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Qui Exanimis Nascitur? Can “Better Regulation” in the European Union really be a Servant of Technocracy?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 July 2017

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Abstract

Better regulation is of grave importance to the European Union, as it is seen as a way of obtaining output legitimacy. To achieve this, the European Commission has established a so-called REFIT Stakeholder Platform where stakeholders’ proposals for more effective and efficient EU law are discussed. The central premise for this meta-regulatory instrument is depoliticisation of the REFIT program and the whole better regulation agenda. To ensure this, the European Commission plays a crucial gatekeeping role by only granting access for proposals that echo that premise and by securing depoliticised deliberation afterwards. Utilising a novel typology linking regulatory reform proposals to the risk of politicisation, the argument advanced in this article is that only a minority of the proposals to be considered by Platform members have a low risk of depoliticisation. This, it is argued, is due to the Commission not having a sufficiently well-developed understanding of the premises for REFIT it has itself established.

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Figure 1Risk of politicisation and type of proposal.

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Figure 2Analytical design.

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Figure 3Identifying proposals at odds with Platform premises (N=197).

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Figure 4Reregulatory proposals divided by type (N=144).