Ali Mirsepassi is a sociologist at New York University and an author of several books on contemporary Iranian political culture. He is also a “public intellectual” who consciously links scholarship to matters of public interest. Similar to Mirsepassi's previous works, therefore, Democracy in Modern Iran is both a scholarly study and a political intervention.
According to its preface, the book makes two central arguments. It seeks to situate Iran's post-2009 presidential election protests in proper “historical background” and to understand them through ”concrete social analysis rather than timeless speculative abstractions anchored in the ‘universal’ philosophical assumptions of Eurocentric modernity” (pp. ix–x). The first task is dealt with in a cursory manner; history and historical analysis are not the subjects of a single chapter but addressed only in passing. Nor does the book offer much “concrete social analysis” of class, gender, demographic change, employment, or educational institutions, for example. The only section dealing with sociology is Chapter 8, which mostly discusses and comments on a Persian textbook entitled The Sociology of Iranian Sociology (Taqi Azadarmaki, Jamiʿahshinasi jamiʿahshinasi dar Iran, Tehran, 1999).
Judging by the most frequently referenced terms in its index, Democracy in Modern Iran is primarily about “democracy,” “enlightenment,” “intellectuals,” “modernity,” and “secularism.” Democracy of course stands out in the book's title and, as the author insists, is a central notion in current political and academic debates about Iran. This book, then, is a sociologist's running commentary on political philosophy. Moreover, from start to finish, Mirsepassi remains preoccupied with a specific political/philosophical thesis: “this work analyzes in detail the developments in modern Iranian thought which have created the tendency to imagine democracy and modernity philosophically in terms of total cultural transformation or epistemic rupture, and argues against this tendency” (p. 2). In fairness, Democracy in Modern Iran goes much further than merely juxtaposing democracy and philosophy; it offers abundant information and analytical insight concerning contemporary Iran's intellectual scene. But the book's overall coherence and the clarity of its main arguments are marred by several problems, including those of organization and structure. More than a third of the text (Chapters 4, 6, and 7) consists of material originally written and published in Persian about a decade prior to its publication here in English. These chapters, as well as Chapter 5, mainly present the ideas of a selected number of Iranian intellectuals, both secular and Islamic, and hence could be of value to those who do not read Persian. Mirsepassi does a commendable job of presenting sympathetic yet critical overviews of thinkers such as Abdolkarim Sorush and others who are less known outside of Iran. But these chapters fit uneasily with the first half of the book (Chapters 1–3), which outlines debates in Euro-American political philosophy on secularism, modernity, and democracy.
Chapter 1, “The Origins of Secularism in Europe,” is the book's strongest and most theoretically challenging in terms of engagement with relevant scholarship in intellectual history. Tracing the arguments of the British and American (liberal) Enlightenment, Mirsepassi defines secularism as tolerance of a diversity of beliefs, including religious faith, as opposed to an ideological commitment to the absolute supremacy of rational and/or scientific knowledge. In this sense, secularism is the intellectual/cultural prerequisite to democracy, defined rather similarly as a political system allowing a plurality of choices in how to govern society. The basic argument of the chapter is that democratic politics have the best chance of realization if aligned with the pragmatist epistemology of John Dewey, seen as a further extension of the Anglo-American liberal tradition. Particularly appealing to Mirsepassi in terms of Iran is Dewey's belief in “the potentially positive role of religion in the construction of democratic modernity” (p. 54). In other words, Mirsepassi maintains that secularism in Iran need not exclude religion from the construction of a democratic and pluralistic polity. Yet this generally sound proposition becomes problematic throughout the rest of the book, as in Chapters 3, 4, and especially 7, where Mirsepassi turns it into an endorsement of postmodern philosopher Richard Rorty's claim that in building democracy “philosophy should be consigned to the private sphere” (p. 23). The problem here is that Mirsepassi uncritically follows Rorty's conflating of two different meanings of “philosophy.” In its first and “traditional” sense, philosophy often meant absolutist knowledge systems (Plato, Hegel), rightly criticized for their association with authoritarian politics. But in its second and more modern meaning, philosophy (including pragmatism) refers to the rules that make rational, critical, and consensus-based human knowledge possible. The latter definition of philosophy makes it indispensible to pluralistic and democratic politics. Mirsepassi ironically affirms this by devoting the bulk of Democracy in Modern Iran to discussions of political philosophy, which he claims is not relevant to democracy.
Democracy in Modern Iran does raise very important questions that need to be addressed more extensively in discussions of religion and politics in Iran and other Muslim countries, as well as in more global contexts. In terms of the question of the role of religion in democratic politics, for example, Mirsepassi should have made a more clear distinction between two opposing views. First, faith-based politics are antithetical to pluralism and hence cannot serve as the framework for any type of democratic polity. In this sense, democracy can only be secular, that is, independent of and irreducible to any particular faith, culture, or creed (Islam, Marxism, or market economics). Second, interpretations of religion that accept the basic premise of secularism, namely, intellectual and political parity in the public sphere of contending belief systems, are indeed helpful and even necessary for transition to pluralistic and democratic politics. Mirsepassi makes the previous distinction when noting, for example, how anthropologist Talal Asad's rejection of “Eurocentric” secularism leads to Islamist authenticity politics, whereas Mohammad Arkoun's advocacy of Muslim intellectuals’ open-ended engagement with modernity can serve as a constructive model for Islam's encounter with secularism and democracy (pp. 55–61, 152–55).
Mirsepassi focuses almost exclusively on ideological obstacles, that is, Iranian intellectuals’ alleged absolutist worldviews, as hindering transition to democratic politics. But this assumption is countered by ample evidence (found, for example, in Iran's constantly repressed periodical press) suggesting that most of the country's intellectual elite, both secular and Muslim, excluding those tied to the regime's dominant factions, already gravitate to liberal or neoliberal ideologies. If that is the case, the real obstacles to pluralism and democracy in Iran appear to be political rather than intellectual. In other words, one faces the rather formidable task of determining how to confront in practice a regime whose ultimate excuse for violently restricting political participation is Iran's need to resist foreign impositions, that is, the imperious intolerance of the world's self-proclaimed champion of pluralism, secularism, and democracy.
Democracy in Modern Iran ultimately makes a contribution to ongoing debates on the role of Islam in possible transitions to more tolerant and democratic political cultures in Iran and other Muslim countries. This contribution, however, would have been more effective had the book been better organized and its main arguments more carefully articulated and engaged with relevant scholarly literature.
