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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 April 2005
Late in life, Merrill D. Peterson, a professor emeritus of history and the author of numerous earlier books on American presidents and history, “became fascinated by … the genocide committed by the Ottoman Turks during the First World War” (p. xi). He argues that “in the absence of any public retribution for the crime against the Armenians … the crime festered in the hearts of the Armenian people until it became a hallmark of their national character” (pp. 122–23). Much of his short book deals with the activities of the Near East Relief organization from 1915–29.
Although he writes well and thus makes a strong emotional case for the Armenians, Peterson fails to examine the Turkish side of the issue. The result, therefore, is simply the most recent one-sided restatement of the Armenian accusations of genocide at the hands of the Turks during and after World War I without looking at the overall context of what actually happened.
Throughout his book, Peterson attempts to document his case with only Armenian or pro–Armenian sources and totally neglects contrary evidence, even from Armenians themselves. Some of his sources are reputable, but others are biased or outright forgeries. His citing of the so-called Talaat Pasha telegrams or Andonian documents as “evidence” of premeditated Turkish genocide is a good example. Although the “original” telegrams have long since conveniently disappeared, Peterson considers them genuine and does not even bother to mention scholarly work by Sinasi Orel and Sureyya Yuca (The Talat Pasha Telegrams: Historical Fact or Armenian Fiction? [1986]), which makes a strong case that they are forgeries.
Even Henry Morgenthau, the U.S. ambassador to the Ottoman Empire in 1913–16 and the author of one of the most damning denunciations of Turkish actions, was not a completely credible source when he “cited” Talaat Pasha's anti–Armenian sentiments, called Mustafa Kemal Atatürk “‘a brutal monster’ who held tens of thousands of Armenian women in slavery” (p. 147), or termed Protestant missionaries in the Ottoman Empire “in reality advance agents of civilization” (p. 3). According to Peterson, Lord James Bryce, the compiler of the other most damning contemporary account of the Turkish actions, possessed “authority [that] was unimpeachable” (p. 7) and “could not be dismissed as a war propagandist” (p. 45), although this is exactly what Arnold Toynbee, then his young assistant, later called their work (without, however, negating all of its accuracy).
Contemporary Armenian writers such as Vahakn N. Dadrian is “a leading scholar” (p. 23) and Richard G. Hovannisian “the distinguished Armenian American professor” (p. 174), while Bernard Lewis (who questions the Armenian claims of genocide) is approvingly referred to by another Armenian scholar as someone who “had obviously left the field of scholarship and entered the arena of politics” (p. 172). Heath Lowry, a professor of history at Princeton University, was involved in a “noxious scandal” (p. 173) because he questioned the authenticity of Hitler's reputed statement about who today remembers the Armenians.
Admiral Mark Bristol, the pro-Turkish U.S. High Commissioner in Constantinople after World War I, “held a venomous prejudice against Armenians” (p. 94), while Garejian Pasdermadjian (Armen Garo) is favorably referred to as the Armenian minister plenipotentiary to the United States after World War I (p. 98), without any mention that before the war he had been a member of the Ottoman Parliament who had deserted to the Russian enemy to fight against the Turks. An Islamic mullah is quoted as telling “giavoors … Mohammed had ordered him to sacrifice 100 Armenian male children … in your sanctuary … to be decapitated one by one at the altar” (p. 44). The Kurds are said to have “alternately worshiped Allah and the Devil” (p. 23) because they supported their Turkish co-religionists against the Armenians.
Without even bothering to mention that the Turks were fighting for their very existence after World War I against the Armenians in the east and the Greeks in the west, Peterson blithely asserts that “Kemal's army continued to massacre Armenians” (p. 117). He also neglects even to mention the Greeks' Megali Idea to conquer Anatolia and restore the Byzantine Empire after World War I, when he declares that “Kemal's army had driven one and a half million Greeks from the Pontus, killing 360,000 in the process” (p. 124) and that Smyrna was “restored to Greece in 1920” (p. 129). Peterson's population figure for the Greeks living in the Pontus, of course, is a gross exaggeration, while one wonders what he means by “restoring” Smyrna to Greece, as the Byzantine Empire had been extinct since 1453.
In his brief discussion of Armenian terrorism against Turkish diplomats and others during the 1970s and 1980s, Peterson fails to cite the relevant literature and even partially rationalizes the terrorism when he declares that “the cry for revenge was a desperate plea for attention. In the absence of a tribunal to which the aggrieved might turn, unsurprisingly, some took revenge into their own hands” (p. 167). Similarly callous is his brief statement about “renewed warfare against the Tartars in mountainous Karabagh” (p. 171) following Armenian independence in 1991, which neglects to mention that one of the first things the newly independent Armenian state did was to attack its neighbor Azerbaijan and conquer some 40 percent of its territory, which it still occupies to this day.
As for the claim that “international law assumes a successor government is liable for actions of its predecessors” (p. 166), scholars would argue that it is not so simple to maintain that modern Turkey is the legal successor to the Ottoman Empire. “The reunion of Cyprus … with mainland Greece” (p. 92) in 1913, of course, should instead read Crete. In addition, the Ottoman Empire did not “expire … on October 30, 1918” (p. 61) but lingered until 1922.
Although the Turks were certainly not innocent bystanders in all this, there is clearly more to the story than Peterson knows or is willing to analyze. What is needed, therefore, is a thorough and objective analysis of what really happened.