Adapting and weaving together a collection of essays written at different times for a variety of occasions, Tony Penikett has produced what amounts to a political autobiography. Not surprisingly, the argument presented in the resultant book is occasionally choppy and sometimes repetitious. But taken as a whole, the book provides a powerful account of the thinking of one of Canada’s most thoughtful political leaders and observers regarding matters of common concern unfolding over the last fifty years.

Given the roles Penikett has played beginning in the 1970s, there is much in his reflections that will hold the attention of those interested in Canadian politics and especially in the shifting relations among the federal government of Canada, the governments of the provinces, and the governments of the northern territories, the Yukon, the Northwest Territories, and (since 1999) Nunavut. A crosscutting theme of particular interest centers on the status and rights of the various groups of Indigenous Peoples (First Nations or Aboriginal Peoples in Canadian parlance) residing in the Canadian North. The similarities between the Canadian experience and parallel developments in other parts of the circumpolar north will make Penikett’s observations about the Canadian experience well worth pondering by those interested in Arctic affairs more generally.

Born and educated initially in England, Penikett migrated to Canada as a young man; he has spent his adult life as a politician, negotiator, mediator, educator, and author in the Canadian North and West. Starting his working life as a mine laborer in the Yukon, Penikett became a shop steward and an active member of Canada’s New Democratic Party (NDP) in the 1970s, rising to become president of the federal NDP from 1981 to 1985. First elected to the Yukon Legislative Assembly in 1978, he became the third premier of Yukon, serving in that capacity from 1985 to 1992. During that time, he was the territory’s minister responsible for treaty negotiations with the Yukon First Nations regarding land claims and issues of self-government. After leaving elective politics, Penikett has had a long career as a negotiator and mediator, specializing in issues relating to employment in the public sector. Along the way, he has become an author and an educator. He has been associated with Simon Fraser University in British Columbia in various capacities. In 2013–2014, he held the University of Washington’s Canada Fulbright Chair in Arctic Studies.

What makes Penikett’s observations particularly interesting is that he has an unusual ability both to perform as a sophisticated practitioner seeking to move a political agenda in a highly political setting and, at the same time, to operate as a well-informed analyst reflecting on the nature of political processes and the forces that determine the outcomes of these processes. He also writes in a clear and generally accessible manner about matters of considerable complexity. As a result, his is a voice worth listening to by all those interested in the recent history of northern Canada and the circumpolar north more generally.

As the title suggests, a central concern of Treaty Time is an account of the negotiation and implementation of the modern agreements/treaties dealing with land claims and self-government entered into by the federal government, territorial/provincial governments, and the Aboriginal Peoples of the Canadian North over several decades starting in the 1970s and including some twenty treaties in total. He has a special interest in the 1993 Umbrella Final Agreement among the Yukon First Nations, the government of Yukon Territory, and the Canadian federal government regarding land claims and the Self-Government Agreements (1993–2005) dealing with the political status of the Yukon’s First Nations. He describes his experience in this realm as a journey from “youthful optimism” about these agreements to “sadness about serious implementation failures but ending with the faint hope that we the people will, in the near future, choose leaders determined to keep their nation’s promises” (back cover). But there is considerably more to Penikett’s political journey than this. To unpack the sources of this assessment of the agreements/treaties and to do justice to the full sweep of Penikett’s interpretation of recent developments in the Canadian North and the Arctic more broadly, it will help to say something about his life in Canadian politics beginning in the 1970s.

Penikett’s thinking regarding issues of common concern reflects the perspectives of Canada’s New Democratic Party, a left-leaning party that espouses views resembling those of the social democratic parties in Scandinavia. These include a commitment to social welfare, democratic debate and dialogue, environmental stewardship, sustainable development, the rule of law, and the overarching ideal of good governance. In the North, this vision also includes a commitment to the ideal of reconciliation between Indigenous and settler communities. Enlightened as these perspectives are in many ways, it is sobering to note that the NDP has faltered in recent times as a force in Canadian politics; its representation in the Canadian parliament declined from 25 to just 7 in the wake of the 2025 election. Under the circumstances, it is fair to say that while Penikett’s political views are highly progressive, they are not always well-aligned with the political realities of the North or of Canada as a whole.

Penikett turns repeatedly to the challenges facing Canada’s Northern Territories, and especially the Yukon, a territory that has a resident population of less than 50,000, over three-quarters of whom identify as settlers. The territories today enjoy greater authority to manage their own affairs than they did in the past. Still, they are heavily dependent on decisions made in Ottawa, and there is little chance that they can evolve over time into fully fledged provinces in their own right. The Yukon’s economy is dependent on mining, tourism, and transfer payments, none of which provides a secure and predictable basis for long-term planning. This makes it challenging, as Penikett recognizes, to chart a course toward sustainable development at the territorial level. A particularly sensitive point from Penikett’s perspective arises from the fact that the territory’s settlers, in contrast to its Indigenous Peoples, have no voice in bodies like the Arctic Council, which provide political platforms for those seeking to address a range of northern issues. Penikett is fully supportive of the gains made by Indigenous Peoples in recent times in their efforts to achieve the status of rightsholders regarding Arctic issues. A particularly prominent example is the creation of the status of Permanent Participants for Indigenous Peoples Organizations in the Arctic Council. But, as he observes, there is no parallel mechanism to provide a voice for the Arctic’s non-indigenous residents, who constitute the bulk of the Arctic’s human residents.Footnote ¹ As a result, in his judgment, organizations like the council suffer from a democracy deficit. Unfortunately, there is no simple and satisfactory way to address this issue under the conditions prevailing in the Arctic today.

This brings us to the issue of the modern agreements/treaties designed to address the claims of the Indigenous Peoples of Canada’s North. Inspired by the example of the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, the 1973 decision of Canada’s Supreme Court in the Calder Case, and shifting attitudes toward Indigenous rights as reflected in the 1977 report of the Berger Commission, negotiations aimed at addressing claims to land and self-government got underway in earnest during the 1980s. The results following protracted negotiations were a series of some twenty agreements/treaties dealing with Aboriginal land claims, as in the case of the Umbrella Final Agreement in Yukon, and with Aboriginal rights to self-government, as in the Self-Government Agreements in Yukon. All told, First Nations organizations now hold title to some 500,000 square kilometers of land in Canada’s North, or about 40% of the country’s landmass. Rejecting the corporate model used in Alaska, these agreements seek to establish a form of self-government for First Nations organizations. This means, as Penikett puts it, that “… federal and provincial or territorial governments recognize Aboriginal treaty holders as a third tier of government” (p. 80). These agreements are, as Penikett observes, highly complex and poorly understood by most members of the public. In recent years, he has spearheaded an effort to articulate the principal terms of the agreements in clear and easily understandable language. Taken together, however, the agreements/treaties constitute a remarkable achievement.

Yet problems arise when it comes to implementation or, in other words, moving from paper to practice regarding the terms of these agreements. In the case of land claims, there is no denying that Canada’s First Nations now hold title to large swaths of the country’s North. Even here, however, there are serious problems arising from the unwillingness or inability of government bodies to participate in provisions dealing with matters like co-management and dispute resolution. Even more troubling are the problems of implementation relating to self-government. It turns out that establishing a meaningful “third tier of government” is easier said than done. In Penikett’s judgement, the gap between the ideal and the actual is wide when it comes to the implementation of the provisions of the modern agreements/treaties and the achievement of the vision of good governance embedded in these agreements in practice.

Why is this the case? Penikett seeks to identify the causes of this disappointing outcome under the broad headings of malice and mismanagement. He points to lingering opposition to the recognition of Indigenous rights, the political imperatives of Canada’s efforts to assert sovereignty over its northern lands, and the difficulties of finding a workable division of labor between the jurisdiction of the public governments of the northern territories and the jurisdiction of First Nations organizations responsible for operating a third tier of government. At the same time, he argues that part of the problem is a lack of familiarity in government circles used to administering regulatory arrangements with the practices of alternative dispute resolution along with the usual impacts of bureaucratic inertia. What is to be done about this problem? Penikett has no simple solutions to offer. But he does suggest the value of adding “treaty responsibilities to oaths of office and mandate letters” for government officials and of requiring that “federal and provincial auditors issue annual reports on treaty implementation failures and successes” (p. 258). He is realistic enough to recognize the challenges involved in adopting such measures. But they do constitute the source of his “faint hope” for a future in which leaders do a better job in keeping “their nation’s promises.”

Ever the proponent of progressive politics, Penikett concludes his reflections with a discussion of what he calls “an Arctic genesis” (pp. 282-283). He asks whether efforts to address common concerns in the Arctic “could become the basis for a global paradigm shift” marked by a new consciousness featuring “reconciliation between Indigenous and settler communities, democratic debate and dialogue, social peace, [and] a much longer view of immigration issues, sustainable development and climate adaptation” (p. 283). This is a grand and, in many ways, inspiring vision, especially for those of us who have worked hard to promote international cooperation in the Arctic over the last several decades. Under the conditions prevailing in the Arctic today, however, it is difficult to see a practical pathway toward the realization of this vision.