Elite Perspectives and the Civic Education Programme

The 2001 Constitution of Kenya Review (Amendment) Act became the official framework for the merged CKRC, mandating the CKRC to create ‘a governance system that would derive from, and respond directly to the wishes, needs and aspirations of the people of Kenya’ (CKRC 2005: 13). Despite this declared intention to respond to the people's views, the public hearings were framed by the public opinions of religious, professional and political elites. Popular thought cannot be isolated from the different arenas in which people interact, a factor that blurs divisions between high and low political spheres. The influence of these different dialogues was evident in the first stage in the CKRC process, a civic education programme to prepare Kenyans for ‘effective, and meaningful participation’ (CKRC 2005: 22). Thus, throughout the movement for constitutional reform and the civic education programme, wananchi were confronted with political and social elites' perceptions of possible parameters for political interaction.

At a basic level, democracy can be rooted in contestation between political elites and inclusiveness of citizens in political processes (Dahl Reference Dahl1971), both premised on relationships among citizens and political elites (Saward Reference Saward and Beetham1994: 12). The parameters of contestation and inclusiveness are debatable. Competing ideas about citizenship, popular participation and the rule of law can surface in discussions about the form of legitimate political relations within a state. During the constitutional review process, social elites constructed legitimate political relations within democratic structures differently by emphasising alternative roles for Parliament and political parties, the person of the president, and religious authorities.

The CKRC outlined its views on the parameters of good government in a national curriculum for civic education providers, and in two documents entitled Reviewing the Constitution (CKRC 2001a), and Constitutional Review Process in Kenya: issues and questions for public hearing (CKRC 2001b). The CKRC programme emphasised political legitimacy rooted in a democratic legal-rational authority. According to the 2001 curriculum manual, democracy was a system ‘to promote self-reliance in decision-making … and generally empower [people] to make decisions’ (CKRC 2001c: 17), and government was the organ that ‘carries out responsibilities and exercises power on behalf of the people’ (ibid.: 51). This emphasis on popular sovereignty was coupled with the suggestion that a rule of law was necessary to maintain political stability; the constitution was described as ‘the foundation of a house’ and ‘roots of a tree’ (ibid.: 43).

Public narratives about politics among religious, professional and political sectors complicated the message promoted through the CRKC civic education programme. In the ruling party, the Kenyan African National Union (KANU), President Moi coupled statements emphasising individual hard work and participation with affirmations of his personal right to rule (KBC Radio 2.2.1999, 31.12.2000), and reinforced the authority of Parliament, defining a people-driven review process as one orchestrated by Parliament-led reforms (ibid. 19.12.2000). Other KANU members more strongly promoted popular participation. KANU Member of Parliament John Sambu asserted, ‘The voice of the people is the voice of God’, affirming the people's ability to contribute to constitutional review (The Nation 19.10.1999).

Vocal opposition politicians coalesced around arguments that political transformation depended on ousting President Moi (ibid. 20.1.1999), with Raila Odinga, then member of the National Development Party, suggesting that corrupt individuals in government were responsible for economic collapse (ibid. 4.1.1999). The emphasis on individual leaders manifested itself as a call from some opposition politicians, including Odinga, Paul Muite, Beth Mugo and Tabitha Sii, for constitutional reform to be moved outside Parliament, arguing that genuine representation could not be found in Parliament (ibid. 24.5.1999). Members of smaller opposition parties entered into debates by criticising the main opposition parties and KANU for inciting corruption and ineffectual politics (ibid. 6.2.1999).Footnote ³

Outside Parliament and government, civil society groups engaged in another dialogue about the rule of law and popular sovereignty. Among Christian denominations, divisions over popular sovereignty were demarcated between those promoting parliamentary authority within the review process, such as the International Holy Spirit and United African Indigenous Churches, and those advocating more direct popular participation. The National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) and Catholic Bishops of Kenya (CBK) were inconsistent in their commitment to popular sovereignty. The Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC)'s 1999 Lenten campaign equated popular participation with good government, stating: ‘The sinful and evil structures in our society will be eradicated when we participate in the making of the constitution’ (CJPC 1999: 6). However, the CBK (1996: 5) voiced scepticism about the potential for the rule of law alone to reform government in 1996, and in a publication by Kivutha Kibwana (Reference Kibwana and Ryan2002: 14) the Catholic Church diverged from the CKRC curriculum, suggesting special roles for religious and political leadership to guide and deliver ‘the ordinary citizen in Africa’. Again in contrast, a few individual church leaders continued to promote popular sovereignty. Reverend Timothy Njoya, a Presbyterian minister, provided some of the most vocal criticisms. By emphasising the citizen's role in fostering legitimate governance, strengthened but not superseded by education and the rule of law, Njoya (Reference Njoya2003) presented an expansive view of popular sovereignty.

Njoya's perspective reflected the views held by the Law Society of Kenya (LSK), International Commission of Jurists – Kenya Section (ICJ-K) and the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC). On the surface, the legal sector appeared unified, rooting governance in the rule of law and popular sovereignty, affirmed through The Kenya We Want: proposal for a model constitution, jointly produced by the LSK, KHRC and ICJ-K in 1993. However, as the 2002 general elections neared, members of the legal and academic sectors diverged in opinion. Individuals, such as Professor Anyang' Nyong'o, became increasingly involved in party politics. As a Social Democratic Party (SDP) nominee, Anyang' Nyong'o argued that improved governance depended on removing Moi and KANU from power (BBC News 20.1.1999). In 1999, The Daily Nation (15.8.1999) accused members of the LSK in general as ‘motivated by the narrowest politico-ethnic partisanship’.

Evident through these public assertions about government and reform, surrounding the public hearings was a public dialogue over different possible forms of political relations within democratic structures. Depending on the situation of individuals within Kenya – their relationship to the legal sector, academia, political parties, politicians and the church – it is likely that they would have been aware of the variance between elite perspectives.

Power relations within the public hearings

In addition to elite public dialogues, Kenyans' perceptions about politics as expressed during the hearings were also framed by internal power dynamics within the public hearings. Throughout the hearings, the commissioners injected their own perspectives on what should be discussed. They emphasised the rights of women, youth, persons with disabilities and the elderly to engage in political discussion, requested that participants refrain from explaining their problems, and told participants in Embu, Nakuru and Kakamega Districts to avoid specifically answering the questions from the CKRC civic education booklet. Although one could postulate that these interventions enabled more people to participate, they may also have conflicted with participants' views about political interactions. For instance, participants did not necessarily believe that women should be included in the public sphere. The commissioners repeatedly had to call for order when women were presenting. One man in Lurambi constituency suggested to Commissioner Nancy Baraza amidst laughter and clapping, ‘A kitchen is your office, your Honour’ (CKRC 2002w: 87), inciting Commissioner Baraza to deny the validity of his perspective by asserting, ‘gender equity, it is real, and it is happening’ (ibid. 96).

Amidst these constraints, deriving both from elites' public perspectives and from power dynamics, views relayed through the public hearings provide valuable insights into popular political thoughts. Popular thought is not autonomous, but is entangled with and shaped by perceptions at elite levels (Chabal Reference Chabal1992: 13–14; Lonsdale Reference Lonsdale2000: 112). In the context of competing perspectives on the rule of law, public doubts about the legitimacy of popular participation and the commissioners' direct attempts to influence proceedings, wananchi accepted some and contested other elite viewpoints. The public hearings present a picture of wananchi beliefs about government, valid not by their inclusivity or their distinctness from high politics, but by their representation of what was thought to be possible to express among wananchi, as interwoven with high political views. The viewpoints expressed in the hearings are a window into one manifestation of wananchi political thought in reaction to the debates presented by those in high political spheres.

Nyeri District, Central Province

The first public hearings in Central Province were immediately preceded by media accounts of divisions within the CKRC, and between the CKRC and MPs. According to the East African Standard (23.5.2002), the predominant nationwide divide was between a majority view that the president was the source of all problems, and a minority view that as a developing nation Kenya required a strong executive government, limited mainly by institutional and legal controls. This publicly discussed divide over executive power was evident in the Nyeri District hearings. Consisting of a predominantly Kikuyu demographic disillusioned with the loss of ethnically based privilege under President Moi (Lonsdale Reference Lonsdale, Odhiambo and Lonsdale2003), presenters in Nyeri District voiced distrust in the president. Individuals repeatedly requested that Parliament, the law, a vice-president or prime minister limit the office of the president. Under Kenyatta's presidency, the heads of the central bank, civil service, police, parastatals and public service were all ethnic Kikuyu (Omolo Reference Omolo2002). Their disproportionate representation in Kenyatta's administration accentuated the sense of grievance and disadvantage under Moi as the political landscape visibly shifted; Moi gave Kalenjins high-level positions in the civil service and central bank, and as ambassadors.

Disillusionment with Moi's presidency was clearly reflected in the presenters' desires for limitations on the office. Even in Kieni constituency, where requests were made for increased presidential power, these requests were sporadic and did not refer necessarily to economic power, calling for greater presidential power during wartime and a veto over Parliament, and revealing more of a distrust of parliamentarians than support for the current president.

The likelihood that advocates of strong presidential power were also motivated by distrust is affirmed by deeper analysis of the hearings, in which presenters implicated political leadership, wananchi and the police in the current political situation. Wananchi were even held responsible for corruption through a culture of money, marriage abuses, or joblessness. However, while this acknowledgement of wananchi responsibility corresponded with criticisms of their behaviour, it also was coupled with ideas about wananchi rights to be involved in politics through formal control over political proceedings. One man from Kavaitu speaking in Tetu constituency postulated that elections were necessary because ‘we as wananchi, we are the ones who know our leaders. People, people who can lead us in a good way or in a godly manner’ (CKRC 2002b: 19). Similarly, another speaker in Kieni constituency suggested, ‘even those people who are illiterate, I think can tell and choose a good leader’ (CKRC 2002a: 70). Thus, while scepticism of wananchi was discussed, this was within a framework assumption among participants that wananchi should be involved in selecting and limiting political leaders, conveying relatively greater trust in wananchi than in the current leadership.

While showing distrust of current politicians, presenters in Nyeri District tended to paint a more positive image of historical political relationships, reflecting the contrast between the distribution of privilege under Kenyatta and Moi. A disproportionately high percentage of participants in Central Province were elderly.Footnote ⁴ Reflecting the CKRC's (2005: 129–30) finding that older individuals were more likely to discuss historical experiences, this corresponded to repeated references to Kenya's independence period.

At independence, Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta (Reference Kenyatta and Kenyatta1968: 213), proclaimed that together Kenyans ‘have a duty to ensure that all our citizens are delivered from the afflictions of poverty, ignorance and disease, otherwise freedom for many of our people will be neither complete nor meaningful’. In discussing the current situation, presenters in Mathira, Kieni and Nyeri Town constituencies referred to these three enemies of progress – poverty, ignorance and disease – suggesting that they should be the focus of political agendas. Individuals also identified with Kenya's independence period by mentioning the Kenya African Union (KAU)'s role in liberation, the issues fought for at independence, uhuru and mashamba (freedom and land),Footnote ⁵ and unjust situations of poverty experienced by freedom fighters.

The continued relevance of struggles over land was reinforced through discussions of the importance of land, farmers' situation and agriculture as the heart of Kenya's economy. Land as a political grievance for Kikuyu is rooted in the early twentieth century, when frontier land holding units in southern Kikuyuland were allocated to British settlers from 1902/03; from then on, dispossessed Kikuyu migrated to the Rift Valley.Footnote ⁶ The Mau Mau struggle further emphasised the value of land, arguably translating into an internal struggle between Kikuyu, fuelled by dichotomies between landed and landlessness, colonial resistance and appeasement (Ajulu Reference Ajulu2002; Atieno-Odhiambo Reference Atieno-Odhiambo2002). These references illustrate how, in the public hearings, land continued to be a historical text through which Kikuyu in Central Province understood injustice and inequality.

In response to these historically grounded dissatisfactions with politics, people in each constituency suggested that religion was a necessary and positive influence on politics. Presenters claimed that God was directing the review process, requested that the president be a Christian, and asked that the church be involved in referenda. By depicting religion as a desirable authority in government, individuals placed hope in an external deity rather than in individual leaders. Thus, albeit with some contradictions, Nyeri participants placed the potential for renewed political relations in religion and wananchi participation, and in past political agendas put forward by Kenyatta and at independence. In these suggestions, they reveal contradictions between their historical satisfaction with Kenyatta's leadership, their dissatisfaction with the existing leadership, and their sense of personal responsibility for widespread societal and political corruption.

Mombasa District, Coast Province

Following Nyeri District, public hearings were held in Coast Province. Ever since the Lancaster House constitutional conference in 1962–3, coastal interests, grievances and politics have appeared to significantly differ from those in the rest of the country. Since then, though the Swahili remain the dominant group in Coast Province, there has been an influx of people identifying with other ethnic groups. Significantly for Mombasa District, an increasing number of Luo, Kikuyu and Luhya came to work in the Mombasa docks (Ajulu Reference Ajulu2002; Oucho Reference Oucho2007).

Despite Mombasa's increasingly diverse population, coastal politics under both Kenyatta and Moi regimes was generally marked by distrust of central government. In the 1990s, with discontent stemming from the banning of the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) in 1992, clashes broke out between coastal Muslims and the government (Oded Reference Oded2000). A sense of disillusionment with political power was reinforced in 1997 with violent clashes in Likoni, Mombasa, prior to the elections, marred by the general perception that those at the top levels of government were responsible for the clashes (Ajulu Reference Ajulu2002: 264). Divisions between people of the Coast, particularly Muslims, and the rest of Kenya were further entrenched after the 1998 attacks on the United States embassy in Nairobi, and the subsequent banning of several Muslim non-governmental organisations.

Suggestions to limit individuals' power within high politics were thus, unsurprisingly, common in the Mombasa hearings. While the historical roots of dissatisfaction were unique, those at the hearings in Mombasa commonly recommended implementing measures to check presidential and parliamentary power. Repeated recommendations were made to restrict MPs' control over money, particularly over their salaries. The desired chain of authority stemming from wananchi to their representatives in Parliament was revealed through one man's assertion, Hii Parliament ni ya wananchi, Parliament si ya President (‘This Parliament is the common people's, it is not the President's’) (CKRC 2002e: 87). Requests were also made for separate bodies in society, specifically the CKRC and religious authorities, to limit political elites. It was suggested that the CKRC's experience and knowledge gave it specific capabilities to create a constitution. Others placed God's authority above the law, situating government and the constitution under religious authority. Islam in particular was proposed as a positive influence in political space.Footnote ⁷ As one female lawyer in Kisauni constituency argued, ‘Should there be a conflict between the equality bill and the sheria [sic] law, the sheria law shall be supreme to the equality bill as far as a Muslim is concerned’ (CKRC 2002d: 74).

Though participants in both locations displayed suspicions of leaders' power, divergences arose between Nyeri and Mombasa Districts over perceptions of corruption. As mentioned above, clashes in the 1990s were seen as orchestrated by those in high-level politics. However, diverging from this view, those at the Mombasa District public hearings voiced distrust in all individuals. In Changamwe constituency, individuals referred to a culture of violence and widespread corruption in Kenya; one male resident of Mikindani even extended this to the presidency, stating, ‘To err is human, the President is a human being, can make human errors [sic]’ (CKRC 2002c: 39).

Further differing from Nyeri District, but consistent with regional political campaigns since independence, Mombasa District participants repeatedly recommended majimbo Footnote ⁸ as a means to alleviate the overconcentration of power. Majimbo held specific significance in Coast and Rift Valley Provinces, as minority ethnic groups in both provinces promoted majimbo at independence in response to concerns about economic and political domination by the Kikuyu and Luo (Anderson Reference Anderson2005). In Likoni, Kisauni and Changamwe constituencies, support for majimbo was coupled with references to the interests of watu wa pwani (‘people of the coast’), setting themselves apart from the rest of Kenya.

Nevertheless, beyond this awareness of their situation as people of the coast, the motivations behind the participants' recommendations remained consistent in tone with those expressed in Nyeri District. Historically, experiences in Coast Province have been distinct from those in Central Province, from the Swahili peoples' interactions with the British, strong identification with Islam, and lack of ethnic affiliation with Kenyatta. Nonetheless, the Mombasa District presenters arrived at a similar conclusion: distrust of those in power, albeit of themselves as well, with a desire to check the power of leaders.

Embu District, Eastern Province

Between the Mombasa and Embu District hearings, beginning on 22 May 2002, discussions circulated about extending Parliament's term to enable the CKRC to finish its work before a general election. Debates involved Parliament's right to amend the constitution, the potential for free and fair elections under the current constitution, and the desirability of allowing MPs an extended period in office (East African Standard 10.5.2002; The Nation 16.5.2002, 19.5.2002). Amidst debate, patterns of distrust of leadership continued in the Embu District hearings. This distrust became clear through associations made between leadership and corruption. Although not extensively discussed in either Manyatta or Runyenjes constituencies, corruption was usually described as an issue affecting the state bureaucracy, the police and leadership. While isolated presenters described corruption in the home and among the people, the dominant trend was to assume greater faith in wananchi than in the leadership, epitomised in assertions such as: ‘If the chief is elected by wananchi, there will be no corruption’ (CKRC 2002f: 20).

Fitting with opposition politicians' suggestions to limit the presidency, wananchi in each constituency requested that the president be scrutinised by an independent body, the judiciary, a vice-president, a prime minister, or Parliament. For instance, although two individuals in Manyatta constituency suggested that the president should be the engine of the state or should advise Parliament and ministers, they did not recommend absolute presidential powers. One sought to confine the president to an advisory role, and the other requested checks and balances on presidential power (ibid.: 18–19, 72–3). However, distinguishing themselves from opposition politicians, individuals in the hearings also raised suspicions of Parliament, revealing conflicting perspectives on the balance of power between Parliament and president. Though recommendations were made to have Parliament as the highest governing body, others qualified this by requesting that MPs be limited in their salaries, absenteeism and individual spending.

Embu District participants also presented divergent opinions on the influence of religion on politics. In Runyenjes constituency, the constitution was said to be supreme over religious law, while in Manyatta constituency one man proposed that individuals should exercise choice independent from the church (ibid.: 15–16). However, beyond these views, throughout both constituencies, religion was repeatedly presented as a positive influence on Kenyan politics. In particular, participants suggested that God's law was supreme, that Kenyans were a biblical people, and that religious leaders should advise government. In Manyatta constituency two presenters suggested that religion should be incorporated into politics through kadhi courts (ibid.: 40–4).

The parameters of distrust in Embu District clearly extended beyond those established by elites. By expressing distrust in the president, Parliament and, at times, religious authorities, participants set themselves apart from elites, whose mistrust was restricted to certain institutions and individuals. Perceptions of the balance of power also provided evidence of differences between individuals in Embu District and in Mombasa and Nyeri Districts. These variations were particularly distinct between Mombasa and Embu Districts through consistent opposition in Embu to federalism as a mechanism by which to disperse power. Only one man in Manyatta constituency proposed that a provincial system should be maintained, on the condition that it was not called majimbo (ibid.: 69–70). Despite disagreements over religion, leadership and devolution, it is still possible to recognise convergences in political thought between Embu, Nyeri and Mombasa Districts. A common thread between participants was a concern about the current boundaries of high politics and the corruptibility of the individual in power.

Nairobi District

Like Mombasa, Nairobi is an amalgam of different ethnic identities, histories and social classes. Nairobi is also uniquely situated at the apex of political power, as the location of the Parliament buildings and State House. Despite this distinctive position, distrust of those in power still emerged at the Nairobi public hearings held between 28 and 31 May 2002. The Embakasi constituency hearing on 29 May 2002 began with one woman and one man advocating meaningful powers for the president as an elected leader or through the appointment of judges (CKRC 2002i: 5–6, 13–15). Following these individuals, the remaining presentations discussing presidential power asserted that it should be limited, most often by the law. The trend throughout the Nairobi hearings could be summarised in one man's suggestion that ‘the government belongs to the people, not to an individual’ (CKRC 2002g: 10).

As in Embu District, ambiguities arose in perceptions of corruption. Distrust of the presidency extended to distrust of MPs through descriptions of Parliament as a body that could both check presidential power and also be abused for personal gain. Participants voiced reservations about the extent of parliamentarians' power, requesting checks on MPs' influence over their salaries and public money. In response to the violence and widespread evictions in Nairobi slums in the 1990s, individuals also raised concerns about politicians buying votes, misusing harambee,Footnote ⁹ and exploiting the slums.

In their dissatisfaction with politicians' activities, individuals in the hearings suggest that political leadership is responsible for corruption. A man from Gitari Marigu speaking in one of the Embakasi constituency hearings asserted, ‘we find that corruption in Kenya is high … this has become because our leaders have been given much powers’ (CKRC 2002h: 43), while in Starehe constituency a postgraduate from Kenyatta University voiced his frustration by stating, ‘We have given them [political heads] a whole 38 years, where we respect them, we refer [sic] them but all they have done is throw sand into our cooking plate or eating plate’ (CKRC 2002l: 4).

Amidst criticisms of leadership, suggestions that wananchi were a corrupting force were also raised. Although a few individuals presented a benign and positive image of wananchi, cynicism about wananchi was more common. In Embakasi constituency, one man lamented, ‘corruption, corruption is in our blood in this country’ (CKRC 2002h: 95). Thus, evident in Nairobi is a willingness to implicate the populace as well as leaders, specifically, in experiences of political corruption. In the 1990s, unrest in Nairobi often took the form of gang and police violence, and forced evictions – experiences not necessarily directly linked to politicians. The challenge of attributing experiences of violence to those in power helps to explain participants' perceptions that corruption encompassed both leaders and citizens.

In response to this acute sense of corruption, participants suggested an expanded political space as a means to check power. Every hearing except the second in Starehe constituency contained suggestions that religion should constrain politics. Proposals ranged from asserting that God was above the law, to requesting religious courts, to asking for a president with a Godly image. Historical law, like that attributed to Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, was also discussed as a legitimate guidance for political institutions, albeit less often than religion (CKRC 2002j: 49–50). Finally, the political sphere was expanded to include organisations independent from government; one man even proposed that foreigners were a more likely source of ethical standards than indigenous Kenyans (CKRC 2002k: 108). Thus, experiences of politics and unrest in Nairobi led to distrust reminiscent of the other regions: a population unwilling to name or label any institution or existing politician as trustworthy. By turning to look outside the exclusive high political sphere to implicate political proceedings, those in the Nairobi hearings joined in a public disillusioned with the current direction of politics.

Garissa District, North Eastern ProvinceFootnote ¹⁰

From Nairobi District, the commissioners progressed to North Eastern Province (NEP). The concerns occupying those presenting in Garissa District, NEP, differed significantly from the previous districts, indicating a people living within an acutely perceived state of marginalisation from high politics. Inhabitants in NEP are exclusively Somali speaking (Oucho Reference Oucho2002). Political and religious leaders in NEP had consistently raised concerns over the low level of security and development in NEP (Oded Reference Oded2000: 139). Similarly, in the public hearings, individuals strongly identified with historical injustices. In Lagdera constituency, concerns were raised repeatedly about past government wrongdoings evident in police injustices against Somalis, emergency laws and colonial boundaries.

Depictions of historically based injustices were coupled with requests for change not in the nature of the contract between government and citizens, but rather to include Somalis living in NEP in this contract. In the 1980s, the government commissioned special screening teams to NEP to determine and evict Somalis failing to prove they were Kenyan citizens (Oded Reference Oded2000). In response, individuals focused repeatedly in the public hearings on this situation, requesting the termination of the special screening of Somalis.

In light of this focus, few participants discussed relations within high politics between the presidency and Parliament. In Lagdera constituency only two presenters, one man from an organisation called Homework and Kenya, and the school principal, discussed this topic (CKRC 2002o: 7–9, 40–43). Periodically, those in Fafi and Dujis constituencies argued that the president should retain power over MPs' salaries or remain Commander in Chief. However, most often, presenters recommended reduced presidential power, or that the president deepen his or her relationship with citizens through required visits to NEP.

Comments on direct and indirect participation provide increased clarity on popular views in NEP of the relationship between wananchi and political leaders. In all three constituencies, individuals suggested that citizens should be able to recall leaders and offer complaints. Those in NEP also recommended maintaining and increasing indirect participation by expanding the number of MPs in the NEP and preserving constituencies based on geography rather than population. Finally, residents' participation in the hearings itself suggested a belief in their legitimate role to shape governance. As reported by the East African Standard (17.6.2002): ‘Hundreds of people from all walks of life have turned up at provincial hearings to tell the CKRC commissioners their preferred constitutional changes. It is with such agency, that elderly men and women, children, political and religious leaders braved the scorching heat to present their views in North Eastern Province.’

Expanding on their proposals to extend citizens' inclusion in political proceedings, and similar to the previous districts analysed, those in Garissa District suggested that religion should shape politics. In contrast with the deep-set disillusionment with the government and police, religion was invoked as a positive force in people's lives. No presenter in Garissa District rejected the institution of kadhi courts or Islamic law. One woman, while cautious in her support, affirmed a desire for Islamic law as long as it included justice for youth and women (CKRC 2002o: 68–70). At the extreme, one self-identifying Muslim man proposed that religion was fundamental to political structures, asserting, ‘I think we cannot succeed in man made laws when we are discarding the divine laws because the Holy book Quran [sic] is a compilation of all other books from the Psalms of David to the Torah of Moses and to the Gospel of Christ’ (CKRC 2002n: 64).

Together, religion, popular participation, and expressions of historical injustice influenced individuals' perceptions of desirable government. Those in Garissa District engaged in a discourse about government similar to that in the previous provinces by including space for religion and voicing disillusionment with political leadership. While presenters were distinctive in raising their specific situation as Somalis, they did not promote an exclusive Somali political community. Rather, they asked for Somalis to be included in public space, and for religion and history to influence the nature of politics. Thus, while excluded from the Kenyan state to an exceptional extent, prior to and since independence, those involved in the hearings in NEP arrived at a similar conclusion about the relationship between those in and outside of political power, sceptical of political institutions and individuals in power.

Kisumu District, Nyanza ProvinceFootnote ¹¹

Nyanza Province is distinct in its concentration of Luo peoples. Here, in contrast to the disjuncture between residents and the government in NEP, politicians were closely involved in winning Luo political support. The day preceding the public hearings in Kisumu District, The Nation (10.6.2002) reported: ‘Division has rocked the ruling party in Luo Nyanza in recent months as opposing politicians seek to upstage each other.’ At the centre of this was Raila Odinga, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party. The East African Standard (10.6.2002) suggested: ‘[Odinga] commands the single most disciplined and focused ethnic vote bloc in the country – the Luo vote … a remarkable feat in light of a tradition of a Council of Elders with little space for “Big Man leadership”.’ Raila Odinga's popularity echoed that of his father, Oginga Odinga (Reference Odinga1967: 310), who throughout his political career promoted populist politics, aligning himself with the landless and ex-Mau Mau.

‘Big Man’ politics corresponded with an emphasis on parliamentarians and the president in the hearings, without reaching consensus on the appropriate power balance between the two. As might be expected, given the common association of the Luo population in Nyanza Province with political opposition (Carotenuto & Luongo Reference Carotenuto and Luongo2009: 207), presenters tended to recommend reduced presidential power, often by law or through a parliamentary system. At one level, this can be seen to refer to the balance of power under Kenyatta. At independence, Luos held significant positions in government, and from the 1950s to the early 1970s this was coupled with a disproportionate number of Luo professionals and academics. However, in 1966 Oginga Odinga split from Kenyatta and formed the Kenya People's Union (see Oginga 1967: 297). Correspondingly, Luos' relative influence within government declined. Increasingly, Luos were on the outside of executive power, written off during the Kenyatta years as ‘little animals’ or ‘little boys’ (Atieno-Odhiambo Reference Atieno-Odhiambo2002: 241). Perceptions of disadvantage as well as real decline continued under Moi and by 2003, Nyanza was the most dissatisfied region in Kenya (Morrison Reference Morrison2007).

Despite this disillusionment with executive power, presidential authority was not completely rejected in Kisumu District. In each constituency, calls were made for increased presidential power through a presidential veto, a presidential system, and a president who was above the law or who could dissolve Parliament. This is not inconsistent with the view that people in Kisumu District were generally disillusioned with both historical and present-day situations of the Luo. Rather, it may reflect the other dominant characteristic of Luo politics, the existence of dynamic ‘big men’ such as Raila Odinga, and a desire perhaps for a more favourable position within current systems.

Beyond the predominant distrust of the president, those in Kisumu District extended their dissatisfaction to include parliamentarians. When discussing Parliament, individuals focused on mechanisms to limit MPs' exercise of power. In Kisumu Rural constituency, while suggestions were made to increase MPs' power to impeach the president and address national crises, more attention was given to limiting MPs' power by constitutional amendments and constituency visits. In Kisumu West constituency, citizens, independent commissions and the judiciary were proposed as checks on parliamentary power, while in Kisumu East constituency, five presenters advocated an upper house as a check on Parliament (CKRC 2002p: 14–15). Not all agreed on the nature of restrictions on Parliament or even if restrictions were necessary. Nevertheless, individuals tended to feel that parliamentarians could not be fully trusted, and instead proposed increasing wananchi participation through referenda, recall of MPs, ombudsmen, and impeachment of local authorities.

Though speakers in Kisumu District resemble those in the districts already analysed in their distrust of Parliament and the president, religion escaped most recommendations. Excluding an explicit place for religion did not equate to a denial of space for bodies external to wananchi and the government to shape politics. Rather, it was recommended that NGOs be involved in civic education, decisions to invoke state emergency powers, an independent body to set MPs' salaries, anti-corruption measures, and the regulation of parties. In 2002, Nyanza Province was found to have the next-highest frequency of operating NGOs after Rift Valley Province, corresponding to a disproportionate level of poverty. At the district level, Kisumu District, as an urban centre in the province, had the highest frequency of NGOs in Kenya outside Nairobi, indicating their influence in the area (Oyugi Reference Oyugi2002). It is thus unsurprising that those in Kisumu District would turn to civil society organisations when discussing political power relations. Although references to civil society bodies were sporadic, NGOs and civil society groups were discussed in each constituency, affirming their place within political discourse. As a result, by recommending civil society and direct wananchi participation, the Kisumu District hearings revealed a desire for a dispersal of political power and an overall distrust of individual politicians from the MP to the president.

Nakuru District, Rift Valley Province

About a month elapsed between the hearings in Kisumu District and in Nakuru District, Rift Valley Province. During this period, the media continued to highlight political strife and personal attacks over extending the CKRC and delaying the elections. On 5 July 2002, Reverend Mutava Musyimi, Ufungamano chairman, described the situation as ‘a serious moral crisis, a fight between good and evil, right and wrong, contempt for people and cynicism reeling with wickedness’ (East African Standard). Political conflicts surrounding electoral politics also intensified with two camps materialising within KANU, between those supporting and those against Uhuru Kenyatta's bid for the presidency.

Politicians' strife corresponded with popular scepticism towards MPs. Individuals admonished MPs for their efforts to extend their term in Parliament. Since the early 1990s, Nakuru District had been marred by politically incited ethnic clashes (Klopp Reference Klopp2001: 147). These divisions were mirrored by differing viewpoints on the desirable balance of power between president and Parliament. While continual suggestions were made for Parliament to check presidential power, certainty that Parliament could be trusted more than the president was not completely accepted. Participants also argued that the president should limit Parliament, by means ranging from calls to allocate the president a position over the law to suggesting that the president be able to dissolve Parliament.

Further limitations were proposed on Parliament through increased wananchi participation. While generally supportive of increased parliamentary authority, individuals wanted to reinforce the linkages between MPs and wananchi and expand electoral participation. A recommendation rarely raised in the previous hearings was the request for election of chiefs by mlolongo, or queue voting. By providing a limited form of participation, mlolongo would allow wananchi greater opportunity to influence local politics by extending election to chiefs. Individuals also proposed that wananchi should recall leaders, participate in amending the constitution, and enlist complaints. One individual even advocated that age should not restrict participation as ‘we have young people who can be Presidents, who can make it, who can even be better than some old people we have around’ (CKRC 2002t: 99). Rift Valley people did not necessarily identify or experience politics in the same way as their ‘ethnic’ counterparts in other provinces. For instance, the Kikuyu in Rift Valley were outside Kenyatta's exclusive circles, and had often been landless since the end of the nineteenth century (Ajulu Reference Ajulu2002). Struggles over land and resources and politically orchestrated ethnic clashes explain the widespread distrust of those in executive and parliamentary power.

In contrast to the general desire for increased electoral participation among all present in the Nakuru District hearings, individuals and constituencies were divided over majimbo as a means to devolve power and enhance citizen–government relations. In the 1990s, majimbo had become politicised in Rift Valley Province through its association with a political campaign to evict non-Kalenjins from areas associated with Kalenjin identities (Kagwanja Reference Kagwanja2003: 25–6). Mentioned only a few times throughout the Subukia and Molo constituency hearings, the dominant sentiment expressed was critical of majimbo. In Nakuru Town and Rongai constituencies, those discussing majimbo remained divided. While some linked majimbo to development, those cautioning against majimbo associated it with economic inequality, violence, and instability. As one man in Nakuru Town constituency stated, followed by clapping among those present, ‘we have seen proponents of majimbo what they have done within the short time they have tried to propagate majimboism here. They have done this bonde la ufa to bonde la kufa [they have “turned” this Valley of the Rift into a Valley of Eating]’ (CKRC 2002s: 48).Footnote ¹²

On the first day of the public hearings in Naivasha constituency, there was strong support for majimbo among those advocating Maasai culture and grievances. On 15 July 2002, every individual verbally supporting majimbo in Naivasha constituency identified with the Maasai while none of those against majimbo mentioned the Maasai. Similarly, majimbo was overwhelmingly supported in Kuresoi constituency, where the majority population was Kipsigis. The unanimity with which participants advocated majimbo in Kuresoi was affirmed when Commissioner Pastor Ayonga asked presenters to focus on areas of concern not previously raised, and avoid discussing majimbo (CKRC 2002r: 56, 90). Following this request, one man called for majimbo twice, evoking laughter from the crowd (ibid.: 94–5).

Participants throughout Nakuru District referred to ethnicity, and as with the Somali in NEP, this was invoked in Kuresoi constituency to call for the Ogiek people's inclusion in Kenyan politics. Outside Naivasha and Kuresoi constituencies, ethnicity was not often discussed, though it was still sometimes mentioned in appeals for greater inclusion of the Turkana, or to promote Kipsigis, Ogiek and Kalenjin cultural, traditional, and land rights.Footnote ¹³ The only divergence from this tendency to use ethnicity to justify inclusion was by one man in Kuresoi constituency, who proposed that Kikuyu land titles should be revoked in Chebakundi while the Ogiek people should obtain rights to land (CKRC 2002r: 55–7). By raising ethnicity in the hearings, presenters provide evidence of ethnic divisions in Nakuru District. However, while making perceptions of difference known, they also show that the purpose of discussing ethnic differences is not to advocate further divisions, but usually to describe experiences of neglect and to recommend greater inclusion in politics.

Moving away from references to ethnic identity and majimbo, participants in Nakuru District converged in their opinions on the role of religion in the political sphere. When discussed, religious authority was usually perceived as a positive influence on leadership and the judiciary. In Rongai constituency, religion motivated one man to argue that the president should have a family as it was biblically founded (CKRC 2002t: 74–5). Tradition led a woman to come to a similar conclusion, as she argued that a leader with a family was desirable because it was rooted in African tradition (ibid.: 25–7). By turning to sources of power other than high politics, those in Nakuru District revealed that they were dissatisfied with people in high politics, as in hearings elsewhere. Thus while participants in Nakuru District discussed politics with reference to ethnic differences, they did not completely diverge from other Kenyans' perceptions of high and low political relations. Rather, ethnicity was discussed in conjunction with recommendations for limitations on political elites' authority, revealing a familiar distrust of political power.

Kakamega District, Western Province

Like the Luo in Nyanza Province, the Luhya, concentrated in Western Province, had consistently been confined to the political opposition. As the second most populous ethnic bloc in Kenya, the Luhya, the majority in seventeen out of nineteen constituencies in Western Province, had been a significant factor for those contesting political power. Nevertheless, at the time of the hearings, no Luhya had yet held either the presidency or vice-presidency (MacArthur Reference MacArthur2008). Their significance as a populous ethnic group made the Luhya a focus in electoral campaigning. Open political debate over succession and elections continued throughout the public hearings in Kakamega District, provoking cynicism over political strategising in the media. The Nation (14.7.2002) argued that ‘the opposition should get off its moral high horse’ as ‘its electoral strategy too depends on a new constitution that creates many big posts, as President Moi put it’, asserting instead that ‘the difference in what the two political forces [KANU and the opposition] want is therefore not as great as they have the public believe’.

Amidst this political fighting, distrust remained a prominent theme. People often suggested that corruption was rooted in those in authority, particularly the government and police. In Lurambi constituency, individuals were also willing to implicate themselves in political problems, while in Shinyalu and Ikolomani constituencies participants focused on high-political corruption. In Shinyalu constituency, only Commissioner Maranga openly suggested that Kenyans were partly responsible for the nation's problems, stating: ‘One thing I must tell you is that I think the Kenyans are not serious with themselves. Even when things are being done, they take it for granted until they start affecting them’ (CKRC 2002y: 93).

The most common responses to distrust were to recommend Parliament and wananchi as checks on the abuse of power, indicating greater trust in parliamentarians, as individuals sharing power, than in a president. The absence of the Luhya from the presidency and vice-presidency helps to explain participants' hesitation over past and existing administrations. As one individual, identifying himself as the ‘common man’, suggested, ‘we would rather have a Parliament that runs amok than a single individual representing the Executive who runs amok because we will not have any way to control him’ (CKRC 2002x: 23).

Despite showing more trust in Parliament than the executive, individuals still suggested that controls were necessary on whichever government body was given more authority. Those emphasising greater parliamentary authority conditioned this by calling for an ombudsman, people-oriented leaders or fair elections. Most often, individuals proposed mechanisms for voters to recall MPs and to expand wananchi participation in elections. Two individuals in Ikolomani constituency mentioned mlolongo (CKRC 2002v: 88, 91–5).

As in earlier hearings, recommendations for wananchi participation were framed by propositions for an expanded political sphere. Although the Luhya had only been constituted as a single ethnic group in the 1930s, out of seventeen Bantu tribal groups (MacArthur Reference MacArthur2008: 230), Luhya customs and historical experiences were discussed in conjunction with political experiences, specifically in Ikolomani constituency hearings. In Lurambi constituency, discussions of customary ways of life were intertwined with assertions about the differences between men and women in their ability to influence and shape political relations. While the Commissioners emphasised equal participation by men and women, this view was repeatedly challenged through commotions and noise, as when a female from Standard Seven at Buhai School spoke (CKRC 2002w: 65). Hesitation over women's inclusion in politics and in the hearings was coupled with low levels of female vocal participation. In Kakamega District, women constituted between 10% and 14% of participants speaking in the hearings. Hearings elsewhere also identified resistance to women's participation. The commissioners had first provided a separate space for women to voice their opinions in Mombasa District (The Nation 3.5.2002). However, the frequency with which resistance to women's participation was voiced distinguished Kagamega from the other districts analysed. This vocal resistance gives evidence of the normative assumptions about gender relations among those at the hearings.

Despite some common understanding of culture and politics, presenters were not united in their opinions. Reflecting an image of the Luhya as a fragmented ethnic group with inconsistent political allegiances (MacArthur Reference MacArthur2008: 228), opposing views arose over either the rights of ‘tribes’ to enjoy their share of the ‘cake’ or the need to move away from tribal distinctions, and between promoting majimboism and associating majimboism with hatred or disunity. These were compounded by other differences, such as the contrast between suggestions that political space was only for men and women's actual though limited participation in the hearings. However, as in the other constituencies analysed, these divisions do not preclude common perceptions of politics. Rather, while differences in opinion exist, what is constant in the hearings is a general distrust of political relations.