The 1700th anniversary of Constantine's victory over Maxentius at the Milvian Bridge in October a.d. 312 has seen a spate of studies of that significant but elusive emperor (see Richard Flower in JRS 2012). John Dillon's sound and judicious study, based on his PhD thesis, is a more specialized addition to the list, and concentrates on the ethos of Constantine's administrative legislation. D. argues that Constantine positioned himself through his laws as the champion of the ‘people’ against the corruption of his officials, insisting repeatedly that litigants or tax-payers who felt themselves hard-done-by could appeal over the heads of governors or judges to the praetorian prefects (who could act as judges vice sacra) or to himself, Constantine, in person. Central to this was the operation of referral and appeal, an area where Constantine made significant innovations (see especially but not exclusively chs 7 and 8, 192–250), which, taken together, asserted the emperor's personal control over the judicial procedure.
The main source for the study, the Theodosian Code, generates its own set of problems, which are treated in ch. 1 (12–34). D. analyses the contribution that the 336 individual constitutions (represented in c. 389 extracts) ascribed to Constantine make to understanding of the Code as a whole. While favouring the arguments advanced by Boudewijn Sirks for the compilers’ general reliance on the archives preserved in Constantinople, D. believes, on grounds of rubrics and naming conventions (19), that, for Constantine, intermediate collections made by lawyers at Rome and Carthage were extensively consulted.
Ch. 2 sets out the formal characteristics of Constantine's laws, and especially the partial fusion of the edictal and epistolary forms, also noted by Simon Corcoran for the tetrarchic period (Empire of the Tetrarchs (2000), 198–203), reflecting Constantine's ‘preference for advantages of direct and forceful language over the niceties of legal tradition’ (57). A more controversial question (ch. 3) is the extent to which Constantine departed from conventions observed by his tetrarchic predecessors. In D.'s view, Constantine did not break with classical law or classical jurisprudence (the emperor would not, of course, have been aware of the loaded term ‘classical’). Instead, more subtly, he distanced himself from the ‘tenacious defence’ of classical law and jurisprudence observed by Diocletian (60), preferring to resort to simplification, when the complexities indulged in by the veteres proved excessive. Comparing like with like, D. argues that Constantine's lawyers employed a more rhetorical style even in their rescripts than did those of Diocletian, whose austere labours were extensively preserved in the law codes of Gregorius and Hermogenian compiled in the early a.d. 290s. However, he also concedes that a general change in chancellery style occurred in c. a.d. 300, which perhaps extended to rescripts as well.
Laws ‘not only command but also explain and justify’ (85). Ch. 4 discusses Constantine's self-representation in his laws. Justice, the obliteration of the unlawful acta of usurpers and, most important, a proclaimed readiness on the part of the emperor to avenge the wrongs of his people on his own administrators are the distinctive features of Constantinian legal rhetoric. So too is the intense personal relationship of Constantine with his (Christian) god, a more prayerful development of tetrarchic emphasis on divine favour. This ideology also influenced the workings of the new-style praetorian prefect, whose military and some administrative functions were diverted elsewhere, allowing the prefects to become the prime conduits of imperial justice.
The strength of D.'s analysis of a series of texts on how Constantine tried to ensure accountability on the part of his officials lies in their cumulative effect (see chs 5 and 6). Imperial officials were threatened with punishment, including immolation. The rights of appeal by provincials against corrupt officials were widely advertised. Agents were dispatched to the provinces to keep an eye on the emperor's men, on the emperor's behalf. Acclamations, for and against, public men were to be routinely reported, and acted on (although crowds were not always right). Constantine was serious, D. believes, about improving the access to justice for poorer people through a series of related measures. Judicial bribery and the taking of fees were denounced and outlawed, the defensor civitatis, empowered to hear minor cases, was introduced (although his date is disputed) and bishops’ courts (episcopalis audientia) were made more accessible for civil litigants. Accepting the authenticity of the first Simondian Constitution, a full text addressed to the Christian Ablabius, which survives independently of the Theodosian Code, D. argues that it preserved ‘a failed experiment … in which Constantine attempted to transform Christian bishops into agents of imperial justice’ (155) by making their judgements greater, in Sozomen's words, that those of other judges. The emperor's rhetoric, that bishops’ decisions were inappellable as being pro sanctis is read by D. (and perhaps by Sozomen) as enabling them to act as quasi-praetorian prefects. D. accepts that the law was anomalous; reliance on the sole witness of bishops in trials contradicted a fundamental principle of Roman procedure, that corroboration was required, and was declared unlawful in a.d. 334 (Cod. Theod. 11.39.3). Perhaps D. could go further and ask whether it was Constantine or Ablabius who was ultimately responsible for this rogue text.
D.'s focus is understandably emperor-centric; the book is about how Constantine intended the system to work. That Constantine's system of appeals survived suggests that his successors found it fit for purpose. But this reform, at least, was not populist in its effect, despite the rhetoric; appeals were more the prerogative of the rich, who could afford the time and expense required, and Symmachus’ Relationes as Urban Prefect in a.d. 384 reveal several cases where the process was modified to appease special interests. D. has well shown how Constantine used the law; the next stage is to consider how users of the law exploited Constantine.
