I. INTRODUCTION
Votre repugnance pour les hieroglifes arithmetique[s] est ici fort déplacée. …
Les livres de sciences qui se prouvent par les calculs sont les plus durables. Footnote 1
Quesnay’s letter to Mirabeau, end of 1760
Whether, in the letter quoted in the epigraph above (in Quesnay Reference Quesnay, Théré, Charles and Perrot2005, p. 1207; hereinafter referred to as the “INED” edition), François Quesnay was implicitly thinking of his own contribution is a question that possibly will never be answered with certainty. Still, Quesnay’s long-lasting influence on economics is not debatable, and the calculations of the Tableau économique surely added to it by fueling praise and criticism, as well as countless attempts to faithfully decipher its structure in modern guise and to correct its alleged problems. Footnote 2 This article intends to contribute in this regard by looking at the contributions of Ronald Meek ([1962] 2003, pp. 265–312), who thoroughly analyzed the notion of profit in Physiocracy, and Steven Pressman (1994, pp. 143–154), who reconstructed the dynamics of the Tableau in input-output form and argued that Quesnay did not draw a distinction between nominal and real variables.
Thus, in the paper we will: first, discuss the notion of bon prix and its role in increasing the net product; second, analyze the concept of farmers’ profits and challenge Meek’s widely accepted interpretation; and, third, model the process of capital accumulation (see Vaggi Reference Vaggi1985) in order to assess Pressman’s contention.
II. WHAT PRICE IS A BON PRIX?
The question heading this section lies at the heart of the physiocratic recommendation of free trade, and to highlight the reasoning behind it, we need to recall the two fundamental aspects of the Tableau: corn price and physical surplus as independent co-determinants of the annual revenue.
We have seen in the detailed exposition of the Tableau œco[no]mique that … it is always the price of the annual productions and their quantity … that determine the actual state of the total [mass of] wealth of a nation; I say the actual state because wealth, I repeat it, is a temporary [fugitive] quality of any type of goods … hence the vulgar saying, the price is everything [le prix fait tout].… But the price is relative to the outlays that yearly recreate [font reinatre] with profit the productions. (Miscellanea Philosophie Rurale, p. 818; emphasis in original) Footnote 3
Thus, given a physical surplus, Quesnay argues, an exogenous upward change in corn price would increase the produit net. His reasoning, abruptly summarized (see Problème Économique, p. 861), is that since agriculture constitutes a partial vertically integrated sector and taxes are supposed not to change, the additional revenue generated by the establishment of a bon prix would exceed the expenses: “*The farmer, the landlords and the State* cannot profit but of the surplus [excedant] of produce which the land returns beyond the outlays, and this profit depends on the sale market price [valeur venale] and the state of domestic and external trade of productions” (Commerce, p. 791). Footnote 4 Simply stated, free trade raises wholesale prices and so increases the revenue, as Quesnay writes to the Marquis de Mirabeau in September 1760 (A.N., M 784 n° 72-15, in INED 2005, p. 1195): “Wealth is obtained in an agricultural state through sales and the bon prix of corn, and sales and the bon prix are obtained through the competition of buyers and this competition is promoted by the immunity and the freedom of your ports.”
More precisely, while, on the one hand, wholesale prices (prix de la vente de la première main) increase thanks to free trade (and so does the farmers’ revenue accordingly), on the other hand, retail prices (prix du dernier achat) do not change due to the competition of foreign retailers. These two are fundamental features of the bon prix:
It has been proved that freedom of external trade, at the same time as it raises the price of the country’s products, assures them a price which is much less variable than it would be in the absence of this freedom of trade. It has been calculated that the establishment of this greater equality between the wholesale [prix de la vente de la première main] and retail [prix du dernier achat] price,[Footnote 5] i.e. in the purchase made by the consumer, yields to the wholesale sellers a profit of more than one-tenth without causing any damage to the purchaser-consumer. (Problème Économique, p. 603, in Meek [1962] 2003, pp. 171–172) Footnote 6
For these reasons free trade is extensively and consistently seen as “an essential if not indispensable means to restore agriculture” (Fermiers, p. 150, in Groenewegen Reference Groenewegen1983, p. 19). As a matter of fact the transfer of monetary merchants’ profits to farmers, which we will model in section VI, constitutes another fundamental feature of the notion of bon prix. Thus, not any international price (higher than domestic wholesale and lower than domestic retail prices) would conform to Quesnay’s notion of bon prix since a monetary transfer of the merchant’s markups to the farmers is also required to enable capital accumulation in the agricultural sector. Footnote 7
But, for the purpose of this paper, the question to be answered is whether a net product increase is merely a nominal phenomenon or not. Pressman (1994, p. 145) identifies in the Tableau a “confusion between real and nominal variables.” And the search for an answer leads us, in Meek’s words ([1962] 2003, p. 298), to a “latent contradiction” in the physiocratic system about the role of profits. In his influential essay Meek ([1962] 2003, pp. 297–312) advances four interpretations of the physiocratic notion of profit: 1) that profit is included in the net product, but this opinion is discarded; 2) that profit is included in the interest on the advances, but this option is rejected; Footnote 8 3) that profit, given the “state of bliss” conditions of the Tableau, is nil, and this option is endorsed; and, 4) that profit is a higher supervision wage, but this option, despite being recognized, is not addressed in detail. Footnote 9 Thus, in what follows we will: first, analyze in detail option 3); second, address options 1) and 2); and last, look into option 4), before turning to Quesnay’s growth dynamics.
III. DO PROFITS CRYSTALIZE OUT INTO RENT?
In his early writings Quesnay included the farmers’ profits in the produit net. In Grains the following proportions in the shares of the net product (averaged over the five years) are suggested under the regimes of petite (p. 165) and grande (p. 177) culture: Landlord 3/5 [1/2], Taille 1/5 [1/4], and Farmer 1/5 [1/4]. And profits are envisaged as a stable component of the produit net and not limited to the case when grande culture methods are adopted. Further, it should be noted that these ideal shares refer only to corn cultivation. In fact, Quesnay develops also a summary table showing the actual state of France including productions other than corn (with a mixture of petite and grande culture methods; Grains, p. 173) as well as a summary table under the supposition that the entire French territory is cultivated with grande culture methods (ibid., p. 180), including also non-corn productions. Finally, the two tables are compared (ibid., see p. 181n18 for the corrected figures), and, irrespective of their incongruence with the ideal shares of 1/4 and 1/5, farmers do share in the produit net in the current (with 15%) and in the imaginary “state of bliss” (with 19% of the net product).
But, in contrast with the articles, in later writings no reference is made to profit as a net product share. For instance, in Philosophie Rurale (p. 661) and in the Formule (p. 548), the revenue is split in different proportions: Landlords 4/7, State taxes 2/7, Church dime 1/7. This change undoubtedly constitutes an important aspect to properly interpreting Quesnay.
With this aim let us reconstruct Meek’s argument (similarly Pressman Reference Pressman1994, pp. 143–154). In the Economic Problem (pp. 597–615), first published in August 1766, Quesnay introduces the assumption that the rent is agreed upon at the beginning of the lease period for the duration of the contract. Footnote 10 Thus, a rise in corn price during a given lease period allows farmers to “profit up to the renewal of their leases from the constant increase in the prices of products … [a]nd this gain is most fruitful, most profitable … [since] profits … increase the wealth which they employ in cultivation” (Economic Problem, p. 611, in Meek [1962] 2003, p. 180). This specific idea of a temporary monetary gain for farmers due to a price increase was already presented by Quesnay in January the same year: “and it is in fact on this same price, averaged on a common year, that farmers regulate themselves for the price of the rent that they engage to pay to the landowners for the duration of their lease” (Réponse au mémoire de M.H., p. 836). Also in Rural Philosophy, published between November 1763 and February 1764, Footnote 11 profits are conceived as farmers’ temporary gain due to a price increase during the lease period (see Meek [1962] 2003, pp. 141–142). A similar view is already expressed in Impôts (p. 233): “The competition among farmers at the renewal of their leases always proportions the proprietors’ revenue to the product of the landed properties.”
In other words, higher wholesale prices for agricultural products increase the farmers’ revenue, initially only in monetary terms, i.e., no change occurs in the physical surplus rate, but this allows farmers to accrue an extra profit margin until the renewal of their leases when the profit is “transformed” into rent, i.e., produit net. Clearly, this aspect of Quesnay’s reasoning must have been appealing for an audience at court constituted predominantly (if not exclusively) by nobles. Thus, Meek’s interpretation seems more than justified: in the Tableau Quesnay assumes a long-period equilibrium position in which the process of technological change is completed and profits are not included in the produit net because they have “crystalized out into rent.”
But this interpretation is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, it leaves unresolved the position and role of profits in a dynamic context: if profits are not visible as a share of the produit net in the “state of bliss,” what about their role in the process of capital accumulation? Gianni Vaggi (Reference Vaggi1985) showed how temporary profits are the result of the transfer of merchants’ margins to the farmers. Second, Meek rules out the possibility that profits are altogether accounted for somewhere else. Could it be that Quesnay for policy reasons “moved” profits out of the produit net? If this possibility is accepted, would profits still appear to have a mere temporary nature or would they rather seem to constitute a stable component of Quesnay’s system? Given the importance Quesnay attaches to this social share to foster economic development, an analysis of these possibilities seems to be more than justified and will be undertaken in the next two sections.
IV. ARE PROFITS NOT DISPOSABLE?
We noted above that although in the articles Quesnay included the famer’s profit in the net product, by late 1763, when Philosophie Rurale was published, he envisages those profits as temporary “quasi rents” accruable by farmers only until lease renewal. This change raises several questions, but we shall focus on one in particular: What were the reasons for this change? To answer this question we should preliminarily note that Quesnay’s early views on which social shares constitute the net product have a clear genealogy, which directly leads back to Richard Cantillon’s ‘three rents’ theory (Essai, Cantillon [1755] 2015, ch. XII). Footnote 12 Thus, on the one hand, the initial inclusion of profit is a plausible (or at least probable) consequence of Cantillon’s influence, Footnote 13 whose echo is still recognizable in the Philosophie Rurale (1763, p. 405; the French text is also reproduced in Cartelier and Longhitano 2012, p. 97n24):
Land, once acknowledged as an abundant source of goods, received a third value from this same notion, based on the increase of the product which, by its market value [valeur vénale], exceeds the outlays: this is the value of property. This third value [valeur] exchanged for the rent of landed property stimulates the farmers to secure the yearly surplus [excédent] and the increase in order to settle their engagement with the landlord and to increase their profit. It is this last surplus [excédent] that we call revenue [revenu].
On the other hand, the later “exclusion” of profits from the produit net is explainable, without rejecting the validity of Meek’s “transformation” of agricultural profit into rent, by the desire “to preserve this form of income from taxation for the sake of economic growth” (Groenewegen Reference Groenewegen1983, p. xxiii). As Anne Robert Jacques Turgot writes to David Hume in 1767 (Groenewegen Reference Groenewegen1992, p. 17): “[T]he total product is divided into two parts: one destined for the reproduction of the following year, which includes … their [of the entrepreneur-farmers] profits and the interest on their advances. The other part is the net product which the farmer gives to the proprietor, when the person of the latter is distinguished from that of the cultivator.”
And this issue was first raised by Peter Groenewegen (Reference Groenewegen1974), who summarizes the discussion between Turgot and Hume by remarking how, for the physiocrats, “[w]ages and profits were clearly non disposable” (Groenewegen Reference Groenewegen1974, p. 481), although this was difficult to reconcile with the other physiocratic analytical cornerstone relating to the impôt unique: “the unique position of the net product of land for tax policy purposes could not easily be abandoned” (ibid.). Was it thus the “dilemma between theory and policy” that prompted Quesnay’s exclusion of the farmer’s profit from the produit net? Was Quesnay required to amend his early “Cantillonian” views to preserve the idea of an impôt unique levied on the landlord’s revenues without running the risk of impacting profits that were considered the primary source of capital accumulation, hence not disposable? If so, then Meek’s option 1), that profit is included in the net product, assumes a different explanatory validity. Gary Buurman (1991, pp. 490–491) reconstructs the issue similarly, also highlighting Meek’s later alignment (1968) towards Groenewegen’s suggestion and the views argued for in this paper. In fact, in his 1968 paper Meek restates his position (option 3 above), but also recognizes that the earlier inclusion of profits in the produit net was not easily reconcilable with the idea of an impôt unique, thus leaving the physiocrats “in something of a cleft stick” (ibid., p. 54).
It also follows that option 2)—i.e., that profit is included in the interest on the advances—becomes rather a consequence, or a theoretical “escamotage,” to safeguard a social share of fundamental importance for Quesnay, who, in the Philosophie Rurale (p. 662), writes: “In the list of the farmer’s costs, we talked about the reproduction of its annual advances and interest without saying anything yet about the retribution due to him for the care, work and risks of his business; since this retribution is mixed up with the expenditures of his annual advances and with the product of the cattle.”
In other words, Groenewegen suggests that Quesnay “retreated” from his initial “Cantillonian” position and “moved” profits out of the net product to “protect” them from the idea of an impôt unique. And precisely in the unpublished Impôts Quesnay draws this fundamental distinction between proprietor’s revenue and farmer’s profit:
The profits of the farmers and the gains of the men whom the farmers employ in cultivation ought to be distinguished from the revenue which this same cultivation brings every year for the proprietor; for it is the costs and profits of the husbandmen which assure the cultivation and the revenue … the cultivation of the land entails considerable expenses, and the more these expenses are increased, the more fruitful the land is. (Impôts, p. 232, in Meek [1962] 2003, p. 106)
The same view is shared by Turgot in his 1763 written Plan for a Paper on Taxation in General (discussed in Groenewegen Reference Groenewegen1977, pp. xxi–xxiii and 96–108): “M. Quesnay was the first to establish the correct notion of the revenue, when he learnt to distinguish the gross product from the net product, and not to include the profits of the cultivator in the net product” (in Groenewegen Reference Groenewegen1977, p. 102).
Thus, Turgot explicitly recognizes Quesnay’s exclusion of profit from the produit net, Footnote 14 and further argues in favor of this exclusion, raising as a rhetorical question, “Why would the cultivator work if he could not count on his legitimate profit?” (ibid.), to then conclude his argument, clearly stating the fiscal reasons behind this exclusion:
The cultivator has made these calculations when he leases a piece of land. It is the surplus [surplus] which he gives to the proprietor that makes up the revenue, and it is only on this revenue that taxes can be levied. When the proprietor cultivates the land himself, he has no greater disposable revenue, but he combines in one person his revenue as a proprietor and his profits as a cultivator, a profit which is not disposable at all. (ibid., p. 103).
The same idea is clearly visible also in Quesnay’s late writings as in the unpublished Note sur les exemption de dixmes (pp. 823–825, A.N., M 784 n° 70-4), dated by Georges Weulersse around 1764:
Let us explain this truth; if an arpent of bad quality land yields 72 bushels, of which 70 return the cultivation outlays, there won’t be but 2 bushels of profit and if the dime takes 6 … the farmer does not cover his outlays and this land will not be cultivated.… If an arpent of good land produces 144 bushels and 70 return the cultivation outlays, there are 74 bushels of profit on top of the outlays, [and if] the dime takes 12, 62 bushels of profit remain for the farmers.
In other words, according to the quality of the land and, most importantly, whether taxation is calculated on the basis of net product (i.e., gross production net of the cultivation outlays), profits can be calculated as the residual share due to the farmers.
In light of the above, it thus seems adequate to adopt Groenewegen’s suggestion that profits are not accounted for as a share in the produit net in order to preserve them from taxation, not only because they “crystalize out into rent” at lease renewal. Thus, the impôt unique should be levied on the yearly surplus (excédent) that goes to the landlord and not on the farmer’s profits, Footnote 15 which are not included in the revenu because they are not disposable.
Circumstantial support for this interpretation can be derived from Quesnay’s aversion towards the proposal by Sébastien Le Prestre, marquis de Vauban (1663–1707) to introduce the dîme royale (1707) and eliminate all other taxes (see, for instance, Impôts, p. 226). Footnote 16 Already August Oncken remarked on Vauban’s proposal that it “should not be confused … with the physiocratic impôt unique” ([1902] 2007, p. 255); in fact, the dîme royale (for a detailed account, see Kwass Reference Kwass2000, pp. 227–231) would have also affected farmers’ income, i.e., the profit on the advances, and thus capital accumulation, a matter of great importance to Quesnay (see Longhitano 2012, p. 20n26).
Although beyond the discussion of this article, it should be also mentioned that the royal court was an extremely “dangerous” environment with regard to the level of freedom to openly express opinions on topics like taxes: Vauban was banned from court by Louis XIV after the presentation of his Dîme Royale (1707) (McNally Reference McNally1988, p. 77), and Mirabeau’s Théorie de l’Impôt (1760) was not welcomed by Louis XV, who banned the marquis from court for two months, only after Quesnay’s intervention via Madame de Pompadour avoided him a five-year imprisonment (see Oncken [1902] 2007, p. 325).
V. ARE PROFITS “A SORT OF SUPERIOR WAGE-OF-MANAGEMENT”?
Having clarified the policy reasons that prompted Quesnay to exclude profits from the net product, a collateral question naturally arises: If not accounted for in the produit net, are farmers’ profits only a temporary share that crystalizes out into rent or are they a more stable component of famers’ income? Karl Marx interpreted Quesnay along these lines when he wrote that profit is “only a kind of higher wages paid by the landowners, which the capitalists consume as revenue” (TSV, p. 47). Footnote 17
Marx’s interpretation is corroborated by the views expressed by Turgot in the cited Plan for a Paper on Taxation in General (1763), where, while listing the items to be deducted from the gross product, he restates the exclusion of “the subsistence and reasonable profit for the entrepreneur farmer” (in Groenewegen Reference Groenewegen1977, p. 103; emphasis added). Footnote 18 What is of interest in this latter quotation is that Turgot, on the one hand, distinguishes between the farmer’s subsistence and his profit, while, on the other hand, he still groups together both “incomes.” This is surely indicative of the fact that profit, by 1763, has not yet fully emancipated as a distinct notion from the idea of a higher wage, and so is correctly termed by Meek ([1962] 2003, p. 280) “a sort of superior wage-of-management-plus-payment-for-risk-bearing.”
This specific aspect of Quesnay’s conceptualization of profit can be better grasped if we turn to the question of when the change between early “Cantillonian” and later “crystalization” formalizations took place in Quesnay’s mind. Christine Théré and Löic Charles (2009) trace this rupture in the 1700 words making up Quesnay’s notes to Mirabeau’s Mémoire … de Berne. Footnote 19 In these annotations, written most likely during the summer of 1759, Quesnay initially includes farmers’ profits in the produit net (as in the articles and the first two “editions” of the Tableau), to then switch in the same document “for the first time” (ibid., p. 86) to his “later” position, according to which farmers do not share in the produit net. Footnote 20
This contribution, though, despite identifying a very precise moment (summer 1759) for this change in Quesnay’s views on the composition of the net product, does not help to clarify its reasons (was it for fiscal reasons or because he just changed his mind?), or its possible consequences on his system (if moved out of the net product, where are farmers’ profits accounted for?). As a matter of fact, to answer these questions was also not Théré’s and Charles’s goal. Still, for the purposes of this article, they suggest an interesting “semantic” avenue that supports the interpretation that profits “emigrate” into the category of interest on the advances. As they highlight, in his contributions written after the Mémoire’s notes, Quesnay introduced in his terminology the concept of “reprises”—i.e., advanced costs—which, to paraphrase Théré and Charles (ibid., p. 88), the farmer needs to deduct from the annual output in order to secure the advances for the following production cycle.
Thus, if we attempt to analyze Quesnay’s contributions in this period more holistically, as a first approximation it seems reasonable to say that the position held by Quesnay in the Analysis, which forms the basis for Meek’s interpretation, Footnote 21 is fully established by late 1763 when Philosophie Rurale was published. Footnote 22 The article Grains appeared in Volume VII of the Encyclopédie in November 1757 (thus, it must have been written by May of the same year, like the unpublished Impôts). So we can preliminarily identify a window of about six years for this change to develop in Quesnay’s mind. During this period three major physiocratic texts were written: the Traité de la monarchie (Mirabeau and Quesnay Reference Mirabeau, Quesnay and Longhitano1999) between 1757 and 1759; the Tableau économique in December 1758; and a new edition of the Theorie de l’impôt, originally published in 1760, in whose edition Quesnay was involved by Mirabeau.
With regard to the Traité, Gino Longhitano (Introduction to Mirabeau and Quesnay Reference Mirabeau, Quesnay and Longhitano1999) showed how the “hidden” political roots of the Tableau are to be found in this unpublished text and how they relate to the confrontation between Quesnay’s and Mirabeau’s political views. With regard to the Tableau, Quesnay, after the first autograph zig-zag, engaged in its refinement, which should have led to the publication of a Grand Tableau œconomique (see Eltis Reference Eltis1996) and eventually resulted in the Philosophie Rurale. But before the latter’s publication, the collaboration between Mirabeau and Quesnay found expression in the Tableau œconomique avec ses explications (pp. 439–526), published in 1760 and included in the sixth part of Mirabeau’s Ami des hommes.
It is this text (together with Quesnay’s correspondence with Mirabeau prompted by the publication of the Theorie de l’impôt) Footnote 23 that clearly documents Quesnay’s “transition” between his early “Cantillonian” views and his later position on the “accounting” of profits. In fact, already in its introduction, the link between taxation and net product is discussed: “Who is that engaged in an examination of what is the net product … [of a] nation? Who judged the visible or hidden state of the different products which must enter into the proportional tax allocation?” (Tableau œconomique avec ses explications, p. 440).
It should not be difficult to answer these questions with the name of Quesnay. But more interestingly, a few pages later, the surplus (excédent) is paired together with profit and the latter is excluded from the revenue, being not disposable (similarly as Turgot a few years later):
The fruits bore by a good cultivation must be an abundant harvest which delivers: 1° The return of the annual advances to prevent and prepare the future harvest; 2° the interest on the primitive advances, which is a honest profit, which is needed for the revenue of the funds employed in machines, cattle, fertilizers etc.; 3° A surplus [excédent] and a profit in proportion, which the farmer can sell or exchange. It is this surplus [excédent] that we call revenue. It is the only wealth, because it is the only disposable part. (ibid., p. 444)
Thus, in the next section we will take into account both aspects of profit: i.e., its dynamic component (visible in a growing economy), and its stable supervision wage component.
VI. QUESNAY’S DYNAMICS OF CAPITAL ACCUMULATION
In this section we will integrate our interpretation—that Quesnay moved profits out of the net product to analytically safeguard them from the idea of impôt unique levied on the landlords’ revenue—with a discussion of the idea that the bon prix is transformed into a farmer’s monetary profit, which in turn kick-starts the process of economic growth (see Vaggi Reference Vaggi1985). As we highlighted already in section II, this aspect is fundamental to the notion of bon prix, which could otherwise be any international price. Thus, let us introduce the idea of the merchants as intermediaries within a simple input-output model: Footnote 24
A labourer, who sells his corn to a merchant [merchand], is paid in cash; with this money he pays the landlord, the taille, his domestics, his workers and purchases the merchandise he needs. The merchant, who sells the corn abroad and who either bought or bartered from abroad other merchandise, sells upon return the merchandise brought back and with the money he receives he purchases corn. (Grains, p. 202)
Let us define: Footnote 25
A = two sectors matrix of direct input coefficients [a ij] describing the amount of good i directly required to produce one unit of good j
q = column vector of elements Q i representing physical quantities of gross output
y = column vector of elements y i representing physical quantities of final demand
p = column vector of elements p i representing wholesale (vente de première main) prices Footnote 26
ξ i = difference between international and domestic wholesale prices ( p uk - p ) in sector i
M = diagonal matrix of the markups (merchants’ profit) m i in sector i, m i = ξ i > 0
p*= column price vector of the elements p*i representing retail (dernier achat) prices
s = column vector of the elements s i representing surplus value
I = identity matrix
We obtain the quantity (1) and price (2) systems of the Tableau as open Leontief systems:
The surplus vector s should be further characterized by defining impôt unique, T = t sa, and rent, R = sa (1- t), to obtain s T = [sa ; sm] = [(T + R); 0]. This surplus vector clearly shows the physiocratic distinction between productive and sterile sectors, since in the case of agriculture a surplus exists (the scalar sa is positive, sa > 0), while the manufacturing sector is sterile (the scalar sm is nil, sm = 0). Footnote 27
Further, we introduce the simplification that the produit net (s a) is a fraction (1 > s > 0) of the total agricultural production considered homogeneous in physical terms (Q a), and value it at current prices (p a). We shall also adopt the idea that in equilibrium the value of the agricultural surplus (s a) matches the sum of the elements constituting final demand in physical terms (y is) valued at their current prices (p is) to obtain the condition:
Equation (3) expresses what Quesnay writes in the third edition of the Tableau (p. 414): “The sale of the net product which the cultivator has generated in the previous year … results in the payment to the proprietor of a revenue.” Footnote 28 As it is evident by setting the markups equal to zero—i.e., assuming no merchant profit is generated by buying cheap in the countryside and selling dear abroad or in the cities—the equilibrium level depicted by equation (3) is lower (in terms of size of the net product) compared to a situation without merchants, which would be:
This is clearly visible if we look at the value range giving economic meaning to the physical surplus rate s. In fact, on the one hand, without a physical surplus larger than final corn demand (augmented by a factor corresponding to the merchants’ markup in the corn sector), there cannot be any final demand for manufactured goods; i.e., if [s Q a – (1+ m a ) y a ] = 0, then p m y m = 0. From this it follows that the minimum productivity of the agricultural sector has to be not only positive, but also above the physical ratio of final demand (augmented by the merchants’ markup) to total output; i.e., s > (1+ m a ) y a / Q a > 0. Footnote 29 On the other hand, the upper limit of s is set by the unrealistic situation in which the whole corn production is devoted to final demand; i.e., Q a = (1+ m a ) y a. The resulting value range is thus the following:
For this reason Quesnay explicitly condemns the intermediation of merchants: “The profits which provide a clear gain for the merchants of a nation should never be confused with the wealth of the nation itself. … The merchant tries to buy at the lowest possible price and to sell at the highest possible price … his individual interest and that of the nation are opposed” (Formule, p. 559, in Meek [1962] 2003, p. 164).
In relation to the markups, it should be noted that transportation and resale costs (ρ) would also impact the monetary surplus accruable by the farmers, m i = (ξ - ρ). But for simplicity we can exclude them from our model, although Quesnay speaks very openly against them: Footnote 30 “To abolish or reduce the excessive rights to charge river dues and tolls, which swallow up the revenues of those remote provinces in which produce can only be sold if it is transported over long distances” (Grains, p. 205, in Meek [1962] 2003, p. 79).
If we move to Quesnay’s growth dynamics, let us additionally define:
π = supervision wage, consumed as revenue for subsistence by the farmers (à la Marx)
π ’= monetary profit, accrued by the farmers during a lease period (à la Vaggi)
β = depreciation rate of fixed capital (K) equal to the interest on the annual advances i
i* = (i + π + π ’) = farmers’ interest on the advances
Quesnay assumes in the Tableau (third edition, p. 417) that “[t]he interest on these advances [original advances] ought to amount to ten per cent at least” (Meek [1962] 2003, p. 132). In the Formule (pp. 532–533) he adds that this might be an overstatement, thus leaving space for interpretation: “I am not saying that all cultivators draw annually, in addition to their annual advances, ten per cent for the interest on their original advances. But I do say that this is one of the main conditions of a state of prosperity” (in Meek [1962] 2003, p. 155). Thus, simply stated, Quesnay’s idea is that the introduction of free trade, at time t 1, will reduce the existing difference, at t 0, between international and domestic corn prices, ξ t1 < ξ t0 , and raise the domestic wholesale prices. The merchants’ margin, equal to the difference between domestic wholesale and retail prices, will decrease accordingly, m t1 < m t0, and by the same amount the farmers’ interest on the advances is increased (see Vaggi Reference Vaggi1985):
From this we can derive the net accumulation rate as the interest on advances net of depreciation, if we assume, as Quesnay does, the “automatic” reinvestment of any monetary surplus accrued by the farmers:
The total amount of this interest is spent annually, because cultivators never allow it to remain inactive; for the intervals when they are not obliged to use it for repairs, they do not fail to put it to profit in order to increase and improve their cultivation, without which they would be unable to provide for serious accidents. That is why interest is included in the total of annual expenditure. (Formule, p. 533, in Meek [1962] 2003, p. 156)
Formally, this idea can be expressed as follows:
This can be reformulated taking into account (5) and the other definitions above to obtain:
It should be noted that in (6) π, i.e., the supervision wage, is excluded from accumulation since it is assumed to be fully consumed by the farmers (see Cantillon [1755] 2015, p. 215, H-268): “The assumption I shall make in this enquiry … is that Farmers earn three Rents and spend the third Rent on living more comfortably instead of saving it.” This simplification excludes the possibility that the farmers’ consumption basket is still kept at a physiological minimum and part of the supervision wage is accumulated. This option is also hinted at by Cantillon ([1755] 2015, p. 325, H-439), who portrays the situation in which a farmer borrows the funds necessary for the yearly advances.
Importantly, equation (6a) highlights a fundamental assumption underlying the whole of Quesnay’s policy recommendations relating to free trade and bon prix, namely that international wholesale prices ( p uk) are consistently (i.e., at t 0 as well as at t 1) above domestic wholesale prices ( p ), since otherwise ξ would be negative, which in turn implies that there would also be no merchant’s markup m. This assumption, it should be noted, has to be measured against the historical background of the economic policies of Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619–1683), whose policies, aiming at establishing France as a luxury manufactures producer, resulted in trade restrictions, low grain prices, and the abandonment of the countryside. Footnote 31
But, most importantly, equations (6) and (6a) reconstruct in a simplified manner the dynamics of capital accumulation in terms of the interplay among interest on the advances, supervision wage, and monetary profit, adjusting for depreciation: “If they [commodities] are sold at a price which is high enough to yield a gain sufficient to encourage people to maintain [i* – β = π, with π ’ = 0] or increase [with π’ = ξ t0 - ξ t1 > 0] their production, they are at their proper price” (Hommes, p. 276, in Meek [1962] 2003, p. 93).
Thus, through free trade, wholesale prices increase aligning with international prices so that farmers will accrue not just their interest on advances (i = β), required to be at least equal to depreciation to secure future reproduction and a “sort of superior wage-of-management-plus-payment-for-risk-bearing” above the physiological minimum wage, but also a monetary profit (π ’ = m t0 - m t1), equal to the increase in wholesale prices before and after the introduction of free trade. Eventually, this monetary profit is assumed to be fully reinvested in fixed capital (K t1 > K t0) in order to upgrade the production methods from petite to grande culture, Footnote 32 which in turn will positively affect the physical surplus rate (s t1 > s t0), thus increasing production in real terms, (Q a t1 > Q a t0), as Quesnay writes already in his first economic article:
For by the restoration of la grande culture, richer crops producing a great deal more wheat, vegetable and fodder would be obtained … from which results a surplus [surcroît] of revenue … a continual growth of wealth … [and] to bring about this situation, only very large funds are required, but the countryside lacks such funds for they are drawn to the large towns. (Fermiers, pp. 153–154, in Groenewegen Reference Groenewegen1983, p. 21)
And this position is consistently held also in later writings: “An abundance of products is obtained through large advances” (Maximes Générales—Note sur la même Maxime—XIII, p. 584, in Meek [1962] 2003, p. 251). Thus, higher prices lead in the long run to a technology upgrade, as it is implicitly assumed in the Tableau: “We are not speaking here of small-scale cultivation carried on with the aid of oxen [i.e., petite culture]” (in Formule, p. 678, in Meek [1962] 2003, p. 131).
Having sketched Quesnay’s capital accumulation theory, a few remarks are necessary. First, with regard to Pressman (1994, p. 144), his main argument runs as follows: Footnote 33 “When the prices of agricultural and manufactured goods increase by the same proportion, the only way real profits in the agricultural sector can rise is for productivity in the agricultural sector to rise. In this case real agricultural output will increase. Why agricultural productivity should increase is left unexplained however.” There are two issues at stake here: first, regarding the question “why agricultural productivity should increase,” in our reconstruction (following Vaggi Reference Vaggi1985) an increase in the net product in real terms occurs over time, i.e., once additional capital has been accumulated, unless Pressman’s requirement is that productivity rises in real terms simultaneously with a price increase, which makes the requirement economically less (if at all) meaningful. Second, it is suggested that the prices of manufactured goods will also increase. This is somehow misleading since, in line with the distinction between wholesale and retail prices, in Quesnay’s mind retail prices would not increase since the sterile class can buy necessaries at t 1 at the same retail price as at t 0. There is no need for manufactures prices to rise, as has also been argued for by Anthony Brewer (2008, p. 20): “If non-agricultural prices cover costs, they must rise in line with any increase in agricultural prices, so the produit net is unchanged in real terms”(see also Meek [1962] 2003, pp. 282–286; and Beer Reference Beer1939, p. 165). The idea that there must be surplus profits in the sterile sector that could be reduced to increase agricultural surplus profits and/or rents (Brewer Reference Brewer2008, p. 22) shows a misunderstanding of Quesnay’s price categories (see Vaggi Reference Vaggi1983 and Reference Vaggi1987). Moreover, if we recall the Fifth Letter on the Grain Trade, Turgot, while discussing a consumption tax, remarks: “[Day labourers] if they are thrifty, [they are able] to create a little movable fund which becomes their resort in unforeseen cases of sickness, or times of high prices, or unemployment. When the objects of their expenditure increase in price, they first begin to cut down on this little superfluity and the enjoyments it can procure for them” (reproduced in Gordon Reference Gordon2011, p. 229). Thus, even accepting the possibility that retail prices rise (see footnote 6 above), to consider the peculium Turgot refers to as a profit would not seem to be fully justifiable. It follows that it seems adequate to discard Pressman’s contention that Quesnay missed the distinction between nominal and real variables, since enough evidence suggests the contrary. Footnote 34
The second remark is in regard to Meek’s four interpretation options. According to option 3), which Meek accepted and has since been widely adopted by modern commentators, profits, given the conditions of the Tableau (in its Formule version), are not visible because they have already crystalized out into rent. This option in our analysis clearly maintains its validity, but only with regard to the way in which profits are transformed into rent. But in our interpretation, as already Groenewegen suggested (1974, 1977, and 1983), farmers’ profits are evidently regarded by Quesnay as not disposable due to their fundamental role in the process of capital accumulation, and for this reason are not accounted for in the net product but somewhere else. In other words, Quesnay moved away from his initial “Cantillonian” position, Meek’s option 1), to “protect” profits from taxation. It follows that Meek’s option 2), i.e., profits are mixed with the interest on the advances, is an analytical escamotage adopted by Quesnay to reconcile the conflicting physiocratic policy and theoretical stances in relation to bon prix, taxation, profit, and capital accumulation.
Our third remark is that we argued that profits, rather than having just a mere ephemeral nature, since they are visible only in a dynamic context (Meek [1962] 2003; and Vaggi Reference Vaggi1985), appear to display a more stable character, in line with Marx’s interpretation in the Theories of Surplus Value ([1863] 1963) of profit as a supervision wage. But even if this interpretation is accepted, two aspects of Quesnay’s notion of profit should be briefly highlighted to pay the right tribute to Turgot: 1) nowhere, to my knowledge, Quesnay derives the rate of profit as a return linked to the capital employed, Footnote 35 thus profit still results in being partly connoted as a risk, an entrepreneurial and supervisory return; Footnote 36 and, 2) in only one instance Quesnay seems to play with the idea of profit as a return due as a compensation for the opportunity cost of not lending the money, rather than reinvesting it in cultivation. Footnote 37
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we discussed Quesnay’s dynamics of capital accumulation. We challenged Meek’s influential interpretation ([1962] 2003) that profits are not included in the produit net because they are crystalized out into rent. Following Groenewegen’s suggestion (1974, 1977, and 1983), we contended that profits are present in Quesnay’s system, but not accounted for in the net product for policy reasons related to the other physiocratic maxim of a unique tax on the proprietors’ revenue. We also highlighted how profit appears to be an income component still not fully emancipated from the notion of supervision wage (Marx, TSV). Finally, contrary to Pressman’s contention (1994) that Quesnay missed the distinction between nominal and real variables, we modeled Quesnay’s capital accumulation process combining a notion of profit à la Marx (supervision wage) with a dynamic notion à la Vaggi (monetary profit) to show how technical change increases the physical surplus rate and, with it, the produit net in real terms.
