Published 24 years after the combined United States and Caribbean invasion of Grenada, Gary Williams' book provides the most comprehensive and detailed examination that I have read of the events leading up to the overthrow of the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) on October 25, 1983. Drawing on an astonishing range of primary and secondary sources (the bibliography runs for 37 pages), this book provides the definitive account of the discussions and negotiations which took place prior to the invasion. For anyone with an interest in either the Caribbean or US foreign policy in the region, this book is a must-read.
The book is divided into seven chapters excluding introduction and conclusion, an epilogue and four appendices. The first chapter of the book, ‘United States’ Intervention in the Caribbean Basin', is the weakest. It provides a very brief overview of US policy in the region, beginning with the Monroe Doctrine and ending with discussion of the post-Cold War period. The intention of this brief chapter is to contextualise the decision to invade Grenada. Unfortunately, it does not provide a very clear framework and could be better connected to the policy choices which Williams discusses in so much detail later in the book. This is connected to the one criticism I would have of the book, which is that the formulation of the key arguments could have been more usefully described in the introduction. While this omission at the beginning of the book is completely rectified at the end in a strong, coherent and succinctly argued conclusion, it would have helped the reader to know at the beginning where this very detailed examination was leading.
Aside from this criticism, the book is excellent. Chapter 2, ‘Prelude to a Revolution’, provides a good overview of the Gairy regime, the formation of the New Jewel Movement and the events that led to the revolution in March 1979. However, it is Chapters 3 to 7 that make a major contribution to the debate about US intervention in Grenada. The key thrust of Williams' argument is that the invasion was not inevitable but can be explained by the desire to protect American students, restore democracy and undermine the Cuban-Soviet presence in the region. I began unconvinced by the ‘protection of American citizens’ argument, but throughout the book Williams builds a very solid case providing detailed evidence of the day-to-day policymaking process within the US administration. Indeed, this is a key strength of the book.
Chapters 3 and 4 concentrate on relations between Grenada and Presidents Carter and Reagan. In essence, although the Reagan administration exhibited a more hard-line approach to the revolution, the continuity in foreign policy was remarkably apparent, particularly as Grenada deepened its relations with Cuba. Throughout the book, Williams takes an even-handed approach. While he is critical of the People's Revolutionary Government in terms of its handling of US relations under both presidencies, he rightly points out that the US approach increased pressure on the revolution, particularly through its attempts to manipulate the International Monetary Fund and the propaganda about the Port Salines airport. Chapter 5 presents the events leading up to the murder of Maurice Bishop and seven of his colleagues, and highlights the almost immediate calls by the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) for US involvement in a military invasion to overthrow the RMC. Chapters 6 and 7 discuss the development of events from 20 October through to the invasion on the 25th. In rich detail, Williams guides us through the decision-making process of US officials while at the same time emphasising the role of the OECS, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Cuba and the Soviet Union. In doing so, he presents a comprehensive analysis of how the decision to invade the island was reached. His account gives weight to the argument that the invitation from the OECS was crucial in determining US responses, although it is also made clear that the protection of American citizens was another key factor. In fact, Williams points out a number of times that ‘hostages was arguably Reagan's greatest concern throughout his presidency’ (p. 166), due principally to the Iran hostage crisis during the Carter administration. The conclusion provides a succinct and convincing summary of the key arguments.
This book is a comprehensive, meticulously researched and well-written examination of the period leading up the invasion of Grenada. It draws together a very impressive range of perspectives to provide a coherent and convincing argument. Williams' original contribution is to highlight the nuances of foreign policy making within the US administration. While it is tempting to view the US decision to invade Grenada as part of a wider neoconservative, Cold War Reagan doctrine, Williams highlights the point that the factors leading to this decision were much more complex, involved a variety of actors and were driven by a number of considerations. I would highly recommend this book to anyone with an interest in the Caribbean, US relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, and US foreign policy making.
