Philosophical literature on the afterlife is customarily a part of philosophy of religion, metaphysics, the history of philosophy or theology. It is a pleasure reading Jerry Walls on the afterlife, for he is able to discuss beliefs about ‘final things’ with an eye on how they fit in with (or disrupt) a broad spectrum of concerns, historical and contemporary, metaphysical and theological. The writing is clear, accessible and packed with arguments and counter arguments. Walls is becoming a leading contributor to what may be called philosophical eschatology. The book on heaven is preceded by Walls's Hell: The Logic of Damnation (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992). Walls has also edited what is sure to become a definitive reference work, the Oxford Handbook of Eschatology (Oxford University Press, 2007). In terms of his conclusions and style, I see Jerry Walls as carrying forward the work of A. E. Taylor (1869–1945). Although Walls does not cite Taylor's work, Walls' contribution to the case for an afterlife may be positively compared to the achievement of Taylor's The Faith of a Moralist (London: Macmillan, 1930) which repays close attention today.
The comments that follow do not so much challenge Walls' work; they are largely aimed at further extending his project.
The Introduction is a marvellous overview of past and current views on the afterlife that pits Augustine against Gorda Kaufman, Augustine's mother Monica against current feminists, and features Quine, Feuerbach and others versus John Wesley, Locke and others. Walls only cites and does not explicitly critique the feminist thesis propounded by Rosemary Ruether (along with Charlotte Perkins) that ‘male religion has focused on death and how to escape it, while for women the pivotal experience has been birth, and the primary concern has been to nurture ongoing life on this earth’ (p. 4). Walls cites Ruether:
Acceptance of death, then, is acceptance of the finitude of our individuated centers of being, but also our identification with the larger matrix as our total self that contains us all . . . it is also not about our calling to be concerned about the eternal meaning of our lives, and religion should not make this the focus of its message. Our responsibility is to use our temporal life span to create a just and good community for our generation and for our children. (p. 4)
In a sense, Walls does challenge many of these assertions, showing how belief in an afterlife directly impacts and can flow from the pursuit of a just and good community. Moreover, since Walls conceives of the afterlife in temporal terms, his positive case for the coherence, importance and plausibility of belief in the afterlife does not amount to the celebration of an abstract, deathless ‘eternal meaning’ (whatever that may involve). But I would also add that I find no credibility whatsoever in the claim that it is more female to deny an afterlife and more male to affirm one or, that women are somehow more focused on birth and men on death. Arguably, until very recently, to focus on birth involved a colossal concern about death, given the vast amount of women who die in giving birth and in view of infant mortality. Moreover, if an afterlife of personal fulfilment is a credible option, what mother or father wouldn't desire such fulfilment when faced with the death of their child? If it is known that no fulfilment after death is possible, then it makes little sense for a mother to do anything other than ‘accept’ such a fact. But of course the belief and hope for an afterlife with God is grounded (partly) on the conviction that the value of persons is not exhausted by one's earthly ‘life span’ as though there is not good left to redeem and fulfil after so many years of life. I see no reason why a mother or feminist who accepts the possibility of an afterlife should somehow desire or prefer that the good of persons be seen only in terms of the length of this life.
The first chapter, ‘Heaven and God's Goodness’, is a masterful treatment of Hume on God and death. Walls argues cogently that the pallid, ‘thin’ theism of Philo in the Dialogues is untenable and that, on Humean principles, the more plausible conclusion would be that God is malicious. Along the way, I believe Walls effectively brings to light the important role that belief in an afterlife plays in addressing the problem of evil. Walls also, here and elsewhere in the book, shows how background assumptions have a huge impact on the case for an afterlife. For Hume, this is especially evident in his own reflections on mortality. Shortly before his death, he expressed his contentment with there being no afterlife. It is especially interesting to note that Hume framed his ‘acceptance’ of only having this life in the context of an imaginary conversation with Charon, the ornery impatient guide to the next life. If we imagine a different context, as Walls does, the terrain shifts. (As an aside, one may see the same shift in assessing Hume on miracles. With an antecedent naturalism, reports of miracles will be dodgy, but over against a more open background such reports may receive a better hearing.)
Chapter 2 highlights different accounts of the atonement and salvation as well as a defence (much like A. E. Taylor's in Faith of a Moralist) of a period of purgation after death. Walls's case for purgation is based on his high view of sanctification. Walls's treatment of all these issues is fair-minded and careful. My only suggestion is that further work on the atonement will benefit from taking seriously the Christus Victor tradition that locates Christ's key saving act in his overcoming sin and death by the resurrection. To put this school of theology in abbreviated terms, if I wrongly harm you – imagine this is a grave harm such as murdering your child – I can repent, reform, grieve, undergo punishment and perhaps make partial reparations, but none of this can restore your child to life. But now imagine that there is a God-man, Jesus, who in his own person overcomes death and promises the resurrection and restoration of all, including your child. Imagine I am offered by Jesus an occasion to incorporate my will in his (that is, I, too, will or desire his saving will) and that this resurrection of your child occurs. By my assumption, in the sense of ‘taking on’ or identifying with Christ's restorative work, I thereby move towards the divine atonement (literally at-onement) or reconciliation with God and those I have harmed. Walls does address the ways in which the afterlife can impact such scenarios in chapter 5 under a treatment of the problem of evil. My modest suggestion is that a Christus Victor theology is central to the atonement itself.
Chapter 3 contains a searching treatment of the scope of salvation. Walls rejects traditional beliefs that the fate of one's soul is sealed at the time of death and he also finds Hick's pluralism wanting. Walls does not shy away from considering the prospects of human infants and nonhuman animals. Consistent throughout this book is Walls' commitment to a high view of God's omnipotence, love and justice. Justice involves fairness and so no one will be separated from God unless a creature freely and knowingly resists God's grace.
Chapter 4 is an excellent example of how philosophy of mind may have a vital role in the philosophy of God and vice versa. Walls contends that both dualist and materialist accounts of human persons can permit an afterlife.
Chapter 5 connects beliefs about the afterlife to the current literature on the problem of evil. A minor caveat: Walls writes about whether evils are redeemable. I suggest it would be better to refer to the redemption of those who do evil, not the evil itself. There is not space to bring out the importance of this distinction other than noting that a theology of the redemption of persons is different from a theology that justifies the evil that persons commit.
The last two chapters take up relevant epistemological issues and address the meaning of belief in the resurrection.
Walls' work is useful for its admirable philosophical erudition. He quite handily exposes the ways in which belief in an afterlife is caricatured rather than taken seriously.
