Fleming and Michel put forward interesting hypotheses and predictions about the function of visual consciousness on the assumption that various experiments seem to show that it is slow – that is, based on first-person reports in postdictive experimental settings, it lags well behind fast processes of unconscious integration and readiness to action. If consciousness is this slow, then it is not apparently for online action-guidance; hence, it is a puzzle why it even exists, what its function is supposed to be. This, however, is a big “if.”

The authors are aware of the contentiousness of the claim that consciousness is slow and of the alternative interpretation, according to which what really happens is that phenomenal consciousness (the mere having of an experience) and access consciousness (availability to action, reportability) come apart (Block, Reference Block1995, Reference Block2007, Reference Block2008, 2011) but try to downplay its force. In fact, it is the key element in one of the most conspicuous methodological conundrums in consciousness studies when it comes to measuring consciousness (Phillips, Reference Phillips2018). The two approaches that took shape in this area are: (a) one skeptical of the very idea of phenomenal consciousness, and hence focusing solely on report-based experimental data (a trend set by Dennett, Reference Dennett1991; Dennett & Kinsbourne, Reference Dennett and Kinsbourne1992), and (b) one that does take phenomenal consciousness as the essence of what we mean by consciousness, and consequently treats reports and any other conditions that might not be synonymous with immediate awareness as confounding factors in experimental design.

Fleming and Michel’s approach is puzzling because they both accept the legitimacy of the phenomenal/access distinction, hence that of the phenomenal, yet deny that the (b) type approach is as legitimate as the (a) type approach, when it comes to experimental evidence and its interpretation. For instance, they keep calling the hypothesis of phenomenal consciousness overflowing access consciousness, such as in Block’s interpretation of the Sperling experiment (Block, Reference Block2007), a “gambit,” insinuating that it could not be as serious and methodologically sound as the simpler one, namely, that consciousness is simply slow. At the same time, they do not reject the legitimacy of phenomenal consciousness as both conceptually coherent and probably empirically testable.

If this is indeed the case, then both the (a) type and (b) type approaches to the interpretation of results in postdictive experimental paradigms should have a claim to relevance. More to the point, (b) type approaches focus on building experimental designs in which the report condition is considered a confounding factor, hence it is avoided. It is in this spirit that the no-report paradigm is put forward, as a better shot at trying to pin down the time of conscious awareness itself rather than that of reporting (Tsuchiya et al., Reference Tsuchiya, Wilke, Frässle and Lamme2015; Hatamimajoumerd et al., Reference Hatamimajoumerd, Ratan Murty, Pitts and Cohen2022). The claim put forward by the authors, and playing a crucial role in their argument, that the postdictive experimental paradigm [visual masking, attentional postdictive effects] is superior to the direct detection paradigm, is too strong, and from a methodological perspective we could at most establish an equal claim to legitimacy of the two paradigms. If the direct detection paradigm is adopted as a normative constraint on what we should be pursuing and what we should avoid when trying to pin down the neural correlate of visual consciousness, conscious processing does not lag behind nonconscious processing; hence, there is no puzzle about the function of such a “slow” phenomenon of consciousness. In effect, the latest research employing psychophysical methods, such as ERP-based [event-related potential] studies, point out that the 300 ms mark indicates reporting rather than sensory awareness, whereas the latter is likely occuring within the 100 ms – 300 ms zone (Schröder, Nierhaus, & Blankenburg, Reference Schröder, Nierhaus and Blankenburg2021; Dembski, Koch, & Pitts, Reference Dembski, Koch and Pitts2021).

I am not saying that the various no-report designs are successful in eliminating cognition, which is what one ideally wants in a detection paradigm; indeed, it is controversial whether there is a completely successful recipe for it (Overgaard & Fazekas Reference Overgaard and Fazekas2016; Odegaard, Knight, & Lau, Reference Odegaard, Knight and Lau2017; Block Reference Block2019; Phillips & Morales, Reference Phillips and Morales2020). Rather, the point is that taking phenomenal consciousness seriously makes any claim about the slowness of consciousness contentious at the moment.