Alan Rhoda's article, ‘Gratuitous evil and divine providence’, raises important issues.Footnote 1 He is quite right that discussions of the evidential argument from evil often neglect the question concerning which model of divine providence is at issue, and this neglect is unfortunate. His classification of the different models of providence is both elegant and illuminating. And his discussion, in the latter part of his article, of the bearing of the models of providence on the problem of evil is insightful and, I believe, generally accurate. The point at which I wish to raise questions, however, concerns the formulation of the evidential argument from evil on which the discussion is based.
Rhoda begins with an extremely general formulation, involving both an ‘evidential premise’ and a ‘theological premise’:
(1) Gratuitous evils occur.
(2) If God exists then no gratuitous evils occur.
Therefore,
(3) God does not exist.
But this, of course, requires more explanation. According to Rhoda, ‘What we want … is a definition of “gratuitous evil” that makes the theological premise uncontroversial for theists and, subject to that constraint, renders the evidential premise as initially plausible as possible. By securing (2), we force theists to focus their fire on (1)’ (282).
The project Rhoda is attempting here is in principle a commendable one. If a complex issue can be formulated in such a way that everything hinges on a single, clearly formulated point of controversy, the issue has so far been clarified and may be closer to a solution. But the fact that such a clarification would be desirable does not guarantee that it is possible, and I suspect that the sort of clarification Rhoda desires is not possible in this case. That is, I suspect that there will not be found any formulation of the theological premise that is both uncontroversial and useful for the discussion of the problem of evil. (One could of course say, ‘God will prevent any evil such that he has no morally adequate reason to permit it’. But this verges on tautology; it will not be useful for the discussion unless and until the nature of ‘morally adequate reasons’ has been explicated – and at that point it will no longer be uncontroversial.) My present project, however, is only to show that Rhoda has not produced such a formulation.
The task, then, is to define ‘gratuitous evil’. Rhoda begins with a definition derived from William Rowe's classic 1979 formulation of the argumentFootnote 2:
(5) A gratuitous evil=def. An instance of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. (287)
Rhoda notes that, for full generality, gratuitous evils should not be limited to cases involving intense suffering, though such cases elicit a powerful emotive response. He proposes a general definition of ‘an evil,’ as follows:
(6) An evil=def. An event-token which is such that, in relation to the Good, it is objectively better that it not occur, than that it occur. (287)
Given this definition of ‘an evil’, Rhoda observes that the concluding phrase in the earlier definition ‘boils down to the idea that the evil in question could have been prevented in a way that would have made the world overall better’ (288). In view of this, he redefines ‘gratuitous evil’ as follows:
(7) A gratuitous evil=def. An instance of evil which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented in a way that would have made the world overall better. (288)
Further refinements are needed, however. ‘Suppose’, Rhoda suggests,
… we think of omniscience as the property of knowing all that can be known. And suppose God could have prevented a certain evil E by doing A but that there was no antecedently knowable fact about whether God's preventing E by doing A would have made the world overall better. (288)
In this case, one can't reasonably insist that God ought to have done A and thereby prevented E. So we modify the definition once more:
(8) A gratuitous evil=def. An instance of evil which an omnipotent, omniscient being antecedently knew He could have prevented in a way that would have made the world overall better. (288)
The next refinement is motivated by the worry that, according to some philosophers, ‘there are no singular propositions about particulars that have not yet existed’. If this is correct (Rhoda does not take a position on the issue), ‘there are no propositions about instances of evil for God to know in advance’ (288). In order to avoid this problem,
… we can revise (8) to cover not only tokens of evil but also types. So, to use Rowe's example, even if there was no prior fact about whether the fawn's suffering could have been prevented by God, there could still have been a fact about whether God could have prevented the suffering of a fawn under relevantly similar circumstances. (289)
Incorporating this change, and inserting the term ‘God’ instead of mentioning the divine attributes, we have:
(9) A gratuitous evil=def. A token or type of evil which God antecedently knew He could have prevented in a way that would have made the world overall better. (289)
In the light of this, the theological premise can be restated as:
(2*) If God exists then there occur no tokens or types of evil which God antecedently knew He could have prevented in a way that would have made the world overall better. (289)
Rhoda contends that ‘(2*) ought to be uncontroversially true for theists on account of God's perfect goodness’ (289). Still, he invites readers who think that further refinements are needed to supply them: ‘Such refinements will only help my overall project’ (n. 23, 301).
At this point I propose to take Rhoda up on his invitation. It is clear, I think, that (9) cannot possibly define gratuitous evil as the concept is used in the evidential argument from evil. Evidential arguers (such as Rowe) maintain that the world actually contains gratuitous evil, and that this shows that God does not exist. According to (9), however, gratuitous evil cannot possibly exist in a world without God, for in such a world it will not be true that God knew He could have prevented the evil so as to make the world better! Clearly, what is required is:
(9′) A gratuitous evil=def. A token or type of evil which God, if God exists, could antecedently know He could prevent in a way that would make the world overall better.
Correspondingly, we modify (2*) as follows:
(2*′) If God exists then there occur no tokens or types of evil which God, if God exists, could antecedently know He could prevent in a way that would make the world overall better.
I am confident that this corresponds with Rhoda's intentions, and for the rest of this discussion I will assume that (2*′) is to be substituted for (2*).
Rhoda goes on to argue that several arguments that have been proposed for the compatibility of God with gratuitous evil do not succeed where (2*) is concerned, even though some of them may succeed given other definitions of gratuitous evil. In the interest of brevity, I will focus here on my own previously published argument to this effect, which Rhoda paraphrases as follows:
Hasker … contends that the theological premise undermines moral motivation and so should be rejected by theists. Thus, if God prevents all gratuitous evil, then every evil that occurs is either necessary for a greater good or such that the world would be overall worse unless something comparably bad occurs in its stead. But if so, then all successful efforts to prevent evil are counterbalanced by additional evils (or loss of goods) elsewhere. Hence, we can't do anything to make the world overall better. If we believe this, contends Hasker, it will undermine our moral motivation. So if God wants us to take the demands of morality seriously … God must permit gratuitous evils. (291)Footnote 3
Rhoda thinks this argument is unsuccessful against (2*):
Distinguish evils that are preventable by God in a way that would make the world overall better from evils that are preventable simpliciter (i.e. by someone or other) in a way that would make the world overall better. Moral motivation requires that it be possible for the latter sort of evils to exist, but it does not require the former. And it is only the former that qualify as gratuitous in terms of (9). (291)
Now, part of what Rhoda is claiming here is correct. It does seem that there could be evils that we could prevent with the result that the world would be better as a result, but such that if God were to prevent them the world would not thereby be improved. This is correct, and I have acknowledged as much in previous writings on the subject.Footnote 4 What we have to ask, however, is this: granting the possibility of such instances, would instances of this sort be sufficient to maintain our moral motivation at a high level?
Contrary to Rhoda, I believe they would not. Consider what sorts of cases would be involved. They are cases in which, if God were to prevent some evil, the world would not be improved. Why not? Well, we might suppose that this evil is one that, if permitted, will in some way lead to a greater good, one that would be lost (without equivalent compensation) if the evil were prevented. But in this case, the evil would not be ‘preventable simpliciter (i.e. by someone or other) in a way that would make the world overall better’ (291). So this isn't the sort of case we are looking for. What we need, then, is a case in which the evil itself would not lead to a greater good, so that in the evil's being prevented there is a positive benefit; so far, the world would be a better place. But then, why wouldn't it be good for God to prevent the evil? This can only be, because there is some good that is lost if the evil is prevented by God, that (at least) counterbalances the good that would be gained by its being prevented. The only plausible candidate for this ‘lost good’, is, I submit, the exercise of free will on the part of the human agent who has the opportunity to prevent the evil but decides not to do so.
Now, how valuable is the bare fact of a single such exercise of free will? Not very, seems to me to be the correct answer. The possession of the capacity for free will is (we may suppose) a metaphysical good for an agent, and in order for that good to be actualized there must be occasions on which the capacity is exercised. So it is reasonable to suppose that each such exercise possesses some degree of intrinsic value. But to ascribe to each individual exercise a large value seems most implausible. It would hardly do, for example, to say that the evil of a murder is compensated for by the intrinsic good of the free choice made by the one who committed the murder!
In the light of considerations such as these I have argued that, on the assumption that God prevents all gratuitous evil, the following ‘limited harm principle’ must be true:
(LH)Whatever evil may result from a seriously harmful moral offence, the greater part of this evil (and perhaps all of it) is compensated by good results which could not have been obtained had the agent chosen a morally acceptable course of action instead.
The admission that not all of the evil need be compensated by good results comes from the recognition that some part of the evil may be compensated for by the inherent good of the agent's exercise of free choice. But since (as I've argued) the value of such an exercise is in itself quite small, it remains true that the greater part of the evil resulting from a serious offence (such as failing to save someone from preventable harm) will be compensated for by good results occurring elsewhere.
I believe, furthermore that if (LH) is true, and an agent knows it is true, then the agent's inclination to take moral requirements seriously is likely to be very significantly lessened. But this result is contrary to God's intention that human beings should place a high priority on fulfilling moral obligations, and should assume major responsibility for the welfare of their fellow human beings. Put more briefly: If we know that God will permit a morally wrong action only if it results in a compensating good, then our motivation to take morality seriously as a guide to life is likely to be seriously impaired. I believe Rhoda will admit that in this case we should not expect God to adopt the policy implied by the theological premise (2*′).
It must be admitted, however, that (2*′) provides Rhoda with resources to which he can appeal to deny the cogency of my reasoning. For it would seem that there could be cases in which (a) God by preventing a serious evil could make the world better overall, but (b) God could not know antecedently that this would be the case. For instance, it may be that God, by preventing some serious evil (say, a famine) could make the world better, but that the world would be better yet if we human beings, employing our resources and exercising our compassion, should prevent the evil ourselves. God, then, withholds His intervention in order to give us the opportunity to do the right thing. Unfortunately, we make poor use of our freedom and do not take the opportunity given us to do this great good, and as a result the world is worse than if God had prevented the evil Himself. But God could not have known this in advance, so the evil goes unprevented – and now we have a counter-example to the ‘limited-harm’ principle (LH).
The reasoning in the previous paragraph is so far correct. What it shows, however, is that (2*′) needs to be modified yet again. We are being asked to contemplate a situation in which it is impossible for God to know certain things about the future; specifically, propositions concerning the exercise of creaturely free will. But if we make this supposition, we must also suppose that God would have an immense amount of probabilistic knowledge concerning the future, and that God's actions would be guided by this probabilistic knowledge. (It would be absurd to suppose that God would act on the assumption that P will be the case, when it is overwhelmingly probable that ~P will be true instead of P.) Accordingly, (2*′) needs to be revised yet again, as follows:
(2*+) If God exists then there occur no tokens or types of evil which God, if God exists, could antecedently know it to be certain or extremely probable that He could prevent in a way that would make the world overall better.
Here's the point: in very many cases of the sort described, where God refrains from preventing an evil in order to give humans the opportunity to do so, it will become extremely probable that the humans will not act in the required way long before the evil becomes unpreventable-for-God. (At what point, we might ask, had it become extremely unlikely that the Nazi leadership would turn aside from their plan to exterminate the Jews of Europe? Fairly early on, one would think.) In such cases, according to (2*+), God will at that time act, even if reluctantly, in order to prevent the greater evil from taking place.
Conceivably, there could be exceptions to this generalization. These would be cases in which the human being's acting to prevent the evil remains a live possibility right up until the very last moment, when it is impracticable even for God to intervene to prevent that evil from occurring. I think it is clear, however, that this would be so in only a small minority of all the cases that might arise. In order to allow for this, however, (LH) can be amended as follows:
(LH+)Whatever evil may result from a seriously harmful moral offence, it will be true in the great majority of cases that the greater part of this evil (and perhaps all of it) is compensated by good results which could not have been obtained had the agent chosen a morally acceptable course of action instead.
(LH+), I submit, would have very nearly the same deleterious results, with regard to undermining our motivation to care for the world and for our fellow-humans, as the original (LH).Footnote 5 If so, my conclusion holds: we should not expect God to adopt the policy implied by (2*+), so this premise should be rejected.
It is not to be expected that the reasoning in this article will be found compelling by everyone, though it is compelling to me. So it won't surprise me if Alan Rhoda comes back with further objections. What I do expect, however, is that he will acknowledge that these are serious arguments, worthy of philosophical consideration. And that is all I need. For if he admits that much, he also has conceded, in effect, that his proposed theological premise for the argument from evil, be it (2*) or (2*′) or (2*+), is not by any means uncontroversial among theists – and that is what I set out to establish.
