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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 May 2004
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Egypt adopted numerous political reforms that seemed to herald the beginning of a democratic transition. The regime released political prisoners, eased constraints on the press, allowed the growth of civil society, and permitted opposition groups to gain influence in Parliament, professional associations, and campus organizations. According to Eberhard Kienle, it was all a “grand delusion.” These reforms were little more than tactical liberalization that adapted Egyptian authoritarianism to a new set of conditions without any significant reduction in the regime's power.
For example, Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court ruled in 1990 that the country's electoral law discriminated against independent candidates. In response to this ruling, the Parliament was dissolved and a new electoral law was adopted that improved the competitiveness of elections. Many observers saw this as a step toward democracy. Kienle presents a more skeptical view. He argues that the regime adapted to the new electoral landscape by arresting popular candidates and their supporters (particularly Islamists), manipulating voter registration, and rigging the vote count. These measures ensured that the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) retained control of Parliament. In Kienle's view, the seeming progress toward democracy suggested by the new electoral law was offset by the regime's reduction of liberties in other arenas. The net result was a modified form of authoritarianism rather than any meaningful progress toward democracy.
Kienle's analysis draws a distinction between positive liberties (such as the freedom to vote) and negative liberties (such as freedom from government restrictions on expression and assembly). He traces the rise and fall of each type of liberty over the course of the 1990s through study of the regime's relationship with political parties, the judiciary, nongovernmental organizations, human-rights groups, the media, and Islamic groups. Despite the title, he does not examine the government's economic reforms in detail. Rather, he focuses on the regime's tactics for suppressing its opponents.
In the concluding chapter, Kienle argues that Egypt's modern history contains several periods of relatively liberal authoritarianism, followed by reversion to more brutal and comprehensive repression. The expansion and contraction of political freedoms in the 1990s was merely the latest example of this cycle. Furthermore, Kienle believes that Egypt is unlikely to escape this cycle in the foreseeable future. Illiberal attitudes toward politics are gaining ground among secular nationalists as well as Islamists. Economic reform has produced a private sector with very close ties to the state and little interest in constraining state power. And the longevity of the regime has enabled it to construct a vast network of supporters who benefit from its patronage and services. This network will resist efforts to improve the rule of law, increase governmental accountability, and enhance transparency. In short, Egyptians face a bleak political future.
Kienle supports his argument with a vast amount of information that he carefully documents in more than 600 footnotes. He draws extensively on primary and secondary sources in Arabic, as well as on relevant works in English, French, German, and Spanish. The book is by far the most detailed work in English on Egyptian politics in the 1990s.
The book's primary shortcoming lies in its exclusive focus on the government's use of various forms of repression to protect its power. While this is an important feature of Egyptian politics, the regime also works assiduously to co-opt its adversaries by granting them subsidies, government contracts, positions in the NDP, and other benefits. The regime's strategy for survival is built on combining threats with incentives. Kienle has provided extensive details on the regime's use of intimidation in a wide variety of forms. He has said virtually nothing about its use of persuasion to recruit allies and co-opt opponents. The only other significant gap in Kienle's analysis is his neglect of politics within the ruling NDP. Throughout the 1990s, the NDP experienced a substantial increase in the number of “independent” members. These were members of Parliament who joined the NDP after winning election as independent candidates. Their electoral success meant that they were not beholden to the party for their seats. They helped to initiate increasingly lively debates within the NDP on a wide variety of issues, including the nature of economic reform, relations with the United States, political and civil liberties, and strategies for dealing with political Islam. These debates suggest that the primary arena for politics in Egypt is within the NDP rather than between the NDP and its opponents. This observation does not detract from the value and quality of Kienle's book. It simply suggests that a comprehensive understanding of Egyptian reform (or lack thereof) requires equally detailed research on the internal politics of the ruling party.