Melissa Schwartzberg’s monograph is a major achievement and an important addition to the literature on democratic theory. Particularly noteworthy is her method, a blend of historical reconstruction and social choice theorizing. The historical section of the book, in which she outlines the long history of supermajority rule and its relationship to previous forms of voting, stretching back to the ancient world, is especially enlightening. The scholarship in this section of the book (Part I) is broad, meticulous, and quite brilliant, and it bodes well for the future of the discipline to find a scholar who can range from Athens to Rome to the election of medieval popes to Condorcet and Ferejohn.
There are, however, several difficulties with the prescriptive portion of the work (Part II). Schwartzberg’s central argument here boils down to the relatively simple proposition that a requirement of a supermajority does not provide any of its supposed benefits, and is also fundamentally flawed from a normative perspective. In her defense of this general proposition, she makes some questionable assumptions and is open to challenge on several grounds.
Perhaps most problematic from the outset is her normative argument that every citizen’s vote represents a “judgment” about “their own interests” deserving “equal respect,” and that these are “central commitments of democracy.” To prevent a majority of these rational citizens from having their way “is to treat such citizens disrespectfully” (p. 7, 184). Based on these assumptions, every vote is “of equal merit” and therefore “the default voting rule within democracies should be majority rule” (p. 7). To her credit, Schwartzberg does not present an absolute argument for simple majority rule, but her intent is clearly to argue that in the vast majority of situations, majorities should rule.
We need only turn to the most basic document of American history, The Federalist, or to recent history, to raise questions about these assumptions. Most fundamentally, a vote may be based on self-interest yet conflict with the public good, as Madison tells us:
Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens… that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. Footnote 1
Alternatively, we can turn to Ronald Dworkin, who argues that citizens often have both “personal” and “external” preferences (homosexuality is immoral and dangerous versus this is who I am, deal with it), and that external preferences have questionable validity. Footnote 2
One does not have to fully agree with Dworkin or go so far as to endorse Madison’s concept of “virtuous citizens” to accept the idea that a public good exists and that it may conflict with majority preferences at any given time. By endorsing a simplistic notion of citizen opinion, Schwartzberg glosses over the fact that American constitutionalism, and constitutionalism in general, is based on the assumption that citizens possess both short-run preferences and long-run interests, that the two may conflict, and that institutions must be designed to protect both.
As the American founders knew, human nature means that short-run preferences—what Schwartzberg calls “judgment”—are not always to be taken as benign or worthy. Such preferences may be strongly influenced by self-interest run amok (in 1787, perhaps “to hell with Massachusetts shipbuilders”; today, “let’s reduce income taxes to 5 per cent”) or by prejudice (in 1787, perhaps “non-Christians should not be full citizens”; today, “closely monitor all Muslims and restrict the movement of men of color”). These examples are caricatures, but they make the point: Majority decision-making may damage other paramount values.
Schwartzberg concedes as much, at least in the abstract. She concedes that “majority rule may usher in injustice or exacerbate distributive inequalities” (p. 8) and that “the best argument for supermajority rule as an alternative to majority rule is that in some . . . circumstances, the bias it introduces may in fact have moral or epistemic warrant” (p. 9).
These are large concessions.
The problem here is in part that it is impossible to theorize about voting mechanisms without at the same time theorizing about sovereignty. Again, to go back to our most basic document: In The Federalist, the people will be sovereign when they ratify the Constitution, including a near permanent commitment to certain rights and procedures and, in some circumstances, a commitment to require supermajorities to make changes—what Stephen Holmes calls pre-commitment. Footnote 3 Thus supermajority voting rules may originate in, and gain their legitimacy from, a profoundly democratic decision, a decision by the majority to restrict its own future power because of the fundamental values at stake.
Should government institutions be designed out of fear of horrible outcomes or should they prevent the frustration of majority will? Should we minimize the chances of disaster, out of fear, or trust that the “judgment” of our fellow citizens will avoid profound injustices and mistakes?
Whether we should fear simple majority rule will depend on context, and context will determine whether supermajority rules work or don’t work as intended. How large or small, homogenous or diverse, is the population in question? What minorities exist and what prejudice exists against them? How permanent is minority status? What are the lines of cleavage, and how deep go they go? How large is the territory?
In place of supermajority rule, Schwartzberg advocates instead what she calls complex majoritarianism, which relies upon deliberative assemblies and time delays (ch. 6). But the literature criticizing deliberative democracy is by now vast, Footnote 4 and Schwartzberg’s endorsement of it does not resolve any of the most basic criticisms that can be and have been offered.
Schwartzberg believes that procedures can be “designed to elicit high-quality judgments” from citizens, “that is, judgments worth aggregating.” Majoritarian institutions “must be designed with the aim of improving the quality of individual judgments … . It is critical to reduce the risk of whimsical or passionate decision-making.” Citizens must “receive adequate and balanced information well in advance of votes” (p. 185). This is the language of utopian perfectionism, a fantasy that politics can be made pure, that passion and prejudice, demagoguery and the misuse of power, can be removed from the body politic if only we try hard enough.
Judith Shklar argued, often, that politics is always about the weak and the strong. Footnote 5 There is very little reason to believe that time delays and deliberation will make the strong generous or the weak any less so. Has the debate over abortion become any less shrill or more informed in 40 years of “deliberation” since Roe v. Wade? Have politicians on both sides proven any less likely to use the issue for crass partisan purposes? Has the debate about creationism or attempts to make American a “Christian nation” ever fully receded from American life? Have the politics of race become any less fraught? Can we not say that the politics of race and the attempt by religiously-inspired zealots to enshrine their moral judgments in legislation—not to mention greed and economic exploitation—are permanent features of American politics?
In a large, diverse, riven territory, constitutionalism puts its money on fear, and the wisdom of the majority’s founding decision to restrict its own future power. This is the ultimate paradox of constitutional democracy, and it is based on a set of profound observations, including fundamental observations about human nature. Again to quote The Federalist, “as long as the connection subsists between [man’s] reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other.” Footnote 6 Politics will always contain a strong dose of passion, and no deliberative institutions will erase that fundamental fact.
The need for rights derived from a democratically-adopted sovereign document and an endless argument about the content of those rights, settled often (but not always) by nine unelected, fallible judges, as well as other un- or non-democratic processes, is a paradox many believe we should endorse, not challenge, though Schwartzberg’s challenge may well be the most profound to have emerged from modern democratic theory. And that is a profound achievement.
