No CrossRef data available.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 March 2004
This slim and eminently readable volume of essays provides an impressive coverage and update on recent research on the causes and course of the Great Depression of the 1930s. It builds on the substantial and authoritative scholarship already deployed by Barry Eichengreen and Peter Temin on the subject. It exhibits depth as well as breadth and offers a panorama of the “chain reactions” set in motion by the initial and concomitant deflationary shock in both core and periphery economies. Despite being obviously aimed at the professional economist or economics-literate historian with a taste for monetary and financial questions, the approach is very reader friendly so as not to discourage the nonspecialists (including this reviewer).
Although the editor has clearly given free rein to the contributors to recount the unfolding of the slump in their area of expertise, what is affectionately labeled by the editor the “ET (or Eichengreen-Temin) thesis” on the primacy of the deflationary transmission of the gold standard provides the fil rouge of the quest for the underlying causes of the slump which carried the West and the rest of the world into an unprecedented cataclysm. In an opening chapter Balderston offers a clear and welcome exposition of the “propagation mechanism” fostered by international monetary arrangements in setting off the worldwide depression. He complements it with a chronological recounting of policy decisions and new estimates on the distribution of gold money stocks before and in the course of the slump. In chapter 2, Pierre Siklos analyses the behavior of the Canadian economy during this period in relation to that of the United States. The immediate geographical proximity makes Canada a prime example for testing the transmission through interest rates and capital flows mechanism of the depression. After investigating the monetary and financial integration of the two economies prior to the shock, he scrutinizes the business cycle(s) and price movements to identify the primum mobile for the Canadian slump. In spite of institutional differences (no central bank until 1935) and the Canadian dollar's peg on the pound, the two economies exhibit a strikingly similar behavior with regard to the slump's timetable and subsequent recovery. Begging to differ on the centrality of monetary forces' thesis, the author concludes that the identification of one single central cause should not detract from the investigation of additional determinants that triggered “such a cataclysmic event.” The next major player in the international gold standard system was of course France whose central bank, along with the Fed, powerfully contributed to deflation by increasing its gold assets at the turn of the 1930s. Pierre Villa (chapter 3) concentrates first on explaining why France entered the depression as late as it did. Using a portfolio model he subsequently shows that the same policy that helped stabilize the franc and foster gold inflows also accounts for France being spared the full blow of the depression until 1931. He reasserts the primacy of deflationary policies, and hence of policy-makers' ideology and representations, in triggering the slump. The unintentional combination of restrictive monetary and neutral fiscal policy proved “effective in fighting inflation and boosting growth” but reduced growth prospects in the long run. Villa emphasizes the lack of coordination between central bankers as a key element but exonerates French authorities for the retention of excessive gold reserves during the crucial monetary crunch.
Whereas ET stress that gold accumulation by creditor countries was the obvious sign of a profound credibility crisis, Kitson, reviewing the British case (chapter 4) tends to adopt an “absolutist” view according to which the rigidity of any fixed-exchange-rate regime would have brought about a worldwide recession “sooner or later.” With regard to the swift exit from gold by British authorities in September 1931, Kitson calls into question the strength of the “chain reaction” of monetary deflation to transmit the depression and adds the qualification that the effectiveness of the propagatory mechanism depended on the financial crisis being the “endogenous consequence of prior monetary contraction.” Altough the devaluation of the pound contributed mightily to the domestic economic revival of 1932–1937, the British economy was not large enough for its “apostasy” to carry with it the world economy. Ritschl (chapter 5) pushes the case further and contends that the ET explanatory model minimizes the impact of “reparations politics” on capital flows to Germany and that reparations constituted the principal obstacle to the reconstitution of inter–central bank cooperation. In this view, of the “double whammy” taken by the German economy in 1931 (banking crisis in June, Brüning decrees in December), it was clearly the first shock which set the depression in motion: thus, the gold standard turned a foreign borrowing crisis spurred by the Young plan (1929) into a contraction of domestic money (and later of output). But the adoption of a floating rate regime would not have averted the consequent balance of payment crisis.
Both Balachandran's chapter on India (chapter 6) and Singleton's on New Zealand (chapter 7) offer fascinating insights in the unfolding of the depression in two periphery primary producing countries. The British government forced monetary cooperation on its empire and dominions; this translated into engineering a gold outflow from India to bolster British reserves which increased four-fold in 1932–1938. As the editor emphasizes, the collapse of the gold standard made the world more dependent on gold as a reserve asset, not less. But as elsewhere, the accompanying deflationary policies for defending the rupee's peg to the pound resulted in lowering living standards, especially among India's rural classes. In New Zealand by contrast, the “double-dip” deflation of 1930–1933 allowed a redistribution of income to farmers from their urban creditors and purveyors. Perhaps an additional chapter on one of those South American countries that defected from the gold standard early (Argentina or Brazil) would have illustrated more dramatically the damage endured by primary producing countries at the onset of the slump.
Thus the emergence of an excess global demand for gold seems critical to the effectiveness of the propagation mechanism. The “run for gold” was consequential upon U.S. and French “excess” accumulation soon emulated by a host of core countries but supported by a general distrust in the ultimate sustainability of the system. Even the Soviet Union seems not to have been immune from this fatal bent. Gregory and Sailors offer an in-depth examination of the Soviet economy's fundamentals in the interwar (chapter 8). Thanks to the former's unrivaled expertise on Russian and Soviet national accounts, the authors show that GDP, which doubled within a decade, did indeed outpace capitalist countries' performance. Growth was home-grown, maintained as it was by buoyant investment financed by taxation of the urban sector. Insulated from Western economies, the Soviet economy embraced autarky, a set of policies that amounted in fact to pushing the mercantilist precepts adopted in the West to their limits.
As a conclusion, Eichengreen and Temin present a particularly concise and illuminating “afterword” in which they reformulate their scenario for the international transmission of the depression and examine three complementary counterfactuals, which strengthen their case. In their view the responsibility for pulling the world into a deep and lasting depression lies firmly with the operation of a gold standard in which the adjustment procedure was deflation rather than devaluation. They do not deny that the initial downturns could have had “independent roots” but the choice of deflation and the inability of governments, made more dependent on their electorate since World War I, to implement it fully, explains the ensuing tightening of credit, profit squeeze, and eventual contraction of business activity as well as the rapid erosion of investors' confidence. What made deflationary policy such a lethal weapon under the circumstances was the “hegemony” of the gold standard mentalit among central bankers and their political masters. With regard to the German case, they reassert their belief that even without a banking crisis spurred by the dispute over reparations, any improvement would have been “minor.” The implications of fixed-exchange-rate regimes the authors have expounded elsewhere; here they conclude by stressing the far-reaching consequence of poor policy choices and the absence of effective international adjustment mechanisms. After unduly blaming the Fed's incompetence, it is perhaps time to take on French authorities. After all it was their dogged insistence on fantastic reparations and their (self-destructive) obsession of a gold-backed “franc fort” that hampered the reconstitution of mutually guaranteed foreign exchange reserves.