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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 March 2005
In an age of feminist criticism, it is of considerable importance to understand how the archetypal matriarch of the Jews fared in the writings of Philo, the most prolific and influential of Alexandrian Jews. The story of Sarah raises key issues concerning the nature and status of women in the Bible. Sarah is the spouse of the founder of the Jewish nation, yet her marital status is twice threatened by the advances of foreign kings. She is the first of several mothers in the Hebrew Bible who, having waited a long time for offspring, takes an active role in bringing up her only son. Moreover, she enjoys a relatively close relationship with God, who directly intervenes in history on her behalf. Sarah's story thus invited anyone reading it in antiquity to clarify his or her own views on motherhood and on the relationship between women and God.
How did Philo, a male reader addressing other male Jews in first-century Alexandria, react to the biblical construction of femininity in the figure of Sarah?1
Throughout my book Philo on Jewish Identity and Culture (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), I have argued that Philo's implied audience is Jewish. Moreover, Philo addressed primarily men, as is evident in such passages as Spec. 3.67, where he instructs his readers how to propose marriage to a woman via her legal representatives. Regarding the distinction between femininity and femaleness, see Toril Moi, “Feminist, Female, Feminine,” in The Feminist Reader (ed. Catherine Belsey and Jane Moore; 2d ed.; Houndmills: Macmillan, 1997) 104–16.
Gen 18:11–12. I have argued elsewhere that Gen 18:11 can well be understood as an example of “free indirect discourse” that reflects Sarah's own initial thoughts when hearing the messengers' promise. See Maren Niehoff, “Do Biblical Figures Talk to Themselves? Narrative Modes of Representing Inner Speech in Early Biblical Fiction,” JBL 111 (1992) 583–85.
Some of these questions have already been addressed in two pioneering studies of Sarah's image in Philo's midrash. These investigations concluded that Sarah is a prime example of Philo's general tendency to write women out of the traditions and history of his people. Dorothy Sly concludes that the “person Sarah whom Philo allows to emerge is thus only a shadow of the Biblical Sarah.”3
Dorothy Sly, Philo's Perception of Women (Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1990) 154.
Judith Romney Wegner, “Philo's Portrayal of Women—Hebraic or Hellenic?,” in “Women Like This”: New Perspectives on Jewish Women in The Greco-Roman World (ed. Amy-Jill Levine; Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1991) 55.
At the same time, however, the methodological assumptions of Sly's and Wegner's studies need to be reconsidered and their conclusions nuanced. Their work is compromised by their acceptance of an essential dichotomy between Judaism and Hellenism.5
The notion of an essential dichotomy between Judaism and Hellenism has influenced the study of Jewish Hellenism from the beginning of modern research. See Maren R. Niehoff, “Alexandrian Judaism in 19th Century Wissenschaft des Judentums: Between Christianity and Modernization,” in Jüdische Geschichte in hellenistisch-römischer Zeit: Wege der Forschung: Vom alten zum neuen Schürer (ed. Aharon Oppenheimer; Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1999) 9–28.
See especially Esther Fuchs, “The Literary Characterization of Mothers and Sexual Politics in the Hebrew Bible,” in Feminist Perspectives on Biblical Scholarship (ed. Adela Yarbo Collins; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1985) 116–22. For a survey of different feminist approaches, some more critical of the Bible, others allotting it a place in the history of feminist writings, see Ilana Pardes, Countertraditions in the Bible: A Feminist Approach (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992) 13–38.
Contra Betsy Halpern-Amaru (“The Portrait of Sarah in Jubilees,” in Jewish Studies in a New Europe [ed. Ulf Haxen, Hanne Traudner-Kromann, and Karen Lisa Goldschmidt Salamon; Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel, 1998] 336–48), who argued on rather speculative and apologetic grounds that Sarah in fact received special attention in Jubilees, taking for example the omission of incriminating details about Abraham in Gen 12:10–20 as a demonstration of “a particular concern for the characterization of Sarah” (ibid., 341).
I refer here to the particular voice of Sarah reflecting something of her inner life as a woman. Such a voice is quite naturally in conflict with the patriarchal environment in which she is staged, but can be either reconstructed and enhanced by the exegete or be repressed even more so than in the biblical story. For a discussion of the notion of women's voice, see Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).
Sarah B. Pomeroy, Women in Hellenistic Egypt: From Alexander to Cleopatra (New York: Schocken Books, 1984); and Jane Rowlandson, Women and Society in Greek and Roman Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Joan E. Taylor (Jewish Women Philosophers of First-Century Alexandria: Philo's “Therapeutae” Reconsidered [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003]) provides a thorough analysis of Philo's relevant texts, but is too far-reaching in her conclusions; see my review in Scripta Classica Israelica 23 (2004) 305–9.
Philo's midrash on Sarah must also be investigated in a comprehensive fashion. Considerable attention has thus far been given to certain passages in the Questions on Genesis and the Allegorical Commentary, while other books, such as On the Life of Abraham, have been neglected or even misunderstood.10
For a complete list of Philo's references to Sarah, see Peder Borgen, Kåre Fuglseth, and Roald Skarsten, The Philo Index: A Complete Greek Word Index to the Writings of Philo of Alexandria (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans; Leiden: Brill, 2000) 307. I do not discuss the passages from On the Posterity of Cain and His Exile (Post. 62, 76) that simply name Sarah as an exemplar of virtue.
Niehoff, Philo on Jewish Identity, esp. 18–19, 94–110.
Maren R. Niehoff, “Circumcision as a Marker of Identity: Philo, Origen and Genesis Rabbah on Gen. 17:1–14,” JQS 10 (2003) 89–123.
In light of Philo's attitude toward Eve and contemporary Jewish women, it is all the more remarkable that he did not reduce Sarah's importance. Since it has been argued that he actually wrote her out of Israel's history, it is worth stressing that he sharply differs in this respect from Josephus, who indeed limited her role as much as he could when retelling her story in his Jewish Antiquities. Josephus curtails Sarah's involvement in the drama over Hagar, writing that it was “by God's command” that Sarah brought Hagar to Abraham's bed, “so that he would beget children from her.”13
A.J. 1.187; Josephus follows Gen 16:2 LXX when suggesting that it is Abraham, not Sarah, who is supposed to have children from his union with Hagar; see also Marguerite Harl, La Genèse (vol. 1 of La Bible d'Alexandrie; Paris: Cerf, 1994) 167. Since Josephus grew up in Palestine and was familiar with the Hebrew Bible, his agreement with the LXX must be regarded as a significant choice.
Fuchs (“Literary Characterization,” 119–20) has stressed the male perspective and ideology that informs the biblical account of Sarah's sterility and subsequent fertility, arguing that Sarah emerges “as primarily a means of reproduction, the instrument through which God will keep his promise to Abraham.” This conclusion must to some extent be modified when we consider that Sarah's initiative to procure a child via a surrogate mother (Gen 16:1–2) precedes the scene where God promises Abraham offspring from Sarah (Gen 17:15–16). The biblical narrator thus portrays Sarah's own interests and initiative.
Josephus follows a similar line of interpretation regarding Sarah's relationship with God. In his account of the couple's journey to Egypt, when God is said to punish the Egyptians “on account of Sarah” (Gen 12:17), Josephus does not mention God's concern for the matriarch even when describing the divine intervention (A.J. 1.164). Yet the plot of the biblical story turns on God's concern for Sarah, which surfaces in the Antiquities only when Josephus must explain how Pharaoh knew that the calamity that had befallen him was due to the new woman in his house. Josephus has the Egyptian priests explain that “God's wrath” had come upon them because Pharaoh “wished to maltreat the stranger's wife” (A.J. 1.164). This rearrangement of the biblical material may seem harmless, yet it actually effects a subtle manipulation of the reader's sentiments.15
Such rearrangements of the biblical material are typical of Josephus's exegetical technique. See Maren R. Niehoff, “Two Examples of Josephus' Narrative Technique in His ‘Rewritten Bible,’” JSJ 27 (1996) 31–45.
Furthermore, Josephus minimizes Sarah's role at Mamre, where the couple encounters God's messengers. She is not even mentioned when Abraham prepares food for the visitors. In the biblical narrative, Abraham “rushed to the tent to Sarah and said, ‘Make ready three measures of fine flour, knead it, and make cakes ’ ” (Gen 18:6), but Josephus condenses this vivid notice to a statement that Abraham “ordered cakes of meal to be made” (A.J. 1.197). While the biblical Sarah, even though in the tent, still emerges as a distinct person and is directly addressed by her husband, she has become an anonymous servant in Josephus's account.16
While Fuchs (“Literary Characterization,” 121) has rightly pointed to Sarah's subordinate role in the biblical story, we must recognize that she still plays a significant part.
Gen 18:12–15. Fuchs (“Literary Characterization,” 121) has stressed the inequality in the biblical treatment of laughter in the two promises of the birth of Isaac: while Sarah is rebuked for it, Abraham is reassured as a result of it (Gen 17:17–22).
All of these examples indicate Josephus's tendency to write Sarah out of the biblical account. He lacks sympathy for the matriarch and makes no attempt to represent her point of view or her voice. Whenever he can, he omits her altogether, and on the remaining occasions he limits her role and distances her from God. Surprisingly, however, Josephus does introduce her in his retelling of a biblical story in which she is not mentioned: the Aqedah (Genesis 22). Yet his explanation of her absence confirms his previous tendency. According to Josephus's reconstruction, Abraham concealed his plans from Sarah as well as from his servants, fearing lest they prevent him from performing God's service.18
A.J. 1.225; see also Sebastian Brock, “Sarah and the Aqedah,” Le Muséon 87 (1974) 67–77, a fascinating study of this tradition from Josephus onwards in Palestinian and Syriac midrash, which increasingly integrates Sarah until she becomes a full partner in the Akedah.
With Josephus's treatment of Sarah as a foil, we are in a better position to grasp the nature and complexity of Philo's midrash, which displays a very different spirit and is indeed considerably more appreciative of the matriarch. His writings obviously did not serve as a model for Josephus. The sheer amount of references to Sarah in Philo's writings is impressive. Unlike Josephus, who avoided mentioning her even when seemingly obliged by Scripture, Philo voluntarily deals with this figure not only in the context of Abraham's biography, but in another treatise largely devoted to her and Hagar, as well as on numerous other occasions. Philo was clearly very interested in Sarah. And unlike Josephus, Philo, in his characteristic fashion, interpreted her both literally and allegorically, yielding a wealth and diversity of exegesis.
On the level of literal exegesis, Philo made one central and highly original contribution: in his Life of Abraham he rewrote Sarah's story with a sympathetic view to her person. Now, it should be noted that his reconstruction of Sarah's voice is by no means subversive of or a challenge to patriarchal values, but rather emerged within a distinctly patriarchal context. Indeed, in the Questions and Answers on Genesis, Philo opposed critics of Abraham who accused him of abandoning his wife and betraying the laws of marriage (QG 4.61). He thought that such Jewish Bible critics were in fact “deserving of condemnation” (QG 4.60).19
On Jewish exegetes in Alexandria, who were critical of the contents of Scripture, see Edmund Stein's short but important discussion in Alttestamentliche Bibelkritik in der späthellenistischen Literatur (Lwow: n.p., 1935) 4–10; see also J. Shroyer, “Alexandrian Jewish Literalists,” JBL 55 (1936) 261–84; David M. Hay, “Philo's References to Other Exegetes,” in Both Literal and Allegorical: Studies in Philo of Alexandria's Questions and Answers on Genesis and Exodus (ed. idem; Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1991) 81–98. The subject of literal Jewish exegetes in Alexandria deserves more attention than is feasible within the context of this article. A more detailed reconstruction of their work will be published separately.
In the following paragraphs, I examine Philo's treatment in the Life of Abraham of three episodes in the life of Sarah: her sojourn in Pharaoh's house (Genesis 12), her decision to offer her servant Hagar to Abraham as a surrogate mother (Genesis 16), and the visit of the messengers at Mamre (Genesis 18). Philo does not treat these episodes in the order in which they are narrated in Genesis. He reserves his account of Sarah, Hagar, and Abraham for the moment when he narrates her death. At that point he inserts a lengthy obituary of Sarah, using the story of her offer of Hagar to illustrate her virtues as a wife (Abr. 245–54). I begin with the obituary, because it contains Philo's broad appraisal of Sarah's character.
Philo's obituary of Sarah is unique in ancient exegesis. While other interpreters simply noted the fact of her death,20
See, e.g., Jub. 19:1–3; Josephus, A.J. 1.237.

(Abr. 256).
After this, In the course of time, his dearest wife, most noble in all things, died after having given countless examples of her love for her husband: her abandonment of family members together with him; her unhesitant migration from home; her continuous wanderings on foreign soil, one after the other; her privation during famine; and her attendance on campaigns during times of war. For always and everywhere was she near him as a help (

), leaving him at no place and time—truly a partner in life and in events throughout life (

), deeming it right to share the good things together with the bad. She did not, as some women do, shun misadventures and lie in wait for pieces of good luck, but accepted her lot in both realms with total readiness, as something belonging to and befitting a wedded woman. (Abr. 245–46)
Commenting on this passage, Sly insists that the term “partner” (

) must not mislead us into thinking that Philo implies true equality between Abraham and his wife. Sarah is instead merely cast in the minor role of “model helpmeet.”
22Sly, Perception of Women, 148.
Ibid. It is in the context of Migr. 126, 140, 142 that Sly criticizes Philo for ignoring her biblical role as a partner in the great migration, claiming that in the Bible, Abraham is not portrayed as making a solitary decision to migrate. The passage in Abr. 245–46 quoted above, she argues, while seemingly presenting her as partner, continues the same line as Migr.
“Abraham took Sarai his wife and Lot his nephew and all their possessions which they had acquired” (Gen 12:5); compare the introduction of Lot in Gen 12:4 as “going with Abraham.”
Philo's exegetical contribution emerges with particular clarity in his use of the term

, which he applies to Sarah but never uses in the context of other marriages. The term normally refers in Philo's work to the partnership between priests who perform sacrifices or rulers who share power.
25See Spec. 1.131, 221; Flac. 10; Legat. 23, 25, 32.
Indeed, according to Philo, Sarah is just as stoic as Abraham. The ability to leave behind a family and a familiar environment requires, as Philo explains (Abr. 62–65), considerable mental effort as well as the ability to overcome the tendency to remain attached to one's natural context. Sarah's willingness to migrate indicates her control over her passions. While she had less choice than her husband, she made his decision truly hers, willingly participating in Abraham's plan just as he was participating in God's. She could very well have acted differently, Philo points out, by complaining about the difficulties or even accusing her husband of forcing hard circumstances upon her. In Abr. 85–87, Philo dwells at considerable length on the difficulties involved in migration: one must accept detachment from home, insecurity, alienation from city life, and solitude, relying instead on vague hopes for a better future. Abraham mastered these difficulties and never complained on the journey (Abr. 85). Philo maintains that the same is true of Sarah, who bravely endured the strains of prolonged traveling on foreign soil. Among the extant sources, Philo is the first exegete to recognize what Sarah had to endure as a result of Abraham's migration. He calls his readers to appreciate her achievement, thus transforming her from a passive figure into an independent person.
In his obituary, Philo claims that the clearest proof of Sarah's character is to be found in her offer of Hagar to Abraham. Unlike Josephus, who suppressed her voice in this context and suggested that it was God who prompted Sarah to propose Abraham's union with Hagar, Philo permits Sarah to speak eloquently. Sarah does not merely say to her husband, as the Septuagint reports, “Behold now, God has prevented me from bearing children, go now into my maid so that you may have a child from her.”26
Gen16:2 LXX, rendering the Hebrew expression

by an exclusive reference to Abraham,

. Unlike Josephus, Philo does not seem to have had access to the Hebrew text and was thus unfamiliar with the idea that Sarah wanted children of her own. Philo has thus not presented her as “more self-effacing than she appears in the Bible,” as Sly (Perception of Women, 150) has suggested.
We have lived together for a long time, being well-pleasing to each other, but the purpose for which we ourselves came together and for which Nature has arranged the partnership of husband and wife, namely the birth of children, has not yet been fulfilled, nor is there any hope at all that hereafter [children will be born] from me, at least, for I am now past the age. Do not suffer on account of my infertility; and do not prevent yourself from becoming what you yourself can be, namely a father, only because of your kindness towards me. In my heart there should be no (

) jealousy toward another woman, whom you shall take not out of irrational passion, but in order to fulfill the indispensable law of Nature. Therefore I shall not delay in providing a bride for you who will surely make up for what is lacking in me. And if the prayers for the birth of children are answered, the offspring will be legally yours, and surely also mine by adoption. (Abr. 248–50)
Sarah's words so impressed Abraham, according to Philo, that he stood speechless in admiration for her unfailing love and her forethought. Convinced by her proposal, he immediately acted on it. Unlike Josephus, Philo is content with the biblical statement that Abraham obeyed Sarah (Gen 16:2).27
Compare Josephus's account in A.J. 1.187, and notice that Philo interprets Gen 16:2 allegorically in the same vein, stressing Abraham's obedience to virtue (Congr. 63). Contrast Sly (Perception of Women, 150–51), who overlooks Abr. 248–50 and argues that Philo “does not refer to Abraham's obedience to Sarah,” because it would have been a violation of marital hierarchy. Philo thus differs from Origen, who altogether denies the literal account and associates the issue of Abraham's obedience to Sarah with Adam's fateful obedience to Eve; see Origen, Homilies on Genesis and Exodus (trans. Ronald F. Heine; Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1982) 122.
Gen 21:12. Philo does treat this scene on the allegorical level, as I shall discuss below.
The principles of married life that Sarah explains to her husband are also those that Philo considered to be the central pillars of Mosaic law. Biblical legislation, he explains, generally aims at inculcating enkrateia and is particularly concerned to ensure that the choice of sexual partners guarantees legal offspring rather than pleasure.29
For details, see Niehoff, Philo on Jewish Identity, 94–110.
It is remarkable that Philo also has Sarah recite these principles, because he generally considered enkrateia to be a masculine virtue: one has to wrestle with oneself in order to discipline one's passions. Philo nevertheless allows Sarah to expound these principles of rational modesty in sexual matters. Her offer of Hagar becomes a paramount expression of Mosaic ethics. Indeed, Sarah imposes on herself a measure that goes beyond the normal requirements of the situation: on another occasion, Philo determined that it is halakhically acceptable for a married couple to stay together even though a problem of infertility has arisen (Spec. 3.35); he did not recommend the use of substitute spouses in such cases. Sarah's action is thus highly exceptional. While loving her husband dearly and being a true partner to him in all his endeavors, she advises him to employ a surrogate mother, banishing all jealousy from her heart. Her commitment to the Mosaic ideal of procreation thus proves far stronger than her personal attachment to Abraham. Her mind controls her emotions, setting a perfect example for her husband as well.30
Abraham is said to have had minimal intercourse with Hagar, fulfilling his procreative duties but not engaging in pleasure. Philo remarks that he owes this information to tradition (

, Abr. 253). Philo cites no such traditional authority for Sarah's speech, which seems to be his invention.
Sarah's speech radiates a sense of partnership not present in the biblical story. Sarah remarks that she herself finds her marriage fulfilling; she says that the marriage is a happy one, resting on mutual satisfaction. Moreover, according to Philo, both spouses seem to have been praying for offspring. In the biblical story, Abraham alone speaks to God about his lack of children (Gen 15:2). He alone is initially and repeatedly promised an heir (Gen 15:4, 17:16), while Sarah is only later—and indirectly—assured of her fertility (Gen 18:9–10). Esther Fuchs has rightly identified in these passages a strong expression of patriarchal ideology, which conceives of Sarah “as primarily a means of reproduction”; her fertility is a “logical and necessary procedure required by Yahweh's commitment to Abraham.”31
Fuchs, “Literary Characterization,” 120.
Philo's Sarah insists that the offspring from Abraham's union with Hagar will be his by legal parenthood, yet also hers by adoption. Her motherhood, even if only legal and not biological, is crucial. She will be the mother of Abraham's child even if she has not given birth to it. This interpretation of Sarah's role undoubtedly relies on Philo's halakhic understanding of matrilineality, according to which the child's status is determined by the mother as well as by the father.32
This concept is new in Judaism, as the Bible embraces a patrilineal halachah. For more details on the nature and circumstances of Philo's innovation, see Niehoff, Philo on Jewish Identity, 17–33; and eadem, “Jewish Identity and Jewish Mothers: Who Was a Jew According to Philo?” Studia Philonica Annual 11 (1999) 31–54.
Philo introduces his retelling of the story of Abraham and Sarah at Pharaoh's court blatantly patriarchal terms. He explains that this story deals with a threat to Abraham's marriage, which is ultimately “kept untouched and intact” by the help of God (Abr. 90). Philo similarly concludes his account by stressing that God granted to Abraham that his marriage, which was to become the fountain of a whole nation, should go unharmed (Abr. 98). Abraham and the purity of his lineage are thus the focus of the narrative: God intervenes in history in order to protect the patriarch's marriage. One can hardly imagine a more androcentric starting point. At the same time, however, and somewhat surprisingly, Philo also turns his attention to the matriarch. Although he clears Abraham of any responsibility for Sarah's plight, he shows more sympathy for her than previous interpreters had.
Philo introduces Sarah as a character in the Life of Abraham only when he begins to recount the couple's journey to Egypt. He then mentions that Abraham “had a wife most noble with regard to the soul and more beautiful in body than other women of her time” (Abr. 93). When they arrive in Egypt, her beauty is reported to Pharaoh and he sends for her. Philo stresses, contrary to the biblical account, that Pharaoh had no decent intentions, but merely wished to satisfy his passions and bring her to shame. Philo then approaches the crux of the biblical story, namely the opaque statement that “they [the chiefs of Egypt] brought her into Pharaoh's house.”33
Gen 12:15 LXX, slightly changing the Hebrew

(“and the woman was taken into the house of Pharaoh”); on the opacity of this verse, see Jacob Licht, Storytelling in the Bible (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1978) 91–92.
Nahmanides ad loc., stressing that the expression “it went well with Abraham” (Gen 12:16) echoes Abraham's own description of his tactics in Gen 12:13: “that it may be well with me because of you and that I may live on account of you.”
Sarah herself remains completely opaque in this biblical scene. She is not even called by name. Her feelings and experiences at Pharaoh's court are of no interest to the biblical narrator. This situation seems to have left even the earliest readers of the story uncomfortable. Some of the more striking gaps in the text have accordingly been filled in by the biblical narrator of the story of Abraham, Sarah, and Abimelech, when the same plot is repeated. In this tale, it is made clear that even though Sarah was taken by the foreign king, she was not actually touched (Gen 20:2–4). Indeed, we hear that Sarah complied with her husband's scheme, saying to Abimelech, “He is my brother” (Gen 20:5). The reader is reassured that Sarah was not violated because this time God promptly intervened on her behalf. Sarah moreover emerges as a distinct speaking character, insofar as her words are quoted by Abimelech. Her brief statement conveys her heroic attitude: even when confronted with the immediate prospect of being violated, she protects her husband.
Only two of the extant exegetes of the Second Temple period were curious about Sarah's situation in Pharaoh's house. Both the author of the Genesis Apocryphon and Josephus imagined what she said to Pharaoh. Gen 20:5 served as their model. In the Apocryphon, Sarah's statement that “he is my brother” is simply quoted in the context of Pharaoh's rather than Abimelech's court (XX, 10). Abraham explicitly acknowledges the beneficial effect of her words: “I was saved because of her and was not slain.”35
Gen. Apoc. 20:10, translation by Nahman Avigad and Yigael Yadin, A Genesis Apocryphon: A Scroll from the Wilderness (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1956) 43.
Josephus, as we saw above, tells a different story and lets Sarah speak the truth. It is from her that Pharaoh learns about Abraham's real status. Yet Sarah's own words are not explicitly mentioned in Josephus's account. Instead, Pharaoh explains how he was terrified by the turmoil caused by God and therefore “asked Sarah who she was and who was this man whom she had brought along” (A. J. 1.165). Sarah's reply is implicit in Josephus's concise remark that Pharaoh indeed “learned the truth” (ibid). Josephus characteristically silences Sarah. In this case he has also reduced her heroism: while the authors of Genesis 20 and the Genesis Apocryphon appreciate Sarah's courage, even if it is forced on her by her situation, Josephus seems to imply that she, as a woman, was not even capable of complying with her husband's scheme. When pressed, she revealed the secret of her identity.
Philo is the first to address the issue of Sarah's plight in Pharaoh's house. He reconstructs Sarah's situation with remarkable empathy, attributing to her not only words but thoughts and feelings as well, describing the whole episode from her perspective:
Seeing that in a foreign country at the house of an immoderate and savage-hearted ruler she was at a loss for someone to help her—for her husband was not able to assist, being afraid of the menacing terror of those more powerful—she took refuge together with him in the last alliance, which comes from God. (Abr. 95)
The reader is invited to identify with Sarah in her search for someone to rescue her from her dreadful situation. Her isolation is distressing. Abraham, on the other hand, is excused. Philo explains that he was powerless to interfere. In contrast to the biblical story, Abraham is a concerned husband who has turned to God for help. This detail appears already in the Genesis Apocryphon, where Abraham's full prayer is recorded (XX, 12–16). It is theoretically possible that Philo was familiar with this exegetical tradition. Yet his implication that Abraham prayed with Sarah (“she took refuge together with him”) can be understood as a creative interpretation introduced by Philo, who was ever concerned to defend Abraham. Since we know that he was sensitive to criticism of the patriarch's abandonment of his wife, it would be natural for him to supply details suggesting that Abraham had done everything he could to prevent Sarah's violation. The same apologetic concern surely inspired the author of the Genesis Apocryphon. Only Philo, however, has Abraham join in Sarah's prayer. In his midrash, Sarah has direct access to God and pleads for rescue from above. She speaks with an effective voice: God responds by punishing Pharaoh. This midrash on Sarah probably reflects the biblical statement that “God punished Pharaoh and his house … on account of Sarah, Abram's wife” (Gen 12:17). While the Septuagintal

does not convey the rich connotations of the Hebrew

(literally, “on account of the matter/word of Sarah”), it nevertheless provoked an exegesis which refers not only to the “matter” of Sarah, but also to her words.
Philo has only praise for Sarah in her role as Abraham's wife. In his midrash, the couple acts in perfect harmony and mutual understanding. Yet he does not reproach Abraham—who was, after all, responsible for the very plight with which Philo empathizes! This restraint is characteristic of Philo. His sympathetic reading of Sarah's story is by no means subversive, but remains firmly anchored in a patriarchal framework. He is definitely not a feminist in the modern mode who challenges the legitimacy of existing social hierarchies.36
On the subversive political roots of feminist literary criticism, see Glenn Jordan and Chris Weedon, Cultural Politics: Class, Gender, Race and the Postmodern World (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995) 177–216.
Gen. Rab. 41:2. For more details on Sarah's voice in Genesis Rabbah, see Maren R. Niehoff, “Associative Thinking in the Midrash Exemplified by the Rabbinic Interpretation of the Journey of Abraham and Sarah to Egypt” (in Hebrew), Tarbiz 62 (1993) 339–60; and Noam Zohar, “The Figure of Abraham and the Voice of Sarah in Genesis Rabbah” (in Hebrew), in The Faith of Abraham: In the Light of Interpretation throughout the Ages (ed. Moshe Hallamish, Hannah Kasher, and Yohanan Silman; Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2002) 71–86.
Finally, let us look at Philo's reading of the annunciation scene at Mamre (Gen 18:1–15). As mentioned above, the biblical scene is thoroughly focused on Abraham. It is he who meets the divine messengers, organizes their meal, and receives their promise of an heir. Sarah is confined to the tent. Noticing her absence, the messengers ask where she is, yet do nothing to effect her appearance (Gen 18:9–10). On the contrary, immediately after asking about Sarah, they resume their conversation with Abraham, while Sarah remains inside “listening through the door of the tent” (Gen 18:10). Even when her incredulous laughter provokes God's disapproval, she is only indirectly addressed through her husband.38
Gen 18:13. In Gen 18:15, it is not clear whether it is God or Abraham who insists that she has indeed laughed, even though she is now denying it.
Gen 17:17–19. See also Fuchs, “Literary Characterization,” 120–21.
Philo's rewriting of this biblical scene is remarkable. He observes that “the divine being of their nature had escaped his [Abraham's] attention” (Abr. 107). Abraham receives the three men as regular strangers and shows them the hospitality due human visitors. When the story opens, Abraham is not even aware of God's presence. Sarah, on the other hand, is no longer confined to the tent.40
In QG, where Philo proceeds from verse to verse and can thus not avoid the biblical report about Sarah's confinement to the tent, he simply states that “the literal meaning seems to be clear” and moves on to the allegorical sense (QG 4.13; see also QG 4.11).
But they [Abraham and Sarah] did not seriously pay attention to the promises because of the incredible nature of the matter. For having already passed the years of parenthood, they despaired of begetting children because of their exceedingly old age. It is written that after hearing it [the promise], the woman laughed in the beginning and then, when they [the messengers] said, “Is anything impossible for God?” she felt ashamed and denied her laughter. For she had certainly known that everything is possible for God, having learned this principle almost from the age when she was in swaddling clothes. It seems to me that it was then that she first no longer took the figures to be the same as they appeared, but comprehended their more awesome nature as either prophets or angels transformed from their spiritual and soul-like being into human shape. (Abr. 111–13)
In this passage, Philo transforms the ending of the biblical annunciation scene, which depicts the chastening of Sarah.41
Similarly, in the Questions on Genesis (4.17), where he cannot avoid addressing the issue, Philo interprets the rebuke as a praise.
For details on Philo's notion of Jewish education, see Niehoff, Philo on Jewish Identity, 161–86.
At the end of his account of the annunciation, Philo records his own view. “It seems to me,” he writes, that Sarah then recognized the divine nature of the messengers, perceiving their essence through their appearance. Philo's portrait of Sarah seems to have been inspired by the biblical note that she denied her laughter, because “she was afraid” (

, Gen 18:15 LXX). The verb

refers not only to the act of fearing, but often describes in Philo's writings a form of worshipping God which is to be distinguished from loving God. While the “love of God” is possible only for those who have a completely ethereal notion of the deity (Deus 69), more wordly figures such as Joseph demonstrate their fear of God by rejecting material things and recognizing the true God (Migr. 19–21). Similarly, the shepherds at the well were seized by awe or fear when they realized that Moses was not just another colleague, but a divine messenger (Mos. 1.57). This kind of recognition is now attributed to Sarah. Philo carefully explains the mental process involved, suggesting a Platonic advance through the perception of external appearances to the comprehension of spiritual essence. Philo's exegesis is all the more remarkable because he had earlier suggested that Abraham himself lacked this insight, as he failed to observe anything special about his guests. It was only Sarah who had a keen inclination towards the divine and, like Manoach's wife, recognized God's presence when confronted with it.
In Philo's literal exegesis of Sarah's story, she is treated with a degree of attention and empathy that was unusual in antiquity. Philo supplements the biblical text with a sympathetic understanding of her person. In his midrash she becomes a more complex as well as a more important character. She has been educated and is committed to the stringent ethics of Mosaic law. She recognizes the presence of God and prays to him for assistance regarding both her infertility and her plight in Pharaoh's house. The dreadful nature of her situation in Pharaoh's house is conveyed. Her initiatives are seconded by Abraham. Sarah is not only an ideal wife who accompanies and aids her husband, but an impressive matriarch in her own right. Philo's portrait of Sarah is richer than her biblical characterization, and he has positioned her closer to God.
This result is striking in view of Philo's general remarks about women and his interpretation of Eve in particular. How can we account for the difference in his attitude? Perhaps Sarah aroused Philo's sympathy because, unlike Eve, she personified nothing subversive but rather followed her husband and accepted her lot. Because she did not pose a threat to either Philo's patriarchal values or his theological convictions, Sarah could be exalted. More likely, Philo celebrated Sarah because she was the mother of the Jewish nation. While Eve was the mother of all, Sarah mothered a specific ethnicity. She is “our” ancestor, with whom Philo naturally identified, and as the Jewish matriarch, Sarah deserved the same exegetical care and concern as Abraham.
Having appreciated Philo's sympathetic reading of Sarah on the literal level, we may now ask how he proceeded on the allegorical level. Did he express a more critical attitude in this realm, as he did in the case of Joseph? The latter indeed fares well in the Life of Joseph, where he is portrayed as an exemplary politician, but draws harsh criticism when read as a figure of allegory. I have argued elsewhere that the discrepancy between these two approaches has to do with historical context. While in the biography Philo wished to idealize the biblical ancestor, he introduced a distinctly topical perspective in the allegories, criticizing Joseph as a symbol of assimilated contemporary Jews in Egypt.43
For details on Philo's double reading of Joseph, see Maren R. Niehoff, “New Garments for Joseph,” in Biblical Interpretation: History, Context and Reality (ed. Christine Helmer and Christof Landmesser; Atlanta, Ga.: SBL Press, forthcoming).
While Philo's literal exegesis of Sarah is concentrated in the Life of Abraham, his allegorical interpretations are dispersed among several of his writings. It is striking that the texts about Sarah that Philo reads allegorically are almost exclusively verses that he ignored in his literal exegesis. It is only on the allegorical level, for example, that we hear anything about Abimelech approaching Sarah (Genesis 20).44
Her. 258; QG 4.60–68.
Fug. 1–6; Congr. 139–40, 180. In QG 3.25, Philo also avoids confronting the implications of Sarah's maltreatment of Hagar, simply stating that “the literal meaning is clear” and then presenting an allegorical reading of Gen 16:6.
For details, see Niehoff, “New Garments.”
One more introductory statement on Philo's allegorical exegesis of Sarah is in order. We have seen that Philo vehemently condemned earlier Alexandrian critics who accused Abraham of abandoning his wife, and that he countered their charges with an innovative literal interpretation of Sarah. When he turns to Sarah as a figure of allegory, however, Philo expresses strong approval of several extant Alexandrian interpretations. But Philo's allegorical interpretation of Sarah is not wholly dependent on the work of predecessors: as he did in the literal realm, so too does he introduce innovative allegorical readings. In the following four sections, I treat Philo's discussion of earlier Alexandrian exegesis, his original approach to the report of Sarah's menopause (Gen 18:11); and his curious insistence on Sarah's parthogenesis, based on his reading of Gen 20:12.
In On the Change of Names 141–43, Philo cites four current interpretations of Gen 17:16 that all presuppose the Septuagint translation and dwell on the expression, “I will give you a son out of her (

).” Only the Greek preposition

, and not the Hebrew

, suggests the notion of “outside and beyond” on which these exegetical traditions are based. Philo thus refers to interpretations that must have developed in a Greek-speaking environment, probably Alexandria. The first three interpretations on Philo's list take

as a reference to the divine origins of spirituality. Some take it, he writes,
as a reference to that which comes into being outside of her [the soul] (

), holding that it has been judged best by right reason that the soul should display nothing beautiful as belonging to her own, but all has been added from outside (

) by the great benevolence of God, who grants in abundance. (Mut. 141)
“Out of her” is taken to mean “outside of her”: the soul produces offspring not from within itself, but from beyond, namely through the agency of God. A second group of interpreters takes

to mean “immediately,” indicating the swiftness with which God's gifts are given. A third group suggests that “virtue is the mother of all created good, receiving the seeds from nothing mortal” (Mut. 142). In these three interpretations, Sarah is no longer the historical matriarch, but a symbol of spiritual processes in the soul. These early Jewish exegetes in Alexandria seem to have applied the Platonic metaphor of the soul's pregnancy to the biblical report of Sarah's anticipated conception. While Plato had human creativity in mind, especially in the realm of philosophy and poetry, the Jewish exegetes adapted the image of spiritual pregnancy to a distinctly religious context and suggested that the soul is impregnated by God.
47See especially: Plato, Theaet. 149–50; Symp. 206c–211b; and Elisabeth Asmis, “Plato on Poetic Creativity,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 338–64.
See Yaira Amit's discussion of this motif, “Why Were the Matriarchs Barren?” in Reading from “The Beginning” (ed. Ruthi Ravitzky; Tel Aviv: Yediot Acharonot, 1999) 127–37. The Stoic motif can be found in Diogenes Laertius 2.79.
Philo's report of a fourth interpretation of

in Gen 17:16 indicates the variety of exegetes whom he knew, as well as his own tendency to embrace the allegorical approach. He reports that some “ask whether the barren indeed gives birth, since the oracles earlier describe Sarah as barren and now admit that she will become a mother” (Mut. 143). Philo replies in a leisurely and somewhat patronizing tone, as if to someone of limited learning, that the literal meaning must not be taken at face value: “It is not in the nature of a barren woman to bear children, just as the blind cannot see nor the deaf hear” (ibid.). The real meaning, Philo adds, emerges when we consider the underlying significance of the text and realize that Sarah is a symbol of the soul, which is sterile when entertaining wicked thoughts, but fruitful when retreating from passions and vices. The allegorical reading of Sarah that Philo adopts is remarkably similar to that of the previously cited interpreters, who were also to some extent gender-biased.
In the Life of Abraham, Philo cites a fifth allegorical interpretation advanced by certain “natural philosophers” (

, Abr. 99). He indicates right away that he sympathizes with the interpretation that they proposed, he stresses, “not without good purpose.” These exegetes, who are committed to an interpretation of Scripture in accordance with nature, have been correctly identified as Jewish allegorists of diverse philosophical backgrounds and various hermeneutical tendencies.
49Thus did Emile Bréhier (Les Idées Philosophiques et Religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie [Paris: J. Vrin, 1925] 56) and Edmund Stein (Die Allegorische Exegese des Philon [BZAW 51; Giessen: A. Töpelman, 1929] 26–27) correct Wilhelm Bousset, who argued that this group was composed of Jewish exegetes whose worldview was shaped by orthodox Stoic thought (Jüdisch-Christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandrien und Rom [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1915] 14). Note, nevertheless, that the

in the above example propose an interpretation which is based on the etymology of Sarah's name, a procedure typical of Stoic readings of Homeric texts, on which see A. A. Long, “Stoic Readings of Homer,” in Homer's Ancient Readers: The Hermeneutics of Greek Epic's Earliest Exegetes (ed. Robert Lamberton and John J. Keaney; Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992) 52–64; and G. R. Boys-Stones, “The Stoics' Two Types of Allegory,” in Metaphor, Allegory, and the Classical Tradition (ed. idem; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 193–201.
In the case of Abraham, Philo does not refer to the Chaldean roots of his name, but the process of interpretation can be recovered from QG 3:43 and Mut. 69, where Philo develops the allegory from “father of elect sound” to the mind of the virtuous person. Edmund Stein (Allegorische Exegese, 41–50) has argued that reference to Hebrew roots indicates an earlier source, because Philo himself was philologically incapable of producing his own Hebrew etymologies.
Lester L. Grabbe (Etymology in Early Jewish Interpretation: The Hebrew Names in Philo [BJS 115; Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1988] 119) discusses the etymology of Sarah's name as a rare example of Philo receiving an etymological tradition from a “certain school of exegetes,” whereas he usually relied on “onomastical lists” for etymological explanations of biblical names.

explained the extraordinary nature of the relationship between Abraham and Sarah by contrasting it with normal gender roles:
The aforementioned marriages [of the body and the soul] are contrary to each other. While in a marriage of the bodies the male sows and the female receives the seed, in a union of souls, by contrast, virtue, while seemingly holding the position of a wife (

), is by nature disposed to sow good counsels and serious instructions and propositions of tenets most useful for life, while reason, thought to hold the place of a husband, receives the holy and divine sowings.
52Abr. 100–1. I follow David M. Hay's analysis of this passage. Hay (“Philo's References to Other Allegorists,” SPhilo 6 [1979–1980] 52) argues that the opinions of earlier exegetes is paraphrased in Abr. 99–101a, and again in Abr. 103–5b, while 101b–2 represents a later critical appreciation of that tradition. This analysis makes far more sense than that of F. H. Colson (Philo [trans. F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker; 11 vols.; LCL; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1929–1962] 6:597–98, note on Abr. 100–2), who argued that Philo's critique of earlier opinions begins in Abr. 100, but then acknowledged unsolvable problems in Abr. 101 where Philo says (in Colson's translation), “perhaps however the statement above is a mistake.” Colson admits that the text thus understood is “not very clear.”
Presumed by this interpretation, of course, are the Aristotelian constructions of masculinity and femininity, which translate biological facts into broad cultural and philosophical categories.
53For Philonic examples and bibliography on Aristotle's notions, see Niehoff, Philo on Jewish Identity, 19.
Abr. 101b,

.

has misled exegetes to think that virtue assumes the role of wife, while the masculine gender of

was mistakenly understood to signify that mind performs the husband's function. He argues that virtue must be male because it is active, whereas the mind is feminine because it is the passive recipient of action: “Virtue is male, since it causes movement and affects conditions and suggests noble conceptions of noble deeds and words, while mind is female, being moved and trained and helped, and in general belonging to the passive category.”
55Abr. 102, quoted by Sly (Perception of Women, 153–54) as a proof that “Sarah is completely relieved of female characteristics.”
This question becomes especially intriguing in light of the fact that Philo on other occasions inverts gender roles and speaks of virtue as feminine. Richard A. Baer (Philo's Use Of The Categories Male And Female [Leiden: Brill, 1970] 62–63) has suggested that Philo's “male-female terminology is simply a very vivid means of concretizing or giving expression to these contrasts” between active and passive, or divine and human, and can thus change according to each particular context. I shall argue below that Philo's categories are far more substantial.
Philo's conviction on this matter is so strong that it colors his paraphrase of the earlier tradition. The statement that virtue “seemingly” holds the position of wife (Abr. 99) must surely be Philo's own, because the

certainly regarded physical and spiritual marriage as really, not just seemingly opposite. In their eyes, Sarah, interpreted as virtue, indeed functioned as a wife in spiritual marriage, but to Philo this was a false conclusion based on the misleading gender of the respective Greek nouns. His paraphrase of the earlier tradition prepares the reader to accept Philo's own criticism. These objections notwithstanding, it is important to remember that Philo accepted the allegorization of Sarah as virtue. He liked this allegorical tradition so much that he continued to paraphrase it in the Life of Abraham, after he had expressed his own reservations (Abr. 103). As I noted above, he also mentioned a version of it in connection with Gen 17:16. Philo appropriated this allegory for himself to the extent that on numerous other occasions he simply reproduces it without identifying its source.
57See especially QG 4:61, where Philo applies the allegory of Sarah as virtue to the problematic story of her stay in Abimelech's house; and also QG 3.19–20, 4.8; Cher. 9; Mut. 71, 77; Congr. 6, 11–12, 23, 71; Leg. 2.82, 3.244; Sacr. 59; Det. 59; Post. 130.
The Septuagint wording of Gen 18:11 led Philo to propose an innovative reading in the spirit of the earlier allegorists. In the Masoretic text, this verse simply reports the cessation of Sarah's monthly period; literally, it states, “There ceased to be for Sarah a way like [that of] women” (

). The Septuagint version, by comparison, is rather more suggestive: “There ceased to be for Sarah the menstrual cycle” (

).
58John W. Wevers, Genesis (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1974) 185.

, here used to indicate the menstrual cycle, has a wide range of meanings in Greek literature. Literally, it means “things pertaining to women,” and is used to denote the female sexual organs and female medical disorders as well as feminine garments and makeup;

is the women's quarter within a house, and the adjective

describes feminine or even effeminate character traits. It is in this broader sense that the word appears on other occasions in the Septuagint;
59See Deut 22:5 LXX, referring to women's garments; and Est 2:11 LXX, referring to the women's quarter.

refer to the menstrual cycle. The phrase is an appropriate rendering of the unusual Hebrew expression

(“a way like [that of] women”). Hippocrates and Aristotle had already used the term as an equivalent of

.
60LSJ 363 lists Hippocrates, Aph. 5.28, and Aristotle, Part. an. 648a31, as occurrences of

in the sense of

.

indicates that Sarah was in a continuous menopausal state.
Given the broad range of meanings that could be attached to

, however, the Greek sentence could easily be read as implying an intriguing double extendre. This is precisely the path that Philo took. He understood Sarah to be the subject, rather than the object of the action.
61On one occasion Philo quotes this verse with the verb at the end of the sentence:

(Det. 28).

, which is grammatically superfluous in his interpretation of the verse (Fug. 128). On other occasions, Philo qualifies the expression

by adding “all,” underlining the broader cultural meaning of this term and eliminating the possibility that it could refer to the menstrual cycle.
62Cher. 50; Ebr. 60.

as a reference to women's quarters and applies it to the soul (QG 4.15). Sarah's departure from womanly ways, he asserts, teaches us that we have to leave the women's quarters of the soul and embrace manly virtues.
On the Cherubim contains a key passage in which Philo elaborates his views on Sarah's departure from womanly ways (Cher. 41–50). He begins by stating that the biblical accounts of the marriages of heroes to their respective wives must have been meant allegorically, because these men are described as virtuous and thus could not have associated with real women. This is so, Philo concludes, “because we say (

) that women are symbolically sense perception, whereas learning comes into being through estrangement from sense perception and body” (Cher. 41). The wives must thus be interpreted as virtues, especially as the name Sarah means “sovereign and leader” (

). Philo alludes here to the etymological explanation of Sarah's name that he reported in greater detail in Abr. 99, and names the virtues that correspond to various biblical wives. He then embarks on an excursus on their pregnancies and birth pangs. Philo's explanations require that he use erotic imagery, which he fears may be misunderstood, and so he he warns that he will talk about holy mysteries which should be received only by the initiated.
63Cher. 42. Scholars have discussed whether Philo can indeed be identified as a mystic. See David Winston, “Was Philo a Mystic?” in Studies in Jewish Mysticism (ed. Joseph Dan and Frank E. Talmage; Cambridge, Mass.: Association for Jewish Studies, 1982) 15–39; and compare Christoph Riedweg (Mysterienterminologie bei Platon, Philon und Klemens von Alexandria [Berlin: de Gruyter, 1987]) argues, rather unconvincingly, for a merely metaphorical use of mystery terminology in Philo's work.
One must really begin the initiation (

) in the following way. Following nature, man comes together with woman, the human male with the human female in order to have intercourse for the purpose of producing children. But it is not right for virtues that produce numerous and perfect offspring to share in the lot of mortal man. Yet without receiving seed from someone else, from themselves alone they will never become pregnant. Who, then, is he who sows good seeds in them, if not the Father of existing things, the unbegotten God who begets everything? He sows, but he gives as a gift his own offspring, that which he has sown. For God does not produce anything for himself, insofar as he is in need of nothing, but [produces] everything for the one who asks to receive.
64
. Note that

could also be translated as “to miss, lack,” but the active sense of asking better suits the continuation, where Abraham's longing for wisdom is rewarded by God.

), and as bearing offspring not to the Author of her visitation but to the one who is longing to attain wisdom (

), this person being called Abraham. (Cher. 43–45)
Philo explains in this passage the mystery of how virtue is begotten by God. Virtue (

) assumes a female role since “she” is impregnated and gives birth. This impregnation cannot be achieved by a mere human male, but instead requires God's presence. Sarah thus symbolizes the human mind's converse with the deity. Philo's explanations closely follow the allegory of his Alexandrian predecessors, who suggested that Sarah is “virtue … receiving the seeds from nobody mortal” (Mut. 142). Yet Philo elaborates further, probing the triangular relationship between Sarah, God, and Abraham. He proposes a rich exegesis of Gen 21:1, “And the Lord visited Sarah, as he said, and the Lord did to Sarah as he spoke.” Philo is keenly aware that this verse mentions only God and Sarah, while the following verse states that she became pregnant and “delivered a son to Abraham” (Gen 21:2). Filling in the gap in the biblical narrative, Philo suggests that Sarah had actually been “left alone” by her human husband and was thus ready to receive the divine seed. Her offspring, however, is donated to Abraham, who “is longing to attain wisdom.” It is striking how easily Philo moves here from virtue to wisdom, simply exchanging these two feminized abstractions. It furthermore emerges that Abraham, when obtaining wisdom, receives his wife back, after she has been impregnated by God. This arrangement conjures a ménage à trois through which the human and divine realms are conflated. Yet Philo's insistence that his teaching is only meant for the initiate suggests that he wished to keep from sounding any mythological overtones when speaking of the deity's intercourse with real human women.
65In Mut. 137–38, Philo also stresses Isaac's generation from God, using the same cautious formulations (“but this saying is not for all to hear, so strongly does the evil tide of superstition flow in our minds and drown unmanly and degenerate souls,” Mut. 138). See also Det. 124, where Philo says “God may with perfect truth be said to be the father of Isaac.”
Leah and Tamar, who were not only left alone by human males, but even rejected by them, are favorite figures in Philo's allegorical midrash, illustrating the soul's impregnation by God (see, e.g., Post. 135; Leg. 3.181; Cher. 46; and similarly concerning Hannah in Deus 5).
Philo's exegesis does not seem to have been particularly eccentric for its time. It strongly resembles the image of the student seeking personified Wisdom in the Wisdom of Solomon. The male protagonist describes his search for Wisdom in erotic terms: “I loved her,” he says, “and I desired to take her as a bride for myself” (Wis 8:2). At the same time, wisdom also “enjoys intimacy with God and the Master of all loved her.”67

(Wis 8:3; translation by David Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon [AB 43; New York: Doubleday, 1979] 191). Winston also pointed (ibid., 193–94) to parallels between the erotic language of this passage and various Philonic discussions.
After Philo has carefully outlined the conditions of God's converse with virtue/wisdom, giving particular emphasis to the separation between the divine and the human realms, he describes the nature and effect of such intercourse. The basis of his explanation is Gen 18:11, which he now reads in the context of Jer 3:4 LXX, “the husband of your [God's] virginity.”68

. This phrase is not otherwise attested in LXX, the standard rendition of the Hebrew expression

being

.
In contrast to us, it is proper for God to hold converse with the truly virgin nature, which is undefiled and untouched and pure. For the union of human beings which serves the purpose of producing children turns virgins into women. But whenever God begins to consort with the soul, he renders her who was previously a woman a virgin once more (

), because after taking away the low-born and unmanly passions by which it [the soul] has become feminine, he replaces them with indigenous and unmixed virtues. He will at any rate not converse with Sarah before she leaves all the ways of women [Gen 18:11] and resorts to the condition of a pure virgin (

). (Cher. 50)
Here Philo inserts a radical paraphrase of Gen 18:11. Stating that Sarah left “all” womanly things, he then asserts that she has returned to a state of virginity. This interpretation assumes that femininity equals sexuality, and that leaving womanly ways implies celibacy. It is not clear from Philo's words precisely when Sarah became a virgin once more. Did her converse with God result in such a complete eradication of the passions that she became as pure and innocent as she was before knowing man? Or did she become a virgin first, as the end of the above passage indicates, and thus qualify to be visited by God? This distinction seems important, because it implies different agencies. In the first case, virginity is assumed to be a spiritual gift from God; in the second case, it is the result of Sarah's chosen abstinence from womanish ways. Important as this distinction appears to be, it does not trouble Philo, for whom these two aspects seem to have complemented each other. As the parallel case of Abraham shows, human effort at enkrateia is a prerequisite for God's gracious visitation, which in turn strengthens one's ability to sublimate the passions. The symbol of virginity is thus used here in a somewhat loose sense, representing either a substantial taming of the passions or their complete eradication.
Virginity is an important topic in Philo's writings. We saw above that he generally distinguished the Jews on account of their enkrateia in sexual matters. His Joseph was proud to tell Potiphar's wife that “we come as virgin men to virgin maidens” (Jos. 43). Philo clearly envisions virginity here as a temporary state, which is later replaced by a period of marriage and procreative sex. Virginity is thus important, but not as an end in itself. It therefore comes as a surprise that Philo praises the women among the Therapeutae for being “mostly aged virgins” who have chosen celibacy “not under compulsion … but of their own free will in their ardent yearning for wisdom” (Contempl. 68). Seeking wisdom clearly demands abstinence, especially in women, but also in men.69
Taylor (Jewish Women Philosophers, 249) has stressed a significant difference between the men and the women among the Therapeutae: only the former are said to have left behind children (Cont. 13, 18) and thus fulfilled their procreative duties before joining the group.
Taylor, Jewish Women Philosophers, 249–62. Taylor mistakenly thinks that the obligation of procreation applied already in Philo's time to the men only (ibid., 249). Her evidence is Mishnaic and thus chronologically problematic. Moreover, Philo himself never distinguishes in this respect between men and women.
Even when his respect for the Therapeutae is taken into account, Philo's interpretation of Sarah's virginity is astonishing. Sarah, he asserts, withdrew from the realm of women and became a virgin again as God took away “the low-born and unmanly passions, by which it [the soul] has become feminine” (Cher. 50). Her renewed virginity is the result of the process of becoming masculine. Neither real life nor the paradox of spirituality can account for this surprising turn in Philo's exegesis. What is the source of this motif? I shall argue that the myth of Athena is the key to understanding his interpretation and appreciating his originality. Going beyond the work of earlier exegetes, Philo attributed to Sarah some of the well-known characteristics of the Greek goddess of wisdom, weaving mythological imagery into his reading of Gen 18:11. This move becomes particularly clear in a passage in On Drunkenness, where Philo interprets the verse in light of Abraham's statement that Sarah is his half-sister, the daughter of his father but not of his mother (Gen 20:12). Sensitive to the Greek expression

, which can easily be understood in a more general sense than the Hebrew

(“[she is] not the daughter of my mother”), Philo reads this verse in a radically new way:
She herself [Sarah] is introduced by the oracles as “having left all the womanish things” when she was about to bear and give birth to the self-taught nature, which is called “Isaac.” It is moreover said that she was born motherless from a father (

), but not from a mother, having obtained her lot only in ties of kinship, while lacking a share in the female stock. For someone said somewhere: “In reality she is my sister, being [born] of [my] father, but not of [my] mother (

, Gen 20:12).” For she is not born of the sense-perceptible material, ever in a state of formation and dissolution, that some, in whom the sprout of wisdom first grew, called mother and rearer and nurse of created things, but [she is born] of the Cause of all things and the Father. (Ebr. 60–61)
Philo suggests that Sarah left “womanly things” in an even more radical sense than has hitherto emerged. Not only has the matriarch returned to virginity, as we learned in the previous passage; now she is said to lack female descent altogether! She is born from the father's side alone. Philo quotes Gen 20:12 as a proof for this claim, yet the gap between the meaning of this verse and Philo's midrash is glaring. He obviously took the ambiguous expression

out of context and interpreted it very creatively. Most striking is his inference that Sarah's motherless birth means that she was born from God, the Father of all things. What made Philo translate a verse that could be interpreted to mean that Sarah lacks a mother as a reference to her divine genealogy? He alludes to some possible sources of inspiration for his proposal, some men “in whom first the sprout of wisdom grew.” Philo may have had in mind various passages in Plato's Timaeus that speak of hylē as mother and nurse.
71Colson (3:348 n. a) suggests Tim. 51a, 49a, 52d.

), having been born only of her father, God of all things, lays claim only to male descent” (Her. 62). The crucial question is, What led Philo to move from Gen 18:11 and 20:12 to the notion of Sarah's divine genealogy?
As I indicated above, the key to understanding Philo's interpretation of Sarah is the figure of Athena. This goddess was described in antiquity as a motherless virgin and Zeus's daughter, who sprang directly from his head and not from a motherly womb.
72Hesiod, Theog. 924:

, in Martin L. West, Hesiod: Theogony Edited with Prolegomena and Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966). See also West's commentary (ibid., 401–3), where he identifies this version as the older one, reflecting primitive views of the head as a source of generation. For surveys of Athena's complete image and reception in antiquity, see especially F. Dümmler, “Athena,” in Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft (Stuttgart: T. B. Metzler, 1896) 4:1941–2020; Walter Burkert, Greek Religion (trans. John Raffan; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985) 139–43; and Martin P. Nilsson, Geschichte Der Griechischen Religion (Munich: Beck, 1941) 410–16.
Burkert, Greek Religion, 142.
Eumenides 736–39; trans. Herbert W. Smyth, Aeschylus (2 vols.; LCL; Cambridge, Mass: 1926) 2:343–45. See also comments ad loc. in Alan H. Sommerstein, Aeschylus: Eumenides (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 229–31. I wish to thank Yehuda Liebes for drawing my attention to this passage and discussing it with me.

, “virgin”) had been erected in Athens.
75For details, see Burkert, Greek Religion, 142. It is interesting that Nilsson regards Athena's virginity as a necessary outcome of her character which was too independent to be subordinated to a man (“um einem Mann untergeordnet zu werden,” Geschichte, 410).

, On The Bath of Pallas, lines 134–35; text and trans. by Anthony W. Bulloch, Callimachus: The Fifth Hymn Edited with Introduction and Commentary [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985] 102–3. See also Bulloch's comments ad loc. (ibid., 242–43). Bullock stresses (ibid., 20–21) that the masculine traits of Athena must not obscure the fact that in both ritual and tradition she remained associated also with femininity and fertility, being called “Mother” in Elis for having assisted in the conception of children.

(ibid., 133); compare Bulloch's translation, “her father's full powers,” which is more specific and ignores the aspect of her legitimate claim to her father's inheritance.
Philo knew Hellenistic sources that transformed these familiar images of Athena into philosophical allegories. He usually cites such traditions in connection with the seventh day of creation, as celebrates the unique qualities of the hebdomad. He is particularly intrigued by the fact that the number seven is neither a factor nor a multiple of any of the numbers of the first decade: it is both “barren” and without a “parent.” “For this reason,” Philo says, “the Pythagoreans, applying themselves to an explanation [of the hebdomad], liken her to the ever-virgin and motherless, because she was neither delivered from the womb nor will she give birth” (Leg. 1.15).
78
.

does not mean “indulging in myth,” as Colson translates it (1:155), since the verb refers only to actions of saying, speaking, and explaining.

), who, tradition has it, appeared out of Zeus's head (

).”
79Opif. 100. See also David T. Runia's comment in Philo of Alexandria: On the Creation of the Cosmos According to Moses: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (ed. idem; Leiden: Brill, 2001) 273.

. Philo is thus clearly familiar with a Pythagorean interpretation of Athena that associates this goddess with the barren and motherless number seven.
80Horst R. Moehring (“Arithmology as an Exegetical Tool in the Writings of Philo of Alexandria,” in The School of Moses: Studies in Philo and Hellenistic Religion [ed. John P. Kenney; Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1995] 155) has posited a Neopythagorean source, even though Philo mentions this school only in Leg. 1.15, while speaking in Opif. 100 of “other philosophers” in distinction from the Pythagoreans. Runia (On the Creation, 274) lists three post-Philonic sources referring to a Pythagorean interpretation of Athena as hebdomad (Anatolius, Theon, and Lydus). Plutarch certainly thought that this was a Pythagorean motif, one of the many examples of their general tendency to “embellish also numbers and figures with the appellations of the gods” (Is. Os., 354f, 381f). It is worth remembering that the Pythagoreans were formidable allegorical readers of Homer, significantly contributing to the early process of transforming Homer into a theologian. See Jean Pépin, Mythe et Allégorie (Aubier: Montagne, 1958) 95–97; and Robert Lamberton, Homer the Theologian (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986) 31–43.
Philo draws on Pythagorean traditions about Athena elsewhere in his work,81
See, e.g., Spec. 2.56; QG 2.12; Her. 170; Decal. 102.
Her. 216:

Philo mentions the two alternative Pythagorean interpretations of the hebdomad in Leg. 1.15 and Opif. 100b. It is not necessary to assume a misunderstanding or a corruption of Philo's text. Plutarch is again helpful, illustrating the exegetical variety which apparently characterized the Pythagorean tradition. In Is. Os. 354f he reports the Pythagorean identification of Athena with the hebdomad, while speaking in 381f about their equation of Athena with the triangle. Since Plutarch in these contexts did not pursue any visible exegetical agenda of his own, his witness must be trustworthy. Such variety is also attested by Philo, who puts it to creative exegetical use.
French scholars have tended to regard Philo's fragment of Philolaus as authentic (Pierre Boyancé, “Études Philoniennes,” REG 76 [1963] 91–95; and Armand Delatte, Études sur la littérature Pythagoricienne [Genève: Slatkine, 1974] 157–59). Other scholars have been more skeptical: see Carl A. Huffman, Philolaus of Croton: Pythagorean and Presocratic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 334–39; and Holger Thesleff, The Pythagorean Texts Of The Hellenistic Period (Abo: Akademis Forlag, 1965) 151 n. 10. See also the previous note.
The evidence does not permit us to determine whether the Pythagoreans themselves interpreted Athena's birth from Zeus's head as the birth of seven from the sovereign One and not from hylē.
This is precisely what Philo says about Sarah. Interpreting Gen 20:12, he suggested, as we saw above, that “she is not born of the sense-perceptible material (

), ever in a state of formation and dissolution, that some … called mother and rearer and nurse of created things, but [she is born] of the Cause of all things and the Father” (Ebr. 61). It is clear that the Pythagorean interpretation of Athena led Philo to infer Sarah's divine ancestry from her biblical identification as Abraham's paternal half-sister. In Greek tradition in general, Athena's motherlessness was explained by her birth from Zeus's head. These two aspects were intrinsically connected, a fact that prompted Philo to explain Sarah's lack of a mother by reference to her birth from God. Furthermore, Philo draws on distinctly Pythagorean Athena traditions. In fact, he never refers to Athena in other than Pythagorean terms, always referring to the goddess as a symbol of the hebdomadic principle in creation. It is thus not surprising that he attributed to Sarah a birth untainted by hylic matter.
Another Pythagorean Athena tradition preserved in Philo's writings is highly relevant to his interpretation of Sarah. In the Life of Moses, Philo once more addresses the subject of the hebdomad, in the context of the seventh day:
For [Moses] found [the hebdomad] in the first place to be motherless, having no share in female descent (

), begotten by the Father alone yet without seed, and brought to the birth yet without conception. Then he saw not only this, that she is all-beautiful and motherless, but that [the hebdomad] is ever virgin, neither [born] from a mother, nor [herself] a mother, neither born of mortality nor fated to be ruined. (Mos. 2.210)
Philo uses here the classical epithet of Athena—“having no female descent”—in exactly the same way as he did when describing Sarah's genealogy, remarking that the matriarch has “no share in female descent” (

, Ebr. 61). Moreover, Philo stresses that the special nature of the hebdomad is connected to its unusual birth from the Father. Reflecting Pythagorean asceticism, he speaks of a generation without seed and a delivery without conception. This paradox is augmented by the assertion that the hebdomad was not only motherless, but also, like Athena, a pure virgin. It is precisely this network of motifs that recurs in Philo's interpretation of Sarah. As we saw above, he distinguished her impregnation by God from regular human intercourse. He also remarked that “whenever God begins to consort with the soul, he renders her who was previously a woman a virgin once more” (Cher. 50). God's intercourse with Sarah is clearly not of the common sort but rather follows Pythagorean paradigms. Furthermore, Philo's exegetical leap from Gen 18:11 to Sarah's virginity is fully comprehensible in light of the Pythagorean traditions about Athena.
To summarize: Philo's allegorical reading of Sarah as virtue constructs a distinctly masculine figure that is altogether devoid of “womanly things,” to the extent that Sarah does not even have a mother. It is striking that Philo chose both to identify Sarah with a goddess who appears masculine already in the ancient myths and, in addition, to adopt Pythagorean motifs that augment those traits.86
On the masculinity of Athena in ancient myth, see Sarah B. Pomeroy, Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity (New York: Schocken Books, 1975) 4.
Plutarch, Is. Os. 352a, 354c, 376a.
See especially ibid., 366a.
When compared with his literal exegesis of Sarah, Philo's allegorical readings are a surprise. While Philo praises her on this level also, suggesting that she is worthy of the closest ties with God, we cannot avoid the impression that Philo's attitude towards her femininity has rather radically changed. In the Life of Abraham, Philo proved to be exceptionally sympathetic to her as a woman. He recognized her plight in Pharaoh's house, praised her efforts at accompanying and supporting her husband, and suggested that she too had been educated about the nature of God and that she prayed to him directly. When reading Sarah allegorically, by contrast, Philo makes considerable efforts to extricate her from the realm of femininity, which he now identifies with the inferior material world. Sarah is thus appreciated precisely because she lacks female genealogy and feminine characteristics: she is the masculine daughter of a masculine God.
How can this striking difference be explained? The case of Joseph provides a useful parallel. As we saw above, Joseph fared well in his biography, but was harshly criticized elsewhere in Philo's writings. Philo's perspective had changed. While he wished to portray an exemplary forefather in the Life of Joseph, he was otherwise concerned with topical matters pertinent to Egyptian Jewry. It was his resentment of the latter's acculturation that led him to view Joseph in negative terms. Philo used Joseph as a symbol of what he perceived to be the weaknesses of Egyptian Jewry. A similar dynamic may have played a significant role in the case of Sarah. As the matriarch of the Jews, she deserved Philo's special attention and praise. Unlike Josephus, he did not write her out of the history of his people; indeed, he allotted her more space than the biblical narrator had allowed. Sarah's voice is heard in Philo's account more than in Scripture and more than in any other midrash of the period. Her womanhood is not only portrayed in positive terms but also depicted as conducive to a state of proximity to God. Sarah is thus not only Abraham's exemplary wife, but also a person who prays to God and receives his assistance. Like Joseph, who represents the ideal statesman of the Jews in his biography, Sarah represents the ideal Jewish wife and matriarch. She is a model for contemporary Jewish women.
In his allegorical readings of Sarah outside the Life of Abraham, however, Philo raises topical concerns. While he uses Joseph to express his worries about Jewish assimilation to Egyptian culture, his use of Sarah illustrates his concern about the threats posed by femininity to male rationality. On the allegorical level, Abraham could not have married a real wife, since women represent sense perception and thus intellectual decline. Abraham, Philo claims, instead pursued wisdom and nourished his virtuous soul. Sarah no longer represents an ideal human wife but becomes a distinctly masculine figure in the image of the Pythagorean Athena. I have mentioned that Philo's choice is striking, in view of the fact that Athena was identified in Egypt with the highly feminine goddess Isis. Philo's preference for Athena's exclusively masculine traits over Isis's femininity may be interpreted as his rejection of local, contemporary traditions. That is, just like his allegorical treatment of Joseph, Philo's allegorical interpretation of Sarah may indicate that he is sensitive to the dangers of Jewish acculturation to Egyptian culture. As I have shown elsewhere, Philo harbored a deep disgust for Egypt and its ways.89
See Niehoff, Philo on Jewish Identity, ch. 2.
What does this analysis of Sarah in Philo's midrash contribute to our general understanding of his attitude towards women? I began this article by criticizing the view that Philo's interpretation of the matriarch simply embodies a misogyny that he inherited from Hellenism and transmitted to Western theology. It has become abundantly clear by now that the picture is far more complex and intricate. Philo certainly was a conservative who did not challenge prevalent patriarchal structures, and he reproduced contemporary stereotypes about gender and sexuality. At the same time, however, he was surprisingly capable of recognizing the specific virtues of an individual woman and appreciating the historical matriarch: he is far more sympathetic to Sarah than the biblical narrators were. His philosophical preconceptions of masculine activity and feminine passivity, however, lead him in his allegorical interpretation of Sarah to go to great lengths to strip her of her femininity. At the same time, however, we must appreciate that Philo is willing to idealize Sarah as a personification of masculinity who enjoys the closest ties to God—a position that is, I think, much preferable to Josephus's consistent and complete silencing of women's voice.