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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2004
Since the late 19th century, modern nation-states have sought to fix pastoral nomadic societies through various policies of settlement and sedentarization. One of the most basic has been the transformation of open and permeable frontiers into closed borderlands. While many writers have assumed that the inevitable fate of nomads is to become settled and converted into agriculturalists, a few rare voices have called attention to the resilience of pastoral ways. In this respect, the work of M. Nazif Shahrani has been pioneering. In his classic The Kirghiz and Wakhi of Afghanistan: Adaptation to Closed Frontiers and War (originally published in 1979), Shahrani suggests that in the Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan there has been no clear progression from nomadic to settled or urban life and that “both nomadization of agriculturalists and sedentarization of nomads has always occurred” in marginal environments (p. 221). While the closing of frontiers in late-19th- and early-20th-century Central Asia imposed dire limits on the Kirghiz, bringing them territorial loss and severing their socio-economic ties with Chinese and Russian Turkistan, they were nevertheless able to remain herders by moving to the high altitudes of the Afghan Pamir, “the roof of the world” (bam-i dunya).
Since the late 19th century, modern nation-states have sought to fix pastoral nomadic societies through various policies of settlement and sedentarization. One of the most basic has been the transformation of open and permeable frontiers into closed borderlands. While many writers have assumed that the inevitable fate of nomads is to become settled and converted into agriculturalists, a few rare voices have called attention to the resilience of pastoral ways. In this respect, the work of M. Nazif Shahrani has been pioneering. In his classic The Kirghiz and Wakhi of Afghanistan: Adaptation to Closed Frontiers and War (originally published in 1979), Shahrani suggests that in the Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan there has been no clear progression from nomadic to settled or urban life and that “both nomadization of agriculturalists and sedentarization of nomads has always occurred” in marginal environments (p. 221). While the closing of frontiers in late-19th- and early-20th-century Central Asia imposed dire limits on the Kirghiz, bringing them territorial loss and severing their socio-economic ties with Chinese and Russian Turkistan, they were nevertheless able to remain herders by moving to the high altitudes of the Afghan Pamir, “the roof of the world” (bam-i dunya).
Shahrani depicts the Pamir Mountains of Afghanistan as a land of retreat and refuge, a sanctuary for those compelled to take flight. The Pamir Mountains were “a no man's land” for authorities and a sanctuary for those fleeing from them. During the 19th century, groups of the Kirghiz, who had migrated from Mongolia to Xinjiang Province 1,000 years before, began to practice “vertical nomadism” in the Afghan Pamir, climbing to the upper pastures in warmer seasons to graze their herds (p. 48). Russian inroads into Kirghiz territory, beginning with the pacification of Ferghana in 1898, led other Kirghiz families to take refuge in the Afghan Pamir. Following the unsuccessful liberation movements of the Turks of Central Asia against the Russians that began in 1916—known as the basmachi, or “bandits,” rebellion among the Bolsheviks—numerous Kirghiz families fled to Kashgaria and Kulja in Xinjiang (p. 39). More Kirghiz tribes moved to the Afghan Pamir following the communist revolution in China in 1949 (p. 49). This is all reminiscent of Ibn Khaldun's “Mountains are safe from their destructiveness…flat territory falls victim to their prey” (The Muqaddimah). For the Kirghiz, pastoral mobility is a political as well as an ecological decision (p. 220).
While detailing the adaptability of a pastoral subsistence economy, Shahrani also stresses that the world of the Kirghiz was radically changed with the formation of nation-states: “there are no real places of refuge left” (p. 222). Following the closing of the Russian and Chinese frontiers, 2,000 members of the Kirghiz confined themselves year-round to the Afghan Pamir. Without access to pastures in the lowland steppes, they were forced to discontinue their traditionally extensive pasture ranges and vertical migrations in favor of intensive grazing patterns. Although the Kirghiz still maintained herds in the Pamir, they had to adjust the composition of their herds, increasing the number of sheep and yak they possessed while lowering the number of horses and camels. This was accompanied by changes in Kirghiz society. With the closing of frontiers, individual families made claims to the ownership of pastures and campgrounds, and attempts were made to improve pastures through irrigation works (p. 224). The structure of Kirghiz political organization was altered as tribal khans became officially sanctioned under the title of qaryadar, or village headman, by the Afghan state. According to Shahrani: “the traditional, somewhat egalitarian, and rather loosely structured Kirghiz” became socially stratified (pp. 226–28).
The updated edition of The Kirghiz and the Wakhi of Afghanistan, published in 2002 with a new Preface and Epilogue, addresses questions regarding the current crisis in Afghanistan and traces the movements of Kirghiz tribes from the Afghan Pamir to the province of Van in Anatolia since the book's original publication. Shahrani suggests that the “root causes” of the problems facing modern Afghanistan are political, not religious, a result of the alienation brought on by the imposition of the centralized nation-state on Afghan societies (p. xxvi). While the new Preface looks into the current state-building effort in Afghanistan, in the Epilogue Shahrani chronicles the relocation of the Kirghiz to eastern Anatolia following the communist coup in Kabul in 1978.
One would have also liked to see Shahrani bring some of the ethnography up to date. The bibliography does not contain a single work published after the 1970s. In light of recent scholarship on ethnicity in South and Southeast Asia, as well as in China, Shahrani might have thought again about the social and political making of Kirghiz identity over time. Although Shahrani mentions that the Kirghiz “were not originally Turks and were Turkicized very early,” the question of Kirghiz ethnicity is missing from his account (p. 47). We are left with a picture of Kirghiz identity as primordial, natural, and “ineffable.” And while we are shown the sedentary origins of pastoral nomadism and the fluidity of Kirghiz ecology, we do not get a sense in the end of the shifts in the mentalities and the values of the Kirghiz. We do not know, for instance, how Kirghiz identity changed after the people were cut off from the steppes. Neither are we told what the substantial loss of horses, which the Kirghiz could not breed in the high altitudes, meant to them (pp. 105–107). Despite such questions, The Kirghiz and the Wakhi of Afghanistan stands as a valuable ethnography and a significant contribution to the study of Central Asian frontiers in modern times.