Akonor aims to investigate the reason why compliance with IMF conditionalities has been limited in sub-Saharan Africa. He does this through the case study of Ghana, which takes up most of the book. Ghana is a case study which has already gained relatively high levels of scrutiny by researchers, offering as it does a prima facie case of a ‘transition’ state: taking on structural adjustment in 1983, achieving economic growth by the end of the decade, introducing multi-party elections in 1992, and successfully voting out an incumbent in 2000. Akonor makes his claims to originality by setting out an analytical framework based in public choice theory (my phrase, not his). He is interested in the distributional effects of price changes induced by (limited) liberalisation and the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ that this generates. The nub of his argument is that during periods of ruling elite instability and intense pressure from constituencies close to government, conditionalities are highly liable to be reneged upon. Africa and IMF Conditionality makes this case through a sequential structure in which key periods of delinquency are identified and described.
Within these terms, the book is a fair read. There is some interesting empirical material and data which adds a more ‘robust’ flavour to other more ‘stylised’ narratives of halting adjustment implementation. But I was left wondering exactly how much the book adds to what has already been said. Certainly, Akonor is not the first to associate elections with the flurried loosening of public exchequer purse strings, which seems to be a phenomenon practically throughout the world. It is also something of a foundational article of faith in political science (try Hobbes or Machiavelli) that regime and/or personal survival is the first order concern of modern politics. Thus, in instances where adjustment restrains state action or potentially upsets ruling coalitions, the first order concern of regime stability/survival undermines reform compliance.
It is from this almost axiomatic starting point that interesting questions emerge: how are these ruptures dealt with politically by the IMF and the ruling party? How do social groups respond to the perceived opening up of state expenditure in the run-up to elections? How is ‘new’ money employed to maintain elite stability and re-election? Although Akonor hints at answers to these questions, these are not his central concern.
Akonor's understanding of the ruling elite is problematic. He identifies the ruling ‘class’ as practically any group which holds a modicum of relative wealth or power. This serves to efface any conflicts within this group – which in Ghana are significant and help to explain Ghana's considerable political turbulence. This approach also serves to leave the politics of democratisation or adjustment rather underanalysed, as non-compliance is understood as serving ‘elite’ interests, which does not take us very far. There is no account of how wage workers, farmers or other social groups are represented; nor is there an investigation of the ideological contours of adjustment presentation to a broader citizenry. The book is well written and tells a convincing story. But it has its limits.
