To ask the question, which constitutional actor (be it the judiciary, legislature, executive or any other institution, body, group or person) has, or ought to have, the ‘final word’ on matters of constitutional compatibility is somewhat misleading. Decisions about the constitutional compatibility of any given constitutional actor's behavior are rarely ever final. Legislatures, for instance, are commonly able to put an issue back on the table, thereby instigating a reexamination of the constitutional issue at hand, through new legislative initiatives. A similarly misleading part of this question is the implication that a single constitutional actor is charged with determining compatibility with constitutional norms when in fact the duty is often one shared between multiple constitutional actors. Having lodged these two qualifications, it can now be said that, paradigmatically, a legal system assigns one constitutional actor as the ‘central guardian’ of the constitution, whose duty it is to uphold constitutional law by reviewing the compatibility of the actions of constitutional actors against constitutional norms. This is (if only in a glib sense) the constitutional actor with the ‘final word’ on what a constitution demands in practice. Who that ‘central guardian’ is, why that guardian has been chosen and how that guardian goes about performing constitutional review within the legal systems of various EU Member States, and within the EU's legal order itself, is the subject of Maartje de Visser's book.

From the outset, two aspects of de Visser's approach to these questions should be set out clearly. Firstly, the definition of ‘constitutional review’ adopted in this text is broadly conceived; the matter of the judiciary striking down primary legislation (an emerging common use of term ‘constitutional review’) in, what may commonly be considered, the Marbury v Madison 5 US 137 (1803) sense is only one aspect of what is being considered here. de Visser defines constitutional review sensu lato as the practice of assessing another or one's own behavior for its constitutional compatibility whereas constitutional review sensu stricto is taken to mean that the actor executing the assessment of constitutional compatibility is able to attach consequences to its assessment, thereby imposing that assessment on other actors (the obvious example being a judicial power to strike down primary legislation). To this end, the author goes to great pains to ensure the reader does not conflate constitutional review with judicial enforcement of a constitution. Secondly, de Visser makes it plain that her analysis will be one that, where necessary, takes account of the fierce normative debate surrounding constitutional review but does not seek to influence or be influenced by it. The questions of who, why and how form the core of the account here. Questions of ought are put to one side. The author is uncompromising in this approach. In sum, de Visser's main objective is to paint a comprehensive picture of the current practices of constitutional review, including the justifications for those practices, across a range of EU member states and the EU's own legal order.

This approach facilitates the author's central aim for the text insofar as it allows for a more expansive and, in many ways, more accurate account of the current state of constitutional review in Europe to be set out. For instance, R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 AC 262 and other well-known flirtations with some form of judicial enforcement of constitutional norms inevitably form the backbone of de Visser's various examinations of the British constitutional configuration. However, a reasonable amount of time is spent considering non-judicial mechanisms for reviewing the constitution (the role of the House of Lords Constitution Committee is afforded a considerable amount of attention in various chapters). Such a broad-lensed approach is likely to be welcomed by those expressing concern about the increasing juridification of fundamental constitutional issues for it facilitates an assessment of the effectiveness of political, as opposed to legal, means of upholding constitutions. This is a complaint de Visser is clearly very conscious of and, at times, even sympathetic to – explicitly cautioning against any potential ‘unhealthy’ obsession with judicial actors in the constitutional review debate. Notwithstanding the merits of this broad approach, it must be noted that the passages which explore the arguments surrounding assigning judicial actors some form of strike down power – particularly where such arguments are explored within the context of diverse national constitutional histories – is where this book is at its best. In absence of any normative agenda of her own, de Visser conceives one of the main purposes of this text to be to provide the reader with materials and arguments capable of being relied upon when thinking about constitutional review. Whilst the text is a useful source of information for multiple purposes, it will be those arguing for or against the existence of a judicial strike down power in any jurisdiction (or, indeed, in theory) who will be most enriched by the array of arguments and materials to be found amongst these pages.

Not all EU Member States are considered in the text. The countries which do feature – Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Hungary, the Netherlands, Spain, Poland, and the United Kingdom (Estonia is also afforded a cameo in chapter one) – are a diverse yet representative selection of systems in terms of current practices, political heritage and simple geography. Also considered at various points throughout is the approach of the EU's own legal order – the author rightly being alert to the fact that any account of constitutional review in Europe would be bereft without such consideration given the mutual spheres of jurisprudential inspiration and legal influence the constitutional orders of the EU and its Member States respectively reside within. The ECHR does feature in places but to a far lesser extent. Those reading this book from the British perspective would perhaps have welcomed further discussion of the ECHR system given that elements of the ongoing discussion pertaining to the extent of Britain's involvement with the ECtHR system seemingly has some of its roots in a clash of domestic and continental constitutional heritages and practices.

The text is, however, not structured around different states or systems. Rather, a central theme or question is considered in each chapter. This allows for thorough examination of differing constitutional practices and experiences from various systems to be relied upon at pertinent moments, whilst at the same time sparing the reader the impression of being given a repetitive, whistle-stop tour. Chapter one examines the role of non-judicial actors in the enforcement of constitutions. The devotion of the first substantive chapter of this book to the role of non-judicial actors is indicative of the author's sustained commitment to demonstrating that constitutional review is about much more than just courtroom proceedings. The roles of non-judicial constitutional actors, some of which are alien to the British constitution, are examined in detail. Councils of state, chancellors of justice, parliamentary systems, heads of state and the general public are amongst those considered. From here on in, the focus of the book is very much placed upon judges as central constitutional guardians and the implications of that institutional arrangement. Chapter two is concerned with the question of why judicial enforcement of constitutions has risen to such prominence across Europe. Here the author explores the desire to avoid competency clashes between various levels and bodies of the state, the rise of a fundamental rights culture and the impact of the ECHR and EU membership as justifications for the rise of court-based constitutional review. An interesting account of how the UK and the Netherlands have, thus far, been able to (at least mostly) resist the incoming tide is also offered. Chapter three considers how constitutional courts work in more detail and how, and by whom, they can be accessed. Chapter four is dedicated to exploring the make-up and dynamics of a constitutional court's bench. A range of approaches to issues including selection and appointment procedures, eligibility, the number of judges occupying the bench, tenure and termination are all examined. Chapter five analyses how the ‘yardsticks’ necessary to adjudicate upon constitutional compatibility are identified in various systems. Chapter six explores how such yardsticks are applied and the various consequences that can result following a finding of constitutional incompatibility. The focus here, quite expectedly, is placed upon how the judicial and legislative branches of government interact on such occasions. Chapter seven offers a broader discussion of a theme underlying chapters two to six – namely, how constitutional courts interact with the wider systems of governance around them and, in particular, legislatures.

Ultimately, Maartje de Visser's comparative contribution to the exploration of the constitutional review issue should be warmly welcomed as an even-handed, lucidly written and insightful addition to the ever-swelling body of scholarship in this area. Whilst it may be easy to overlook the fact, the author has managed to construct, without superficiality and with well-paced order, a comprehensive and credible survey of constitutional review practices across Europe – a survey that is at the once a heavy-duty piece of scholarship and a generally fascinating book.