This is an original and provocative work of democratic theory. Drawing on decades of political science research, Jeffrey Green reminds us that democracies seldom function the way that normative theorists imagine. Most citizens are poorly informed about political issues. They seldom engage in public reasoning, nor do they mobilize through grassroots organizations. Green asks us to reconsider the significance of an obvious political phenomenon in modern liberal democracies: the fact that most citizens experience politics as a spectacle. What sets this book apart from other works of democratic theory is that he celebrates what other theorists lament.

According to Green, the dominant democratic theories are unable to make sense of political spectacle because of their reliance on a vocal model of political power. The key feature of this model is the assumption that democratic institutions enable the people to express their voice by enacting laws. The underlying normative principle, he explains, is autonomy. The political order is legitimate because the people authorize the limitations on their freedom and the structure of their public life. Green finds these assumptions unconvincing and reminds us that actually existing representative democracies are governments run by a relatively stable group of elites. These elites do not enact the will of the people, in part, because the citizens do not have coherent preferences on most policy issues. According to the author, “The citizen-being-ruled is not a political animal but a frequent attendee at the political zoo” (p. 33).

The evidence that Green presents is familiar to any student of political behavior. Following Joseph Schumpeter, he concludes that representative government functions as a plebiscite, in which citizens periodically review the conduct of governing elites and decide whether to replace them. Whereas most democratic theorists have criticized Schumpeter, Green insists that a plebiscite can actually realize democratic values. He urges his fellow democratic theorists to accept that we live in the society of the spectacle and embrace an “ocular” model of popular power.

Ocular power is the power of the spectator. It is a term that describes the way that the gaze of the audience can punish or reward a performer, thereby influencing his or her conduct. One example is the way a stand-up comedian will modify a routine in order to get laughs from the audience. Green suggests that something similar happens in the relationship between democratic leaders and the citizen-spectators. Democratic leaders must craft their performance in order to secure the gaze of their audience. The disciplinary gaze of the people—not their voice—is the source of their power.

One of the most interesting sections of the book is the discussion of Max Weber's theory of “plebiscitary leader democracy.” According to Green, Weber was one of the few theorists to admit that contemporary mass democracy had little in common with ancient Greek participatory democracies or even nineteenth-century representative governments. Mass democracy enables the emergence of a new kind of charismatic leadership. Weber also suggests that electoral competition provides the ideal conditions for the training and cultivation of charismatic qualities among those who seek popular support. Instead of relying on birth or technical expertise, democratic leaders must inspire the people. Moreover, the popular support that they garner can legitimize creative and innovative politics.

It is undoubtedly true that electoral competition provides a strong incentive for leaders to fashion an image that appeals to potential voters. George W. Bush, despite his Ivy League education and aristocratic pedigree, cultivated a common-man persona through his diction and photo-ops on his Texas ranch. But if we are examining democracy from the standpoint of normative theory rather than empirical political science, the salient question is whether this is a good thing. There is a risk that the ocular power of the people will be usurped by leaders through the careful use of manipulation and staging. Green recognizes this danger. In order to prevent such abuse, he insists that the spectacle of democratic competition must be limited by the principle of candor. Candor refers to the norm that leaders should not be able to control their relationship with the public. Instead, they should be subjected to a series of unscripted events: debates with vigorous cross examination, press conferences, and public inquiries into misconduct.

These are good suggestions. Yet it is hard to see how they are distinctively “ocular” modes of accountability, given their reliance on language, argument, and the dissemination of information. These proposals also give Green's theory a utopian character, which is strikingly at odds with the “realistic” thrust of the book as a whole. For example, he criticizes deliberative democracy and participatory democracy because they rest on unrealistic assumptions about the capacities and proclivities of ordinary citizens, yet the ideal of candor seems to rest on an equally unrealistic account of the behavior of political leaders. Furthermore, even if candor did become institutionalized, I am not sure whether it would engender effective government, as the author assumes.

In this book, Green develops his theory in a rigorous manner, but he provides surprisingly few examples of how ocular power supplemented by candor can help realize democratic values. He tells us that the Clinton impeachment was not such a bad thing, but fails to explain why. The book would have benefited from more detailed attempts to clarify how “ocular politics” operates—or could operate—in contemporary political life. Instead, Green illustrates the political efficacy of candor through an interpretation of Shakespeare's Coriolanus. In the pivotal scene in the play, Coriolanus, an aristocratic Roman general, is forced to appear before the common people. Incited by his political rivals, the people become angered by his apparent disdain and reject his bid to become consul. This scene is a striking illustration of candor, but it is not clear whether the ritual actually enabled popular power. Coriolanus's rivals were more adept at courting the favor of the people but not necessarily more public-spirited or skilled at governing. Alexis de Tocqueville, of course, reached the same conclusion in Democracy in America. Tocqueville felt that the spectacle of campaigning and public scrutiny discouraged great men from seeking office and left the field open to mediocre talents whose main qualification was that they had made no enemies.

The Eyes of the People is a courageous book that mounts a spirited critique of democratic theory and offers an intriguing alternative. I was also impressed by the way that Green engaged empirical research on democracy, rather than dismissing it. He is right that political theorists should pay more attention to the ocular dimensions of politics rather than just the deliberative ones. Yet it is puzzling that he fails to mention two important texts that exmine the relationship among spectacle, visibility, and democratic life: Rousseau's Letter to M. d'Alembert on the Theatre and On the Government of Poland. There are also a number of contemporary theorists writing about the affective, visceral, aesthetic, and performative registers, and the book would have benefited from incorporating their insights. Engaging this literature would have forced Green to consider the possibility that the relationship between actor and audience can be reversed and reconfigured. It is not only the leaders who are on stage. The people, too, can make a spectacle of themselves.

I read this book the week that downtown Toronto was turned into an armed fortress for the meetings of the Group of Twenty (G-20) major economies. Tens of thousands of people took to the street to protest. In the cacophony of the demonstrations it was difficult to discern a clear political message, but this is a problem only from the perspective of the “vocal model of popular power.” When the people take to the street in protest, they try to reverse the direction of the gaze and this, too, is part of democracy.