Conjectural history was a venerable Enlightenment exercise that attracted first-rate minds of that age: Hobbes, Hume, Smith, Rousseau, and Kant were all practitioners. A conjectural history is a broad-gauged hypothetical account of humankind's social origins and development. The hypothetical takes as its base a specific conception of the nature of human rationality or, more precisely, of what it is that makes rationality a single, continuous, coherent, and authoritative whole. Reason in such accounts is typically understood as definitive of humans; accordingly, the development of humanity in general is at issue. These narratives are typically teleological; even when divorced from the idea that human development is prescribed by a divine intellect, they deploy intrinsic ends as the aim of rational development. Moreover, the present from which the hypothesis is stated is often construed as the end towards which development progresses. That end constitutes the perfection of reason, at least with regard to its fundamental properties. This teleological dimension puts modern sensibilities on alert, owing to the self-congratulatory potential in the conjectural enterprise—to say nothing of the freewheeling, fact-free speculation that characterizes it.
Advances in the social sciences over the past two centuries have put paid to such histories, or so one might believe. David Graeber and David Wengrow think otherwise. Reigning stadial theories of the evolution of human sociality from the Neolithic to the modern may not wear their conjectural inheritance on their sleeves; nonetheless, like their forebears, they order the past so as to add up to an all but inevitable present. Specifically, Graeber and Wengrow forward two concerns. Stadial theories pave a one-way street running from foragers to farm to city to state, in the bargain modeling hunter-gatherers as unreflective, socially underdeveloped, and fitted only with the staple concept gleaned from their “primitive” circumstances, equality. By contrast, herder-farmers are reflective, materially mature enough for permanent settlement, and feature heightened division of labor and the consequent productive surplus that seed technological invention, bureaucratic centrality, and, necessarily, inequality. Early social evolutionary accounts of civilization like Morgan's or Fraser's may be old hat, but the schema still grips archeologists, anthropologists, sociologists, historians, and political theorists: human sociality passes seriatim through three or four stages of development. And that brings one to the second concern. Unilinear accounts of the development of social agency place certain forms of political organization, like anarchism, in an unenviable light: they are retrogressive and impossible, unless one is willing to restrict political life to exceedingly local and rudimentary forms. But that is just retrogression by another name.
The Dawn of Everything is a wide-ranging book that presents itself as a “synthesis” (522) of recent archaeological and anthropological fieldwork it claims overturns stadial accounts of human social development (4–5). It advances and defends four primary theses:
1. Bright-line sorting of foragers from agrarians is artificial. Agrarian settlement was gradual, often appeared in combination with foraging, and was viewed by many prehistoric peoples as a social option that could well be declined.
2. Early cities could be administratively decentralized and need not token sovereign rule; there were hunter-gatherer metropolises.
3. Indigenous peoples in areas undergoing European colonization possessed developed social imaginations that, in some cases, contributed cardinal ideas to debates in the European Enlightenment.
4. Reconsideration of the stadial conjecture affords a heightened sense of the ultimate contingency of social practices that, in turn, provides a better appreciation of alternatives to the bureaucratic state in which many feel themselves “stuck.”
Graeber and Wengrow take as their point of departure eighteenth-century European social and political theory and, in particular, accounts of the emergence of political life from a state of nature, in which there exist only minimal social relations. The choice of Rousseau as representative is natural enough, but the exegesis of his thought is all at once narrow, loose, and inaccurate, as when one is told, for instance, that his primitives are in fact recalcitrant Hobbesians (64). Such lapses are especially disconcerting and distracting at the outset of the argument, where the conceptual impetus for what is to come must take firm hold. That said, such lapses do not, I think, damage the overall case, for Graeber and Wengrow do not require Rousseau to have had the view they ascribe to him in order to make their main point: his thought is emblematic of general views of European intellectuals of the eighteenth century on the intellectual and social capacities of Indigenous peoples. The very possibility that Rousseau discounts—that of the intellectual “savage”—does figure in Enlightenment discussions of egalitarianism by way of written reports of dialogues between Indigenous thinkers and their European counterparts (48–59). Graeber and Wengrow allow that the exaggeration one finds in several such works can raise questions concerning their authenticity (56), but ultimately side with those who argue that some of the accounts are factual. One certainly can appreciate Graeber and Wengrow's impatience at discounting these narratives, even if one does not join them in seeing a strategy of “neutralizing the threat of indigenous critique” (32). Given what we know were complex relations internal to Indigenous societies of the time, equally demanding relations between different societies, and exposure to Europeans bent on impressing them with allegedly better ways to govern, there is every reason to believe that Indigenous peoples were fully social reflective and had a good working knowledge of European modes of sociality with which they could contrast their own. Perhaps Pierre Clastres is right that they were even more imaginative than their European counterparts.
Graeber and Wengrow contest what they take to be simplifications in views on hunter-gatherers still at work in descendants of this Enlightenment picture. The great difference of course in the bona fides of stadial views in contemporary archeology and anthropology is that they can cite evidence won from digs and advanced modeling regimens. A great deal of The Dawn of Everything is devoted to offering alternative interpretations of this data, as well as arguing for the centrality of what are taken by the mainstream to be marginal cases. According to what Graeber and Wengrow cast as the standard story, all roads to the present run through agrarianism and the claimed inheritance it afforded: increasingly dense and centrally organized cities and nations, the invention of bureaucracy, and accelerated technological knowledge. Their criticisms are many. The forager-agrarian line is questioned in cases of seasonal urbanism, as is the inexorable trend from forager to agrarian. Foragers and agrarians coexisted for very long periods of time, and Graeber and Wengrow cite cases where they find it probable that what is happening is an informed refusal of foragers to take on the incipient “grain state,” as James Scott has called it. Nor, they argue, is it a given that urban centers shed all of the decentralized authority that characterize foraging societies. Graeber and Wengrow write that the elements that have contingently joined to form the modern state are now “drifting apart” (431) and hope that unsettling the sense that modernization in its present forms is all but foreordained opens conceptual space for considering less authoritarian social possibilities.
I am not competent to judge the book's proposals with regard to the fieldwork discussed. Doubtless there will be disagreement about some of their empirical claims and extrapolations. I merely raise two conceptual points. First, there can be a great deal of play built into most stadial paradigms. Nothing changes all at once and all over. The stadial theorist can always argue that stages take a long time to coalesce, and the fact that there are long periods of social ambivalence as between basic forms of life is to be expected. Indeed, one of the strengths of such theories is that they can make such accommodation. I suspect that Graeber and Wengrow would respond that ceteris paribus can go only so far. If enough cases are assembled to make transitions between stages less focused, the stadial scheme will be less explanatory. Still—and this is the second point—I wonder if Graeber and Wengrow's strongest suit is not to exploit exemplars instead of wagering on the impact of the sum total of countervailing cases, some of which are hardly univocal. I was especially struck by their discussion of Teotihuacan, a mass urban setting in which a number of forager-like liberties were, at times, in place. If the aim is to dislodge received views of what can count today as feasible societies by pointing to forms of past sociality that diverge from the present norm, powerful select examples can have as much if not more impact than compounding a sheer mass of cases. Perhaps, however, as Enzo Rossi suggests to me, the authors simply wish to blunt facile objections to the effect that exceptions prove rules.
What are the lessons to be drawn from the reorganized past moving forward? The book offers two especially valuable suggestions that live at the intersection of ethnography and political theory. The first is a reworked Weberian schema for identifying and analyzing forms of social domination: control of violence, control of knowledge, and charismatic power (362–70, 413–18). Control of violence, all things being equal, is the most durable and juridical. But even in societies where law is less concentrated, one can find fairly rigid hierarchies involving access to production of knowledge. Charisma is the least durable. Each type of domination establishes the basis for core institutions of modern states: i.e., respectively, sovereignty, bureaucracy, and democracy (the last understood as “a competitive political field” [367, footnote omitted]). These three dimensions of domination typically coexist in various balances with one another, but they need not come packaged together as they have been, as each has different genealogical roots. Because the three forms of power do not combine of necessity, they may be reconfigured in terms of different equilibria. That does not require one to discount the empirical force of the current combination or to deny that the current combination is itself a matured form of more nascent varieties of striking the balance in terms of the modern state. The point remains, however, that the modern social and political world is not set in stone.
Second, Graeber and Wengrow propose a triple shift in the theoretical structure of political anarchism. In its classic nineteenth-century forms, anarchism placed a premium on social equality. But equality has had a mixed career as a social and political concept. A case in point: Marx heaps scorn on it as a quintessential bourgeois idea, a concept all the more debilitating because vacuous. What is the Hobbesian state of nature, after all, if not a state of equality in which each is like enough to each to stake all to perpetual fear of violence? Anarchism does well to take the lesson, which also extends to that second talisman of anarchism, the state as anathema. For many anarchists, the principal reason that states cannot be reformed internally is that they cannot deliver the egalitarian goods. It is better to look to the concept of freedom for alternatives to liberalism. Graeber and Wengrow forward three types of freedom found distributed broadly in the human register since Neolithic times: the freedom to refuse, to move, and to rearrange social relations (44–45, 426ff., 503ff.). These are by no means separate categories. If your group moves out of a society, you are refusing that society and rearranging it as well, if only by your absence from it. There are also forms of refusal that are less peripatetic and rearrangements of society that feature neither moving out nor refusal. This account of freedom is intended to replace the liberal conception of freedom as right, specifically as based in property right. Conceptions of property right become central to Enlightenment political theory and practice, providing rationales for the necessity of the state and even for conceiving of one's interest in one's personhood. The key positive point Graeber and Wengrow wish to make here is that, when the property model gives way to their more historically aware triad of freedoms, one is in a much better position to take account of what really matters: the relative responsiveness within a society to demands for change, even radical change. Moreover—and this is the second component in the pivot within contemporary anarchism that Graeber and Wengrow propose—stricter focus on alternative forms of freedom will cause one to stop asking, as anarchists sometimes do, after the nature of the state and how it can be avoided. Instead ask: What kind of power is being centralized, how, and to what ends (474)? Third, why accept the gambit that the only alternative to centralized power is to live in small, relatively isolated communities? There are plenty of examples in the last five thousand years of humans living in large-scale yet decentralized ways (502).
Do Graeber and Wengrow entirely escape conjectural history? They do not; much of what they seek to establish rests on case studies that are subject to disagreement, and they dispense their fair share of speculation. To my mind, the transformative impulse that informs The Dawn of Everything recalls the vigorous reimagining of history by anarcho-romantics like Novalis and Landauer, while its empirical audacity pays dues to Kropotkin. I take it that its authors intend the titular “dawn” to be read in two directions at once: to refer both to the emergence in prehistory of human sociality and to the present possibility of marshaling a new understanding of the past to find new ways forward. Graeber and Wengrow have placed squarely on the breakfast table an array of cases that provokes careful thought and challenges one to reawake the social imagination.
