Although Hobbes's idiosyncratic views of language are central to his philosophy, they have been the subject of relatively little scholarly attention. Once one factors out the substantial literature on Hobbes and the classical rhetorical tradition, Yves Charles Zarka's Hobbes et la pensée politique moderne (Presses Universitaires de France, 1995) is probably the most important recent monograph that attempts to read Hobbes through what Zarka calls a “semiology” of power. Against this background, Philip Pettit's new book is a welcome and elegant demonstration of what one might call the “language thesis,” that is, that Hobbes “is the inventor of the idea that language is a transformative technology that has shaped our species, accounting for our characteristic features on both the positive and negative sides of the ledger” and that this “thesis about the transformative part played by speech shapes every aspect of this theory” (2).
Made with Words shows that many of the traditional areas in Hobbes interpretation can be explored fruitfully by way of the language thesis; part of the evidence in support of the thesis is precisely this interpretive fecundity. Pettit starts with the mind. Hobbes was a resolute materialist—he found the Cartesian “mental substance” incoherent—and so has to explain how matter can think. His “two-stage approach” (13) to the problem, as Pettit outlines in the first two chapters, involves assigning the generation of momentary apparitions and the like to bodily motions that humans and animals have in common. Language, enabled by human curiosity (26), allows classification and denotation, and thus enables the mind to move beyond the apprehension of particulars; the linguistically-enabled human mind “does not merely see, it sees as,” and “does not merely register things, it also classifies them” (32). In sum, thought presupposes language, not the other way around (29–30), and language is best seen as an “invention,” on par with the printing press (25–26). From a seventeenth-century point of view, these are shocking conclusions, and Pettit emphasizes Hobbes's departure both from his own contemporaries like Descartes and from classical conventionalists like Cicero.
Subsequent chapters show the importance of Hobbes's views on language to other aspects of his thought. Chapter 3 considers Hobbes's characterization of reason as ultimately reducible to addition and subtraction. Chapter 4 examines the way that language allows personation—the ability of individuals to speak or act “in their own name or the name of a principal” (56). This then enables the discussion in chapter 5 of how words allow incorporation, the ability of diverse individuals to speak and act as one person; Pettit shows how Hobbes adapts medieval theory to treat the commonwealth as such a corporate entity. Chapter 6 treats the way that linguistic aptitude makes humans prone to conflict. Essentially, human difference, anxiety over the future, and scarcity of resources combine to cause people both to use the same evaluative words differently and to constantly compare their own position with others. Everyone wants to surpass everyone else, and we are in this regard worse off than animals that do not speak and seek only immediate goods. As Pettit puts it, “[T]he upshot is pretty bleak. . . . It is as if the advent of speech and the knowledge that came with it precipitated a secular fall: an expulsion from the tranquil world of private concern for the present into a turbulent existence where people sustain one another in frenzied anxiety about relative power” (95–96). Thus, the “state of nature,” as chapter 7 shows, can in this sense be seen as a state of “second nature,” a condition where people have mastered language but not the way out of the problems it induces. The final chapter then shows how the “commonwealth of ordered words” enables humans to live together as linguistic beings, incorporating themselves into commonwealths, where meanings are stabilized. The book concludes with a brief summary of its essential theses.
Hobbes's argument marches inexorably toward its absolutist conclusion, and Pettit tries to take some of the edge off with the suggestion that Hobbes implausibly assumes without argument “that people can only be satisfied with superiority” and cannot settle for the “positional good of equality in standing” (96). I am inclined to think that Hobbes does better than this, for a reason having to do with what strikes me as the main omission from Made with Words, Pettit's reduction of the role of Hobbes's methodology to marginal status (see 18–22). Classic geometry is the science that Hobbes thinks gets method closest to correct, and in the preface to De Cive he credits most of human civilization to advances in geometry, thereby giving it a role comparable to language. One point upon which Hobbes insisted was the law of homogeneity—one could only calculate and demonstrate with like quantities. If we apply this reasoning to the question of the motivations of those in the state of nature, it becomes apparent that the claims that they perceive all goods as zero-sum and cannot be content with equality function axiomatically to enable reduction of individual motivational differences to homogeneity.
Is this a reasonable move on Hobbes's part? Here is the sort of argument I think he can give. Hobbes says that it is a precept of reason that people acknowledge one another as equals (see Pettit's discussion, 101–2). I take it that Pettit's interpretation shows, at least in outline, how it is that many Hobbesian people might let their anxieties overtake them and come to demand superiority over others. The question, then, is how far such behavior would generalize. Hobbes's answer, provided in the preface to De Cive, is that reasonable, “good men” must always be on their guard against the unreasonable. Even those who would be satisfied with equality are thus rationally driven to present a conflict-generating, competitive posture, in which others are treated as if they were relative-standing maximizers. In other words, emphasizing Hobbes's method provides some evidence in support of an answer to Pettit's central objection to the Hobbesian account of natural human conflict.
That said, this concern about the status of method should not deter anyone from reading Made with Words, which should be required for serious students of Hobbes. Pettit modestly acknowledges the contribution of Zarka in particular (155 n1), but he is one of the few to take the language thesis seriously and one of even fewer who will be accessible to an Anglophone audience. In my view, the language thesis is correct, and Pettit's presentation of it is both convincing in its own right and helpful for the light it casts on any number of problems in Hobbes interpretation. Made with Words thus makes a significant contribution to our understanding of a central and neglected aspect of Hobbes's thought.
