but also the propensity for domainal cooperation outside of shogunal authority.
The final chapter brings the Edo period to a close by exploring the increasing activity in and defence of newer treaty ports, including Yokohama and Hokkaido. Wilson demonstrates how the focus of shogunal control in those regions shifted from military to commercial, evidenced in the repurposing of fortifications for firing celebratory gun salutes and changing the post of coastal defence officer to the “office of magistrate of foreigners”. The shogunate had effectively ceded military authority over the treaty ports to the various domains, while trying to maintain a modicum of economic control.
Wilson ties this decline of shogunal military might into the overall fragmentation of centralized power during the late Edo period. She suggests that the growing autonomy of the domains over the ports was an aspect of continued dissatisfaction with Tokugawa rule and was a precursor of the unrest that would develop in the 1860s. Her work continues to help break down the idea that Tokugawa Japan was a “closed country”, as the very need for such attention to maritime defence implies that there was a continued foreign presence to defend against. Furthermore, Wilson’s recounting of the shifting political climate provides important new clues into our understanding of perceptions of early modern Japanese views of the sea and port defence, as well as contributing to a greater body of knowledge about maritime dominance as a critical aspect of political control. Particularly through her study of Naomasa, she admirably depicts the port as intellectual entrepôt as well, demonstrating how exposure to new ideas through foreign contact helped lead to Naomasa’s innovative views toward technology and collaboration.
There are a few minor flaws in the book that should not detract from its value as a whole. Wilson begins her introduction with a detailed discussion of a particular woodblock print, and while reproduction rights were surely an issue here it seems to be such an evocative image that it is a shame to not have had it reproduced somewhere in the monograph. An occasional typographic error distracts (most notably a repeated “Mitusyuki” for “Mitsuyuki” on page 60), as does the slightly inconsistent translation of “azukari dokoro” in Chapter 5 as variously “trust lands” or “entrusted lands”, with no explanation as to any potential difference between the two.
Wilson’s work emphasizes the importance of military control over Tokugawa Japan’s treaty ports, and shows the consequences of the shogunate’s decisions to allow the domains an ever-growing influence over port defence. In doing so she highlights the gradual erosion of centralized power in Edo, demonstrating that yielding authority over the treaty ports left the Tokugawa shogunate itself defending against both internal and external threats.
