It should be said at the outset that the subtitle is highly misleading: the volumes contain neither a text nor a commentary, rather a series of chapters by various authors on the different areas of Roman law appearing in the Twelve Tables, with discussion of the wording of the statute; nor is this the only oddity: the volumes include a chapter by Oliviero Diliberto, pointing out on the basis of a substantial list of important earlier publications that the traditional order of the tables and their contents is certainly wrong, yet all the authors use the traditional numbering!
After a brief introduction by the editor, the first chapter, by Cosimo Cascione, deals with ‘Il contesto storico della legislazione decemvirale’; it is a lucid, if conservative, pre-Niebuhrian account of the literary tradition, including the supposed embassy to Athens and involvement of Hermodoros of Ephesos. There then follows the already mentioned chapter by Oliviero Diliberto and a chapter on ‘Il processo privato’, by Roberto Fiori; this is not made easier to follow by the combination of discussion of forms of pressure on a defendant at the beginning of proceedings with those involved at later stages. It is claimed that ‘Si è sostenuto, cioè, che il deesse del teste non dovrebbe essere considerato una mancanza a un dovere e che obvagulo possa essere semplicemente un sinonimo di appello’ (85). This is a reference to Roman Statutes (London, 1996), 621, where ‘a cautious enquirer will wonder …’ surely does not amount to ‘sostenere’ (Massimo Miglietta, ‘Le norme di diritto criminale’, 489, similarly misrepresents Roman Statutes). Nor do I think that we can claim to know (117) that the distinction between classicus and infra classem was between a member of the first class and the rest, plausible though this may be.
A chapter by Isabella Piro deals with ‘Matrimonio e condizione della donna’, a reasonable endeavour, despite, as Piro correctly observes (153), the fact that the Twelve Tables offer no ‘organic’ treatment even of the first half of the chapter title. I am less happy with the apparent acceptance (179) of the speech of C. Canuleius in Livy as a reliable source. A chapter by Thomas A. J. McGinn deals with ‘La familia e i poteri del pater’; it is impressive both in its handling of the ancient evidence and in its awareness of the anthropological parallels. Giovanni Finazzi follows with ‘La successione ab intestato’; he shares, more decisively, the doubts already expressed in Roman Statutes, as to whether the phrase familia pecuniaque stood in the Twelve Tables. Contra Finazzi (252), however, essit appears, not only in the Collatio, but also in the Tituli Ulpiani, and we know far too little of the Latin of the fifth century b.c. to be justified in changing it to escit. But the most glaring deficiency of this chapter is the failure to take account of the important work of Christopher Smith on the Roman gens, a stricture that applies also to the following chapter (see C. J. Smith, The Roman Clan, 2006, 21–30). Contra L. Parenti, in the chapter in question, ‘Sul regime della partiziarietà in presenza di più eredi’ (382), per legem is not the same as ex lege, but mostly means ‘as is compatible with (the law)’: see OLD, s.v. per, §9, ‘(indicating a person, authority, circumstance, etc. which has or might be supposed to have the option of allowing or preventing an action) as far as — is concerned’.
Maria Floriana Cursi, ‘La mancipatio e la mancipatio familiae’ and Riccardo Cardilli, ‘Il nexum e l'oportere nelle XII tavole’ both discuss cum nexum faciet mancipiumque (VI, 1), without any sign of either taking account of the discussion of the other. In the latter chapter, ‘testamento se dare damnatus sum’ seems to me to be fairly horrible Latin. In Cosima Möller, ‘Il regolamento di conflitti’, I am not sure that we need to be told twice (449 and 454) that Gaius is an early classical jurist; and to link fines regere with the rex of the period before the foundation of Rome seem to me far-fetched; and although I am sympathetic to the notion of Greek input into the Twelve Tables, to use as Möller does the details of the legislation of Solon seems to me hazardous; a serious omission is any reference to the major work of Brian Campbell on the Agrimensores.
The much-tortured provisions on the caput ciuis and priuilegia occur frequently (Miglietta at 505, 518; 521; Emanuela Calore, ‘Le norme di diritto pubblico’ at 722, 738, 744). We surely need to remember that from the moment of his departure into exile, Cicero was desperate to show that his treatment had been illegal; yet there is no trace of the Twelve Tables in his abundant correspondence; only some years later did he ‘find’, i.e., invent a nice archaic-sounding clause about the ‘comitiatus maximus’, and unscrupulously equate it with the comitia centuriata, at the same time switching the verb irrogare from its normal predicate multam, to priuilegia: the verb is necessary, since ad hominem legislation in favour of an individual was of course uncontroversial.
Contra C., ‘Gli illeciti privati’ (564), not every manuscript at Gellius XX, 1, 12, has iniuria, rather than iniuriam; the two are for all practical purposes virtually indistinguishable in medieval manuscripts, assuming the use of m with suprascript bar; the latter form is printed both by Hosius and by Marshall. Something has gone wrong with ‘rupitias … accanto a rupitias’; it also seems to me unwarranted to combine this isolated word with the equally isolated word sarcito (605). Despite Pomponius (523, 525), I continue to disbelieve that quaestores parricidii figured in the Twelve Tables, or that in the Rome of the mid fifth century b.c. it was necessary to legislate against treason, contra Miglietta (527).
Unlike Lucio Parenti, ‘Il regime degli interessi’ (647), I have the very gravest doubts whether Tacitus knew what was in the Twelve Tables, or whether Cato, who undoubtedly referred to interest rates, referred provision for them to the Twelve Tables; and it will not do to cite on the Roman Republican coinage a general work of 1943; nor is aes signatum the proper term for ‘currency bar’: aes signatum means ‘struck coinage’, as even cursory attention to Latin usage demonstrates. ‘Secondo l'ipotesi oggi più accreditata’: so C. on funerary regulation (703); but has anyone ever doubted that Cicero's De re publica and De legibus are complementary? In addition to the issue discussed above, Calore also deals with the alleged clause ‘quod postremo populus iussisset …’: Cicero, Balb. 33, cannot possibly be used to support the existence of this clause; and De inv. II, 145, along with other parts of this work, shows, rather than that this clause existed, that the whole topic was one that advocates argued about.
Perhaps the most interesting chapter is the last, by Cardilli, dealing with what may perhaps best be called intentionality, with rich parallels from modern civil law systems.
The volumes are on the whole well printed and proof-read, though there are perhaps too many typos; most will not mislead: ‘non sono’ for ‘non solo’ (108); ‘intezione’ (159); ‘Virgina’ for ‘Virginia’ and ‘conuivium’ for ‘convivium (180); ‘secum’ for ‘ne secum’ (181); ‘adgantus’ (249); ‘immeditamente’ (341); ‘die’ for dies’ (353); ‘sufficiente’ for ‘sufficientemente’ (384); ‘al terza’ for ‘la terza’ (425); ‘vervo’ for ‘verbo’ (426); ‘dal cause’ for ‘da cause’ (438); ‘gande’ for ‘glande’ (443); accumunato’ (401); ‘sazionatoria’ (496); ‘egoet’ (500); ‘comitatus’ (520); ‘potrebbe’ for ‘potrebbero’ (574); ‘il parere <di> Aristone’ (616); ‘Q. Menelio’ (656), though ‘pro Rhodiensis’ there is rather alarming; ‘pacione’ (689); ‘ostentanzione’ (713); ‘iniustus’ for ‘iniustius’ and ‘cuismodi’(744); ‘imperiandi’ (783); ‘atorno’ (859).
These volumes are immensely learned, but most of the authors seem to think that their case is strengthened by multiplication of citations of modern scholars holding the view that they wish to advocate.
