I. INTRODUCTION
Karl Marx is often and legitimately regarded as anticipating both the development of globalization and the corrosive effects market relations can have on other forms of economic and social organization. But he also used the principles of historical materialism to predict the long-term decline of the market. He identified five reasons for this decline: increasing economies of scale, and the ensuing centralization of industrial capital; the growing use of credit money and of joint-stock companies; the rise of cartels and trusts; expanding regulation of the market for labor power by the state; and the ever more pervasive role of scientific knowledge in production. Furthermore, Marx's arguments were accepted without significant criticism by later social democratic and Communist theorists, and similar ideas featured prominently in the work of many non-Marxian economists who were sometimes indirectly influenced by Marx's earlier analysis. In some respects they were all correct, but ultimately they were fundamentally mistaken, as the development of neoliberalism during the final third of the twentieth century attests.
II. THE PUZZLE
The main puzzle we explore in this paper can be stated very simply. Marx is often, and quite correctly, seen as the apostle of the market, most especially of the world market. The latest commentator to do so is Thomas Friedman (Reference Friedman2005), but the argument has been made many times before by social theorists and economic historians, notably by Eric Hobsbawm (Reference Hobsbawm, Karl and Engels1998). In the century after his death, however, most of his followers were convinced the market was in irreversible long-run decline. This prediction lay at the heart of Eduard Bernstein's revisionist challenge to the official theoretical position of the Second International, but it was also evident in Rudolf Hilferding's Finance Capital, published in 1910, in his post-1914 writings on “organised capitalism,” and in Nikolai Bukharin's thinking on “state capitalism” (Howard and King Reference Howard and King1989, chaps. 4, 5, 13, 16; Reference Howard and King1992, chaps. 1, 4). Yet Hilferding and Bukharin, at least, claimed to be orthodox Marxists.
The puzzle can be resolved, also very simply. Marx's views changed significantly after 1848, first as a result of the failure of the revolutions of that year, and, second, due to the deepening of his knowledge of economics, in particular between 1857 and 1867. The failure of the revolutions led to a shift in his theory of social and political change from a political voluntarist to a more economic determinist position. His intensive studies in political economy were reflected initially in the Grundrisse manuscripts of 1857, and culminated in the publication of volume I of Capital ten years later. (After 1867 Marx did relatively little new thinking or writing on economic issues, but Friedrich Engels continued to observe and to theorize right up to his death in 1895, and he maintained the emphasis on the economic determinism to which Marx had moved). Marx's research brought many changes in his ideas: it led him away from philosophical speculation towards empirically informed economic theorization, away from Adam Smith and towards David Ricardo, away from exchange and towards production as the dominant force in economic life, and away from proclaiming the political potential of the proletariat and toward the analysis of those political transformations initiated by the proletariat that could be sustained by material conditions.
Robert Brenner notes that in his pre-1848, “Smithian” phase, the story that Marx told began with the growth of the market; this allowed the extension of the division of labor, which in turn gave rise to changes in the nature of social relations. “By the end of the 1850s,” however, “Marx had significantly transformed his conception of historical materialism, precisely by transforming his understanding of the relationship between class and property relations and the development of the productive forces” (Brenner Reference Brenner, Beier, Cannadine and Rosenheim1989, p. 285). The growth of the market, Marx now argued, was a revolutionary force only in appropriate circumstances, and these circumstances were determined by the nature of the mode of production.
Brenner's principal interest is in Marx's analysis of the transition from feudalism to capitalism, for which “[t]he results….were far-reaching: essentially, they were to turn his first approach to transition upside down” (Brenner, Reference Brenner, Beier, Cannadine and Rosenheim1989, p. 292; see also Brenner Reference Brenner1978). But this theoretical inversion also had profound implications for Marx's and Engels's views on the transition from capitalism to socialism, which Brenner does not address. In their later economic writings, they claimed that socialism was maturing economically “within the womb” of capitalism, just as capitalism had matured economically within the womb of the feudal mode of production. Market relations, especially, were being eradicated, so that economic processes were becoming less commodified in the specific Marxian sense: less atomistic, less impersonal and less anarchic. In the place of these characteristics, bureaucratic administration of resource allocation, the planning of activities in larger productive establishments, the rising significance of public goods relative to private goods, and greater state regulation of remaining market prices and conditions of contract were becoming more important. All this was seen to be a consequence of capitalist economic development, but also as transformative of capitalism itself.
More particularly, Marx and Engels argued, it was the result of five factors that could be seen to operate in contemporary capitalism. First, technical change brought enhanced economies of scale in modern industry, and this gave rise to increasing centralization of capital, which transformed some market activities into undertakings within firms. Second, the growing importance of credit money and the related emergence of joint-stock companies were socializing some of the most important functions of capital. These two factors were engendering a third, the growth of cartels and trusts, which greatly reduced the intensity of competitive forces and tended to replace market processes with a form of private planning of prices and production. Fourth, the Factory Acts represented a fundamental reassertion of social control over the market for labor power. Fifth, and finally, the increased role of science in production meant that public goods, in the form of knowledge, were becoming more important relative to private goods, and this was another force operating to socialize production.
Thus the seeds of the Hilferding-Bukharin view of the declining market were sown by Marx and Engels in their mature thinking on the dynamics of capitalism. Moreover, these thinkers, in turn, have had an important influence, both directly and indirectly, on non-Marxian economics in the twentieth century. There has been a widespread acceptance far beyond Marxian circles that the market was in terminal decline. This was argued most forcefully by Joseph Schumpeter, who was directly influenced by Hilferding. But many Keynesians, including Keynes himself, took a similar view, as have institutionalists like John Kenneth Galbraith. And even leading neoclassical economists of the stature of Paul Samuelson and Kenneth Arrow have believed market eradication to be a trend evident during most of the twentieth century, as we will document in section V below.
Of course, it has been clear since the 1970s that any such trend has been reversed, so the arguments made to explain it were flawed. But the arguments are nonetheless crucially important because of their pervasive influence in the history of economic thought. Neoliberalism must have been a shock for leading economists of all schools, whether pleasantly received or not.
III. BEFORE 1848: THE TRIUMPH OF THE MARKET
The first full-scale account of the role of the market in Marxian writings comes in the opening chapter of The German Ideology, supposedly devoted to a critique of Ludwig Feuerbach but actually ranging over the whole of human history. Here Marx and Engels describe the development of the world market as an essential pre-condition for the achievement of communism, first because it is necessary for the development of the productive forces and second because it leads to the creation of “the ‘propertyless’ mass” on a global scale, that is, the formation of a world proletariat. “Without this . . . communism could only exist as a local phenomenon” (Marx and Engels Reference Marx and Engels1845, p. 57). This point is repeated in the next section, where they argue that the causal sequence runs from the development of the productive forces to the growth of the proletariat, and then to revolution (p. 60). There is no suggestion in either of these passages of any trend of market eradication, let alone of the emergence of socialist relations within the capitalist mode of production itself.
Later in the chapter Marx and Engels emphasize the importance for England of the growth of the world market in the early modern period: “This demand, outgrowing the productive forces, was the motive power which, by producing large-scale industry—the application of elemental forces to industrial ends, machinery and the most extensive division of labour—called into existence the third period of private property since the Middle Ages” (this “third period” was the Industrial Revolution). The result was “universal competition,” which “forced all individuals to strain their energy to the utmost. It destroyed as far as possible ideology, religion, morality, etc., and, where it could not do this, made them into a palpable lie. It produced world history for the first time,” and created a world proletariat, the first truly global class (p. 81). “And finally, while the bourgeoisie of each nation still retained separate national interests, large-scale industry created a class which in all nations has the same interest and for which nationality is already dead” (p. 82).
The growth of the market is given an equally prominent place in the first section of the Communist Manifesto, where we learn that, after the discovery of America, “The feudal system of industry . . . now no longer sufficed for the growing wants of the new markets” (Marx and Engels Reference Marx, Engels, Marx and Engels1848, pp. 109-10). “Meantime the markets kept ever growing, the demand ever rising . . . the need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe” (Marx and Engels Reference Marx, Engels, Marx and Engels1848, pp. 110, 112). Marx and Engels celebrate the achievements of this world market, which “batters down all Chinese walls . . . [and] compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production . . . In one word [sic], it creates a world after its own image” (Marx and Engels Reference Marx, Engels, Marx and Engels1848, p. 112).
But, they argue, this powerful process is also a contradictory one. Recurrent economic crises demonstrate that bourgeois production relations have become a fetter on the productive forces. “And how does the bourgeoisie get over these crises? On the one hand by enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones. That is to say, by paving the way for more extensive and more destructive crises” (Marx and Engels Reference Marx, Engels, Marx and Engels1848, p. 114). But the bourgeoisie has created its own grave-diggers in the form of the proletariat, which is becoming increasingly homogeneous, and its conditions increasingly desperate, in an increasingly polarized society. In consequence:
the bourgeoisie is unfit any longer to be the ruling class in society, and to impose its conditions of existence upon society as an over-riding law. It is unfit to rule because it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his slavery, because it cannot help letting him sink into such a state, that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him
(Marx and Engels Reference Marx, Engels, Marx and Engels1848, p. 119).Three points should be stressed at this stage. The first is the brilliance of the Manifesto, both as literature and as social theory. Hobsbawm rightly sees Marx and Engels as visionary prophets of the globalization of our own epoch. The world they described “is recognizably the world in which we live 150 years later . . . what might in 1848 have struck an uncommitted reader as revolutionary rhetoric—or, at best, as plausible prediction—can now be read as a concise characterization of capitalism at the end of the twentieth century. Of what other document of the 1840s can this be said?” (Hobsbawm Reference Hobsbawm, Karl and Engels1998, pp. 16, 18). The second point is the speculative, sketchy, underdeveloped nature of their arguments. Allen Oakley describes the economics of the Manifesto as “impressionistic,” and comments that “Marx made . . . no attempt at this time to investigate the complex analysis that would be required rigorously to support his assertions” (Oakley Reference Oakley1984, p. 128). Hobsbawm refers to Marx as a “communist Ricardian” at the time of the writing of the Manifesto, rather than a “Marxian economist” (Hobsbawm Reference Hobsbawm, Karl and Engels1998, p. 13; “communist Smithian” would be a much better description). The theory of revolution set out there, Hobsbawm argues, was derived from philosophical speculation: “The aim of communism, adopted before Marx became “Marxist,” was derived not from the analysis of the nature and development of capitalism but from a philosophical—indeed, an eschatological—argument about human nature and destiny” (Hobsbawm Reference Hobsbawm, Karl and Engels1998, p. 22). The third point is that political revolution, not economic processes, eradicates market relations, which may remain vibrant up till then.
Those few passages in the early writings of Marx and Engels that do refer to the concentration and centralization of capital actually serve to reinforce these characteristics. In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, for example, Marx follows Adam Smith in identifying a fall in the rate of profit as the consequence of increased competition; “the first to suffer” from this “is the small capitalist” (Marx Reference Marx and Struik1844, p. 83). He continues:
If, however, the big capitalist wants to squeeze out the smaller capitalist, he has all the advantages over him which the capitalist has as a capitalist over the worker. The larger size of his capital compensates him for the smaller profits, and he can even bear temporary losses until the smaller capitalist is ruined and he finds himself freed from this competition. In this way, he accumulates the small capitalist's profits.
Furthermore, the big capitalist always buys cheaper than the small one, because he buys bigger quantities. He can therefore well afford to sell cheaper (pp. 84-85).
There is no suggestion here of economies of scale in production or of any role for technical progress in advantaging the big capitalist, or in reducing the importance of market relations in any other way. Marx again cites Smith on the effects of a fall in the rate of interest: “When, therefore, this large capital is opposed by small capitalists with small profits, as it is under the presupposed condition of intense competition, it crushes them completely” (Marx Reference Marx and Struik1844, p. 85).
In his Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy, written at almost the same time as Marx's Paris manuscripts, Engels does refer to monopoly as an innate tendency of the capitalist system:
The opposite of competition is monopoly. Monopoly was the war cry of the mercantilists; competition the battle cry of the liberal economists. It is easy to see that this antithesis is again quite hollow. Every competitor cannot but desire to have the monopoly, be he worker, capitalist or landowner. Each smaller group of competitors cannot but desire to have the monopoly for itself against all others. Competition is based on self-interest, and self-interest in turn breeds monopoly. In short, competition passes over into monopoly. On the other hand, monopoly cannot stem the tide of competition—indeed, it itself breeds competition; just as high tariffs, for instance, or a prohibition of imports positively breed the competition of smuggling
(Engels Reference Engels, Karl and Struik1844, p. 213).There is no suggestion here of any long-run trend towards the growth of monopoly and reduction in the sway of market relations, still less one based on the nature of technical change in capitalist industry. On the contrary, Engels here sees the incentive to restrict competition as a universal feature, applicable to all points in time and to the owners of labor power and land no less than of capital. Later he does seem to identify such a tendency:
Moreover, the stronger worker drives the weaker out of the market, just as larger capital drives out smaller capital, and larger landed property drives out smaller landed property . . . In crises of trade and agriculture, this centralization proceeds much more rapidly . . . The middle class must increasingly disappear until the world is divided into millionaires and paupers, into large landowners and poor farm labourers . . . Free competition, the key word of our present-day economists, is an impossibility (p. 223).
Even here, though, the drive to increased centralization applies to merchant capital and landed property no less than to industrial capital, and even (somewhat bizarrely) to labor power. There is more rhetoric in this passage than there is analysis. As Oakley notes, with reference to the Outlines as a whole, “the predominant influence of Adam Smith is noticeable here” (Oakley Reference Oakley1984, p. 33), and the overall impression obtained from Marx's and Engels's early writings is that Brenner is indeed correct in arguing that the role of the market is exaggerated, and the importance of the mode of production correspondingly underplayed, compared to later writings.
IV. AFTER 1848: THE MARKET IN DECLINE
After 1848 there were three subtle but cumulatively very important changes in Marx's thinking. The first involved his theory of revolution, and entailed a more considered articulation of the doctrine of historical materialism. It is most clearly expressed in the well-known “Preface” to the Critique of Political Economy, published in 1859:
No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society. Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present, or at least in the course of formation
(Marx Reference Marx1859, pp. 21).This brings to mind the equally celebrated description of capitalism maturing within the womb of the feudal order, but it is now asserted as a general principle, applicable to socialism no less than to capitalism.
Second, and very closely related to this first change, is Marx's new methodological insistence on the priority of production over exchange. As Maurice Dobb notes, Marx began (especially in the Paris manuscripts) with the concepts of supply and demand, competition and the market—in the German Ideology and the Communist Manifesto, the world market. His critique of these concepts, his reflections on the nature of a truly scientific political economy, and the increasing influence of Ricardo at the expense of Smith, all led him to privilege relations of production over relations of exchange (Dobb Reference Dobb and Karl1971, pp. 5-6). Again, this confirms Brenner's argument concerning the transformation of Marx's economic thought in the 1850s. It emerges very clearly from Marx's discussion of the world market in volume III of Capital, where he writes that it had “contributed materially toward destroying the feudal fetters on production,” but “only where the conditions for [the modern mode of production] had taken shape within the Middle Ages. Compare, for instance, Holland with Portugal.” The effects of the development of the world market in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were “accomplished conversely on the basis of the already existing capitalist mode of production . . . it is not commerce in this case which revolutionises industry, but industry which constantly revolutionises commerce” (pp. 332-33).
This, of course, is related to the third critical change: his analysis was now based on painstaking research into the origins of English capitalism, its contemporary characteristics, dynamic tendencies, and the political economy literature that it had inspired. Between 1857, when he began an intensive program of research in economics, and 1867, when the first volume of Capital was published, Marx learned a very great deal about the capitalist mode of production. His research led him to uncover five reasons to expect the decline of the market as a result of capitalist development itself. And while this market eradication is never identified with the achievement of socialism, it is seen as its precondition. The five reasons are more or less clearly set out and more or less logically developed in his mature economic writings and they are, to a greater or lesser extent, interrelated. For convenience we shall deal with them separately in the remainder of this section.
Economies of Scale and the Centralization of Industrial Capital
Marx distinguished what he termed “modern industry” from “manufacture.” His terminology here is rather unusual. By “manufacture” he refers to the early stages of industrial production, in which craft skills are used, in conjunction with hand tools, in small workshops. “Modern industry,” by contrast, denotes large-scale production in factories, using machinery and steam power (Sweezy Reference Sweezy and Eagly1968). From his reading of Charles Babbage, he discovered the advantages that were enjoyed in modern industry by “the collective labourer” over the individual workman (Marx Reference Marx1867, p. 349; cf. Babbage Reference Babbage1832, pp. 172-73). Later in volume I of Capital, in the chapter on “The general law of capitalist accumulation,” Marx identifies a strong tendency for technical progress to increase the amount of constant capital used in production, relative to variable capital. (The “general law” is the tendency thus created for unemployment to rise, as the supply of labor power outstrips the demand for it.) This reinforces the competitive advantage of large capitalists, and gives rise to “concentration of capitals already formed, destruction of their individual independence, expropriation of capitalist by capitalist, transformation of many small into few large capitals” (Marx Reference Marx1867, pp. 625-26).
Note that Marx's terminology is once more highly distinctive. By “concentration” of capital he normally means an increase in the size of the individual unit of capital, while by “centralization” he denotes what is today referred to as industrial concentration. The trend to centralization implied that a growing proportion of economic activity would be taken out of the market and internalized to the firm. As early as 1848 Marx and Engels were describing nationalization as the ultimate limit of centralization, predicting that the proletariat would soon use its political supremacy to “centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the State,” and making an immediate demand for the “centralisation of credit in the hands of the State” (Marx and Engels Reference Marx, Engels, Marx and Engels1848, p. 126). Twenty-four years later, in a newspaper article on the nationalization of the land, Marx repeated the point in a very clear statement that the development of capitalism is itself eradicating market relations and preparing the way for socialist relations of production, which Marx expects to be created in the not-too-distant future (Marx Reference Marx, Karl and Engels1872, p. 290).
Within capitalism, however, “[t]he battle of competition is fought by cheapening of commodities. The cheapness of commodities depends, caeteris paribus, on the productiveness of labour, and this again on the scale of production. Therefore, the larger capitals beat the smaller” (Marx Reference Marx1867, p. 626). And Marx has much more to say about economies of scale in volume III of Capital, especially in the opening chapters devoted to the theory of the falling rate of profit. In chapter V, where he discusses “economy in the employment of constant capital,” he gives a number of examples. The cost of motors does not rise in proportion to their horsepower. The cost of transmission equipment does not increase at the same rate as the number of laborers who work on it. The frame of a machine does not increase in cost as rapidly as the number of tools that it operates. There are savings in the cost of workshop and warehouse buildings as their size increases, and the same applies to expenditure on fuel and lighting. Finally, there are economies of scale in the recycling of waste products (Marx Reference Marx1894, pp. 79-80).
As the ratio of constant capital to variable capital increases, Marx believes that the rate of profit tends to fall, and this reinforces the tendency towards the centralization of capital. Accumulation increases the organic composition of capital, Marx writes. But “[o]n the other hand, a fall in the rate of profit again hastens the concentration of capital and its centralisation through expropriation of minor capitalists, the few direct producers who still have anything left to be expropriated” (Marx Reference Marx1894, p. 241). Indeed, this process “would soon bring about the collapse of capitalist production if it were not for counter-acting tendencies, which have a continuous decentralising effect alongside the centripetal one” (p. 246).
Money, Credit, and Joint-Stock Companies
In the chapter in volume I of Capital on “the general law of capitalist accumulation,” Marx introduces “an altogether new force . . . the credit system,” which he describes as “a new and terrible weapon . . . an enormous social mechanism for the centralisation of capitals.” In consequence, “the force of attraction, drawing together individual capitals, and the tendency to centralisation are stronger than ever before.” Unlike concentration, centralization is not limited by the overall rate of capital accumulation. Indeed, “[i]n a given society the limit would be reached only when the entire social capital was united in the hands of either a single capitalist or a single capitalist company” (Marx Reference Marx1867, pp. 626-27).
In volume II of Capital, writing about “disturbances in the circuit of money-capital,” Marx points to price fluctuations in the course of the business cycle as an additional factor increasing the centralization of capital (Marx Reference Marx1885, p. 110). Later in volume II Marx suggests (in passing) that the credit system might also increase the concentration of capital (p. 239), and in volume III of Capital he returns to the question of its role in promoting centralization. Credit gives “absolute control within certain limits over the capital and property of others . . . Success and failure both lead here to a centralisation of capital, and thus to expropriation on the most enormous scale.” In fact, “the development of the credit system” amounts to “the implicit latent abolition of capitalist property,” albeit “in a contradictory form” (Marx Reference Marx1894, pp. 439-40).
Marx returns to this theme later in volume III: “This social character of capital is first promoted and wholly realised through the full development of the credit and banking system . . . [which] does away with the private character of capital and thus contains, in itself, but only in itself, the abolition of capital itself.” The relevance of this argument to his historical materialist theory of social transformation now becomes clear: “Finally, there is no doubt that the credit system will serve as a powerful lever during the transition from the capitalist mode of production to the mode of production of associated labour; but only as one element in connection with other great organic revolution of the mode of production itself” (Marx Reference Marx1894, p. 607).
The growth of credit, Marx maintains, is closely related to the rise of the joint-stock company. He cites Andrew Ure on the separation of ownership and control, which means that salaried managers, not capitalists, are now “the soul of our industrial system” (p. 386). The work of supervision is now “entirely divorced from the ownership of capital.” The success of cooperatively owned factories has demonstrated that “the capitalist has become no less redundant as a functionary in production as he himself, looking down from his high perch, finds the big landowner redundant,” while “Stock companies in general—developed with the credit system—have an increasing tendency to separate this work of management as a function from the ownership of capital, be it self-owned or borrowed….the capitalist disappears as superfluous from the production process” (pp. 387-88).
Marx regards these phenomena as fundamentally important, since “the stock company is a transition toward the conversion of all functions in the reproduction process which still remain linked with capitalist property, into mere functions of associated producers, into social functions” (p. 437). Like cooperative factories, joint-stock companies “should be considered as transitional forms from the capitalist mode of production to the associated one, with the only distinction that the antagonism is resolved negatively in the one and positively in the other” (p. 440). Oakley notes that Marx had already stated this striking principle in 1858, when he wrote to Engels setting out his plan for “Book I, Capital”: “Share capital as the most completed [vollendetste] form (passing over into communism) at the same time with all of its contradictions” (Marx to Engels March 29, 1858; cited by Oakley Reference Oakley1983, p. 67).
Engels returned to this theme in 1891 in his critique of the draft program of the German Social Democratic Party (which was eventually known as the Erfurt Programme). Objecting to the phrase, “The want of plan rooted in the nature of capitalist private production,” he asked:
What is capitalist private production? Production by separate entrepreneurs, which is increasingly becoming an exception. Capitalist production by joint-stock companies is no longer private production but production on behalf of many associated people. And when we pass on from joint-stock companies to trusts, which dominate and monopolise whole branches of industry, this puts an end not only to private production but also to planlessness. If the word “private” were deleted the sentence could pass
(Marx and Engels Reference Marx and Friedrich1973c, pp. 431-32).Along with market eradication, then, Engels clearly expected that the internal organization of the firm and cooperative relations between firms to become more encompassing, and both phenomena were seen as preceding the transformation into socialism.
Cartels and Trusts
Cartels were discussed only briefly by Marx. This was in volume III of Capital, to which Engels added extensive editorial notes. Marx refers to the cartels established by cotton manufacturers to stabilize or reduce the price of raw cotton, which survived only for a short period: “And it must be admitted that such control [over the price of raw materials] is on the whole irreconcilable with the laws of capitalist production, and remains for ever a pious wish, or is limited to exceptional cooperation in times of great stress and confusion” (Marx Reference Marx1894, p. 120). This was written in 1865. Engels comments, twenty-nine years later, that there has since been an increase in tariffs and in trusts. But he expects the latter to collapse in “the first storm . . . and prove that, although production assuredly needs regulation, it is certainly not the capitalist class which is fitted for this task. Meanwhile, the trusts have no other mission but to see to it that the little fish are swallowed by the big fish still more rapidly than before” (Marx Reference Marx1894, p. 120n). In a later editorial insertion, he observes that the instability of cartels has “led, in some branches, where the scale of production permitted, to the concentration of the entire production of that branch of industry in one big joint-stock company under single management.” He cites as an example the United Alkali Trust. “Thus, in this branch, which forms the basis of the whole chemical industry, competition has been replaced by monopoly in England, and the road has been paved, most gratifyingly, for future expropriation by the whole of society, the nation” (Marx Reference Marx1894, p. 438).
Engels had already written on these questions in 1880, in Socialism Scientific and Utopian, where he referred to a “rebellion of the productive forces, as they grow more and more powerful, against their quality as capital,” in which “The mode of production rises in rebellion against the form of exchange. The bourgeoisie are convicted of incapacity further to manage their own social productive forces” (Marx and Engels Reference Marx and Friedrich1973c, pp. 143, 151). Economic crises encourage the development of trusts, in which “The whole of the particular industry is turned into one gigantic joint-stock-company; internal competition gives place to the internal monopoly of this one company.” Again he cites the alkali industry as an example, in which the planlessness of competitive capitalism has been replaced by “a definite plan of the invading socialistic society,” and the exploitation of monopoly power has become so bare-faced that “it must break down.” “In any case,” Engels continues, “with trusts or without, the official representative of capitalist society—the state—will ultimately have to undertake the direction of production” (Marx and Engels Reference Marx and Friedrich1973c, p. 144). Increasingly, the development of “joint-stock companies, trusts and state property shows how unnecessary the bourgeoisie are” for the management of production. Having driven out the independent producers, in fact, capitalism is now driving out the capitalists and beginning the planning of production. But, Engels warns, “the transformation, either into joint-stock companies or trusts, or into state ownership, does not do away with the capitalistic nature of the productive forces.” In the case of joint-stock companies and trusts this is obvious, but even the modern state is “essentially a capitalist machine” (Marx and Engels Reference Marx and Friedrich1973c, p. 145).
The Factory Acts
Capitalist machine or not, the British state had already intervened decisively in the market for that most important of commodities, human labor power. The introduction of the Factory Acts, Marx and Engels argued, represented a crucial curtailment of the power of capital. Marx deals with this question at some length in volume I of Capital, especially in section 5 of chapter X on “the struggle for a normal working day.” Although he does not use the term, Marx here reveals an understanding that the establishment of a maximum working day is equivalent to the production of a public good, the physical well-being and ability to reproduce itself of the workforce. This public good is threatened by unrestricted competition because, “in its blind unrestrainable passion, its were-wolf hunger for surplus-labour, capital oversteps not only the moral, but even the merely physical maximum bounds of the working-day” (Marx Reference Marx1867, pp. 264-65). That there are no benefits to the individual capitalist from limiting the working day is recognized. “Capital cares nothing for the length of life of labour-power. All that concerns it is simply and solely the maximum of labour-power, that can be rendered fluent in a working-day. It attains this end by shortening the extent of the labourer's life, as a greedy farmer snatches increased produce from the soil by robbing it of its fertility.” Capitalism:
produces thus, with the extension of the working-day, not only the deterioration of human labour-power by robbing it of its normal, moral and physical, conditions of development and function. It produces also the premature exhaustion and death of this labour-power itself. It extends the labourer's time of production during a given period by shortening his actual life-time
(Marx Reference Marx1867, p. 265).“Après-moi le deluge! is the watchword of every capitalist and of every capitalist nation. Hence Capital is reckless of the health or length of life of the labourer, unless under compulsion from society” (Marx Reference Marx1867, p. 270). Though entirely rational for the individual capitalist, this is suicidal folly from the standpoint of the class as a whole. Marx draws a contrast here with slavery, where labourers, like horses, are private property, so that the slave-owner does have a material interest in humane treatment. “It would seem therefore that the interest of capital itself points in the direction of a normal working-day” (Marx Reference Marx1867, p. 266).
Functional as it was for the system as a whole, the achievement of a normal working day was possible only after a prolonged struggle, and possessed a substantial symbolic and ideological significance. “The creation of a normal working-day is, therefore, the product of a protracted civil war, more or less dissembled, between the capitalist class and the working-class.” It had begun in England, whose workers “were the champions, not only of the English, but of the modern working-class generally, as their theorists were the first to throw down the gauntlet to the theory of capital” (Marx Reference Marx1867, p. 299). (He cites Robert Owen in a footnote.) As Marx said at the inaugural meeting of the International Working Men's Association in 1864, the Ten Hours’ Bill was “not only a great practical success; it was the victory of a principle; it was the first time that in broad daylight the political economy of the middle class succumbed to the political economy of the working class” (Marx and Engels Reference Marx and Friedrich1973b, p. 16).
Once it had been achieved, the normal working day served to strengthen those forces that were already increasing the centralization of capital and thus market eradication and bureaucratization. As Engels put it in 1892, in a preface to a new edition of his Condition of the Working Class in England, manufacturing industry had been “apparently moralized” in the 1840s. “Thus the truck-system was suppressed, the Ten Hours’ Bill was enacted, and a number of other secondary reforms introduced—much against the spirit of Free Trade and unbridled competition, but quite as much in favour of the giant capitalist in his competition with his less favoured brother” (Marx and Engels Reference Marx and Friedrich1973c, p. 441). Capitalist acceptance of trade unions, and other concessions, are “nothing else but means to accelerate the concentration of capital in the hands of the few . . . and to crush all the quicker and all the safer the smaller competitors, who could not make both ends meet without such perquisites” as had previously been provided by a totally unregulated labour market (Marx and Engels Reference Marx and Friedrich1973c, p. 442).
Marx, too, writes in volume I of Capital of “[t]he necessity for a generalisation of the Factory Acts” from cotton spinning and weaving to capitalist industry in its entirety, due to the way in which all branches of industry “become, in a, comparatively speaking, wonderfully short time, dens of misery in which capitalistic exploitation obtains free play for the wildest excesses.” This generates a “cry of the capitalists for equality in the conditions of competition, i.e., for equal restrain[t] on all exploitation of labour” (Marx Reference Marx1867, p. 490). The “general extension” of the Factory Acts “hastens on the general conversion of numerous isolated small industries into a few combined industries carried on upon a large scale; it therefore accelerates the concentration of capital and the exclusive predominance of the factory system” (p. 503).
The Increasing Role of Science in Production
The fifth and final factor tending to reduce the importance of market relations was the increasing role of science in capitalist production, which was seen to be expanding the public sphere at the expense of the private. In the Grundrisse manuscripts of 1857 there is a long discussion of “the labour process and alienation in machinery and science,” in the course of which Marx writes that:
The tendency of capitalism is thus to give a scientific character to production, reducing direct labour to a simple element in this process. As with the transformation of value into capital, we see when we examine the development of capital more closely that on the one hand it presupposes a definite historical development of the productive forces (science being included among these forces) and on the other hand accelerates and compels this development (1857, pp. 157-58).
Or, as he put it six years later in Wages, Price and Profit, science has become the principal source of rising productivity and the most important means “by which the social or cooperative character of labour is developed” (Marx and Engels Reference Marx and Friedrich1973b, p. 52). As a consequence, direct individual labour is becoming less and less important:
It is reduced quantitatively to a smaller proportion, just as qualitatively it is reduced to an indispensable but subordinate role as compared with scientific labour in general, the technological application of the natural sciences, and the general productive forces arising from the social organisation of production. This force appears to be a natural gift of community labour, although it is a historical product. In this way capital works for its own dissolution as the dominant form of production
(Marx Reference Marx and McLellan1857, pp. 158; emphasis added).The significance of science in this context is brought out very clearly by Hal Draper, who emphasizes Marx's comment that scientific knowledge “costs it [capital] nothing”; in modern terminology, it is non-excludable and also non-rival, and is thus a public good. In volume III of Capital, Draper reminds us, as in the Grundrisse, Marx distinguishes “general labour” from “collective labour.” The latter is under the direct control of an individual unit of capital, and produces marketable commodities. The former refers to “all scientific labour, all discovery and all invention,” and is the common property of humanity as a whole (Marx Reference Marx1894, p. 104). This is described in the Grundrisse as “the labour of the community—of its historical development, which does not proceed from the labour of individuals or the exchange of their labours” (cited by Draper Reference Draper1978, pp. 496-98). Since it costs nothing, capitalists tend to undervalue it (Marx 1963, p. 343). As this general or universal labor becomes more and more important, commodity production and market exchange become correspondingly less so.
Writing in the 1850s, Marx cannot reasonably be expected to have anticipated the emergence of intellectual property rights, which by the late twentieth century had become the most rapidly-growing form of capitalist property in the most advanced capitalist countries (above all in the United States). He simply followed the great majority of writers in his day and assumed that knowledge was for the most part inherently non-appropriable, so that property rights in it could not, in principle, be defined. Hence, he concluded, science and technology were not and would not become the subjects of market transactions. It followed that this increasingly important part of the productive forces lay outside the market.
V. AFTER MARX
We do not wish to overstate our case. Especially as far as Marx is concerned, this analysis of the decline of the market is based on fragmented reasoning and observations rather than fully-developed arguments. This is hardly surprising, since with the exception of the Factory Acts they were hardly very developed in practice in 1867, when Marx's creative work in economics largely ceased. Engels, who lived until 1895 and was intellectually active and involved in political economy until the end, took things a little further. But it was only after his death that the claims of Marx and Engels were developed much more systematically by Bernstein and the revisionists, by Hilferding and by Bukharin. The transformation of the German economy in the course of the First World War seemed to confirm their prognoses. As Hilferding wrote:
In place of the victory of socialism, there appears possible a society organised, indeed, but hierarchically and not democratically organised, at the apex of which stand the combined forces of the capitalist monopolies and the state, under whom the working masses are engaged in a hierarchy as agents of production. Instead of the triumph of socialism over capitalist society we would have an organised capitalism, better adapted than hitherto to meeting the immediate material needs of the masses
(1915, p. 22; cf. Howard and King Reference Howard, King and Samuels2003).In similar vein Bukharin argues that the major capitalist powers have become “organized” entities, in which market forces play no significant economic role and the law of value has ceased to operate. The growth of monopoly has culminated in the establishment of “state capitalist trusts,” and the national economies of the combatants are moving towards a form of state capitalism. The anarchy of capitalist production has been transferred to the level of inter-state relations; economic crises now manifest themselves in imperialist wars (Bukharin Reference Bukharin1915). In the 1920s Hilferding took a more benign view of “organised capitalism,” in effect becoming a revisionist, while Bukharin was for a while the leading economic theoretician of the Third International, his ideas influencing Eugen Varga's later use of the term “state war-monopoly capitalism” (Varga 1935). There were of course big differences in political outlook between Hilferding and Bukharin, but they were in substantial agreement about the underlying processes, if not on their implications for socialist policy.
All this was taken much further by later Marxists, in particular by the Frankfurt School in the late 1930s and early 1940s, and by the Regulation School in the 1970s. In 1932 Friedrich Pollock stressed the increasing economic role of the state, which was leading to a planned and relatively stable form of regulated capitalism in which economic, political, and cultural freedom would all decline. By 1941 he was predicting the emergence of a new state capitalism, in which the market would have no function of any significance and economic laws would have disappeared (Pollock Reference Pollock1932, Reference Pollock, Amato and Gebhardt1941). Pollock's erstwhile Frankfurt School colleague, Herbert Marcuse, subsequently defended a very similar position (Marcuse Reference Marcuse1958). And as late as 1979 the founder of the Regulation School, Michel Aglietta, was predicting that “[t]he coming massive socialisation of the conditions of life will destroy free enterprise as the pillar of liberal ideology” (Aglietta Reference Aglietta1979, p. 385).
Many prominent non-Marxists agreed, and sometimes under the direct influence of Marxists. The most notable economist for which this is true is Joseph Schumpeter, who had personal contacts with many Austro-Marxists, including Hilferding, whom he first encountered at Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk's graduate seminar at the University of Vienna in 1905-1906. The decline of the market under “trustified capitalism” is a major theme in Schumpeter's mature work (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter1928, Reference Schumpeter1942; cf. Bottomore Reference Bottomore1992). Similar ideas are evident in the work of John Maynard Keynes, from his famous essay, “The End of Laissez-Faire” (Keynes Reference Keynes1926) down to the General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, where he argues that “the duty of ordering the current volume of investment cannot safely be left in private hands” (Keynes Reference Keynes1936, p. 320).
American institutionalists made a similar case (Berle and Means Reference Berle and C. Means1932, Galbraith Reference Galbraith1978). Even neoclassical economists were not immune from expressing analogous arguments, with Paul Samuelson supporting the trend toward “deliberate, purposive, intelligent social action” substituting for “the invisible hand” (Samuelson Reference Samuelson and Stiglitz1966d, p. 1442; also see Samuelson Reference Samuelson and Stiglitz1966a, Reference Samuelson and Stiglitzb, Reference Samuelson and Stiglitzc) and Kenneth Arrow pointing to the importance of incomplete markets, which means that “other coordinating and communicating mechanisms are needed for efficiency. These come close to defining the socialist economy, although admittedly wide variations in the meaning of that expression are possible” (Arrow Reference Arrow1978, p. 478; see also Arrow Reference Arrow and Abramovitz1959, Reference Arrow1974, Reference Arrow1976, Reference Arrow1986). Both Samuelson and Arrow are likely to have been influenced by Schumpeter, but, clearly, there was much within the neoclassical tradition, both Marshallian and Walrasian, which illuminated market eradication, and allowed it to be welcomed.
VI. CONCLUSION
The significance of Marx's ideas on market eradication is therefore clear. But later developments in the line of thought he initiated show that there were arguments that Marx could have made to buttress his case but which he actually did not make. Most obviously, crises of effective demand were never regarded by Marx as engendering corrective policies on the part of the state, either in regulating or in eliminating market relations, and he seems to have had no inkling that demand management might be possible. In this regard, then, Marx made no anticipation of Keynesian economics, which proved so influential on the market eradication views of economists in the second half of the twentieth century, and had an impact on some Marxists.
Marx also takes an uncomplicated view of “market” and “non-market” relations. As is exemplified by his treatment of the Factory Acts, state regulation is seen to be at the expense of the market, rather than as changing the form of the market and possibly actually supportive of market relations in contexts where there are more sophisticated productive forces. In other words, Marx did not realize that state and market can interact in many different ways, and that the expansion of one does not always entail the contraction of the other. In this respect, he makes no anticipation of the New Institutional Economics, or even of later Marxists’ more nuanced understanding of the relationship between the public authority and capitalist relations of production. This lacuna is especially puzzling given that the functionalist strands in his theory of the state could have easily led him in this direction (Wetherly Reference Wetherly2005).
Moreover, Marx and the Marxists, along with those non-Marxian economists who believed market eradication to be an important secular trend, were ultimately proved wrong. Neoliberalism has been a powerful force operating since at least the 1970s and, for the greater part, any tendencies to market elimination or containment have been sharply reversed. This has involved much more than “globalization.” Within all advanced capitalist economies there have been pronounced changes in direction toward privatization, deregulation (more accurately described as market-promoting re-regulation), commercialization of nonprofit organizations and government agencies, along with the vertical disintegration of corporations and increased competition. There has also been surprisingly little opposition. Neoliberalism has become the new consensus politics in the advanced capitalist countries and the so-called “transition economies,” if not yet in the less prosperous peripheral areas (especially Latin America).
All five factors pointed to by Marx turned out differently than he expected, as did the additional considerations elucidated by economists after his death. Economies of scale proved less overwhelming, and the impetus to centralization much less compelling, than they supposed. The emergence of a market for corporate control has subjected managers to the discipline of financial markets in a form that Marx and Engels never imagined. Cartels were controlled, and trusts broken up, by a combination of government regulation, cross-entry by rivals from other industries and, increasingly, global competitive forces. In the labor market the laws of supply and demand did appear, for a time, to have been repealed by state intervention and trade union power, but this proved to be a temporary aberration. Bureaucratization of firms and the professionalization of management has certainly occurred, but it has also been increasingly coupled with the use of the price mechanism inside corporations to govern resource allocation internally. Keynesian demand management during the Golden Age (1945-73) proved to be successful without the socialization of investment and was also a major force behind the simultaneous growth in market and state activities. Science is more important as a productive force than ever before, but it too has been turned into a commodity in the form of intellectual property, so that knowledge too is subject to market forces (Warsh Reference Warsh2006). Similarly, negative externalities and the problems of asymmetric information have been curbed through regulation, sometimes in a way that extends the pricing mechanism. No doubt, in all these cases, the results are imperfect but the deficiencies themselves are now recognized to be less amenable to solution than once believed to be possible because state activism encounters its own set of difficulties.
There are many lessons to be learned from examining the “market eradication” strand in the history of economic thought. Perhaps the most important is that institutional prediction over the long run appears to be almost as insecure as accurate quantitative forecasting in the short run. In both cases there are disruptive forces at work which resist anticipation even by the most sensitive and intelligent economists. That is a sobering, even depressing, thought.
