Studies have shown during the last two decades that Islamic intellectual history, and the philosophical tradition, in particular, cannot be adequately examined without reference to Avicenna's (d. 428/1037) philosophy.Footnote 1 To show Avicenna's centrality in later traditions, these studies have generally focused on his logic, his physics, and, especially, his metaphysics, namely, his theoretical philosophy (al-ḥikma or al-falsafa al-naẓariyya). However, some questions still remain regarding the influence of his philosophy. Is Avicenna's impact on later intellectual traditions in Islam restricted to theoretical philosophy? Can we explore the possibility of a similar influence on the conception and development of practical philosophy (al-ḥikma or al-falsafa al-ʿamaliyya) after Avicenna?
It is difficult to claim that Avicenna has an established place in the modern scholarly works that study on the practical philosophy in Islam, including ethics, household management or economics, and politics. There are two main reasons for Avicenna's ambiguous position regarding the practical philosophy. One is the effect of Avicenna's own position vis-à-vis practical philosophy, and the other, the outcome of the modern scholarly approach to the latter. As for the first factor, although he founded what is arguably the most comprehensive and influential philosophical system of the Middle Ages, Avicenna, unlike his predecessor al-Fārābī (d. 339/950), dealt only minimally with practical philosophy in his philosophical writings.Footnote 2 While he provides an in-depth analysis of logic and all parts of theoretical philosophy – physics, mathematics, and metaphysics – in his masterpiece, al-Šifāʾ (The Cure), as well as his other works, he only briefly touches upon the three components of practical philosophy in the last chapter of his Metaphysics (al-Ilāhiyyāt) by way of “indicating some [basic] points there (mušāran fīhi ilā ğumal).”Footnote 3 A quick glance at his career shows that he only wrote a few short treatises on this fieldFootnote 4 and that either he never discussed practical philosophy in his philosophical summas, beginning with al-Ḥikma al-ʿArūḍiyya (Philosophy for al-ʿArūḍī) and culminating with al-Išārāt wa-al-tanbīhāt (Pointers and Reminders), or he only examined it briefly and in a very general manner at the end of the section on metaphysics.
On the other hand, one of the influential approaches to Islamic philosophy during the twentieth century, the Straussian approach, is another obstacle in detecting Avicenna's impact on the later development of practical philosophy in Islam. Leo Strauss (1899–1973) and his followers, who interpret the entire philosophical tradition in Islam on the basis of politics and the relationship between philosophy and religion, view al-Fārābī as the central and major figure of this tradition, and accordingly, present Avicenna as one of al-Fārābī's relatively insignificant successors.Footnote 5
This essay argues that Avicenna's view of practical philosophy was also effective in the subsequent centuries. The history of practical philosophy in the post-Avicennan tradition is usually studied in the modern works by referring to the literature started with Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's (d. 672/1274) Aḫlāq-i Nāṣirī, and reached its most complete form in the Ottoman scholar Qinalīzāda ʿAlī Efendi's (d. 979/1572) Aḫlāq-i ʿAlāʾī.Footnote 6 Since I think that this literature has some unique characteristics and should be examined independently, I will trace Avicenna's impact on the conception of practical philosophy in the post-classical period of Islamic intellectual history by focusing on two points, namely (a) the impact of his classification of practical philosophy and (b) the possible reasons why practical philosophy has been disregarded in the philosophical summas after Avicenna. In particular, I will refer to the major works on the classification of sciences, and the commentaries (šurūḥ) and glosses (ḥāwāšī) on the two most important and widely circulated philosophical summas in the post-Avicennan philosophy, al-Abharī's (d. 663/1264) Hidāyat al-ḥikma (Guide to Philosophy) and al-Kātibī's (d. 675/1276) Ḥikmat al-ʿayn (Essence of Philosophy).
CLASSIFICATION OF PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY: THREE OR FOUR?
Before showing the impact of Avicenna's classification of practical philosophy on the later period of Islamic intellectual history, one should first investigate Avicenna's different approaches to the classification of practical philosophy among the philosophical or intellectual sciences. Accordingly, I first examine his Risāla fī aqsām al-ʿulūm al-ʿaqliyya (Treatise on the Divisions of the Intellectual Sciences), which, according to Gutas, “must be considered a relatively early treatise.”Footnote 7 Although Avicenna reproduces through this treatise the traditional and formal way of classifying philosophy, in general, and practical philosophy, in particular, his subdivision of politicsFootnote 8 has some important features that facilitate an understanding of his approach(es) to practical philosophy throughout his career. Avicenna's point of departure in classifying practical philosophy is “human governance,” which is divided into (a) the single individual and (b) association with others. The latter is in turn subdivided into (a) household and (b) city. Each of these three corresponds to a branch of practical philosophy: ethics, household management or economics, and politics, respectively. While one knows through ethics how to attain happiness in this life and in the hereafter, household management aims to determine the rules on how to conduct the governance of one's household. In his examination, Avicenna begins by defining the first two sciences and mentions their primary reference books, including Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Bryson's On the Governance of the Household, respectively.Footnote 9 He then discusses the field of politics. For Avicenna, the study of politics addresses the types of political regimes, rulerships, and associations, both the virtuous and the non-virtuous ones. It also makes known the way of preserving each, the reason for its disintegration, and the manner of its transformation.Footnote 10 Interestingly, at this point, Avicenna divides politics into two parts: one addresses kingship (mulk), which is discussed in the books on politics of Plato (The Republic) and Aristotle (Politics), while the other concerns prophecy (nubuwwa) and šarīʿa,Footnote 11 which are also covered in Plato and Aristotle's two works.Footnote 12 His words on politics are worth quoting:
Through this part of practical philosophy are known [a] the existence of prophecy, and the human species' need for the šarīʿa for their existence, survival, and future life (munqalab). And through it is known [b] the wisdom in the universal commands and prohibitions (ḥudūd)Footnote 13 that are common to all šarāʾiʿ and in the commands and prohibitions pertaining to particular šarāʾiʿ, according to each particular people and particular time. And through it is known [c] the difference between divine prophecy and all false claims.Footnote 14
Avicenna's reference to this unnamed part regarding prophecy and šarīʿa, as “this part of practical philosophy (wa-hāḏā al-ğuzʾ min al-ḥikma al-ʿamaliyya)” brings into question whether it is an independent part of practical philosophy or a subdivision of politics, as Avicenna clearly says in the introduction to practical philosophy that it is divided into three parts. However, it is not easy to claim that this part lacks an independent position among practical sciences in Aqsām. His attempt to determine the content of this dimension can be interpreted as the first indication of his tendency to make it an independent part of practical philosophy in his career. Unfortunately, Avicenna does not say anything about the subdivisions of politics; rather, he follows the traditional tripartite classification of practical philosophy in ʿUyūn al-ḥikma (Elements of Philosophy), written before 414/1023,Footnote 15 and al-Šifāʾ, written c. 411–418/1020–1027.Footnote 16 However, in his Dānešnāme-i ʿAlāʾī (Philosophy for ʿAlāʾ al-Dawla), written c. 418/1027, another work he wrote during the same period as ʿUyūn and al-Šifāʾ, he clearly divides the science of management of all people (ilm-i tadbīr-i ʿāmm-i mardom) into two parts: the first discusses divine laws (šarāyiʿ), which is the basic part (aṣl), and the second division, which is a derivative (farʿ) of the former, addresses different forms of ruling (siyāsāt).Footnote 17 Because his Dānešnāme does not contain a separate chapter on practical philosophy, nor does it touch upon it at the end of the chapter on metaphysics unlike al-Šifāʾ, it is not possible to follow how Avicenna would have examined these two divisions of the science of general management.
Avicenna's different approaches to the classification of practical philosophy throughout his career can be said to have reached their culminating point in al-Ḥikma al-mašriqiyya (Eastern Philosophy), written c. 418–420/1027–1029. Although the entire text has not survived, Avicenna offers a classification of the philosophical sciences in the extant introduction, indicating which of them will be included in the work. An examination of this text supports the argument that his view of the classification of sciences evolved toward a more independent form during his career. As Gutas states, “his classification of the sciences is different from that he has given elsewhere and consistent with the development of his thinking away from traditional Aristotelian models.”Footnote 18 Apart from the difference in the main divisions of sciences, the most striking feature of Avicenna's new classification is his introduction of two new sciences that entail theoretical and practical sciences respectively.Footnote 19 As for the theoretical sciences, he divides metaphysics into two separate categories: “theology” (ʿilm ilāhī), which addresses things totally separate from matter and motion, and “universal science” (ʿilm kullī), which examines those things that are sometimes associated with matter. By so doing, therefore, he increases the number of theoretical sciences from three to four.Footnote 20
More significant for the purposes of this paper is the nature of the new classification of practical philosophy in al-Ḥikma al-mašriqiyya, which has not hitherto been taken into consideration in studies on Avicenna's conception of this aspect of philosophy. First, Avicenna divides practical philosophy into two parts. The first is called ethics and addresses the “human soul and its conditions pertaining to it to reach happiness in this world and hereafter,” while the other examines associations (al-mušārakāt) between human beings to establish a virtuous order (niẓām fāḍil) both in the particular (ğuzʾī) association, that is, “the household,” and in the general (kullī) association, that is, “the city.” According to Avicenna, both of these associations must have a legitimate law (qānūn mašrūʿ), and a ruler/manager (mutawallī) to enforce and protect this law.Footnote 21 Since it is impossible for one ruler/manager to protect what was legislated about household and city together, Avicenna reasons, household and city naturally should have different rulers/managers, and household management and politics should be treated as independent disciplines. Moreover, he insists that the laws of these two basic spheres of social life, namely, the family and the city/state, should not be completely separate from each other, because the legitimate law provides a common ground for them. So we have now a law that was legislated by one person and different rulers/managers who enforce it in their fields, i.e. house and city:
Therefore, household management must be singled out as an independent discipline in terms of its ruler, and similarly, management of the city must be singled out as an independent discipline in terms of its ruler. However, it is not appropriate to isolate the legislation about the household and the city from each other completely. Instead, the proper approach is that the law-maker (al-muqannin) is one single individual who possesses one art/discipline (ṣināʿa), in terms of what is necessary to oversee every individual, small association [household] and big association [city], and that is the prophet (nabī). As for the ruler and how he must govern, the most appropriate approach for us is not to mix them together. If you make each legislation an independent discipline (bāb mufrad), you can do this and it does not matter. However, [when you examine] you will see that the most suitable approach for you is to take knowledge on ethics, knowledge on household management, and knowledge on the management of the city as independent disciplines and to take the art/discipline of legislation (al-ṣināʿa al-šāriʿa) and how it must be conducted as an independent discipline.Footnote 22
Avicenna then states that the practical science (ʿilm ʿamalī), like the theoretical one, has four sub-disciplines: ethics (ʿilm al-aḫlāq), household management or economics (tadbīr al-manzil), management of city/state (tadbīr al-madīna), and the discipline of legislation or – in a more explanatory translation – the “discipline of prophetic legislation” (al-ṣināʿa al-šāriʿa).Footnote 23 Furthermore, Avicenna ends his introduction to al-Ḥikma al-mašriqiyya by emphasizing that he will not examine all parts of philosophy, but only logic, theology, universal science, physics, and “that part of practical philosophy as is needed by the person who seeks salvation.”Footnote 24 For Avicenna, the reason for his disinterest in mathematics is that mathematics does not contain any disagreements, and he directs the readers interested in mathematics to al-Šifāʾ's sections on the subject. Moreover, he says that “same is true for the divisions of practical philosophy, which we do not mention here (wa-kadālik al-ḥāl fī aṣnāf min al-ʿilm al-ʿamalī lam nūridhu hā-hunā).”Footnote 25 It is possible to interpret this statement as a sign that Avicenna considers practical philosophy as one of those branches of philosophy for which there is no significant disagreement among philosophers, as in the case of mathematics, and that he perceives what he wrote in al-Šifāʾ about practical philosophy as sufficient, thereby confining his discussion on practical philosophy to the “part which is needed by the person who seeks salvation.” As the only surviving parts of al-Ḥikma al-mašriqiyya are the chapters on logic and physics and as Avicenna did not engage in the subject again in al-Išārāt, it is difficult to understand precisely what he intended by including this new sub-field of practical philosophy, that is, prophetic legislation; also, what he meant by the “part which is needed by the person who seeks salvation” is not clear, either.
The claim that he would examine the discipline of prophetic legislation among the practical sciences in al-Ḥikma al-mašriqiyya is further supported by Avicenna's emphasis on “salvation (al-nağāt)” and its close relationship with the life to come.Footnote 26 Although one may argue that because of Avicenna's general disinterest in matters of practical philosophy, he had little intention of offering an elaborate treatment beyond this theoretical re-classification,Footnote 27 it is, nonetheless, plausible to argue that what Avicenna says about the content of the second part of politics that addresses prophecy and šarīʿa in Aqsām can be considered as the content of the discipline of prophetic legislation. If that is, indeed, the case, then prophetic legislation consists of three main subjects: (a) the existence of prophecy and the human species' need for the šarīʿa for their existence, survival, and future life; (b) wisdom in universal commands and prohibitions (i.e., those that are common to all šarāʾiʿ), and in commands and prohibitions pertaining to particular šarāʾiʿ, particular groups of people and particular times; and finally, (c) the difference between divine prophecy and all false claims.
Very few extant works written by Avicenna's direct disciples', namely al-Ğūzğānī (fl. 11th century), Bahmanyār (d. 458/1066), Ibn Zayla (d. 440/1049), and al-Maʿṣūmī (d. 430/1038), are not related to any part of practical philosophy; thus, we do not know whether Avicenna's new classification of practical philosophy had any impact on those works. Fortunately, it is easy to detect the impact of Avicenna's version of the division of practical philosophy on his famous critic and, ironically, follower, al-Ġazālī (d. 505/1111). At this point, it is also important to note how al-Ġazālī interpreted Avicenna's division of politics into two parts in his Maqāṣid al-falāsifa (Aims of the Philosophers) because of strong connections between the texts of Maqāṣid and Avicenna's Dānešnāme.Footnote 28 Following Avicenna's Dānešnāme, al-Ġazālī discusses in Maqāṣid the science that explains social life as the first part of practical philosophy adding that: “This is a science whose origin (aṣluhu) is the religious sciences (al-ʿulūm al-šarʿiyya), and the above-mentioned political sciences (al-ʿulūm al-siyāsiyya), which address the governance of cities and the order of their citizens, complements it (tukmiluhu).”Footnote 29 Clearly, al-Ġazālī was not aware of what Avicenna emphasized regarding the division of practical philosophy in the Dānešnāme, which becomes more evident when he classifies the philosophers' sciences in his famous autobiography al-Munqiḏ min al-ḍalāl (Deliverer from Error). Al-Ġazālī divides philosophical sciences into six, including ethics and politics, and it seems that his misinterpretation of the word šarāyiʿ as “religious sciences” has a deep effect on his relatively positive view of the philosophers' views on ethics and politics in al-Munqiḏ, as will be discussed later.
Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), one of the most influential figures of the post-Avicennan period both in theology and philosophy, can be considered to be the first to refer to what Avicenna discusses in al-Ḥikma al-mašriqiyya on the classification of philosophical sciences. Despite the fact that his Persian encyclopedia of sciences, Ğāmiʿ al-ʿulūm, does not include any reference to this new classification, al-Rāzī's following statements in his Commentary on Avicenna's ʿUyūn al-ḥikma (Šarḥ ʿUyūn al-ḥikma) shows that he is aware of Avicenna's division of theoretical and practical philosophy into four parts rather than three as in al-Ḥikma al-mašriqiyya:
Commentary: Know that the majority of the philosophers have been in agreement on the fact that the practical philosophy has three parts and the theoretical philosophy has three. And the Master [Avicenna] proceeded in accordance with this position in this book [ʿUyūn al-ḥikma] and in most of his books. However, in his Kitāb al-Ḥikma al-mašriqiyya, he states that the practical philosophy has four parts, and the theoretical philosophy has four. As for the famous and mentioned position in this book, its account is this (…) [here al-Rāzī briefly defines science of ethics (ʿilm al-aḫlāq), science of management of the household (ʿilm tadbīr al-manzil), and political science (al-ʿilm al-siyāsī)]. It is proven by this [explanation] that there are three practical sciences. As for what is [stated] in al-Ḥikma al-mašriqiyya, he first cited the practical sciences as three, he then added the fourth calling it the science of city management (ʿilm tadbīr al-madīna). It is a science of how the city can be controlled and how its welfares can be taken care of. This science is indispensible because man is social by nature. To [attain] what is aimed [by man's being social by nature], it is [necessary] to know the condition of establishing the city, and the arrangement of its people according to different grades and the proper degrees that lead to the attainment of the welfare of society and the removal of corruptions. According to the first position, this science is a part of the political science (al-ʿilm al-siyāsī).Footnote 30
Though al-Rāzī clearly posits that Avicenna added a fourth science to the practical philosophy, al-Rāzī calls it ʿilm tadbīr al-madīna (the science of city management), not al-ṣināʿa al-šāriʿa. On the other hand, he refers to ḥikma madaniyya, which is the third practical science in ʿUyūn, as al-ʿilm al-siyāsī, without discussing the difference between ʿilm tadbīr al-madīna and al-ʿilm al-siyāsī, except to argue that the former is part of the latter.
To find the most systematic expression of Avicenna's new approach to the classification of practical philosophy, we would have to wait for the Šams al-Dīn al-Šahrazūrī (d. after 688/1289), al-Suhrawardī's (d. 587/1191) spiritual student and the reviver of the Illuminationist school after him. In his Rasāʾil al-šağara al-ilāhiyya fī ʿulūm al-haqāʾiq al-rabbāniyya (Treatises of the Divine Tree on the Sciences of Divine Truths), a voluminous encyclopedic work on philosophy and sciences consisting of five epistles (risāla), including methodology and divisions of the sciences, logic, practical philosophy, natural sciences or physics, and metaphysics, while al-Šahrazūrī provides information on the classifications of sciences, he initially introduces the conventional tripartite classification of practical philosophy. Through focusing on the human governance and policies (al-tadābīr al-bašariyya wa-al-siyāsāt) he argues that the former are divided into (a) single individual and (b) association with others, and the latter, in turn, subdivided into (a) household and (b) city. He then indicates the alternative division of the practical philosophy as follows:
This is the tripartite division. The one who makes it a quadripartite divides the second part into two. For the city (madīna) is divided into [two parts]. One concerns sovereignty and the sultanate, and the other prophecy and the šarīʿa. The former is called the science of politics (ʿilm al-siyāsa), and the latter the science of laws (ʿilm al-nawāmīs). There is no contradiction in [this division] because, according to one who makes this tripartite division, one of these two is included in the other. A similar situation has been discussed in theoretical philosophy, namely, the division of [metaphysics into] universal science and theology (ilāhī).Footnote 31
The most striking feature of al-Šahrazūrī's account of the quadripartite division of practical philosophy is his reference to the new part in this division as the “science of laws” (ʿilm al-nawāmīs), not as the “art of legislation” or the “prophetic legislation” (al-ṣināʿa al-šāriʿa), as in al-Ḥikma al-mašriqiyya. It is evident that al-Šahrazūrī bases his discussion upon Avicenna's Aqsām, while referencing the new part of practical philosophy. As previously mentioned, when Avicenna explains the branches of practical philosophy, he describes the third part of practical philosophy as consisting of two aspects, one that is related to sovereignty, and the other to prophecy and šarīʿa. He first explains the scope of the first part and refers to its ancient sources, and before he lists the content of the second part, he relates it with the concept of nāmūs (nomoi):
(…) and the treatment of prophecy and šarīʿa is contained in their [Plato and Aristotle's] two books on the nawāmīs. By the nāmūs, the philosophers do not mean what the vulgar believe, which is that the nāmūs is nothing but a device and deceit. Rather, according to them, the nāmūs is the law (sunna) and the norm (mitāl) that is established and made permanent through the coming-down of the revelation. The Arabs, too, call the angel that brings down the revelation a nāmūs.Footnote 32
In spite of al-Šahrazūrī's own treatment of practical philosophy in his al-Šağara al-ilāhiyya is based on the conventional tripartite division of the practical philosophy,Footnote 33 traces of his formulation of the division of practical philosophy and his naming of the fourth part the “science of laws” can be followed through the commentaries (šurūḥ) and glosses (ḥāwāšī) on the two most important and widely circulated philosophical summas in the post-Avicennan philosophy, al-Abharī's Hidāyat al-ḥikma and al-Kātibī's Ḥikmat al-ʿayn, and through the books on the classification of sciences. In their introductions to the commentaries and glosses of these two works, the authors usually offer some general information on the definition and branches of philosophy, frequently mentioning the different divisions of practical philosophy, without reference to the role of Avicenna in this context. Herein, I will provide, in chronological order, some examples of these accounts:
Quṭb al-Dīn al-Šīrāzī (d. 710/1311), Durrat al-tāğ, ed. Seyyed Muḥammad Miškāt, 2nd edn (Tehran, 1365/1949), p. 80.11–17 (Persian).
Know that some people divided the philosophy of [governing] the city (ḥikmat-i madanī) into two parts: One is related to the sovereignty, and they called it the “science of politics” (ʿilm-i siyāsat). The second is related to the prophecy and šarīʿa, and they called it the “science of laws” (ʿilm-i nawāmīs). From this point of view, some people argued that the practical philosophy has four parts. This view is not contrary to that which sees it as a tripartite because the two parts come under the one part.
Mubārak Šāh (or Mīrak) al-Buḫārī (d. 784/1382), Šarḥ Ḥikmat al-ʿayn (Kazan, 1321/1904), pp. 6.3–10.10 (with al-Seyyed al-Šarīf al-Ğurğānī's [d. 816/1413] and Mullā Mirzā Ğān Ḥabīb Allāh al-Šīrāzī's [d. 994/1586] ḥāšiyas).
Because the discussion in this brief [work] was limited to the explanation of the parts of the philosophy, I decided to introduce the meaning of philosophy and its parts briefly, then I say (…) as for the practical one because what is related to our actions, if it is a knowledge about the governance which is peculiar to the single individual, it is the “science of ethics.” Otherwise, it is the “science of household management” if it is a knowledge that is not completed without the household association, and “the science of politics” (ʿilm al-siyāsa) if it is a knowledge that is not completed without the civil association. (…) and what concerns the governing the city (al-madaniyya) was divided into two parts; one is related to the sovereignty and sultanate, which is called the “science of politics” (ʿilm al-siyāsa), and [the other] is related to the prophecy and šarīʿa, which is called the “science of laws” (ʿilm al-nawāmīs).Footnote 34 Therefore, some made [the practical philosophy] four [parts]. This is not contrary to those who make it three [parts] because the two parts of it come under the one. (…)
Ḫwāğazāda (d. 893/1487), Ḥāšiya Ḫwāğazāda ʿalā šarḥ Mawlānāzāda ʿalā Hidāyat al-ḥikma, MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Karaçelebizade 247, fol. 3r.
[Mawlānāzāda (fl. fourteenth century)] said, “And the practical philosophy...” I say: Know that what concerns the governing the city (al-madaniyya) was divided into two parts; one is related to the sovereignty and sultanate, which is called the “science of politics” (ʿilm al-siyāsa), and [the other] is related to the prophecy and šarīʿa, which is called the “science of laws” (ʿilm al-nawāmīs). Therefore, some of them made the parts of practical philosophy four. This is not contrary to those who make it three [parts] because the two parts of this four come under the one part of the three.Footnote 35
Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1050/1640), Šarḥ al-Hidāya al-aṯīriyya, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā ([Beirut], 1422/2001), pp. 9.15–10.3.
As for the practical philosophy, which its subject-matter is the human soul with respect to its possession of the morals and dispositions, it has also three parts because the human governances and policies are either peculiar to the single individual or not. The first one is the philosophy that through itself, man's worldly life becomes excellent (fāḍila) and his life in the hereafter becomes perfect (kāmila), which is called the “science of ethics.” That which is not peculiar to the single individual, rather requires a type of association that completes it, and this association happens either according to the house or according to the city. The first is called the “philosophy of household” (ḥikma manziliyya), and the second is called “philosophy of governing” (ḥikma madaniyya). One who makes it [namely, practical philosophy] a quadripartite divides the second part into two, for the city (madīna) is divided into what is related to the sovereignty and sultanate, and what is related to the prophecy and šarīʿa. The first is called the “science of politics” (ʿilm al-siyāsa), and the second is called the “science of laws” (ʿilm al-nawāmīs). The same occurred in the theoretical philosophy, and there is not any contradiction here, for, according to one who triples the division, one of the two parts comes under the other. Plato has an excellent and intellectually refined book that is related to the šarīʿa and the prophecy called Laws (al-nawāmīs). Aristotle also has a book on this subject, and both of them have a book on the policies of the sovereign. The First Master [Aristotle] wrote a good book on the refinement of morals (tahdīb al-aḫlāq) [Nicomachean Ethics], and from the later generation (min al-mutaʾaḫḫrīn), Abū ʿAlī ibn Miskawayh composed an excellent book on this that he called Kitāb al-Ṭahāra, which al-Muḥaqqiq [Naṣīr al-Dīn] al-Ṭūsī abridged it – may God sanctify his heart.
Aqkirmānī (d. 1174/1760), Iklīl al-tarāğim (Ottoman Turkish translation of Qāḍī Mīr's [d. 909/1503–4] commentary on Hidāyat al-ḥikma) (Darsaʿādat, 1266/1849–50), p. 5.13–23.
(…) As for the first species, which is the practical philosophy, if it concerns the welfares (masāliḥ) of a specific individual and his embellishment (taḥallī) with the praiseworthy morals and evacuation (taḫallī) from the vice morals, this kind of welfare is called the “science of the refinement of morals” (ʿilm-i tahdīb-i aḫlāq). And if a community (ğamāʿa) gets together in a house, welfare of the parents and children, master and slaves is called the “science of the management of the household” (ʿilm-i tadbīr-i manzil). If a community gets together in a city, its welfare is called the “science of governing the city” (ʿilm-i siyāsat-i madaniyya). (…) The commentator of Ḥikmat al-ʿayn [Mubārak Šāh (or Mīrak) al-Buḫārī] says that some has divided the philosophy of governing the city (ḥikmat-i madaniyya) into two, and called what is related to the sovereignty and sultanate as the “science of politics” (ʿilm-i siyāsat), and what is related to the prophecy and šarīʿa as the “science of laws” (ʿilm-i nawāmīs). Even they have said that the practical philosophy has four [parts], however this approach does not oppose to the view of those who argue that the practical philosophy has three [parts], because these two parts come under the one. (…)Footnote 36
What is more striking than these largely similar explanations about the classification of practical philosophy into four parts is that the “science of laws” (ʿilm al-nawāmīs) is found in the books on the classification of sciences as a science in itself, independent of practical philosophy. When we examine the place of the science of laws among the others in these works, it is surprisingly evident that the former is considered to be a meta-science that includes all religious sciences (al-ʿulūm al-šarʿiyya), but not the philosophical ones. To the best of my knowledge, the earliest example of this approach is found in the renowned Ašʿarite theologian and Qurʾān commentator al-Bayḍāwī's (d. 685/1286 or 691/1292) Risāla [fī] taʿrīfāt al-ʿulūm [wa-mawḍūʿātihā] (Treatise on the Divisions of Sciences and their Subject-matters). In this very short treatise, which does not have an introductory section that contains any clue about the theoretical framework of the classification of sciences and his sources, al-Bayḍāwī examines eight different sciences, including ʿilm al-nawāmīs as the second science after ʿilm al-adab. He does not offer a definition of ʿilm al-nawāmīs, but rather, he only repeats what Avicenna says in Aqsām about the concept of nāmūs by paraphrasing it: “And the nāmūs is called to the revelation, and the angel that brings it down, and to the law (sunna).”Footnote 37 He then states that ʿilm al-nawāmīs includes eight branches of sciences called “religious sciences” (al-ʿulūm al-šarʿiyya), which include (1) the science of recitation of the Qurʾān (ʿilm al-qirāʾa), (2) the science of Qurʾānic commentary (ʿilm al-tafsīr), (3) the sciences needed for Qurʾānic commentary (al-ʿulūm al-mūṣila ilā ʿilm al-tafsīr), (4) the science of transmitters of traditions (ʿilm ruwāt al-ḥadīt), (5) the science of the foundations of religion (ʿilm uṣūl al-dīn), (6) the science of jurisprudence (ʿilm uṣūl al-fiqh), (7) the science of dialectics (ʿilm al-ğadal), and (8) the science of fiqh (ʿilm al-fiqh).
After al-Bayḍāwī, the most comprehensive work to explain ʿilm al-nawāmīs as a meta-science of all religious sciences is Iršād al-qāṣid ilā asnā al-maqāṣid (Guidance for Him who Aspires to the Highest Goals) by Ibn al-Akfānī (d. 749/1348), an Egyptian physician and encyclopedist. Ibn al-Akfānī's work consists of twelve basic sciences, including (1) al-adab, (2) logic (al-manṭiq), (3) metaphysics (al-ilāhī), (4) ʿilm al-nawāmīs, (5) natural sciences (al-ṭabīʿī), (6) geometry (al-handasa), (7) astronomy (al-hayʾa), (8) arithmetic (al-ʿadad), (9) music (al-mūsīqā), (10) politics (al-siyāsa), (11) ethics (al-aḫlāq), and (12) household management (tadbīr al-manzil).Footnote 38 His words on the definition and content of the ʿilm al-nawāmīs are worth noting:
It is a science through which one knows the conditions (aḥwāl) of prophecy, its reality, and in what respect it is needed. And al-nāmūs is a name given to revelation; to the angel that brings it down, and to the law (sunna). The benefit of [this science] is to explain the necessity of prophecy, and the human need for the šarʿ for his survival [in this world] and in the hereafter. [On the other hand, other benefits of this science] are that it explains the difference between the true prophecy and the false claims [of prophecy]; [it provides] knowledge of the miracles that are exclusively given to the messengers (al-rusul) and prophets (al-anbiyāʾ) – peace be upon them –, and of the miracles of the righteous people (al-ṣiddīqīn) and saints (al-awliyā) – peace be upon them. Aristotle and Plato have each a book on this science. And many problems of this science are discussed in Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī's Book of the Opinions of the Virtuous City. It is known that to send messengers – peace be upon them – is God's grace to his creations, and a mercy for them to complete their worldly life and to explain the situation of their hereafter. The šarīʿa necessarily consists of [a] the true beliefs that must be verified, [b] the rituals that get one closer to God, which are to be performed constantly, and [c] enjoining the good and forbidding the evil, which are to be accepted. Consequently, from this science, eight religious sciences are branched out (yantaẓimu).Footnote 39
Following this passage, Ibn al-Akfānī lists eight religious sciences, including (1) the science of recitations of the Qurʾān (ʿilm al-qirāʾāt), (2) the science of transmission of traditions (ʿilm riwāya al-ḥadīṯ), (3) the science of Qurʾanic commentary (ʿilm al-tafsīr), (4) the science of the knowledge of traditions (ʿilm dirāya al-ḥadīṯ), (5) the science of the foundations of religion (ʿilm uṣūl al-dīn), (6) the science of jurisprudence (ʿilm uṣūl al-fiqh), (7) the science of dialectics (ʿilm al-ğadal), and (8) the science of fiqh (ʿilm al-fiqh). He then explains each of these religious sciences separately.Footnote 40
There are two important points to note regarding Ibn al-Akfānī's account of ʿilm al-nawāmīs. The first is that even if the Iršād consists of three conventional parts of practical philosophy, Ibn al-Akfānī does not say anything about the relationship between ʿilm al-nawāmīs and the branches of practical philosophy; thus it seems that for him ʿilm al-nawāmīs is a completely independent science that provides a theoretical ground for the religious sciences by explaining the revelation and miracles in a rational way. Secondly, Ibn al-Akfānī does not refer explicitly to Avicenna, though the similarity between the content of ʿilm al-nawāmīs and Avicenna's presentation of the third branch of practical philosophy in his Aqsām is conspicuous. As an important feature of Ibn al-Akfānī's encyclopedia, he provides a bibliography for every science, and with respect to ʿilm al-nawāmīs, he follows Avicenna by citing Plato and Aristotle's works on laws (nomoi). However, as Avicenna does not have a separate book on this science, Ibn al-Akfānī addresses the work of al-Fārābī, even if it does not correspond completely to that which ʿilm al-nawāmīs professes.
As for Iršād's impact on later authorsFootnote 41 regarding the definition of ʿilm al-nawāmīs as a meta-religious science; two works deserve mention. The first is the encyclopedist al-Qalqašandī's (d. 821/1418) voluminous Ṣubḥ al-aʿšā fī ṣināʿat al-inšā. Unlike Ibn al-Akfānī, al-Qalqašandī sees ʿilm al-nawāmīs as part of religious sciences, rather than as a meta-science, and thus, he proffers a list consisting of nine religious sciences. Moreover, he also prefers to explain ʿilm al-nawāmīs only briefly, stating that “[it is] related to prophecies (al-nubuwwāt).” He then refers to Plato, Aristotle, and al-Fārābī's works on ʿilm al-nawāmīs, as did Ibn al-Akfānī, yet he also adds to this list two works by al-Bayḍāwī, namely, al-Ṭawāliʿ (i.e., Ṭawāliʿ al-anwār min maṭāliʿ al-anẓār) and al-Miṣbāḥ (i.e., Miṣbāḥ al-arwāḥ fī uṣūl al-dīn), emphasizing the last chapters of these works that are about the prophecy.Footnote 42 Another figure who uses Ibn al-Akfānī's definitions of the sciences and much of his bibliographical material is the 16th-century Turkish encyclopedist Ṭāšköprīzāda (d. 968/1561). His famous work, Miftāḥ al-saʿāda wa-miṣbāḥ al-siyāda fī mawḍūʿāt al-ʿulūm (The Key to Happiness and the Light of the Mastery on the Subject-matters of Sciences), divides the sciences into two main parts, those that are acquired through theoretical investigation (naẓar) and those acquired through purifying the soul by acting in accordance to knowledge (ʿamal). The first category includes all instrumental, philosophical, and religious sciences; and when Ṭāšköprīzāda introduces the religious sciences, he touches briefly upon the ʿilm al-nawāmīs. For him, the religious sciences (al-ʿulūm al-šarʿiyya or ʿilm al-šarāʾiʿ) are also referred to as ʿilm al-nawāmīs, a term that comes from the concept of al-nāmūs, which means the angel that brings down the revelation. Ṭāšköprīzāda states that the term al-nāmūs lexicographically means the gnat. As there is a similarity between the sound a gnat makes on the ear and the sound of the revelation's coming to the prophet's ear (sāḥib al-sirr), al-nāmūs began to refer to the angel that brings down the revelation.Footnote 43
PHILOSOPHICAL SUMMAS AND PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY: WHERE IS THE PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY?
As stated in the beginning, when we exclude what are generally described as chapters specifically devoted to practical philosophy, including ethics, household management and politics – that is, the last two chapters of the Metaphysics (al-Ilāhiyyāt) of al-Šifāʾ (X.4–5) – it is very easy to see that Avicenna did not devote a separate chapter to practical philosophy in his philosophical summas. After following the traces of Avicenna's approach to the division of practical philosophy in the post-classical period of Islamic intellectual history, I now focus on whether Avicenna's decision to disregard the practical philosophy in the philosophical summas was followed by the later summa tradition, which was initiated by his famous pupil Bahmanyār's al-Taḥṣīl (The Validation) and developed by al-Abharī's Hidāyat al-ḥikma and al-Kātibī's Ḥikmat al-ʿayn, and if so, why these authors neglected practical philosophy in their philosophical summas.
Indeed, neither Bahmanyār's al-Taḥṣīl nor al-Abharī's and al-Kātibī's summas includes a chapter on any branches of practical philosophy; nor do the authors provide any justification as to why they disregard practical philosophy in their works.Footnote 44 As al-Abharī's and al-Kātibī's summas are, so to speak, the “essential” works of philosophical curriculum in the post-classical period, we would hope to find pieces of information about this disregard in their commentaries and glosses. Fortunately, we do find only in Mawlānāzāda's commentary on Hidāya some information regarding the disregard of practical philosophy. MawlānāzādaFootnote 45 provides a general outline of the different subfields of philosophy in the beginning of his commentary explaining why al-Abharī did not mention mathematics and practical philosophy. Mawlānāzāda's answer to this question is quite interesting, for he explicitly states a common perception of practical philosophy in the following excerpt:
The author [al-Abharī] ignored (…) all branches of practical philosophy completely because the Muḥammadan šarīʿa attained the end [of this branch of philosophy] in the most perfect and detailed manner (wa-aʿraḍa (…) ʿan aqsām al-ḥikma al-ʿamaliyya bi-asrihā li-anna al-šarīʿa al-Muṣṭafawiyya qad qaḍat al-waṭar ʿanhā ʿalā akmal wağh wa atamm tafṣīl).Footnote 46
Before analyzing the relationship between Mawlānāzāda's explanation and Avicenna's view of practical philosophy, it is worth noting that Mawlānāzāda's statement was quite popular in commentaries and glosses on philosophical works and the books on the classification of sciences, and it was usually repeated verbatim (or paraphrased with new elements added) in these works. I now provide some examples of these works, two of which, namely, Qāḍī Mīr's and Mullā Ṣadrā's works, were very influential due to their place in the madrasa curricula.Footnote 47
Qāḍī Mīr Ḥusayn Maybūdī, Šarḥ Hidāyat al-ḥikma (known as Qāḍī Mīr ʿalā Hidāya) (Darsaʿādat, 1321/1903-4), p. 4.12–15.
It was said that he ignored (…) all branches of practical philosophy completely because the Muḥammadan šarīʿa attained the end [of this branch of philosophy] in the most perfect and detailed manner.
Ibn Ṣadr al-Dīn (or Ṣadraddīnzāda) al-Širwānī (d. 1036/1627), al-Fawāʾid al-ḫāqāniyya, MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Mehmed Asım Bey 469, fol. 105v.
The benefit of this science [namely, ethics], in relation with the first [that is the natural disposition (malaka ṭabīʿiyya)] is to bring out what is hidden in the soul, and in relation with the second [that is the ordinary disposition (malaka ʿādiya)] is to acquire them. And what was transmitted from the Prophet – peace be upon him – indicates that, namely, “I was sent to complete the best of morals.” Because of this, it was said that the šarīʿa attained the end of the branches of practical philosophy in the most perfect and detailed manner.Footnote 48
Mullā Ṣadrā, Šarḥ al-Hidāya al-aṯīriyya, p. 10.14–16.
It was said that the author ignored (…) all branches of practical philosophy completely because the Muḥammadan šarīʿa attained the end [of this branch of philosophy] in the most perfect and detailed manner.
Aqkirmānī, Iklīl al-tarāğim (Ottoman Turkish translation of Qāḍī Mīr's commentary on Hidāyat al-ḥikma), p. 5.13–23.
The author ignored the practical philosophy because the Muḥammadan šarīʿa explained the branches of practical philosophy in the most perfect and detailed manner. There is no need for practical philosophy in the manner that the philosophers expressed it. Can the philosophers' explanations, based on their abstract opinions, be compared with the explanations of the most superior Prophet who received the revelation (ṣāḥib-i waḥy)? What has the beggar to do with the kings, and what has the ground to do with the Pleiades?
Al-Qannawğī, Abğad al-ʿulūm, p. 34.3–5.
I said that the Muḥammadan šarīʿa attained the end of the science of ethics. Nobody was left to say anything about it. For when it is compared with the said books [about ethics], the Book and the Tradition are enough for the one who wants to achieve this science and embellish it. For, the morning makes free from the lamp.Footnote 49
I now go back to Avicenna in quest of the possibility of any type of relationship between this perception of practical philosophy and his approach to this branch of philosophy. Certainly, this requires a very detailed examination of Avicenna's view of šarīʿa, which is not the aim of this article. However, as I believe the reason why practical philosophy is omitted in philosophical summas can be found in Avicenna's thought, I will refer to his two important passages on this subject and then examine his views. One is in the introduction of ʿUyūn al-ḥikma's chapter on physics and the other in the introduction of al-Šifāʾs book of Isagoge. In this part of ʿUyūn, Avicenna first describes philosophy by giving a conventional list of theoretical and practical sciences. He then discusses the relationship between the divine šarīʿa and the parts of philosophy, both theoretical and practical:
The principle (mabdaʾ) of these three [parts of practical philosophy] are acquired from the divine šarīʿa (al-šarīʿa al-ilāhiyya), and the perfections of their definitions [or borders] (wa-kamālāt ḥudūdihā) become evident through the divine šarīʿa. After this [determination made by the divine šarīʿa], human theoretical faculty [namely, the rational soul] acts on them by knowing (maʿrifa) their practical laws (al-qawānīn al-ʿamaliyya) and applying these laws to particular issues [by using the practical faculty]. (…) The principles (mabādiʾ) of all branches of theoretical philosophy are acquired from the masters (arbāb) of divine milla by way of remark (ʿalā sabīl al-tanbīh). The human rational faculty (al-quwwa al-ʿaqliyya) [namely, the theoretical faculty] acts to acquire (taḥṣīl) them perfectly through argumentation (ʿalā sabīl al-ḥuğğa).Footnote 50
As for his discussion in al-Šifāʾ, after dividing the philosophical sciences as theoretical and practical and identifying their conventional tripartite subdivisions, Avicenna states:
The truth of all this [i.e., the branches of practical philosophy] is established by theoretical demonstration (bi-al-burhān al-naẓarī) and the testimony of the šarīʿa (bi-al-šahāda al-šarʿiyya) in general, and its details (tafṣīl) and measure of [application] (taqdīr) being ascertained by the divine šarīʿa (al-šarīʿa al-ilāhiyya).Footnote 51
Because of Avicenna's evasiveness on this issue throughout these two and his other works, it is not easy to provide a definite framework for what he really argues about the relationship between the divine šarīʿa and practical philosophy. Fortunately, we have a commentary on ʿUyūn by al-Rāzī, and although it cannot be easily argued that al-Rāzī's comments reflect what Avicenna really thinks about this relationship, they provide some important clues to understand and trace Avicenna's views of practical philosophy in the later tradition. Al-Rāzī begins by commenting on Avicenna's key concepts in ʿUyūn, referring to those of “principles” (mabādiʾ) and “perfection” (kamāl). According to al-Rāzī, for Avicenna every discipline has something that acts as a principle and something that acts as perfection for that principle. Concerning the three parts of practical philosophy, each of the three parts also has a principle and a perfection, and the principles and perfections are acquired from the divine šarīʿa, as the goal of sending prophets to this world is to guide people to the right path (al-namaṭ) and show them the appropriate way to act in their lives. Because the three branches of practical philosophy include all ways of acting, the prophets were sent only to define the principles and perfections of these sciences. However, the prophets cannot express these principles and perfections in detail:
Then, prophets – peace be upon them – cannot but define the principles and perfections of these three sciences only in a universal way (ʿalā wağh al-kullī). For example, they say ‘One who wants [to get] such and such a virtue, he must do such and such action, and one who wishes to remove such and such a vice, he must do such and such an action’. As for determining (al-tanṣīṣ) the situations of Zayd and ʿAmr, this is an impossible [task]; for particular situations of individuals are not detected precisely. Rather, the lawgiver (al-šāriʿ) must determine these laws, and this is reached by the theoretical faculty. Then, [as for] using these laws in respect of the individual forms and particular events, it is reached by the practical faculty.Footnote 52
Al-Rāzī also comments on the meaning of ḥudūd, explaining it with the word maqādīr, which means measures and quantities. For him, measures and quantities in modes of worship, transactions, and punishments can be known only through the divine šarāʾiʿ.Footnote 53 On the other hand, according to al-Rāzī, while the principles of theoretical sciences, unlike the branches of practical philosophy, are acquired from the masters of the šarāʾiʿ, their perfections or ultimate goals are made clear by the rational faculty of argumentation. Al-Rāzī explains this with reference to Avicenna's al-Aḍḥawiyya. According to al-Rāzī's narration, for Avicenna “the lawgiver is under the obligation to invite people to confess the existence of God, His being exempted from deficiencies and vices, and His being qualified by the epithets of perfection and the marks of majesty.”Footnote 54 Because a more detailed knowledge of God cannot be understood by the majority of people, thus damaging his missionary call, the lawgiver must be content with a general call. As for the details, he must refrain from stating them publicly and entrust them to the intellects of intelligent people instead. That is what Avicenna means when he says that “the principles of all branches of theoretical philosophy are acquired from the masters (arbāb) of divine milla by way of remark (ʿalā sabīl al-tanbīh).”Footnote 55
Avicenna's approach to the relationship between philosophy and the divine šarīʿa in ʿUyūn and al-Šifāʾ still must be interpreted and connected with his views on practical philosophy. At this point, one may ask the following questions: If the principles of practical philosophy are acquired from the divine šarīʿa and the divine šarīʿa determines its details and measure of application, what is the role of practical philosophy, and why does it exist? Following al-Rāzī's explanation, Avicenna's indirect answers to these questions might be found on the basis of the characteristics of the prophetic message and the undeterminable features of particular and future events and situations. Accordingly, although the prophet's message consists of the rules concerning the practical philosophy in detail, it is impossible to cover all possible future situations in it. The human theoretical faculty comes in at this stage. First, it determines the principles acquired from the divine šarīʿa, then theoretically demonstrates the validity and truth of these principles; and finally, on the basis of those demonstrated principles, it produces solutions for particular events and situations. It is in this stage that it uses the practical faculty of human being.
When one considers these functions from the perspective of the discipline of prophetic legislation, one can see that the first two roles correspond to the latter's content. It is already evident that what Avicenna does in the chapters X.4–5 of Metaphysics of al-Šifāʾ is to determine the principles legislated by the prophet for ethics, household management and politics, and to demonstrate their validity and truth theoretically on the basis of his theory of prophecy. As for the theoretical faculty's third role, that is producing solutions for new particular events by using the practical faculty, it consists of the subject-matter of every branch of practical philosophy, including ethics, household management, and politics. However, it seems that Avicenna's approach to the prophetic legislation in those chapters of al-Šifāʾ that tend to discuss how to determine the principles of the branches of practical philosophy, shifts in his later works, like al-Ḥikma al-mašriqiyya and al-Išārāt, where he seems to be more interested in the role of the prophet in the life of individuals and societies only. Therefore, one may also argue that he gradually reduced his interest to the practical philosophy and finally restricted himself to discussing only the “prophetic legislation” in a general manner.Footnote 56
As for the relationship between practical philosophy and the divine šarīʿa, an important question to be posed is the following: How can we reconcile the practical aspects of the šarīʿa, which are strictly related to a particular time and society, and the philosopher's claim for the universality of his theories? In other words, how is it possible for the šarīʿa that is advocated by the prophet in a certain social-historical context to provide philosophy in general, and the practical philosophy in particular, with their principles in a detailed manner, while philosophy claims to be above and beyond particular times and societies? To answer these questions, we should take a short glance at Avicenna's theory of prophecy. Following al-Fārābī, Avicenna argues that the prophet with a “powerful soul” acquires the knowledge of all intelligibles from the Active Intellect through his fully developed power of intuition almost at once, and because of which his intellect is called the “sacred intellect” (ʿaql qudsī). Moreover, the prophet's highly developed imaginative faculty both provides the knowledge of particular events taking place in the past, present, and future, and reproduces the intelligible knowledge, which is received from the supernal world as abstract and universal, in terms of the perceptible and audible messages which are recited to the prophet's society, and which then constitute the text of the revelation. Besides, through his motive faculty that is also developed beyond the average level of ordinary people, the prophet can set into motion and influence not only different parts of his own body, but also the bodies other than his own.Footnote 57 It is not easy to claim, however, that such a conception of prophecy leads to a conclusion that every šarīʿa is completely different from another, and that they do not share any common ground. As Avicenna elaborates in his Aqsām, while there are particular commands and prohibitions pertaining to a particular šarīʿa in accordance with the social-historical context, there are also universal commands and prohibitions that are common to all šarāʾiʿ. Therefore, when Avicenna said that “the principles of these three [parts of practical philosophy] are acquired from the divine šarīʿa,” he must have meant those universal commands and prohibitions for the life of individuals and societies that are common to all šarāʾiʿ. It seems that the role of the discipline of prophetic legislation at this stage is to determine these principles and present them to the three branches of practical philosophy. Determining these principles also provides the knowledge about the difference between the divine prophecy and all false claims, which is one of the subject-matters of the discipline of prophetic legislation. For, the perfection of these principles in terms of their effective role in preserving the life of individuals and societies indicates that the one who has legislated these principles has the “divine prophecy”, and all other claims of prophecy are false and invalid.Footnote 58
Accordingly, the answer to the question of why Avicenna did not examine practical philosophy in his summas in detail should be sought from the above perspective. As Avicenna realized the close relationship between the divine šarīʿa and practical philosophy and the dominant and indisputable role of the divine šarīʿa in this field, he must have chosen to introduce a new discipline within practical philosophy and to deal, intensely and consciously in terms of practical philosophy, only with this new discipline throughout his career. Nevertheless, what Avicenna really accomplishes in the last two sections of Metaphysics of al-Šifāʾ can be described as a study on the prophet's role in arranging the life of individuals and society in a demonstrative way. Although al-Ḥikma al-mašriqiyya's relevant section is not available today, what he calls the “art of legislation” or the “prophetic legislation” in the beginning of this book and the second part of politics in his Aqsām refers, in all likelihood, to this framework.
To strengthen my argument for the impact of Avicenna's view of the relationship between practical philosophy and šarīʿa on later works, now I will follow its path, as I did above, through different types of works, such as commentaries, glosses, books on the classification of sciences etc. The earliest example of Avicenna's influence is in al-Ġazālī. Apart from his (mis)interpretation of the politics as a science whose origin (aṣluhu) is the religious sciences (al-ʿulūm al-šarʿiyya) in his al-Maqāṣid, al-Ġazālī presents politics and ethics as two sciences that come from the prophets and the great sūfī masters in his division of philosophical sciences in the al-Munqiḍ:
W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazālī (London, 1952), p. 38.
Politics: All their [philosophers'] discussion of this is based on considerations of worldly and governmental advantage. These they borrow from the divine scriptures revealed through the prophets and from the maxims handed down from the saints of old.
Ethics: Their whole discussion of ethics consists in defining the characteristics and moral constitution of the soul and enumerating the various types of soul and the method of moderating and controlling them. This they borrow from the teaching of the mystics, those men of piety whose chief occupation is to meditate upon God, to oppose the passions, and to walk in the way leading to God by withdrawing from worldly pleasure.
Another figure to detect Avicenna's effect is al-Šahrastānī (d. 548/1153). When discussing the divisions of philosophical sciences into theoretical and practical sciences in his Kitāb al-Milal wa-al-niḥal (The Book of Religions and Sects), al-Šahrastānī explicitly emphasizes the prophetic influence on practical philosophy:
Al-Šahrastānī, Kitāb al-Milal wa-al-niḥal, ed. Muḥammad Seyyed Kīlānī, vol. II (Cairo, 1961), p. 59.18–20.
(…) but seeking help from others in practical [philosophy] is much more [necessary than that is in theoretical philosophy]. The prophets – peace be upon them – supported practical philosophy by [their] spiritual guidance completely [and in detail], but they supported theoretical philosophy only in a limited way. Philosophers undertook the rational guidance to theoretical philosophy completely [and in detail], but they supported practical philosophy only in a limited way.
Ibn al-Akfānī's conclusion at the end of his presentation of the three branches of practical philosophy can also be considered as another expression of the perception of the Avicennan approach:
Ibn al-Akfānī, Iršād, p. 64.845–46.
It has been benefited from these three sciences, i.e., politics, ethics, and household management, by studying the kings' and others' virtuous and praised biographies. And there is not a more beneficial biography than the Prophetic biography – the best blessing and peace and greeting upon the owner of this biography.Footnote 59
In addition to these examples of the indirect impact of the Avicennan conception of practical philosophy, there are a considerable number of texts that use Avicenna's words in his ʿUyūn about the relationship between šarīʿa and the practical philosophy, most likely through al-Rāzī's commentary on it. For example, in his Šarḥ Ḥikmat al-ʿayn, Mubārak Šāh al-Buḫārī clearly says that, “The principles (mabādiʾ) of these three [parts of practical philosophy] are from the divine šarīʿa (al-šarīʿa al-ilāhiyya).”Footnote 60 However, in his ḥāšiya on Mubārak Šāh's commentary, al-Ğurğānī argues that as the science of politics is divided into two parts, i.e., one is related to sovereignty and sultanate and the other concerns prophecy and the šarīʿa, only some of the issues of practical philosophy must be known through the owner of the šarʿ, i.e., the Prophet.Footnote 61 On the other hand, the author of another ḥāšiya on Mubārak Šāh's commentary, Mirzā Ğān Ḥabīb Allāh, insists on defending the commentator and criticizes al-Ğurğānī in a very polite way, stating:
The commentator [Mubārak Šāh al-Buḫārī] said, “The principles of these three…,” i.e., all of their origins (uṣūluhā) and their foundation (asāsuhā) are from the divine šarīʿa according to what [his] phrase involves. This is not incompatible with the division of all [parts of the practical philosophy] to what concerns sovereignty and sultanate, and to what concerns prophecy and the šarīʿa. This is so because this is a division with regard to all [parts of practical] philosophy. Yet, according to the books of [prophetic] biographies (siyar) and the books of history, God – the Exalted – sent it first to the prophets – peace be upon them –, and so, all of it is from the side of the šarīʿa. As for some issues (masāʾil) that conflict with the šarīʿa, they increased by the successive clever opinions (bi-talāḥuq al-afkār al-mutafaṭṭina). Accordingly, there is no need to direct the commentary to what he [al-Ğurğānī] – may God sanctify his heart – committed when he said that “i.e., some of the issues [of practical philosophy] are known through the owner of the šarʿ.”Footnote 62
Finally, an expression of Kawākib-i sabʿa (Seven Stars), a treatise written in 1155/1741 upon the request of the French government on the curricula of Ottoman madrasas by an anonymous mudarris Footnote 63 represents this perception very well. Regarding the place of practical philosophy in the curriculum, the author explicitly says:
Then, [the student] starts to study the theoretical philosophy (ḥikmat-i naẓariyya). Because the Muslims' practical philosophy (ḥikmat-i ʿamaliyya) consists of the Islamic law (fiqh), [the student] does not examine the practical philosophy.Footnote 64
I have argued throughout this article that Avicenna's central position in Islamic intellectual history is not restricted to the branches of theoretical philosophy; rather, when compared with his impact on the venture of theoretical philosophy, he has also had a deep and strong influence on the conception of practical philosophy until modern times. To demonstrate his effect, I have focused on the classification of practical philosophy and the reasons behind the disregard for practical philosophy in philosophical summas after Avicenna. However, studies on the traces of Avicenna's conception of practical philosophy on the independent works of practical philosophy in later traditions, such as Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's (d. 672/1274) Aḫlāq-i Nāṣirī, ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Īğī's (d. 756/1355) Aḫlāq-i Aḍudī, Ğalāl al-Dīn al-Dawwānī's (d. 907/1501) Aḫlāq-i Ğalālī, Ḥusain Wāʿiz-i Kāšifī's (d. 910/1504–1505) Aḫlāq-i Muḥsinī, and Qinalīzāda ʿAlī Efendi's (d. 979/1572) Aḫlāq-i ʿAlāʾī, will provide us with important clues to sufficiently evaluate Avicenna's role in Islamic intellectual history.Footnote *
