Perhaps the best place to begin with Heinrich Meier's new book on Thus Spoke Zarathustra, originally published in German in 2017, is with its odd-sounding title: “What is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?” The title obviously alludes to Heidegger's famous question, “Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?” as well as to his equally famous answer that Zarathustra is the teacher of the eternal return. Meier rejects this answer to the question of who Zarathustra is, arguing that the prophetic teaching of the eternal return is ultimately of subordinate importance in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. He also rejects Heidegger's original question, replacing it with one that asks what Zarathustra is, a prophet or a philosopher, a legislator or a knower. Meier's answer to this question is complex. He concedes that Zarathustra adopts each of these roles at various points in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, sometimes appearing as the prophet who seeks to change the world, at other times assuming the guise of the philosopher who seeks to understand it. But his main point is that, as Zarathustra develops, he comes to realize that these two roles are radically different and ultimately not combinable. Moreover, the general movement of Zarathustra's development is away from the revolutionary prophet and toward the solitary and self-sufficient philosopher. This movement remains incomplete in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, according to Meier, and is only consummated in Nietzsche's final two works, Ecce Homo and The Antichrist. Meier develops this latter point in his 2019 book Nietzsches Vermächtnis: Ecce Homo und Der Antichrist: Zwei Bücher über Natur und Politik.
Meier proceeds in What Is Nietzsche's Zarathustra? by methodically going through all four parts of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. He pays special attention to the drama of the book and deftly uses it to illuminate Zarathustra's philosophical development. The epigraph Meier puts at the front of his book—from an aphorism in The Gay Science on how some authors seek to conceal the meaning of their books—alerts the reader that Meier's interpretation will be an esoteric one. It is an interpretation that certainly casts new and interesting light on Nietzsche's notoriously elusive text. If there is a flaw in it, it is that Meier never allows the reader to get outside of his authoritative retelling of the narrative, thereby giving the impression that the text is far more univocal than it really is. Meier rarely considers alternative readings of the actions and speeches he exhaustively recounts; and there is only one reference (I believe) in the entire book to the voluminous secondary literature on Nietzsche and his most famous work.
Meier begins his commentary on Thus Spoke Zarathustra with the dramatic prologue in which the eponymous hero comes down from the mountain to proclaim his teaching on the overman to an uncomprehending audience. Nowhere does Zarathustra appear more as a prophet with a revolutionary message than in this prologue, and the results are predictably and comically disastrous. In the rest of part 1, Zarathustra changes tack, no longer speaking to the people at large but only to potential companions, but his future-oriented, earth-redeeming message remains largely the same. Meier notes that in the speech “On Reading and Writing” Zarathustra does manage to separate himself briefly from his pupils and speak, not as a prophet, but as a philosopher who “laughs at all tragic plays and tragic seriousness.” But in the final and longest speech of part 1, “On the Gift-Giving Virtue,” Zarathustra returns to the prophetic mode, urging his followers to fight against “the giant, accident,” and the nonsense of history and apocalyptically announcing the coming of a “chosen people,” the overman, and “the great midday.”
All this changes in the second part of Zarathustra, according to Meier, where the “conflict of prophet and philosopher comes openly to light . . . and the teaching of the overman is thrown into crisis” (39). As the second part proceeds, philosophy and self-understanding move to the center of Zarathustra's reflections, and Zarathustra's relationship to his disciples grows increasingly problematic. The key shift in Zarathustra's outlook, Meier argues, occurs in the chapter “On Redemption,” where Zarathustra realizes that his utopian, futurist teaching about the overman is ultimately rooted in revenge against the past. This constitutes the peripeteia of the entire drama. Never again will Zarathustra elevate the overman into the “meaning of the earth” or seek to liberate humanity from the reign of accident and the senselessness of history. One might object that this conclusion seems to be contradicted by the “stillest hour's” chastising of Zarathustra at the end of the second part for his reluctance to assume the responsibility of ruling. But Meier reads this passage less as pointing to a failure on Zarathustra's part than as an assertion of his growing commitment to philosophy.
In the third part of Zarathustra, Nietzsche finally presents what in Ecce Homo he calls the “fundamental conception of the work,” the idea of the eternal return. But against Nietzsche's own statement, Meier makes much of the fact that it is Zarathustra's unreliable animals who proclaim him to be the “teacher of the eternal return,” not Zarathustra himself. He also puts a great deal of emphasis on speeches like “On Unwilling Bliss” and “Before Sunrise,” in which Zarathustra appears to experience the self-sufficiency and happiness of the philosopher “who knows himself to be in harmony with the whole” (96). To be sure, Meier is aware that there are speeches that seem to undercut his interpretation. Perhaps the most important of these is “On Old and New Tablets,” where Zarathustra talks about the need for a “new nobility” to “redeem all that is past.” But Meier claims that in this instance Zarathustra is only evoking his earlier and now discredited prophetic teaching: the speech is “an erratic block jutting out from Zarathustra's past into his solitude. . . . It is not the univocal speech of a legislator who conceives himself to be speaking to the legislators of the future or to the spokesmen of a new aristocracy” (113).
Given his nonpolitical interpretation of Zarathustra, it is not surprising that Meier, contrary to many other commentators, sees the fourth part as integral to the work. In this part, we see Zarathustra in his mountain solitude, albeit one that comes to be disturbed by the cry of the higher man. We do not see him going down to human beings for a third time or teaching the eternal return or establishing a new aristocracy to rule the world. Instead, we see him enjoying a perfect midday that, in contrast to the great midday that signifies the millenarian turning point of history, reflects the self-sufficient happiness of the philosopher—Meier compares it to the happiness described by Rousseau in the Fifth Walk of the Reveries. It is true that in the final chapter of the fourth part the prophetic, futurist vision briefly returns with the appearance of the flock of doves and the laughing lion. But Meier maintains that the ending of the book remains open-ended, especially insofar as there is no mention of Zarathustra's going down to human beings again.
I have provided only a skeletal summary of Meier's deeply considered and insightful book. But in relegating the prominent ideas of the overman, the eternal return, and the will to power to secondary status and making the abandonment of the grand project to transform humanity for the happiness of the philosophical life devoted to contemplation the main theme of Nietzsche's masterpiece, Meier's interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra is unconventional and sure to provoke debate. In places, his interpretations of specific passages seem strained, designed more to buttress his master-theme of the supremacy of the philosophical life over the political life than to shed light on the authentic meaning of the text. At a more general level, I wonder whether the sharp distinction between practical and philosophical life or creation and contemplation that undergirds Meier's argument captures Nietzsche's dynamic conception of philosophy. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche criticizes philosophers for believing that they merely contemplate the world when in fact they poetically create it. The so-called contemplative man turns out to be more active than the man of action, creating the values and roles that the latter merely acts out. This thought finds expression in Thus Spoke Zarathustra in the claim that “around the inventors of new values the world revolves: it revolves invisibly.” Such passages suggest that Nietzsche combines the roles of philosopher and prophet, knower and legislator, contemplator and creator, more successfully than Meier supposes.
