This book draws together Onuma Yasuaki's recent research which formed part of a series of lectures presented at The Hague Academy of International Law in 2007. Onuma encourages the reader to question the prevalent cognitive frameworks which have shaped understandings of international law during the twentieth century, suggesting that international and transnational perspectives fail to adequately respond to the multi-polar and multi-civilizational world of the twenty-first century. Onuma argues that the predominant international perspective relies too heavily on the West-centric concept of the sovereign nation-state, and overlooks the fact that the twenty-first century, and not the twentieth century, will lend itself to the process of nation building and the consolidation of state mechanisms for the majority of Afro-Asian nations (p. 66). Though Onuma recognizes that the transnational perspective has somewhat modified the state-centric focus of the international perspective, he suggests that “the voices of those who comprise more than eighty percent of the human species can scarcely be heard” (p. 75).
Chapter 1 outlines the transcivilizational perspective as an alternative cognitive framework and third perspective. He suggests that “by adopting the transcivilizational perspective as supplementary and modifying international and transnational perspectives, we can see relations between law, cultures, religions and civilizations as well as their changes over a substantial period of time” (p. 105), which will become increasingly important in the emerging multi-polar and multi-civilizational world.
In Chapter 2, Onuma examines the rubric between legitimacy, justice, and power which underpins any legal order within society and can be equally applicable to a global legal order (p. 110). Addressing a number of fundamental weaknesses and inconsistencies with international law, he points to an over-reliance on Article 38 of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute to identify the “sources” of international law (p. 205); unmasks the lack of transparency inherent in the “mystical process of ‘customary’ international law” (p. 137); and “horizontal sanctions”, which in reality apply vertically due to unequal power relations between powerful states and smaller nations (p. 147). Problematizing the unconscious adoption of the “domestic model approach to international law”, which replicates the modern nation-state and situates the judiciary as the “ultimate enforcement mechanism of law” (p. 148), Onuma argues that the balance of power is effectively skewed, thus undermining the legitimacy of international law. As the balance of power shifts, and states including China and India gain economic and political sway, Onuma indicates that the current status quo is not sustainable and greater attention has to be paid to non-Western perspectives in international law, in order to allow for a fully discursive global process. Although he is quick to point out that focus on non-Western cultures and civilizations should not lead to the reification of such cultures, religions, and civilizations (p. 201), initially it seems hard to extract such a line of reasoning from cultural relativist arguments against universalism, which Onuma is clearly conscious of.
In Chapter 4, Onuma reinterprets the history of international law from a transcivilizational perspective, illustrating the importance of studying other normative systems which existed alongside pre-modern European systems, to demonstrate that the concept of “universalism” is relative in itself, and that other belief systems could also be considered universalistic, for example Islam under the Abbasid Dynasty (p. 291) or the Sinocentric Tribute System in East Asia, which influenced political and social relations in China, Mongolia, the Korean Peninsula, Japan, Taiwan, and Vietnam (p. 307).
Chapter 5 evaluates human rights as a substantive example of international law derived from modern Western practices. Onuma seeks to evaluate what is the most effective way to realize human rights, which he views as a means to realize a much greater purpose, the wellbeing of humanity (p. 388). Pointing to conceptual challenges which underpin human rights, including the privileging of civil and political rights over economic, social, and cultural rights, Onuma laments the scant attention paid to paragraph 5 of the Vienna Declaration, which seeks to equate both spheres of rights. The high number of states and civil society actors engaged in the Vienna Declaration's drafting process (p. 435) is seen by Onuma as an indicator of its legitimacy as a transcivilizational human rights instrument. One of his most interesting and perhaps contentious arguments relates to his articulation of transcivilizational human rights, which would require the reconceptualization of rights “from various perspectives of cultures, religions, and civilizations” (p. 462). Onuma's underlying intention is to strengthen the relevance of human rights in all societies. However, he overlooks what some of the potential problems of grounding human rights in religion, culture, and civilizations may be, failing to consider both the practical reality of how rights may be contextualized, and counter-arguments against such conceptualization, including the potential for discrimination against gender or minority groups.
Significantly, Onuma's research demonstrates the importance of revisiting the historical development of international law with a pluralistic lens, taking into account non-Western perspectives, which have directly and indirectly contributed to the development of international law as we know it. Clear examples of unequal balances of power give the reader a sense of fundamental weaknesses, which have ultimately served to undermine international law's legitimacy. While the transcivilizational perspective potentially provides a useful analytical tool, it is unclear exactly how the development of international law may be shaped by a transcivilizational perspective in the future, and whether such a third perspective merely adds an additional theoretical layer to international and transnational perspectives, with little practical grounding. Although Onuma uses human rights as a substantive example of how the transcivilizational perspective could enhance the legitimacy of international law and its applicability globally, in the absence of a clear conclusion or summarizing comments drawing together the practical reality of how a transcivilizational perspective could aid the long-term development of international law, the reader is left with a Pandora's box of numerous lines of reasoning. The overall strength of Onuma's work lies in his contentious and thought-provoking arguments, which have the ability to challenge the reader and will have strong resonance for legal and interdisciplinary scholars in Asia and the West at this particular juncture in history.
