I want to begin by spending a little time articulating how I understand the U.S. government's new “free and open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) policy, which encompasses more than the trade agreements Inu discussed in her remarks. Then, I want to take a look at how this new U.S. strategy and approach would apply to one important key player in the region: Taiwan.

As Professor Erie mentioned in his remarks, the U.S. administration has recently articulated its Asia policy in the form of the “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Like the previous administration's “rebalancing” or “pivot” to Asia, the FOIP is an attempt by the United States to organize its national strategy toward the region. It has many of the same substantive goals, but it has a slightly different emphasis and scope.

As articulated by U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, a “free Indo-Pacific” has at least two components: (1) sovereign nations are free from coercion from other countries; and (2) individuals enjoy freedom within a sovereign nation's domestic system. Similarly, “open” refers to freedom of access to the global commons, especially the sea and airways with the focus on the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime claims. Finally, “open” also refers to “fair and reciprocal trading and investment environments.”Footnote ¹

Although it is not a recognized sovereign in U.S. eyes, Taiwan is a nonetheless a key player and partner in the success of any U.S. “Free and Open” Indo-Pacific Strategy. In my brief comments, I want to explore the extent to which Taiwan will benefit, but also ways in which it will resist or undermine the goals of the FOIP.

My tentative conclusion is that while Taiwan is a strong supporter and beneficiary of both of the U.S. concepts of “free” as it is defined in the FOIP, it is far from clear that Taiwan will support either of the versions of “open.” This illustrates some of the limits in the effectiveness of the FOIP, especially on trade and economic matters, for Taiwan as well as for other likely allies in the region.

Let me start with Taiwan and the concept of a “free” Indo-Pacific. On both dimensions, Taiwan is institutionally and even ideologically committed to being “open.”

Domestically, Taiwan boasts one of the most liberal and democratic political systems in the Indo-Pacific. Indeed, it is a model of what the U.S. might call “good governance” that also respects the “fundamental rights and liberties of its citizens.” On several international measurements, Taiwan is rated as one of the “freest” governments. For instance, in 2019, Freedom House ranked Taiwan as the twenty-sixth “freest” society in the world, second in Asia only to Japan and higher even than traditionally “liberal” societies such as France and the United States.Footnote ² While far from perfect, Taiwan is a liberal constitutional democracy with highly competitive political elections and an independent judiciary authorized to conduct relatively robust constitutional review for the protection of individual rights. In May 2019, it also became the first country in Asia to legalize same-sex marriage.Footnote ³

Internationally, Taiwan's story is much less happy from a liberal or a Taiwanese point of view. The vast majority of the nations in the world do not have diplomatic relations with the government in Taiwan. Many, if not most, have accepted China's “One China” principle, which claims Taiwan as part of that “One China.” Taiwan is excluded from all international organizations that require statehood as well. For instance, despite years of diplomatic efforts, Taiwan has not been able to secure even observer status at meetings of the World Health Assembly.Footnote ⁴ China continues to put diplomatic pressure on nations that continue to have official relations with Taiwan, and it has even expanded this pressure campaign to pressure private companies, such as airlines and hotels, that do not fully endorse China's view on Taiwan.Footnote ⁵

Despite its non-status under international law, however, the government of Taiwan does create a limited international space for itself through unofficial nongovernmental missions and arrangements. As a practical matter, Taiwanese citizens and companies are able to trade and travel in the international community as widely and easily as most U.S. citizens and companies.

However, China's enduring threat to Taiwan, and especially its refusal to renounce the use of force to achieve unification, means that Taiwan's sovereignty and freedom from coercion remain uncertain at best. This uncertainty has only increased in recent years as China's military capabilities have improved while Taiwan's have stagnated or even declined.

The United States, and in particular, the U.S. Congress, has worked to try to support Taiwan's freedom. The United States has long provided arms sales to Taiwan, pursuant to the Taiwan Relations Act, in order to help Taiwan defend itself. The Trump administration has stated that it would be willing to allow sales of advanced F-16V fighter jets (though not the most advanced F-35s sold to allies like the UK and Japan).Footnote ⁶

In addition to numerous resolutions asking the United States to support Taiwan's greater participation in international organizations, Congress has also enacted the Taiwan Travel Act. This law makes it the policy of the United States to allow high-level engagement between U.S. and Taiwanese government officials. This past week, members of Congress have also introduced the “Taiwan Reassurance Act,” which would provide more rhetorical as opposed to practical support for Taiwan's autonomy.

While U.S. support for Taiwan has increased in recent years, especially in the forms of arms sales and legislation, Taiwan arguably remains in a less “free” state internationally than it did before the United States began its FOIP push. Among all the countries we have discussed in the region, Taiwan has the least autonomy internationally, and will require the most direct forms of U.S. support to maintain its freedom.

Though it is easy to say Taiwan's government is unequivocally in favor of both legs of the “Free” in FOIP, it is much harder to say that Taiwan can and will embrace the concept of “open” with the same level of enthusiasm. Indeed, it is possible that Taiwan will be mildly antagonistic to aspects of the U.S. FOIP with respect to openness.

First, it is worth reminding ourselves that the U.S. emphasis on an “open” IP is aimed largely at China and its expansive activities in the South and East China Seas. As most know, China has a remarkably expansive claim to waters and all of the land features in the South China Sea (SCS). It is China's attempts to implement and operationalize its claims in the form of artificial islands that has sparked the most controversy and criticism in the United States.

But there is one other claimant with even more expansive claims. That is Taiwan, which has claims that are co-extensive, and in some ways more expansive, than the oft-criticized People's Republic of China (PRC. Like the PRC, Taiwan claims a broad “U” shaped line that makes some undefined legal claim to over 80 percent of the waters as well as all of the land features in the SCS. In fact, the Republic of China government in Taiwan made the original 9 Dash Line claim in 1947 and scholars from Taiwan continue to be some of the most articulate defenders of this claim.

Like China, Taiwan has rejected the legal applicability (or even the moral force) of the 2016 PCA Arbitral award that, among other things, invalidated China/Taiwan's U-shaped line claim and its claim to an exclusive economic zone around Taiping Island. This island, the largest land feature in the Spratlys, is controlled by Taiwan and its government has poured millions into developing and garrisoning this island with Taiwanese soldiers. It has even used the island as a base for conducting live-fire exercises for its military. It is fair to say that only one nation or claimant shares China's legal claims in the South China Sea (and against Japan in the East China Sea) and that claimant is Taiwan.Footnote ⁷

Unlike China, Taiwan is not an antagonist or a chief target for U.S. Navy freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs). But as a legal matter, Taiwan actually has very similar views on the rules governing freedom of navigation as the Chinese government. Like China, Taiwan's government does not think a foreign warship can cross into its territorial sea on innocent passage without prior notification. That is one of the main areas of legal disagreement between the United States and China for many of the controversial FONOPs involve Chinese claims that the United States should have sought prior notification before entering their territorial seas. Taiwan has the exact same view, and, indeed, the U.S. Navy listed Taiwan as a country that was a target of its FONOP in the Spratlys.Footnote ⁸

It is also strategically dangerous for the United States because Taiwan's facilities could, at least in theory, be swallowed by China in any subsequent unification between Taiwan and China.

Taiwan is also a relatively open economy, which is not surprising because its economy depends on international trade more than most countries. It would seem, therefore, a logical candidate for a U.S. bilateral free trade agreement that is the preference of the current administration. The idea of a U.S.-Taiwan free trade agreement (FTA) has been under consideration for a very long time. Indeed, a Brookings Institution study was advocating for a U.S.-Taiwan FTA as far back as 2004.Footnote ⁹ Despite the many years this idea has been promoted, the United States and Taiwan are not currently in any negotiations for a bilateral FTA, even though the United States and Japan and the United States and the Philippines have already opened such talks.

For Taiwan, it faces the danger of being left out of both regional trading and bilateral trading agreements since it is not a member of the new Trans-Pacific Partnership replacement, and it has only two major bilateral FTAs (with Singapore and New Zealand).

The United States and Taiwan have very complementary economies in many ways, and an FTA could boost both sides’ trade in meaningful ways, without being very disruptive. Currently, trade runs about $86 billion annually, with the United States importing almost $50 billion, and exporting $36 billion. The United States is Taiwan's third largest trading partner after China and Hong Kong. And Taiwan is the United States’ eleventh largest trading partner. A U.S. International Trade Commission investigation estimated that

But the United States and Taiwan have faced severe and difficult obstacles to even opening negotiations. Currently, Taiwan has imposed limits on the importation of U.S. beef and pork due to the use of ractopamine by U.S. producers of beef and pork. The U.S. position has been that these limits should be lifted on pork prior to restarting negotiations (beef has already been lifted). But this has caused a strong public backlash within Taiwan. Meanwhile, the United States has imposed tariffs on Taiwanese steel exports to the United States.Footnote ¹¹

In sum, although it might seem like a good idea, the prospects of a U.S.-Taiwan FTA seem as remote as ever, especially during an election year in Taiwan. Taiwan's ability to increase its “Openness” on this dimension seems small at best.

In conclusion, Taiwan is likely to be one of the strongest supporters and most obvious beneficiaries of the U.S. FOIP push. But while Taiwan needs U.S. support to maintain its freedom, it must change its own policies on the SCS and on agricultural and food safety to work with the United States on achieving the kind of “Openness” the United States is seeking.