Few policy positions have provoked livelier debate than the Bush doctrine of preemptive military intervention, articulating the option of preemptive military intervention to remove renegade regimes and to deal with terrorist groups. Outcries notwithstanding, forcible regime change is not a concept novel to U.S. foreign policy. In the context of the Cold War, the United States, ousted, militarily or through subversion, a number of regimes deemed insufficiently hostile to the Soviet Union, outright armed intervention being used in places like Lebanon (1958) and the Dominican Republic (1964). Even after the Cold War, but before September 11, military force dislodged the regime of Manuel Noriega, a thorn in America's side. Still, preemptive regime removal runs counter to well-established, international norms, and its explicit endorsement fueled further fears, at home and abroad, of coercive and capricious U.S. hegemony. Robert Litwak, former director of staff for the Nonproliferation on the National Security Council, discusses the policy of regime as an extreme tool of U.S. counter-proliferation strategy, providing background, solid analysis, and sensible policy recommendations.
Litwak's draws a firm distinction between preemptive intervention (designed to thwart an imminent and unambiguous threat involving weapons of mass destruction, or WMDs) and the preventive use of force (designed to forestall a hypothetical acquisition of WMD capability). The latter, exemplified by the 2003 invasion of Iraq, is, in the author's view, unacceptable by just about any standard of desirable international behavior. Accordingly, he focuses on preemptive intervention, discussing (a) the circumstances by which it may be justified, and (b) the alternative strategy of seeking to encourage behavior change within a regime that appears to be seeking a WMD capability.
Several general guidelines should, in this author's view, guide military preemption. One, is that it should be a rare necessity, a residual category of policy whose value has to be demonstrated, not assumed. However, two conditions when it should be considered are first, firm indications of both will and capability to attack the United States or its allies, and, second, clear evidence that the adversary is transferring WMD capabilities to a nonstate terrorist group. At the same time, an effective policy must recognize that, in the vast majority of cases, such situations can be prevented, forestalling the need for military action. In this regard, it is important that, thus far, potential proliferants who have abandoned their WMD ambitions have invariably done so because of explicit external security assurances or, more often, because of a change in the international environment that made the option of WMDs unnecessary. In any case, accurate and relevant analysis of the target state—its intentions and capabilities—is essential: this must include, in addition to an objective assessment of capabilities, the geostrategic and historical circumstances, as well the ultimate values, that guide its behavior, as well as the regime's structure, complexity, and the domestic setting by which it is constrained.
Under even the best circumstances, it is difficult to engage in preemptive regime change by armed force, and the brunt of counter-proliferation efforts should, according to Litwak, be directed at encouraging behavior change within regimes, rather than toppling them. To some extent, this can be done via comprehensive containment which, while checking the regime's capability to do mischief, may hasten the evolution of its intentions. Yet this is not a particularly promising approach, partly because the comprehensive of the sanctions assumes an improbable level of international consensus on the threat. More promising is a strategy combining carrots and sticks, where the most valuable carrots are those that address the regime's need to maintain its domestic position. The book carefully examines the methods by which Muammar Qaddafi's acquiescence with the international community anti-WMD policies were acquired, concluding that explicit and implicit assurances of the regime's survival, should it comply, were key (rather, as the Administration has implied, Qaddafi's fear that it would experience the same fate as Saddam Hussein). Nevertheless, Litwak recognizes that the same sorts of inducements might not work in the Korean and Iranian cases. For Korea, nuclear weapons are too inextricably interwoven with the Kim regime's anxieties and legitimacy needs to make it plausible that external assurances could serve the same purpose. A similar judgment may apply to the Ahmadinejad regime, where, in addition, U.S. ambiguity about its resort to force may have undermined the plausibility of security assurances. The point is that, as affairs have been allowed to develop, there may no longer be any good options with regard to these two regimes.
The author severely criticizes the Bush administration for equating the war on terror with the struggle against rogue state acquisition of WMDs. “By misleadingly conflating the terrorism and proliferation agendas, catastrophic or mass-casualty terrorism has become synonymous with WMD terrorism, thereby diverting attention from potential attacks of equal lethality employing more readily obtainable conventional means (such as attacks on vulnerable chemical plants on the outskirts of major U.S. cities)” (293). If, however, WMD are acquired, this is likely to be the result of the nondeliberate “leakage” of dangerous materials and technologies from inadequately secured sites in countries like Russia and Pakistan.
While the argument could have been more tightly structured, the book provides a comprehensive and complex analysis of what may be the major challenge facing U.S. foreign policy and the international community. It examines the issues of preemption and regime change in light of the lessons of history and of a dispassionate understanding of the forces that drive state behavior. It is likely to emerge as the standard against which other scholarship in this filed will be measured.
