In his most recent book, John Borneman presents a fascinating collection of essays that reflect on the conditions and prospects of a just political order. The title themes are taken up in the first section, which is a comparative analysis of various modes of redress used to reckon with political crime and the memory of loss in post-World War II Germany and in Lebanon after the civil war (1975–90) and the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah. Borneman defines political crime as “the wrongful infliction of injury on individuals or collectives by actors or institutions in circumstances they designate as specifically political” (p. vii). He contends that individuals and groups give meaning to these injuries through modes of redress that contribute either to the compulsive repetition of violence or to its cessation. Taking loss as a “fundamental human condition” that is at once “a process and a structure” (p. vii), his aim is to theorize possible modes of reckoning with loss, and the memory of loss, that might lead to a departure from violence and the growth of democracy. In the second section, the author's focus shifts to the question of just politics in the international order, and later, in the third section, to recent political transformations in Europe and the United States. While his concern with just politics continues to animate these sections, the specific themes of political crime and the memory of loss begin to recede as he shifts his attention to the topics of regime change, occupation, democratization, and democratic authority in the latter half of the book.
In the first section, Borneman explores different ways of dealing with political crime by examining various modes of refiguring loss in Germany and Lebanon. He asserts that Germany has established a break with the crimes of its past through a process of historical reckoning that included both “events of closure” and “rites of commemoration” (pp. 3–4). Tracing the modes of accountability employed since the end of World War II, he begins with an examination of the legal prosecutions and monetary reparations implemented by the Allied authorities. According to the author, these measures were essential for assessing liability and calculating debt in relation to specific losses, and contributed to a consciousness of collective responsibility in Germany. However, it was only with increased temporal distance that the question of collective guilt began to find greater resonance. This shift was instigated by the postwar generation, which found the work of retribution and compensation inadequate for addressing the memory of loss, and called for more expansive modes of accountability. These modes of accountability included events of performative redress, such as Willy Brandt's 1970 apology to Poland, discussed in Chapter 3, and a plethora of commemorative activities that aimed to bring the past into a continual engagement with the present in order to prevent repetition. Paying close attention to their sequencing and timing, Borneman argues that the progressive ordering and maturation of these accountability measures contributed to a new collective self-understanding in Germany, and to the necessary flourishing of democracy.
This example of collective self-transformation is placed in contrast to the case of Lebanon, where the author contends there have been few events of closure. He begins with the observation that the Lebanese state was placed under Syrian hegemony after the violence of the civil war came to end. Rather than pursue legal prosecutions, the postwar state passed a general amnesty law covering most war-related crimes. In his view, this made it possible for former militia leaders to maintain political power, turning the state into “a mere arbiter” (p. 26) among a set of internal groups who continued to appeal to external authorities for support and solutions. Although the postwar state supported limited restitution and compensation for lost property, Borneman maintains that it did little in terms of material or symbolic redress. He attributes this lack of accountability to Lebanon's geopolitical context. Unlike in Germany, external forces did not support an internal reckoning with losses incurred during the war. While there are numerous sites of commemoration, they are said to be “nearly all local and sectarian rather than national” (p. 27). To support this point, the author analyzes a massacre and prison site memorialized by Hizbullah after the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 in Chapter 6, suggesting that they serve to prolong, rather than account for, loss through an emphasis on suffering and martyrdom that evades acknowledgement of joint culpability. In the preceding chapter, he outlines what he considers to be the war crimes perpetrated by both parties during the 2006 Israeli-Hizbullah war. While he claims that “current geopolitical configuration makes any prosecution unlikely” (p. 87), he argues for the necessity of justice to establish trust in the rule of law. Without the development of accountability measures, he asserts that the current state of peace will “mark a pause and not a break in a pattern of rebounding violence in Lebanon” (p. 32).
Emerging from this comparative analysis are several concerns relating to the ethics of intervention and the conditions of democracy. These issues are elaborated upon in the second and third sections of the book, which extend Borneman's reflections into a wide range of topics related to international relations and contemporary politics. The second section focuses primarily on regime change and the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Here Borneman presents the Allied occupation of Germany as a model for successful regime change, insisting that it must center on an ethics of care and responsibility. For him, this begins with military intervention, but also entails a long-term investment in rebuilding the social body and instituting the rule of law, which the author views as the necessary preconditions for democracy. In the case of Iraq, he contends that the Bush administration engaged not in an ethics of care, but in a form of “coercive gift exchange” (p. 111) focused on the export of democracy. Labeling its promulgation of democracy as “more strategic than moral, more tactical than principled” (p. 124), Borneman argues that the Bush administration dismissed the rule of law, concentrating only on the successful staging of electoral rituals. This topic provides a conceptual link into the third and final section, where the author examines mechanisms of democratic authority in Europe and the United States.
John Borneman's book provides a series of thoughtful and wide-ranging reflections on ethics and politics, drawing on scholarship in anthropology, social and political theory, and psychoanalysis, as well as extensive ethnographic fieldwork. The first section is the most cohesive, and urges readers to ask a number of important questions related to political crime and the memory of loss. One crucial question raised in this section concerns comparative analysis. The comparative framework Borneman develops is useful for thinking reflexively about modes of accountability and their significance for redressing political violence, but it subsumes two very different contexts, leaving unanswered the question of whether it is worth comparing such different contexts at the cost of understanding the complex social and historical conditions of each. Expansive in scope, each essay is clearly written and insightful, and will appeal to a wide range of scholars concerned with issues of memory, accountability, democratization, and international geopolitics, as well as the histories and politics of Europe and the Middle East.
