The relatively impoverished historiography of modern Syria has long been a puzzling lacuna in Middle East studies. At a time when reductive conceptions of sectarianism and minorities have never had greater purchase on popular understandings of Middle Eastern societies in general and Syria in particular, Benjamin Thomas White provides an important, alternative lens through which to understand the making of modern Syria. Refusing to elevate “minority” to the level of an analytical category, White presents a historicist reading of the concept in 1920s and 1930s French Mandate Syria as it emerged in tandem with the nation-state. White argues that “the development of the nation-state form in the [French] mandate period . . . made the concepts of ‘minority’ and ‘majority’ meaningful in Syria” (p. 3). Tracing the emergence of the nation-state and its majority/minorities through the development of representative government, territorial identity, and national sentiment, White proposes a typology of “minority,” with implications for the study and understanding of Syria, the modern Middle East, and beyond.
The book is composed of three parts. Part One provides the conceptual scaffolding for the argument, including a close look at the emergence of the concept of minority in international political and legal discourse during the 19th and early 20th centuries. White refuses to deny the coevalness of Middle Eastern polities on the global stage: “The emergence of minorities (and majorities, and nation-states) took place in the Ottoman and post-Ottoman Levant at the same time as it occurred in much of Europe—not later” (p. 28). White argues that the concept of “minority” “came into common use in both French and Syrian writings later than one might think, and was used not only as a justification for French domination in Syria . . . but as a means for certain groups in Syrian society to advance their own interests relative to the mandatory authorities, the Syrian state and society at large” (p. 44). The argument here about the relationship between millet and minority in the making of modern Syria becomes somewhat confused, however, and does not seem to be fully engaged with broader debates about the millet system under the Ottomans and its transformation in the post-Ottoman transition. While White recognizes that “the classical ideal of the millet system,” however flawed, “was the understanding that French officials under the mandate brought to Syrian society” (p. 49), he makes the important distinction that “minorities are not the same as millets” (p. 55), without recognizing the potential pitfalls in conceptualizing the Druze and ʿAlawi communities in Syria as “‘unofficial’ millets” (p. 54).
Rather than presuming the coherence of nationalization and the imposition of “nation time” in Syria during the 1920s and 1930s, however, some attention to the differential processes and timetables by which communities (for lack of a better term) in Syria have been made sectarian, tribal, or minoritarian might have sharpened the argument. “The gradual and incomplete change from a sectarian to a minoritarian understanding of Syrian society,” White contends, “reflects the transformation of that society” (p. 47). Rather than critique colonial, nationalist, and statist narratives of modern Syrian society and history, though, this approach runs the risk of reinscribing a nationalist (and modern) tropology that would relegate millet, sect, and other forms of community to the prenational (and, perhaps, even the premodern). Put differently, if White helpfully clarifies how the construction of the nation-state has a variety of side effects, emphasizing the “invention” of minorities under the French Mandate might efface subtler, gradual processes of social and political transformation that occurred over longer periods of time, and were not fundamentally produced in the colonial encounter.
Part Two tackles large thematic issues. Chapter 3 considers the question of separatism and “autonomism” with specific reference to the Druze and ʿAlawi communities. The French colonial attempt to justify a divided cultural and political landscape—creating statelets for the Druze and the ʿAlawis, most notably—alternatively clashed and dovetailed with nationalist attempts to define the nation. Nationalist discourses did not simply describe a reality of territorial coherence, identitarian belonging, and state sovereignty; they were complicit in its production. In this sense, the spread of the nation-state both centralized power and authority and ironically “spur[red] a sense of minority identity,” which “also accounts for the range of options it opens up for the communities that become ‘minorities’” (p. 90). Chapter 4 moves to discuss the consolidation of borders and territorial conceptions of the nation, specifically as they related to Kurdish identity in northeastern Syria and Damascus. This chapter also suggests some of the contradictory effects of nation-state formation under the French Mandate, producing minoritarian consciousness and alliances as well as national solidarities.
Part Three looks at how these new forms of minority and nation-state were worked out in the context of two different processes during the mid-1930s. White offers a new reading of the 1936 Franco-Syrian treaty and the ways in which it engaged the question of minorities. This period of “treaty diplomacy” and the definition of “minorities” can be understood in a transnational context, one in which new norms of international public law were fundamentally reshaping the contours and (dis)contents of minority communities around the world. White situates the “minorities question” in French Mandate Syria in its global context without losing sight of how these debates were “part of a wider contest over the institutional relationship between the population and state” (p. 131). On the local and national levels, “the legally-defined category of minority became a vehicle for the political claims of competing groups and individuals within Syrian society,” even as “the concept also became the terrain on which their competition played out” (p. 153).
In the concluding chapter, White traces debates over personal status law reform as they were inflected by the concept of minority status through a close reading of a transformative 1936 law on religious communities, Decree 60/L.R. White demonstrates the institutional and discursive ways in which the legal field was transformed by the colonial state, through both “standardisation” and “officialisation.” The former indicates “that the relationship between state and religious jurisdictions was to be legally defined by the state, with all religious communities being recognised as either personal status communities or common law communities”; the latter would “mean that communities derived from Islam that had previously been recognised only unofficially, and patchily across the territory, by local state functionaries or the French, would now be officially recognised by the Syrian state” (pp. 183–84). This analysis could have engaged more with the large body of historical and legal scholarship—that by Talal Asad and Wael Hallaq being just two notable examples—that has sought to explain the fate of custom, religious law, and communitarian boundaries in the passage to modernity and the encounter with the modernizing state.
The book relies primarily on French Mandate archival material housed in the Centre des archives diplomatiques at Nantes and La Courneuve as well as the Service historique de l'armée de terre at Vincennes, in addition to sources from the Center for Historical Documents in Damascus, newspapers, and other published material in Arabic. It effectively demolishes certain nationalist narratives of Syrian history, identity, and society, and replaces them with narratives tracing the construction and invention of nations, nationalisms, and nationalist categories. Meanwhile, ironically enough, the argument seems to cement the power and influence of the Syrian nation-state itself during the Mandate period. “If the French had little enthusiasm for building a nation in Syria,” White concludes, “they were nonetheless committed to the task of building a state” (p. 184). Historians interested in the ongoing debates over how to gauge the relative weight and importance of nation and state, sect and community, in the making of modern Syria will find much food for thought in these pages.
