In The Red Star and the Crescent, editor James Reardon-Anderson brings together a diverse group of scholars to investigate China's emerging relationship with the Middle East and North Africa region, giving particular attention to the oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf. In doing so, Reardon-Anderson has helped to shed light on an increasingly important relationship that has often been overlooked by academics and policymakers alike. Many existing works have discussed China's economic rise, its growing global influence, and its grand strategic plans that include the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) Initiative, as well as its expanding and deepening presence in sub-Saharan Africa and, more recently, Latin America. But focused studies that consider China's strategy toward the Middle East and its likely impact have been few and far between.
The book's contributors emphasize that China's economic connections in the region have grown but are quick to contextualize China's rise as a regional player and note the limitations on its short- and long-term influence. China's economy has become heavily dependent on crude oil imports, over half of which are sourced from the Persian Gulf. At the same time, the United States, which became the world's largest crude oil producer in early 2018, has demonstrated an increasing reluctance to exercise leadership in the region. This has been evident in both the Obama administration's “pivot to Asia” and the less-defined “America First” orientation of the Trump presidency.
As noted by several of the book's contributors, America's declining crude imports and relative disengagement from the region have encouraged many Gulf States to increasingly “look East” to China and other emerging markets. However, as noted in Andrew Scobell's chapter, “China's Search for Security in the Greater Middle East,” Beijing's actions in the Middle East have revealed a profound “interest-effort mismatch” (p. 14). In spite of the country's extensive and growing interests in the region, it has been “extraordinarily timid,” focusing almost entirely on economic activities and devoting few resources to military or diplomatic activities (p. 13). Similarly, in chapter 2, Jon Alterman notes that China's cautious engagement with the region is dictated by the persistent presence of the United States. China emerged as a significant player in the region much later than the United States, has narrower interests, and is still developing a sense of its role. The United States has encouraged Chinese partnership on issues of mutual concern, such as piracy off the coast of Somalia, but has responded warily to Beijing's establishment of a military installation at Djibouti and with hostility to its efforts to establish new regional bodies such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Sun Degang writes in chapter 4 that Beijing in fact prefers to have a “soft” rather than “hard” military presence in the region, as it sees the establishment of an economic relationship and military and arms exchanges as a cheaper and more efficient method for securing its expanding interests in the Gulf.
Two chapters focusing on the OBOR initiative, one written by Stephen Blank and the other by Andrew Small, debate the program's significance in the region. Blank suggests that OBOR is likely paving the way for greater Chinese influence in coming decades, while Small indicates that China will continue to have a limited role and influence—the wealthy Gulf States have little need for Chinese investment and most regional players balance their partnerships with Beijing against their ongoing relationships with the United States and other Western powers.
The book also features chapters that apply China's regional policy to its relationships with three strategically important states in the Middle East: Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. Notably, these chapters reveal a significant degree of variation in the nature and extent of Chinese involvement, suggesting that Beijing is taking a pragmatic and variegated strategy in developing its foreign relations. Altay Atli finds that China's economic links are too limited to constitute an important strategic partnership. Joseph Sassoon finds that while China has increasing investment and trade connections in Iraq, it has thus far avoided taking sides in political disputes and intervening forcefully to protect its economic interests and assets. But, Sassoon warns, as Beijing transitions from an emerging to an established player in Iraq, these circumstances might change. In his chapter on Iran, John Garver finds that Beijing has played an important and constructive role in multilateral negotiations over the country's nascent nuclear capabilities, contributing to the finalization of the nuclear agreement struck in 2015.
Overall, The Red Star and the Crescent provides a unique and important contribution on an understudied topic—China's expanding engagement with the Middle East. The chapters, while diverse in their particular foci and theoretical approaches, maintain an effective dialogue with one another, helping to clarify rather than confuse a complex, unfolding topic. The authors avoid excessive jargon, making the book accessible to a larger audience. I would recommend it for upper-division undergraduate and graduate students as well as scholars and practitioners.
