Matthew Avery Sutton's new monograph American Apocalypse traces the development of modern American evangelicalism from its origins in the late nineteenth century to the present day. Central to this story is the question of how conservative (or “radical”) evangelicals went from the margins of American society to, during the height of the movement in the 1980s, a mainstream force with enough political clout to influence the outcome of presidential elections. Sutton's book demonstrates that radical evangelicals’ premillennial eschatology was the driving force behind their efforts to change the world. At the turn of the twentieth century, amidst the growing influence of liberal Protestant theology and secularism, an increasing number of radical evangelicals began to preach that the “end times” – the literal apocalypse followed by the return of Christ to reign over the world for a thousand years – was imminent. But rather than simply wait for this inevitability to manifest, these evangelicals believed it was their duty to ensure that humanity was ready for the end of the world. This notion eventually became “the inspiration for aggressive action,” a call to convert as many souls as possible and to embark on a “moral crusade on contemporary culture” (117). American Apocalypse is the first scholarly history of modern American evangelicalism to be published in a generation. The book offers several fresh interpretations which as a whole take our knowledge of modern American evangelicalism beyond the parameters set by the last wave of research on the topic.

Earlier studies have overlooked the role of World War I in shaping modern American evangelicalism, but Sutton argues that it was in fact a pivotal experience for the movement. Conservatives had long been at loggerheads with their liberal coreligionists over theology and eschatology, but during the Great War these conflicts intensified, spilling over into disagreements about the United States’ place in the world. The two poles of the movement could not agree on how their nation should be responding to the escalating situation in Europe. Whereas liberals saw military intervention as a necessary means to achieving eventual world peace, radicals interpreted the emergence of the first ever global war as undeniable evidence that their apocalypticist prophesies were being fulfilled. With the fate of the world already sealed, most premillennialists advocated pacifism, arguing it was their duty as Christians to convert as many souls as possible in preparation for Jesus’ return. The isolationist tendencies of premillennialism made conservative evangelicals susceptible to accusations – often made by liberals themselves –of disloyalty towards America. Nonetheless, the “seeming fulfilment of prophesy” of the Great War “bolstered radical evangelicals’ confidence,” and sold the movement's premillennial eschatology to an American public struggling to come to terms with the cataclysm of a global war (91).

Premillennialism emerged from World War I in a strong position, and at the beginning of the 1920s the movement was more determined than ever to win their battle with liberal theology. But the apparent vindication of their prophesies, as well as the continued threat of secular discourses such as higher criticism and evolutionism, encouraged radical evangelicals to broaden their agenda beyond eschatology. From now on radical evangelicals would be involved in a battle over the “fundamentals” of the Christian faith, which they took to mean, amongst other things, the inerrancy of Scripture, the reality of miracles and the literal rebirth of Christ. Radical evangelicalism had evolved into a movement that was determined to apply its militant positions to earthly events. Sutton argues that once radical evangelicalism had developed into its new format of fundamentalism, “it was never simply about theology or spirituality. It was always a perspective and an attitude towards this world” (113). This included returning to the issues of citizenship and patriotism. By the late 1930s, fundamentalists had learnt from the lesson of World War I. Whereas radical evangelicals’ “lack of patriotism” during the Great War had “limited their social and political power,” during World War II the fundamentalist movement succeeded in fusing their brand of religious conservatism to American nationalism (266). Premillennialism gained yet more followers at the dawning of the Cold War, as apocalyptic prophesies seemed to edge closer to being fulfilled during the age of the A-bomb.

Sutton's convincing reinterpretations of modern evangelicalism demonstrate the necessity of this new history of the movement. One of the greatest contributions of American Apocalypse is to reveal the striking oversights of the last generation of historiography. The most important of these is the ways World War I helped transform radical evangelicalism from a culturally and religiously marginal group into an organized, mainstream and hugely influential political force. The underappreciated importance of the Great War helps explain – but does not entirely excuse – the heavy bias of American Apocalypse towards the first half of the twentieth century. Sutton devotes just one of his eleven chapters to the last forty years of the twentieth century, failing, for example, to capture the complexity of evangelicalism during the decade of civil rights, second-wave feminism and the Vietnam War. On the other hand, Sutton's pre-1960s slant does allow him to focus in considerable detail on other unexamined features of the movement, such as female and African American evangelicals, whose voices existed despite being stifled by the patriarchal and often racist culture of American premillennialism. Thanks to the way Sutton reinterprets the origins of one of the United States’ most politically and culturally influential religious groups, American Apocalypse is an important and timely contribution to the field of modern American evangelicalism.