1. Introduction
Strictly speaking this is not an essay whose sole subject is music. For what I have to say here can be extrapolated to any other art that possesses the kinds of aesthetic properties that I am referring to, in music, as the ‘pure musical parameters’. But I shall not attempt such an extrapolation here, and leave it to the reader. So for all intents and purposes, this is an essay on music, more particularly, absolute music, music alone, without text, title, program, dramatic setting, or any other extra-musical baggage.
How the topic (and title) of this essay came to be formulated is, I think, important for the reader to know. For it casts some light, I think, on why it should have come to seem an important topic to me and why, as well, it led me to believe that, so far as I know, no one in philosophy of art, at any rate, has attempted to deal with this aspect of authorial intent (although of course I could be wrong about that). So here is how it all happened.
In the July 2009 issue of the British Journal of Aesthetics there appeared a symposium consisting in a paper by Christopher Peacocke entitled ‘The Perception of Music: Sources of Significance’, four responses to Peacocke's paper, one of them by me, and brief rejoinders to these responses by Peacocke.Footnote 1 It is a problem, at least as I perceive it, in Peacocke's paper, my statement of the problem, and Peacocke's response to my statement that together have led me to the present reflections.
2. Posing the Problem
There is no need to delve deeply into Peacocke's complex paper. It will suffice to outline those parts of his argument that are essential to my purpose here.
Peacocke's goal is to explain how it is that we experience what might be called extra-musical qualities in music. ‘We can experience music as sad, as exuberant, as sombre. We can experience it as expressing immensity, identification with the rest of humanity.’ But, Peacocke continues, ‘what it is for music to express these or anything else is easily asked; and it has proved extraordinarily difficult to answer satisfactorily.’Footnote 2
The answer Peacocke offers to the question posed is, in a word, ‘metaphor’, or, more exactly, as he puts it, hearing ‘metaphorically-as’. In brief, the proposal is that ‘when a piece of music is perceived as expressing the property F, then some feature of the music, possibly a relational feature, is heard metaphorically-as F’, as, for example, ‘the rising passage and the progression in Josquin des Prez's setting of the lines “Caelestia, Terrestria, Nove replete laetitia”/”Fills heaven and earth with new gladness” [in the motet, Ave Maria] can be heard metaphorically-as the gradual filling of a space with gladness.’Footnote 3
Example 1
The intricacies of Peacocke's proposal, and the complex argument he marshals to back it up are, as I have said, not relevant to my purposes here. What I am concerned with are the implications for our interpretation of absolute music if Peacocke's account, or one like it, is correct, of how we experience a passage of music's ‘expressing the property F’, when the property is an extra-musical one like ‘the gradual filling of a space with gladness’. I will assume, then, that Peacocke's account, or something very like it is correct. My problem is with the consequences.
Here is the problem. The fact is that we can hear a passage of music, in Peacocke's terms, ‘metaphorically-as’ many different things. We can, for example, hear the passage from Josquin that Peacocke quotes as the gradual filling of a cup, as in the Twenty-third Psalm: ‘my cup runneth over’. The question is: Should we hear it that way? Or, in general terms: Of the many possible Fs you can hear a passage of music metaphorically-as, which, if any, ought we to hear it metaphorically-as? What are the rules?
In musical settings of texts, as Peacocke makes clear, the answer is quite straightforward, to wit: ‘The text fixes a proper subset of the metaphorical contents that can be heard in the music, and so requires that the music be heard in one kind of way rather than another.’Footnote 4 I take it that the meaning of ‘can’, here, is ‘should’, and that there is more or less general agreement as to how texts constrain our extra-musical interpretations: how, in Peacocke's terms, they constrain our hearing metaphorically-as (although even the presence of a text does not preclude off-the-wall interpretations). It is the text of Josquin's motet that, of course, compels us to hear in the music the filling of a space rather than the filling of a cup.
The problem – my problem – enters the picture when we turn our attention from texted music to absolute music. For in music without a text to put the brakes on runaway hearing metaphorically-as, it looks as if anything, or almost anything goes. There seem to be unnumbered extra-musical things you can hear a passage of absolute music metaphorically-as, that many, if not most listeners would find completely off the wall.
Peacocke himself, obviously not unaware of the problem, instances a famous, many would say infamous case in point, Susan McClary's interpretation of the written-out cembalo cadenza in the Fifth Brandenburg Concerto as expressing: ‘The possibility of virtual social overthrow, and the violence implied by such overthrow…’Footnote 5 Peacocke remarks of this interpretation of Brandenburg 5: ‘Some may smile at the specificity of the suggestion…’,Footnote 6 and he is among the smilers, as am I. But what justification do we have for smiling – scoffing would be more like it – if whatever we are able to hear metaphorically-as ‘in’ the music is, eo ipso, ‘in’ the music? All things perceivable metaphorically-as are permissible: musically speaking, esse est percipi.
Now to be sure Peacocke is no more willing to embrace this radical conclusion than am I. For he writes: ‘It is a fact that there are correct and incorrect, better and worse, ways of hearing a piece of music.’Footnote 7 And it is clear from other examples adduced that he thinks this dictum applies not merely to texted music, where the words can dictate what is the correct or better way, but in absolute music as well, where there is no such curb to our free fantasy, as, for example, and it is Peacocke's example, ‘the trio section of a symphony’.Footnote 8
Peacocke's way of dealing with the problem is to rely on what is sometimes referred to as the principle of critical charity, which enjoins us to choose that interpretation which makes of the work of art being interpreted a better work than it would be under any other interpretation on offer. And what that amounts to, for Peacocke, is this: ‘To come to hear a piece of music better is to come to hear it as having a richer, more interesting or more significant metaphorical content than one succeeded in hearing in it previously.’Footnote 9
The difficulty with this apparently exclusive reliance on the principle of critical charity, as I pointed out in my comments on Peacocke's paper, is that it is far too permissive either for Peacocke or for me. It will, for example, not license us to ‘smile’ at McClary's outlandish interpretation of the cembalo cadenza in Brandenburg 5 because she can quite plausibly insist that her interpretation gives the work, to use Peacocke's words, ‘a richer, more interesting or more significant metaphorical content than one succeeded in hearing in it previously’. One certainly can hear it as McClary does. And if our only appeal is to the principle of critical charity, then we should do.
Now what I proposed, in my previous comments on Peacocke's paper, was appeal to authorial intent. This is not to say that I reject the principle of critical charity outright. But I take it to be not a sufficient condition principle: rather, a ceteris paribus one. And I take it, furthermore, that lack of authorial intent trumps it. In other words, the principle of critical charity says, with regard to absolute music, in part: of those ways you are able to hear the work or the passage that the composer could have intended, choose the one that makes of it the best work of art or the best passage.
Authorial intent does just what the principle of critical charity cannot by itself do: it can rule out off-the-wall ways of hearing metaphorically-as that both Peacocke and I would like to rule out. Thus, McClary's claim that the cembalo cadenza in Brandenburg 5 serves, to put it Peacocke's way, as metaphor for social overthrow and its ensuing violence through liberating the harpsichord from its ‘subservient’ role as mere accompanying continuo instrument and throwing it into an unexpected solo role, can be handily hung out to dry by simply adducing obvious facts that clearly show Bach could have had no such intention in the first place. Item. The two-manual harpsichord was in no need of ‘liberation’ from the humble role of accompanying continuo instrument, being the preeminent solo keyboard instrument outside of the church, for which Bach wrote many concerti and solo works, Domenico Scarlatti upwards of 500 sonatas. Item. The harpsichord in Brandenburg 5 hardly requires ‘liberation’ from the humble role of accompanying continuo instrument in the cadenza, being a solo instrument in the concerto right from the get-go. Item. Johann Sebastian Bach would have been just about the last composer in the world to have wanted to express social overthrow or violence in his works, having acquiesced completely in the professional and social role laid out for him from birth, devoting his entire life to the family business, namely organist, composer, and cantor in the service of the Lutheran communion. Conclusion. Even though we can hear the cembalo cadenza in Brandenburg 5 the way McClary suggests, we shouldn't, in the certain knowledge that Johann Sebastian Bach could not possibly have intended it to be heard that way.
Thus my challenge to Peacocke, if one wants to put it that way, was not to his suggestion that when we hear extra-musical ‘content’ in music we are hearing, the way he puts it, ‘metaphorically-as’. As a matter of fact I am quite sympathetic with the suggestion. Rather, my challenge to him was to back up his apparent claim that in music without a text to rule out errant instances of hearing metaphorically-as, off-the-wall hearings such as McClary's of the cembalo cadenza in Brandenburg 5, the job can be done without appeal to authorial intention but solely through the principle of critical charity.
And this brings me to Peacocke's response to my challenge, which I want now to critically examine. But before I do I want to make clear that the reason I cast a critical eye on it is not to try to initiate one of those boring philosophical disputes over minutiae. Rather, by implication, and not, I believe, by intent, Peacocke has, in his remarks, uncovered an issue in philosophy of art that has not, as far as I know, been dealt with seriously, if indeed at all. That being said, on now to Peacocke's response.
3. Peacocke's Riposte
The basic thesis of Peacocke's response to my worry is concisely stated at the outset: ‘…I do not think’, Peacocke writes, ‘that authorial intention that a piece of music be heard a certain way is a necessary condition of the correctness of hearing it that way.’Footnote 10 And he adduces as a case in point a very well known musical example, the thematic relationship between the subject of the fugue that begins the first movement of Beethoven's String Quartet in C-sharp Minor, Op. 131, and the main theme of the finale, that enters at bar 21.
Peacocke writes of this example: ‘The heard relationship between the two [themes] is, in context, emotionally significant.’ As he hears the emotional significance, the ‘unalleviated sadness in the first movement…has been completely overcome in the final movement as a whole….’Footnote 11
Note well – and we are now homing in on the main point of this exercise – that there are two relationships between these two themes: an emotional one and a purely musical one. And the purely musical relationship between the two themes, although Peacocke does not name it, is a well-known one, a familiar technique in the composer's bag of tricks. The theme of the finale is, in fact, a palpable if not perfect inversion of the fugue subject, preserving almost in tact both its intervallic structure and note values, although in a faster tempo. And, indeed, Beethoven all but ‘tells’ us, musically, that the theme of the finale is an inversion of the fugue subject by twice quoting its opening three notes directly after the first entrance of the finale theme (mm. 30–31 and 34–35). As Joseph Kerman describes the musical relationship between the finale theme and the subject of the fugue: ‘Without duplicating the original fugue subject, this [finale] theme retraces its line, performs a sort of inversion or transformation upon it….’Footnote 12
Example 2
Peacocke avers, quite rightly, that: ‘No doubt Beethoven was in fact completely aware of the relationship between the two…themes, and the effect is fully intentional.’ But he then proposes the following thought experiment: ‘suppose’ Beethoven ‘had not been so aware, and suppose that including the second of the two…themes simply struck him as the best way of offering something that the resolution and energy succeeds in overcoming.’ Under such a supposition Peacocke then asks, rhetorically: ‘Does it follow that we should not hear the second theme as reminiscent of the fugue theme in the first movement, and that we should not hear the whole [last] movement as defeating the sadness and passivity expressed in the first movement?’ His answer, of course, is in the negative. ‘In such a case’, he writes, ‘it seems to me that the correct way to hear the music is the same way as if the composer had indeed had that conscious intention.’Footnote 13
As shall become apparent later on, my intuition, in entertaining Peacocke's thought experiment, differs radically from his. But before I get to that some clarification is necessary with regard to the concept of authorial intention itself; and to that clarification I now briefly turn.
4. Where's the Intention?
Having proposed as a thought experiment, or an intuition-pump, if you will, an intentionless hearing of the thematic and emotive relationship between the first and last movements of Op. 131, Peacocke then gives just the merest suggestion of a volte-face, where he writes: ‘Even if the composer did not have the intention to write a theme that uses the elements of the fugue theme, it may be that the unconscious psychological explanation of why that particular theme struck him as a good way of continuing the movement is that it is in fact related to the theme of the sad fugue as described.’Footnote 14 Is intention, then, being sneaked up the back stairs under the guise of unconscious intention? Is unconscious intention to blunt the thought experiment by doing the same work that conscious intention is supposed to do, but that the thought experiment is supposed to suggest is unnecessary? I will leave these questions unaddressed. To do otherwise would lead us astray of the main point.
Suffice it to say, whatever pre-conscious or unconscious mechanisms give birth to the themes, motives, and other compositional ideas in the musical genius's conscious mind I consider a mystery forever sealed to human scrutiny, as I have argued at length elsewhere.Footnote 15 Nor is it the stage in the compositional process where authorial intention enters the picture. One does not – one cannot – intend to get a good idea for a theme, although one can, of course, intend to do other things that might, in the event, end up producing a good idea for a theme.Footnote 16 But how the inversion of the fugue subject popped into Beethoven's extraordinary head is irrelevant to the question of authorial intent. It was Beethoven's conscious decision to use that theme, the inversion of the fugue subject, rather than some other, for the main theme of the finale, that is the authorial intention at issue.
Peacocke's thought experiment, then, I will take to be this. Imagine that Beethoven decided to use the theme that enters at bar 21 of the finale, never mind how it occurred to him, without being consciously aware, without intending it to be a virtual inversion of the fugue subject in the first movement, and without being consciously aware, without intending to have the emotive contrast to the fugue subject in the first movement Peacocke takes it to have. Imagine further that you know for certain, never mind how, of the lack of authorial intent. Would you still be correct in hearing the theme as an inversion and having the emotive contrast as described? Peacocke's intuition is that it would still be correct. That intuition we must now critically examine.
5. Two Relationships: Two Intentions
As I pointed out earlier, Peacocke's example embodies two very different musical features: one an expressive property of the finale theme, the other a purely musical one, which is to say, the ‘property’ of its being a virtual inversion of the fugue subject in the first movement. The former is a feature that, as Peacocke has it, we hear ‘metaphorically-as’, in Peacocke's words, ‘defeating the sadness and passivity expressed in the first movement’.Footnote 17 But there is no reason whatever to invoke hearing metaphorically-as for the latter feature. It just is an ‘objective fact’ that the finale theme is the near perfect inversion of the fugue subject. It is not an inversion metaphorically of the fugue subject (whatever that would mean).
And recognizing this leads to the following conjecture. If the two features of the finale theme differ as stated, perhaps they differ in another way as well. Perhaps one of them is intention-free and the other intention-bound.
In what follows I am going first to suggest that there may be some reason for thinking that whereas the expressive quality of the finale theme is intention-bound, the thematic relation of inversion is not: or, in other words, it would not be correct to hear the finale theme metaphorically-as ‘defeating the sadness and passivity expressed in the first movement’ if it could be shown conclusively that Beethoven did not intend it to be heard so, but it would be correct to hear the finale theme as an inversion of the fugue subject in the first movement whether or not Beethoven intended it to be so heard. In the end, however, I will argue that, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, both features of the finale theme are hostage to authorial intent. Furthermore, the claim is that both extra-musical features in general, for which the expressive quality of the finale theme is a token instance, and the pure musical parameters in general, for which the inversion of the fugue subject is a token instance, are intention-bound, their other differences notwithstanding.
6. Intention, Meaning, and Representation
To begin with, it should be noted that the whole flap over the relevance of authorial intention to interpretation began with, and continues to focus largely upon meaning: in particular, the meaning of literary works. That being the case, it is easy to see why there should be a strong intuitive pull towards intention-bound interpretation. For where the meaning of an utterance, whether spoken or written, is in doubt, what we want to ask the speaker or writer is: What did you mean by that? It is what the speaker or writer intended to convey that answers our question; that resolves our doubt.
I take it I am arguing here, albeit informally, in a Gricean vein. And in the great man's own words: first, ‘my account of the cluster of notions connected with the term “meaning” has been studded with expressions for such intensional concepts as those of intending and believing….’;Footnote 18 second, ‘An utterer is held to convey what is normally conveyed (or normally intended to be conveyed), and we require a good reason for accepting that a particular use diverges from the general usage…’;Footnote 19 and third, ‘in cases where there is doubt, say, about which of two or more things an utterer intends to convey, we tend to refer to the context (linguistic or otherwise) of the utterance and ask which of the alternatives would be relevant to other things he is saying or doing….’Footnote 20
Now I am perfectly well aware that when one moves from conversational meaning, and ordinary written communication, to literary works of art, the issue of intention becomes far from crystal clear, and intuitions are conflicting rather than unanimous. Nonetheless, that a literary work of art cannot mean what is conclusively shown its author could not have intended it to mean, remains, I think, the firmer, more plausible intuition: the intuition to beat; the pre-systematic intuition.
Furthermore, this intuition passes easily from semantic meaning to representational content. In other words, a work of art can no more represent what its creator could not have intended it to represent than it can mean what its creator could not have intended it to mean. No one has articulated this more forthrightly than Richard Wollheim, where he compares seeing things in natural objects with seeing things in representational paintings. ‘With clouds, rocks, sand’, he points out, ‘it is no more correct to see one thing in them than another’. But when it comes to paintings (say) things are quite otherwise. ‘With Titian it is correct to see Venus in a particular stretch of canvas, and incorrect to see anyone or anything else there.’ And the criterion of correctness in the latter case Wollheim has no hesitation placing squarely in intention. ‘The criterion comes from the intentions, the fulfilled intentions of the artist…in so far as those guided the artist's hand and are retrievable from the work.’Footnote 21
At the end of my slippery intention slope I am going to suggest that a strong intuition – certainly my intuition – pulls in the direction of authorial intention for all those musical features that require for their perception what Peacocke calls hearing ‘metaphorically-as’. There is a very strong intuition abroad, I suggest, that if Bach could not possibly have intended the cembalo cadenza in Brandenburg 5 to be heard as a call to liberty, it is incorrect to hear it so. And ditto for expressive properties as well. Of course the presence of intention is not a sufficient condition for hearing metaphorically-as, any more than, on the Gricean account, is it sufficient for meaning. Intentions can, needless to say, fail of their goals. There is a strong intuition, though, I am urging, that it is a necessary condition, though not a sufficient one.
What, however, of the pure musical parameters? What about Beethoven's inversion of the fugue subject? Here we may have found a sticking place on our slippery slope of intentions. This, I conjecture, is why.
It appears to me that all of the obvious cases we have looked at, where intuition pulls towards authorial intention as a criterion of correct interpretation, are cases which we want to describe as involving conceptual content, broadly conceived, of some kind: either semantic or representational or expressive. Furthermore, I think that in all of the musical cases in which it seems appropriate to say, with Peacocke, that we are hearing music ‘metaphorically-as’ one thing or another, we also want to describe what we are concerned with as content, broadly conceived.
But when we come to the pure musical parameters – when we come to Beethoven's inversion of the fugue subject in the finale, and the like – we are not dealing with content, even broadly conceived, nor with Peacocke's hearing metaphorically-as. Furthermore, someone might well claim that in such cases she feels no pull at all of intuition towards authorial intention as a corrective to listening. After all, whatever Beethoven's intention, or lack thereof, it is just a plain objective ‘fact’ of the matter that the finale theme is a virtual inversion of the fugue subject, as ‘inversion’ is defined. So even if one lit upon incontrovertible evidence that Beethoven had no intention of making the finale theme an inversion of the fugue subject, an inversion it remains; and that's that.
Thus a plausible position seems to be emerging where authorial intention is a necessary condition for ‘content’ broadly conceived, in absolute music, for what Peacocke calls hearing metaphorically-as, but not for the pure musical parameters. But in what follows I want to question the plausibility of this dualism. In particular, I want to argue that authorial intent is as necessary a condition for the pure musical parameters as for musical ‘content’, broadly conceived. In short, it's intention all the way down.
7. Thought Experiments
To motivate my argument I want to return to what I referred to earlier as Peacocke's ‘thought experiment’, to wit, that Beethoven was not aware of the musical relationship between the finale theme and the fugue subject: which is to say, the finale's theme being an almost perfect inversion of the fugue subject was unintentional. And I want to begin by considering what I will call the ‘improbability quotient’. For I think that the probability, or, more to the point, the improbability of the thought experiment in question has a lot to do with which direction our intuitions should take. I think that it is implicit, although not stated outright, in the thought experiment, that Peacocke views it, needless to say, as counterfactual, but not, for all of that, as wildly implausible. And I believe this underestimation, as I see it, of the thought experiment's implausibility quotient is of some import in regard to where our intuitions go.
How impossible is it that Beethoven did not intend the finale theme to be and to be heard as an inversion of the fugue subject? I do not know how to measure such probabilities. Let us say it is not as improbable as Rembrandt's not intending the daubs of paint on the canvas known as The Polish Rider to be and to be seen as a representation of a man on horseback. But I want to insist that the improbability quotient of the inversion's being unintentional is, never the less, in the same ballpark as The Polish Rider's being an unintentional representation-like pattern of paint looking for all the world like a representation of a man on horseback. For this reason alone we should be very suspicious of the easy conviction that the Beethoven example is as obvious as Peacocke makes it out to be. To discover that the inversion was unintentional would be stunning indeed, as would be the discovery of the unintentional resemblance of the paint daubs to the representation of a man on horseback: perhaps not as stunning, but stunning enough. What is your intuition about the painting? Would the unintentional ‘representation’ be a representation? And if not, why would your intuition be any different in the case of the unintentional ‘inversion’?
In the conclusion of my paper I want now to expatiate on this point, with the purpose of showing that the dualism outlined above, in which content, broadly conceived, is intention-bound, but the pure musical parameters not, is an untenable dualism, for all of its initial plausibility. The pure musical parameters, I shall argue, are on all fours with content, broadly conceived, in being, as well, strictly intention-bound.
8. Craft without Skill?
In using the inversion of the fugue subject for the main theme of the final, in Op. 131, Beethoven was of course doing something that was to become increasingly prevalent in nineteenth-century instrumental music: imparting what came to be called ‘organic unity’ to a work through thematic unification. That aside though, theme-inversion is part of the bag of tricks that comes under the head of, to appropriate Paul Hindemith's famous book title, The Craft of Musical Composition.
Western art music, at least from the advent of polyphony, has been deeply imbued with the concept of craft. The composer learns his trade at any given time in music history by laborious industry in order to master all of the particular techniques of counterpoint, harmony, theme construction, variation, and manipulation that have defined the various musical styles from the twelfth century to ours.
Any student with moderate musical abilities can master many of these techniques and in the event, for example, write a ‘correct’, if uninspired fugue in Baroque style, or strict but boring polyphony in the style of Palestrina. The craft of musical composition, however, is not to be confused with the craft of making shoes or repairing automobiles. For the musical craft, like any other artistic craft, when mastered by genius, is craft at the genius level, and is as ‘inspired’, if you will, as any other aspect of the musical art. No amount of assiduous application to the technique of canon can produce the Goldberg Variations without the genius to go with it.
The conclusion I am pushing towards here is that the craft of musical composition, for which Beethoven's inversion of the fugue subject has been the poster boy, is a species of skill, namely, skill at the genius level. Furthermore, the perception and appreciation of this genius-level skill is an absolutely essential feature of our aesthetic experience of Western art music.
You can perhaps see, now, where the argument is carrying us. If, per impossibile, I were to discover that Beethoven did not intentionally make the main theme of the finale of Op. 131 the virtual inversion of the fugue subject, but that it just ‘happened’, I would perforce cease to appreciate it as an instance of the composer's skill, qua genius, in the craft of musical composition. This, pace Peacocke, must be a non-trivial, indeed a profound change in my attitude towards and appreciation of the finale theme and its relation to the fugue subject. It cannot be business as usual to stop hearing the finale theme as an intended inversion of the fugue subject and start hearing it instead as a ‘happy accident’. But to drive this point home, imagine now some additional thought experiments.Footnote 22
(1) A kind of child prodigy begins composing music, having heard it a good deal in his home. Without any instruction at all, he produces, after a while, a musical composition that displays all of the artifices of strict counterpoint: inversion, diminution, augmentation, stretto, imitation, canon, invertible counterpoint – the lot.
(2) There is a possible world in which everyone, quite naturally, comes to be able to compose music much in the natural way they come to speak their native tongue, which displays all of the artifices of strict counterpoint: inversion, diminution, augmentation stretto, imitation, canon, invertible counterpoint – the lot.
Surely, one might argue, these are cases in which the ‘craft’, as I call it, is unintentional. Yet surely, so the argument continues, we would still admire, enjoy, appreciate the craft so displayed, as we would displayed in a fugue by Bach with conscious intent. Why shouldn't we? After all, it is just plainly there to be admired, enjoyed, appreciated.
The second thought experiment is, I think, more easily dealt with than the first. So I will get to it straightaway.
A possible world in which the craft of musical composition were acquired by all in the same way as their native tongue, or where walking a tight-rope were acquired by all in the same way as ordinary walking on level ground, would, of course, be a world without any such thing as the ‘craft’ of musical composition, properly so-called, or the ‘skill’, properly so-called, of tight-rope walking. And in such a possible world the ‘craft’ of musical composition and the ‘skill’ of walking the tight-rope would no more be admired, enjoyed, appreciated, in the way they are in our world any more than we admire, enjoy, appreciate speaking in our native tongue or walking on level ground in our world.
The first thought experiment presents difficulties, mainly, because it is open to a variety of interpretations. I shall offer four, and following each, my response.
(1a) The child prodigy in question composed his works in the eighteenth century (say), being now, of course, deceased. And we are apprised of the supposed circumstances under which he composed from contemporary documents: letters, diaries, and so forth. But none of these documents reveals specifically that he knew what all these artifices were, or what they were called. We infer from their presence in his works, quite rightly, that, with regard to these artifices, he was an autodidact, taught himself strict counterpoint, and intentionally employed said artifices in his music for the usual reasons. We admire, enjoy, appreciate these displays of skill as we would in the works of a composer who acquired them in the usual way, from instruction.
(1b) The child prodigy in question is the same as the one in (1a) except that he is quoted in a document as saying, when asked, that when he wrote these juvenilia, so full of contrapuntal artifice, he had no idea what they were, what they were called, or what he was doing when he wrote them into his music. It was like ‘automatic writing’ or ‘speaking in tongues’. Should we still regard them as the artifices they appear, admire, enjoy, appreciate them as instances of skill and craft?
The answer is affirmative, and here is why. We should take a leaf in this regard from Hume's book, which is to say, the essay ‘Of Miracles’, and argue thus. Which is more probable, the incredibly unlikely, indeed near ‘miraculous’ occurrence of contrapuntal artifices as above described completely unintended, by ‘accident’, as it were, in a musical work, or the falsity of the document that affirms such an improbably, ‘miraculous’ occurrence?Footnote 23 I say the latter is more probable. The work trumps the document. So we are fully justified in admiring, enjoying, appreciating the skill displayed in the prodigy's work as we would in the work of any other, more ‘normal’ composer.
(1c) The child prodigy is a living composer and at some point in his life imparts to someone in conversation the very same ‘information’ contained in the historical documents in (1b). The response should be as in the previous case.
(1d) The case is the same as in (1b) and (1c) – whether the composer is past or present being immaterial – but we know, with absolute certainty, and know that we know, never mind how, that the historical documentation, or oral communication, is imparting absolute truth: that the contrapuntal artifice is in the composition through no knowledge or intent of the prodigy, who composes without any concept of the contrapuntal artifice that, through some ‘miraculous’ workings of nature, creeps, without his conscious agency, into his work.
What is our intuition here? By hypothesis work does not trump documentation or oral communication of lack of intent. And if our intuition is that in this (truly extraordinary) case the work should be treated in no way differently from a work by Bach, that we should hear the work as exhibiting contrapuntal artifice in the same we do in the fugues from the Well-Tempered Clavier adduced above, then the claim that intention is a necessary condition on the pure musical parameters – which is, of course, the thesis of this exercise – seems not to stand up.
But is it really so obvious where our intuition goes in this highly implausible thought experiment?
Assuming that it is not a regular occurrence but a singular one, my own intuition is that I would treat the prodigy's work much in the same way I would treat a complex stain on a wall that closely resembled the drawing of a human face or figure. I would, in other words, treat it as a ‘natural object’, a ‘natural wonder’, so to say. As such, clearly, it would not be admired, enjoyed, appreciated as a work of skill and genius, any more than would the stain on the wall. We might perhaps say that we treat the stain ‘as if’ it were a drawing, the contrapuntal artifices ‘as if’ they were inversion, diminution, and the rest. In both cases, however, we are appreciating extraordinary natural objects that bear an appearance of human art. And that is a very different kind of appreciation from that which characterizes our encounters with real drawings and fugues. So, in conclusion, let me bite this bullet and say, baldly, that the musical work in (1d) does not exhibit inversion, diminution, stretto, canon, imitation, augmentation, no matter how much they resemble the ‘real thing’. And there's an end on it.
In fact, nevertheless, it is a nice question whether an accidental or fortuitous sequence of notes can rightly be called an ‘inversion’ of a theme in the first place, anymore than an accidental or fortuitous design in the sand can be called an English ‘sentence’ or a stain on a wall a ‘representation’ of a face. But putting aside the question of whether or not it makes sense to call the finale theme an ‘inversion’ of the fugue subject, if unintended as such, the gnawing question remains: Is it ‘correct’ to hear the finale theme as an inversion of the fugue subject, if the inversion was unintentional?
Let us confine ourselves, as we pretty much have throughout, to the absolute music repertory in the Western art-music canon. The ‘objects’, if I may so call them, of this repertory are craft-objects: factum non genitum. Furthermore, they are generally described by those whose business it is in functional terms, which is to say, the parts are to be understood, wherever possible, as performing some sort of perceivable function in the overall plan and structure of the musical work. That being the case, the passage from the pure musical parameters to authorial intention is direct and unproblematic. There is no function, I think it will readily be granted, without intention: without there being a rational agent or designer that is the originator of the functional part. There are no ‘accidental’ functions.Footnote 24
My conclusion, then, is that as musical content, broadly conceived, pulls us intuitively towards authorial intention, through the concept of meaning, so the pure musical parameters pull us intuitively towards authorial intention, through the concept of function. A dualism, in this regard, although plausible on first reflection, will not withstand critical scrutiny. It is intention all the way down. For without authorial intention as criterial for the correct interpretation of the pure musical parameters, there is neither compositional skill to admire, nor function to be heard. And that, I think is an intolerable result.
