The main objective of Oliviero Angeli's concise book on territory is to marry cosmopolitan moral individualism with a theory of the territorial rights of states. Angeli defends both a theory based on the value of collective self-determination and a functionalist, Kantian theory of the territorial state. To this end, he draws a distinction between, on the one hand, territorial rights and, on the other hand, rights over territory. While the former are powers the state has over people within the territory, the latter are rights that the state claims against people outside of the territory (62). The distinction is a useful contribution to the literature on territorial rights, as it highlights that different kinds of justifications are required for the different kinds of territorial rights, or rights over territory, that states may hold. Emphasizing that rights over territory are claim rights against outsiders is a good way of pointing out that their justification is universal in nature.
Somewhat confusingly, this important distinction is the topic of the second, not the first, chapter of the book. The first chapter, which provides three “genealogies of the territorial state,” defends a Kantian, functionalist justification of states' rights over territory. This is contrasted against Grotius's and Locke's accounts of the territorial state. The chapter provides a thorough discussion of the history of ideas on how states came to have rights over territory and what can justify them. The advantage of the Kantian account, according to Angeli, is that it does not rely on a principle of first occupancy, but is instead forward-looking (40 and 49). On this account, “the legitimacy of the rights of a state over the territory it currently occupies… depends on whether the state in question is effective at enforcing a uniform system of civil and property rights to which its citizens could reasonably agree” (54). Such a jurisdictional system is ultimately necessary in order for citizens to live autonomous lives.
Angeli's Kantian genealogy of the territorial rights of states includes an innovative account of why territoriality is of universal moral worth. The account holds that territories represent what Angeli calls “intelligible maps.” These are imagined, cognitive or mental maps that localize social and natural events and thereby endow them with meaning. In this way, intelligible maps “precede and shape experience” (45). These intelligible maps “are required for ordering relations in space and continually reshaping our empirical knowledge of the world. When we think of legal relations, these mental maps will take the form of separate territories.” As opposed to mere proximity, “[territorial] borders provide a more reliable spatial reference for identifying the degree of legal relationship between individuals” (46). These intelligible maps also help solve the so-called particularity problem. This is the important question about what particular territory a state has rights over, provided it has such rights. On Angeli's account, the territorial rights of states refer to boundaries of actual states. This must be so, for the intelligible maps that such territories represent are an “a priori framework for natural and social knowledge” (48). However, this solution to the particularity problem is rather disappointing. It cannot tell us anything about what happens in the case of a territorial conflict.
The three final chapters of the book discuss consequences for citizenship, for immigration, and for the control of natural resources. Angeli argues that states have a duty to enfranchise all alien residents, that they have a right to exclude nonforced migrants, and that they have a right to control natural resources.
The discussion on immigration is the most developed and makes important contributions to debates on self-determination, coercion, and the value of collective self-determination. The discussion also marks a shift in the book from the functionalist justification of rights over territory, based on the protection of property rights and ordering of legal relations, to a justification of territorial rights based on the intrinsic value of collective self-determination. This shift does not entirely follow Angeli's own distinction between rights over territory and territorial rights, since both kinds of rights are defended using the collective self-determination account. Angeli defends a right to collective self-determination on the basis of the value of individual autonomy (83). “The collective dimension of such a right resides in the fact that for people to exercise their freedom, it is important to have some control over the social and political environment within which they live” (113). Functionalist and self-determination theories of territorial rights are not necessarily compatible or complementary, yet this conjuncture remains unexplained in the book. It is also not clear what kind of collective can hold territorial rights and what such groups' relationship with the territorial right holder, the state, is.
Nonetheless, the self-determination account of territorial rights of states defended in the last three chapters of the book leads Angeli to argue that states (a) have a duty to grant democratic rights to all alien residents (91) and, therefore, (b) they have a right to decide who to share such obligations with (117). The reason for (a) is that the kind of legal coercion residents of a territorial state are subject to, affecting almost all aspects of life, is pervasive enough to trigger the need for democratic justification (91). In contrast, the coercion that the border presents immigrants with is not pervasive to the same extent. Therefore, prospective immigrants do not have to be enfranchised (91). But because all resident aliens have to be enfranchised, the right to collective self-determination triggers a right to determine what the “self” is and therefore to exclude (106 and 117). However, it is not clear on Angeli's account why determining the “self” is essential to collective self-determination as it is defined in the book. For as he acknowledges, citizenship is not voluntary in the first place (99). While he provides some ways in which citizenship can be seen as voluntary in an earlier discussion, it is nonetheless not voluntary in the sense of being able to choose who to share obligations with (100).
Finally, in an attempt to reconcile the right to freedom of movement with the right of states to exclude nonforced migrants, Angeli argues that as part of their self-determination citizens should have a say over migration policy. While maintaining that the right to freedom of movement would be violated if citizens decided to restrict immigration, Angeli insists that the right to collective self-determination also entails a right to make decisions that are morally wrong (108–9). This is a useful way of thinking about the rights of immigrants contra rights of self-determination. Yet it would have helped if Angeli had explained why the right to freedom of movement is a right that can be trumped by the right to collective self-determination, which is not clear from his discussion about having a right to determine “the self.”
Overall, the book provides a good contribution to cosmopolitan thinking on the territoriality of states, though some key concepts, such as the value and nature of collective self-determination, could have been more consistently discussed from the very start of the book.
