It is a historiographical commonplace to portray France during the so-called Trente Glorieuses of economic expansion after the Liberation, especially during the last of those three decades ending in the 1973 oil crisis, as engaged heart and soul in a project of full-throttle modernisation. The Fifth Republic under Charles De Gaulle and Georges Pompidou rolled up its sleeves and set to work tackling the country's multifarious examples of historical backwardness. France ceased to be a nation of peasants, small-minded small business owners and bolshie workers, and instead dreamed of becoming one of confident technocrats, technicians and world-beating industrialists. Only after the end of the Trente Glorieuses, it is often assumed, did that dream of technologically based progress give way to greater scepticism, pessimism and environmental concern, for modernisation swept all before it until its assumptions were rudely challenged by the end of growth in October 1973 - or at least until they were by the political crisis of May 1968.Footnote 1 While more critical perspectives on post-war modernisation are evident in recent historiography, notably on issues around planning in general and housing and the grands ensembles in particular,Footnote 2 transport policy and the set of social experiences which it sought to shape have been relatively more marginal to our understanding. This review article seeks to explore how issues around transport, and their broader implications about the very nature of modern growth-oriented capitalist society, are leading the debate onto new terrain. The underlying purpose of several of the books under review is to cast doubt on the accepted narrative of the Trente Glorieuses. They do so, however, in two defiantly opposite directions: some defending the distinctly pro-car orientation of the post-war elites and others offering a more radical critique of this perspective.
Transport is an obvious prism through which such contours of the Trente Glorieuses might be defined. Whereas the old France preferred to avoid venturing far from home if it could possibly be avoided, and when it did travel it did so by bicycle or train, the new France accelerated to top speed along recently constructed autoroutes and built the world's first commercial supersonic aircraft. Narratives of this process often highlight a claim made by Pompidou: ‘We must adapt Paris . . . to the needs of the car’,Footnote 3 explained the President, as he ripped the heart out of the capital to make way for ugly skyscrapers and the expressway along the right bank of the Seine that bears his name, but which in the twenty-first century a more enlightened administration would turn into a pedestrianised beach each summer. Yet one current direction on the historiographical road map seeks to lead us towards a rehabilitation of the urban policy choices made by Pompidou. Such is the broad aim of Mathieu Flonneau, France's leading historian of car culture, and his colleagues in Georges Pompidou's Parisian Grand Design (Le Grand dessein parisien de Georges Pompidou). We should bear in mind here that many of Flonneau's previous works have been combatively pro-car in their attempts to rebut what Flonneau perceives as a pro-public transport, anti-car bias among French intellectuals.Footnote 4 The present volume is no exception. Despite protestations that the aim is to restore ambiguity to our understanding of Pompidou's relationship to Paris in a non-polemical manner, there is little doubt that Le Grand dessein has a strongly revisionist agenda, as when Flonneau claims there has been a ‘veritable witch-hunt' (153) against Pompidou. Part academic edited volume, part lavishly produced coffee-table book, its cosponsors, the Association Georges Pompidou (chaired by Jacques Chirac and Edouard Balladur) and the Archives Nationales, have spared no expense with sumptuous photographic illustrations. Flonneau's claim is that the Pompidou government has become a ‘scapegoat’ (159), its ultra-pro-car reputation greatly exaggerated by anachronistic latter-day ‘politically correct’ opinion (161). For Flonneau, the spread of cars was not the product of car lobbyists and authoritarian technocrats masterminded by Pompidou but simply a democratic response to the ‘popular will' (159) to travel by car. Rather than ‘all car’ (tout automobile), it was a case of ‘all drivers’ (tous automobilistes) (159). This is good knockabout stuff: indeed in a recent article, Flonneau has colourfully described Paris-Plage's undoing of Pompidou's legacy as ‘A City for Woody Allen’.Footnote 5 It would be tempting therefore to dismiss Flonneau as fighting a rearguard action in defence of a mode of transport whose dominance is increasingly in question, and a period of urban governance whose errors have been rumbled.
However, those of us who take a different view of mobility – in historical study as in daily life – must engage seriously with Flonneau's findings if their weak points are to receive more incisive criticism. Flonneau has surrounded himself with what amounts to a whole new French school of what used to be called transport history but whose adepts now prefer the modish label ‘history of mobilities’. In common with transport historians in the Anglophone world, a decisive and welcome shift is by now well underway, moving from narrowly technical issues towards broader social, cultural and political questions around the use of transport in society. Indeed it is somewhat ironic that in his latest polemic Flonneau should accuse Paris city planning of having been ‘literally subjugated’Footnote 6 by influences from, of all people, that well-known determining force among Parisian lobby groups, Lancaster University's Centre for Mobility Studies. For there is actually common ground in the kinds of questions asked within the ‘new mobilities paradigm’,Footnote 7 whether they be pro- or anti-car, historian or sociologist, Francophone or Anglophone.
Some such authors, notably Flonneau's associate Arnaud Passalacqua, author of one chapter in Le Grand dessein, have made real contributions by applying similar research questions to other modes of transport – in Passalacqua's case, the humble bus, too often neglected in historiography as in real life.Footnote 8 Democracy's Transport (Les transports de la démocratie), the latest volume of papers given at Flonneau and Passalacqua's Parisian seminar on mobility, attempts to explore the paradoxical relationship between mobility and democracy. Not atypically for a volume of this kind, the subject matter is very diverse (from ancien régime France to interwar Czechoslovakia), and the end result is a pick and mix affair. Perhaps the closest thematic focus linking at least some contributions is geographical: Sébastien Gardon, Maxime Huré, Arnaud Passalacqua and Etienne Faugier all focus on Lyon, and Huré and Passalacqua's study of the monopolistic local role of the J-C Decaux company is especially noteworthy. While Decaux run the municipal bicycle hire scheme that made the idea internationally visible in the mid-2000s, they were also responsible for the privatisation of public space through their earlier pioneering role in providing advertisements on bus shelters that were aimed largely at car drivers, making them the ‘Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde of urban mobility’ (69). To be fair, there is plenty in this volume that challenges complacency about hypermobility: as Yves Crozet demonstrates, gains in speed have not gained us time because they have tended to be swallowed up by going further.
In Le Grand dessein, however, Flonneau and Passalacqua's central revisionist claim is that the Pompidolian state was not simply a pro-car juggernaut – responsible, according to polemicists such as the historian Louis Chevalier, for the ‘Assassination of Paris’.Footnote 9 Such revisionism is not totally unfounded in that, as Flonneau points out, the government had a public transport strategy alongside its road one. Indeed, Flonneau suggests that Pompidou's speech on how to ‘adapt the city to the car’ was misrepresented in Le Monde: posterity has forgotten Pompidou's added caveat that drivers be disciplined, and the speech was given at the inauguration ceremony for the first sections of the RER rapid transport system. But there is no necessary contradiction between being pro-car and in favour of certain prestigious public transport projects. The RER was sharply criticised at the time as a metro for capitalists, since the first section to open simply ferried businessmen from Paris's sixteenth arrondissement to the business district of La Défense at a time of severe underinvestment in the routes actually used by most commuters.Footnote 10 At one point Passalacqua's argument seems to rest with the Porsche-driving president's close associations with the heads of the RATP and SNCF, which roughly amounts to saying ‘he's not anti-public transport: some of his best friends are the bosses of public transport authorities’. Similarly, Flonneau plays up the multi-modal credentials of Maurice Doublet, prefect of the Paris region, stressing the way he forced RATP and SNCF to work together at a time when they were both planning separate schemes at the Gare de Lyon without coordinating with each other. Here Flonneau is overly dependent on Doublet's own self-justificatory memoirs and an interview with him held in the Archives Nationales.
Le Grand dessein thus ultimately shows the view from above, both in a metaphorical sense and in the literal sense of the aerial photography that, as Jeanne Haffner has argued, characterised the spatial politics of the period.Footnote 11 Where actual people intrude into the photos, it tends to be Pompidou, trying out slick new ticket barriers, in the drivers’ compartment of an RER train, climbing out of helicopters, swooping down escalators or gazing down on scale models of new towns. They scarcely reflect lived realities like those of commuters on the overcrowded lines from urban overspill estates in places like Aubergenville into the ultra-packed Gare St Lazare, pressed into slow, smelly, ancient rolling stock, whose lighting worked only intermittently.Footnote 12 The trouble with replicating the view from within is that its critics tend to become marginalised. For example, Aurélien Delpirou uses the example of the Front de Seine development in western Paris – now seen as an ugly, cold building – showing that when it was planned few people objected at the public enquiry. While Delpirou has a point in trying to depersonalise responsibility from Pompidou (this was one of the few urban projects of the period in which he played no personal role) enquiries are a problematic source since this kind of consultation is often designed so as to encourage the answer desired by the authorities.
Nevertheless, Passalacqua and Flonneau are surely right to identify this as a crucial period in the origins of France's more successful subsequent urban transport policies. As Passalacqua notes, Valéry Giscard D'Estaing received credit for the RER because its crucial central section did not open until 1977; however, its planning had begun under Pompidou. Today leftist transport campaigners praise dedicated bus-only corridors when they are brought in by socialist administrations, as in Venezuela, for example. Yet the Pompidou government was ahead of its time in introducing them to Paris in the early 1970s, building on progress already made in pioneering bus lanes by, of all people, Maurice Papon, better known to posterity for deporting Jews to Auschwitz and throwing Algerians into the Seine. What Flonneau and Passalacqua seem to neglect is the input of ordinary public transport users themselves, who arguably played a decisive role in transforming government policy through the 1970–71 mass protest movement against fare increases – and the lack of a central section on the RER. Whereas Passalacqua cites the Nora report of 1967 as evidence of the government's pro-public transport credentials, the metro price hikes resulting from this report were precisely what sparked the protest movement. Though receiving a token mention here in the form of an extract from the bestselling 1970 pamphlet Le Livre noir des transports parisiens, the protests are literally boxed off from the main thrust of the argument, and even dismissed in one footnote as ‘irrational’ (117, n. 2).
A closer examination of Le Livre noir would have revealed that is no anachronism to criticise car dominance, for already present in the 1970 movement was a sharp critique of the capture of transport policy by the oil lobby. To lay too much stress on the beneficent origins of later improvements itself runs the risk of establishing a kind of anachronism, for at the time too many people were experiencing not progress but gridlock. Much of the evidence given in Le Grand dessein for a more pro-public transport approach by Pompidou postdates 1970, suggesting that policy was inflected by the protests. That government policy was clearly more favourable to public transport by the time of Pierre Billecocq's 1973 report for the government (cited in Passalacqua's contribution) is surely no coincidence. Rather than being a smoothly conceived grand design of the sort that Flonneau portrays, the improvements to France's transport infrastructure that began taking shape in this period resulted from a rather messy interaction between state authorities and passengers themselves.Footnote 13
Happily, in an edited volume of fifteen authors not everyone will toe the party line. There is some useful material on the control of Paris regional policy by organs of the central state: as Phillippe Nivet notes, Pompidou was opposed to Paris having an elected mayor for fear it might elect a communist. But the contribution that most stands out is Vincent Guigueno's chapter on the Aérotrain, an ultra-high speed monorail train resting on an air cushion bed that was touted as a serious solution to transport problems by many French decision-makers between 1965 and 1974. Having a keener sense than some contributors of the social tensions and consequent political conflicts generated by the desire of modernising elites – what we might call Fifth Republic Man – for hyper-mobility, Guigueno is able to explain why the Aérotrain was envisaged, first to link Orly and Roissy airports, then to join the new town of Cergy with La Défense, only to be abandoned entirely in 1974. Guigueno points to the close links between state officials and Aérotrain's manufacturer Jean Bertin, as well as to national rivalry, since the US Department of Transportation was also very interested in Aérotrain. Yet he also invites us to enter the realms of psychology. Drawing on Lucien Sfez's Critique de la décision, Guigueno depicts the Aérotrain as a ‘fetish’ (143): its aura captured decision makers, and its test sites, where tens of thousands of people went on rides, became ‘theme parks for politicians and technocrats’ (143). Yet once it became clear that an Aérotrain from Cergy to La Défense would simply be a matter of turning a twenty-five minute journey into a ten minute journey at ticket prices so high that only wealthy businessmen could afford them, the argument that had torpedoed the airport link – as an excessive subsidy to the rich – rebounded against the Cergy alternative. The Aérotrain would have entrenched the two-tier transport system still further, segregating the high-speed businessman of La Défense from his beleaguered employees – the new-town office proletariat. Following the deaths of both Pompidou and Bertin the scene was thus set for Giscard to pull the plug on what had become a locally unpopular scheme. Indeed, something of the absurd folly of the Aérotrain is conveyed in the 1969 photo of Jérôme Monod – head of DATAR, the French state's decentralisation agency for technocrats – sporting a crash helmet, about to be driven on a test run at the astonishing speed of 422 kilometres per hour, considerably faster than a modern-day TGV, on a system envisaged for much shorter distances. When we consider that at this time the public transport system of most urban areas in France relied largely on buses whose average rush-hour speeds, snarled in traffic jams, were struggling to make it into double figures,Footnote 14 the gap between fantasy and reality, between elite vision and mass daily experience of transport, is laid bare.
Whereas Flonneau implicitly accepts the premises of post-war modernisation theory, another historiographical signpost points in quite the opposite direction. Timothée Duverger is a prolific young historian based in Bordeaux: born in 1985, he published three books before the age of twenty-eight. While Flonneau's vision of mobility history resembles the view from behind the wheel of a car on Paris’ périphérique, Duverger's version is very much one made in Aquitaine: the view from a Bordeaux tram. It seems no coincidence that south-western France, a region to which many, from genteel English retirees to José Bové, come precisely in order to slow down, should produce a historiography critical of hyper-mobility. In spite of its subtitle, Relational Modernity: An Alternative History of France from 1968 to the Present (La modernité relationnelle: une autre histoire de la France de 1968 à nos jours) is not a general history of France since 1968 but rather an intriguing interpretive essay.
For Duverger the decline in social conflict during France's post-war boom was due not just to a social-democratic compromise between capital and labour but also to an energetic transformation from coal to oil. The car is identified as the ‘supreme fetish of consumer society’ (20) during this period. But May 1968 then opened up a breach in this oil-based ‘organised modernity’ (21), leading in two contrasting directions that for Duverger jointly characterise the ‘relational modernity’ in which we now live: the ‘hypomodern’ and the ‘hypermodern’ (29–30). The ‘hypomodern’ route, drawing on the critique of both state and market by student and social movements, led after 1968 to self-management (autogestion) and, more recently, to a resurgence of comparably anti-consumerist, anti-productivist utopias of emancipation and deceleration, from alter-globalisation to Transition Towns. By contrast, the ‘hypermodern’ route, drawing on the presentism of 1968, has led to an acceleration of neoliberal modernity and its incessant demands that we all be constantly adaptable. Duverger emphasises that, far from being an exception to neoliberalism, France's Fifth Republic actively pursued it. This is a stimulating line of argument and helps put the Nora report into a longer term ideological context.Footnote 15
While Duverger's broad-brush synthesis is put together quite convincingly, it is not completely original. The book's contentions rely heavily, for example, on the arguments of Timothy Mitchell's Carbon Democracy, as well as on those of French thinkers such as Edgar Morin, Eve Chiapello and Luc Boltanski. It is also significant that chunks of this slim volume devote considerable attention to relatively small alter-globalisation initiatives of which the author approves. This reflects the fact that well as being a historian Duverger is also an activist, someone in the quite unusual position of being both a member of the governing Socialist Party (Parti socialiste; PS) and a supporter of décroissance (‘degrowth’), a current so radical in its rejection of the economic status quo that it routinely attacks even France's official Green Party (Europe Ecologie Les Verts), let alone the PS, as having sold out to the beasts of power and growth. But lest anyone dismiss décroissance as a fringe phenomenon, the eponymous magazine has a circulation of over 45,000. Indeed, I have spotted the magazine La Décroissance – complete with Charlie Hebdo-style cartoons mercilessly mocking the gods of cars, computers, technology and progress – on sale at train stations the length and breadth of France, and even as far away as the Greek island of Poros. At the end of La modernité relationnelle Duverger advocates the ‘revolutionary reform’ (129) of a basic income to provide a sanctuary for non-market activities of real value, allow the commons to flourish and free individuals from wage slavery. Duverger looks forward, he tells us, to a harmonious future society built on love. Here he comes across a little like a nineteenth-century French utopian socialist (or indeed a fin-de-siècle anarchist), even citing Charles Fourier. Only time will tell if he is right, but such arguments have an importance well beyond France.
La modernité relationnelle is therefore best read in conjunction with the same author's longer Degrowth: An Idea for Tomorrow (La Décroissance, une idée pour demain) – the best guide yet available to the outsider interested in understanding the genealogy of this phenomenon. Duverger is strong on analysing internal tensions within the French décroissance movement. Drawing on terminology from Fabrice Filipo as well as from Chiapello and Boltanski, he distinguishes a ‘culturalist’ current (17) as the heir to 1968’s ‘artistic’ critique of capitalism; a ‘democratic’ current as in a continuation of more ‘social’ critiques of capitalism; a ‘deep ecology’ current and also a ‘bio-economic’ current, which emphasises how the depletion of natural resources makes décroissance inevitable whether we like it or not. Whereas older activists like Serge Latouche have sometimes brought with them from the 1960s and 1970s a critique of universalism and the western way of life, and have more or less given up on representative democracy, younger leaders, notably the former communist Paul Ariès, seek to reconcile décroissance with the humanist values of the Republic, and so clearly demarcate it from reactionary ideas.
One perhaps unexpected theme that emerges from reading La Décroissance, une idée pour demain is the role of both science and religion in the intellectual origins of such movements. Duverger emphasises the role of a 1979 book by Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, a Romanian-born economist who invented the concept of ‘bioeconomics’ (46). Georgescu-Roegen based his critique of neoclassical economics on the Second Law of Thermodynamics and its concept of entropy. Just as the total quantity of energy within a system can only decline over time, so it is impossible for economic growth to continue indefinitely without running up against the natural limits of the biosphere. Yet Duverger also allows a walk-on part for the first appearance of the term in French in a 1973 article by André Amar (49), a French-Jewish historian of ideas influenced by Heidegger and Foucault. Amar suggested that the modern economy of growth was contrary to traditional western religious-based ethics, Greek, Jewish and Christian alike: the sacred had been weakened by individualism, rational thought and techno-science. Prior to Amar, a key role was played by the Bordeaux-based thinkers Jacques Ellul, a major critic of what he termed le système technicien, and Bernard Charbonneau, author of one early condemnation of car cultureFootnote 16 (and father of Simon Charbonneau, a key activist in contemporary décroissance, whom Duverger interviewed in that slowest of slow towns, Bergerac). In the 1930s Ellul and Charbonneau were strongly influenced by the Christian personalism of Emmanuel Mounier and his journal Esprit. Yet as Protestants who worried much about individual liberty in the face of capitalist, fascist and communist states alike, they rejected Mounier's Catholicism, as well as his Paris-centrism. Throw in the well-known international role of the defrocked Catholic priest Ivan Illich,Footnote 17 whose jeremiads against techno-dominance sometimes used the Greek concepts of hubris and nemesis, and we have a book that may be of as much interest to theologians as social historians. Indeed, Serge Latouche has suggested the alternative term acroissance, intended to convey a sense of becoming atheist in relation to the religious cult of the economy, growth, progress and development.Footnote 18
Duverger, however, is weaker when it come to factual details in the Anglophone world: he locates Totnes, the Devon town where Transition Towns began, in Ireland; spells the Beatles with two ‘tt's and claims that Edward Goldsmith, founder of The Ecologist, was Jimmy Goldsmith's father, when in fact he was his brother. And Duverger's chronology seems too neatly schematised. For him, the first ‘cycle’ of décroissance was ultimately a false start (73), rapidly snuffed out by the 1973 oil crisis – the very event that should have confirmed the veracity of its analysis. Indeed, the unemployment which ensued made the French long for a return to growth. Only after 11 September 2001 and the Argentine crisis of December 2001 did neoliberalism and its accompanying ‘end of history’ narrative enter a period of crisis, allowing the modern décroissance movement to be launched at a conference in 2002. For Duverger, whereas the first cycle of décroissance consisted of only a few prescient voices in the wilderness (the André Gorzes of this world), its second cycle is a burgeoning social movement. It simply awaits its proper political representation after a few teething problems such as failures to find a presidential election candidate and the Front de Gauche's reluctance to adopt full-blown décroissance in its platform. This conclusion may be the result of choices made in the scope of Duverger's research. While for the 1970s he researched mainly the works of key thinkers, for the 2000s he has a more in-depth understanding of the twists and turns of the movements associated with décroissance, suggesting that there is further research to be done on movements in the earlier period.
That is why we need to turn to Céline Pessis, Sezin Topçu and Christophe Bonneuil's edited volume, whose title also claims to offer ‘another history’, but this time of the trente glorieuses themselves. This superbly well-targeted historical sideswipe at everything that was inglorious about the trente glorieuses should be required reading for all historians of post-war France. While there are some points of overlap with Duverger – there is a good chapter here by Christian Roy on Charbonnier and Ellul – this is ultimately the more convincing as historical analysis as opposed to information and exposition. In their introduction Pessis, Topçu and Bonneuil are careful to state that their aim is not to replace productivist history with an ‘ecologically correct’ history (19) but rather to introduce a healthy degree of historical scepticism to our understanding of the trente glorieuses. In this they are successful, from the statistics pouring cold water on the notion that everything was growing as France ‘modernised’. Rather, some things grew while others shrank: the number of rail passenger journeys outside the Paris region, for example, declined from 311 to 211 million. Nor was ‘modernisation’ without its very real victims. This is a history that is attentive to the scars on the bodies of workers in France and to the 250,000 people killed in car crashes between 1945 and 1973. Pessis and Gabrielle Hecht both emphasise the exploitation exerted beyond the Hexagon by France's modernisation, especially in francophone Africa: legal action is still going on today in relation to the radioactive dust breathed in by uranium miners in Gabon and Niger who allowed France to shift to nuclear power.
Moreover, the volume neatly avoids the accusation of anachronism used by Flonneau to dismiss latter-day critics of redevelopment by uncovering a hidden history of resistance to ‘modernisation’ during the trente glorieuses themselves. Thus, whereas in Le Grand dessein Delpirou claims that denunciations of Pompidou's grand projets constitute ‘incantations and projections of later ideologies’, for Pessis, Topçu and Bonneuil, the 1950s and 1960s were full of mini-critics of the dominant narratives of modernity simply awaiting rescue by the historian. And while for Duverger ‘Décroissance was born during the 1970s’ (La Décroissance, une idée pour demain, 21), for Pessis et al. not everything is due to 1968: people were objecting to growth well before. Among intellectuals, critics of the dark side of progress, from Hannah Arendt to Gabriel Marcel, had not gone away. Even Jacques Tati can be seen as an influential critic of modernity.Footnote 19 Loïc Vadelorge's chapter on new towns is particularly enlightening, showing how among the wider public new town schemes from Marne-la-Vallée to Cergy-Pontoise (of Aérotrain fame) were already meeting with popular resistance circa 1967. Vadelorge's call for a move away from a ‘heroic’ story of urban improvement – we need less about plans, more about concrete realities – is well put, and, one might add, apposite to Le Grand dessein (Vadelorge is the only author to contribute to both books). As Vadelorge suggests, there was no simple binary between 1960s blind consumerism and 1970s eco-awareness. Other chapters find early critics of progress in some unlikely places, including the Communist Party: Jean Ferrat was already singing about pollution a year before Silent Spring was translated into French.
Indeed, the second half of Une autre histoire des <<Trente glorieuses>> is entitled ‘Resistances to “progress” and the art of marginalising them’. This deftly explodes the myth that ‘modernisation’ exercised a magic grip over the entirety of French society or was consented to by everyone except a few professional malcontents. The supposed absence or marginality of critics of progress is revealed here as a political and historiographical construct. Contrary arguments were dismissed as either immature, ignorant and dangerous, or as conservative and nostalgic – until the stage when denial was no longer possible and the argument shifted to ‘we are dealing with the problem ourselves, so there is no need for your alarmism’. Topçu reveals a neglected lineage of anti-nuclear protest long before the 1970s movements studied by Alain Touraine.Footnote 20 Meanwhile Renaud Bécot finds that trade unions were not as uncritically productivist as is often assumed: the spread of car ownership was actually criticised at the CGT's 1963 congress by Benoît Frâchon. Nevertheless, it would be hard to deny that there was some conservatism among critics of consumerism, and these ambiguities are interestingly teased out, such as when Patrick Marcolini notes the Situationists’ fondness for old Parisian architecture, knightly chivalric codes and primitive communism – making what are usually seen as the ultimate 1968 revolutionaries sound more like Phillip Blond-esque ‘Red Tories’.
So while the field is certainly a promising one there are few signs of a consensus emerging. Our understanding of transport, and indeed of growth more widely during the Trente glorieuses, is bound to some extent to be shaped by the views we take of globalisation and hypermobility in the present. The task now for historians who take a more sceptical view of the teleology of material progress is to apply the kinds of questions that Pessis, Topçu and Bonneuil ask about post-war French society in general to empirical examples from the field of transport and mobility. Who were the early critics of car dominance? Were they simply a small coterie of intellectuals? Or did they link to broader social movements? If so how? Who defended the rights of pedestrians and local public transport users (and not just at times of crisis like 1970)? How did they critique the policy direction of the Gaullist and post-Gaullist state? Given the encroaching political realities of a France that was increasingly becoming a republic of drivers, at what point did critical voices begin to have any success? For example, more detailed research could be carried on the successful anti-Aérotrain campaign. Whether or not another world is possible, another history usually is.
