How can civil war settlements endure? We have known for some time the importance of rebel groups achieving a durable transition into the realm of normal politics. Yet at every stage of demobilization and (re)integration, warring parties face credible commitment problems and suffer from lack of information about the other’s compliance. In Electing Peace, Aila Matanock argues that electoral participation provisions (EPPs)—defined as clauses in peace agreements specifying postconflict elections in which both sides are to participate as political parties (p. 27)—provide a solution, because they facilitate low-cost, credible international enforcement of peace settlements.
Although Matanock is not the first to highlight the role of external enforcers in ending civil wars (cf. Barbara Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars, 2002; Virginia Page Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil Wars, 2008), her insight about electoral engagement being a “low-cost, long-term mechanism to detect and sanction noncompliance” is fresh and entirely on point (p. 11). Matanock rightly points out that international actors only rarely undertake armed intervention, and even if they do, fatigue and pressure for withdrawal soon sets in (pp. 39–40). Furthermore, she argues that electoral participation provisions are more efficient and inexpensive even compared to other nonmilitary commitment devices, such as demobilization deadlines or schedules for truth and reconciliation commissions (Chapter 2).
When are EPPs introduced, and how do they work? The book’s theoretical puzzle, presented in Chapter 2, is grounded in a bargaining perspective on war in which settlements are plagued by credible commitment problems (pp. 31–38). Such problems are of particular concern for rebel groups, because governments enjoy asymmetric power due to their control over the state (pp. 9, 35, 61). What is required is a means of guaranteeing the settlement by rendering noncompliance costlier than compliance. Drawing from multiple examples—Mozambique, Macedonia, Colombia, Northern Ireland—as well as in-depth case studies of Guatemala and El Salvador, Matanock shows that international election monitoring—when tied to conditional international benefits such as development assistance, democracy aid, or membership in international organizations—can be an effective means of enforcing peace agreements.
This is not at first an intuitive claim. How should unarmed international monitors charged with observing ballot boxes and campaign practices be expected to keep warring parties from fighting? The answer is that elections serve as focal points during which compliance with all dimensions of a peace agreement—not only the electoral dimensions—is evaluated by external actors. Moreover—and crucially—in these postconflict elections, election monitoring is geared primarily to “prevent further fighting—based on standards set by peace agreements—rather than to spur democracy” (p. 23). Matanock’s theory thus stitches together the literatures on civil war termination and international democracy promotion in a sophisticated and counterintuitive way.
The empirical portion of the book is composed of two parts, each of which combines quantitative analysis based on original data with qualitative analysis of carefully selected countries. In the first part, Matanock explores the causes of electoral participation provisions. The analysis features new data on the inclusion and implementation of electoral participation provisions in all peace settlements concluded between 1975 and 2005. There are 122 dyadic peace agreements, 51 of which had EPPs. She also draws from the Militant Group Electoral Participation (MGEP) data set, which she was instrumental in creating, which codes for rebel group participation in national legislative elections (see Aila Matanock, “Using Violence, Seeking Votes: Introducing the Militant Group Electoral Participation (MGEP) Dataset” Journal of Peace Research, 53[6], 2016).
EPPs are creatures of the post–Cold War era (pp. 7–8), the first having been introduced in El Salvador and Mozambique in 1992. The book pays careful attention to how the post–Cold War shift in historical context—in which external engagement became more active and less partisan—made EPPs desirable for the parties on the ground. In short, rebel groups push for EPPs precisely when they anticipate that international actors will help enforce them in a nonpartisan way. This is, however, a source of possible selection bias that is not addressed in an entirely satisfactory way, since variation in expected external engagement is truncated during the post–Cold War period.
In the book’s second empirical part, Matanock turns to the question of EPP effectiveness. The raw data show that EPPs decrease the risk of conflict recurrence by 80%, and regression analysis further supports this finding. Notably, results also hold when limited to those EPPs that are actually implemented (which occurred in 34 of 51 EPPs). The book makes good use of statistical evidence. Readers will find solid model specification, thorough robustness checks, and recognition of the limits of what can be inferred from a relatively small number of cases in observational data.
For these reasons, the case studies play an important role. Electing Peace takes a deep dive into the peace processes in Guatemala and El Salvador, which are selected because they exhibit variation over time in combatant expectations of (nonpartisan) international engagement. These are complemented by shorter, yet quite illuminating, consideration of a “negative” case of a civil war settlement without an EPP (Bangladesh), as well as “outliers” (Angola and Cambodia) in which peace failed despite the presence of an EPP. The country of Chad provides another counterfactual: a Cold War case in which the government attempted to share power with former rebels (without an EPP), but was ineffective due to the lack of a formal agreement and international engagement to “stabilize settlements” (p. 27).
Throughout the book, Matanock meticulously evaluates alternative explanations for the introduction of EPPs into postwar settlements: that EPPs may be implemented in easier cases; in cases where the international community desires to exit the country; when governments seek to preemptively please influential international patrons; or via a process of diffusion, as countries seek to emulate others (pp. 23–25).
The author is also clear-eyed about the potential downside of EPPs. They are, perhaps paradoxically, not intended to “develop democracy” (p. 31). They often involve prearranged power-sharing agreements among elites, or other mechanisms of election “engineering” such as ethnic quotas, which limit the extent to which the contests are open and competitive (pp. 15, 29–30). If there is a criticism to be made, it is that Matanock could have also considered the conduct of the elections—whether they are held on a level playing field, whether candidates could campaign freely, whether balloting and counting was sound—and what this means for the prospects of enduring peace. She states (p. 48) that the elections “need not be ‘free and fair’” in order to promote the external engagement that helps ensure peace. But taking a step back, can it really be that electoral integrity does not matter, given what we know about how it influences public and elite perceptions of the regime’s legitimacy (Susan D. Hyde and Nikolay Marinov, “Information and Self-Enforcing Democracy: The Role of International Election Monitoring,” International Organization, 68[2], 2014; Pippa Norris, Why Electoral Integrity Matters, 2014)?
Another limitation of the book’s tight focus on electoral participation provisions is a failure to perhaps fully engage with the broader phenomenon of electoral participation. The reader is left wondering whether there are instances of former rebels participating in elections absent EPPs (in fact, there are, as Matanock’s own MGEP data set shows), and how these cases fare. In part this omission is a by-product of the book’s grounding in the international relations literature on civil war—which focuses on formal peace agreements and their enforcement—rather than in comparative politics civil war research, which has much to contribute on the question of rebels’ popular support and political strategies.
Perhaps the most important contribution of Electing Peace is the insight it offers into ongoing debates over the dangers of democratization, as well as whether postconflict elections incite a return to violence. Matanock tackles these timely questions with clarity and authority. This is an exemplary piece of scholarship whose attention to context and nuance rewards its readers with generalizations that are at once “big” and “bounded” (Valerie Bunce, “Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations,” Comparative Political Studies 33[6/7], 2000). As such, it is an important book that deserves a wide audience.
