“Hannah Arendt was one of the most important political thinkers of the twentieth century.” So writes Michael H. McCarthy at the outset of The Political Humanism of Hannah Arendt. The book offers a synoptic survey of some themes in Arendt's thought, dealing primarily with The Human Condition and the roughly contemporaneous essays collected in Between Past and Future. The author is especially concerned to examine what she has to say about the philosophical thinkers from the past who serve her as foils for her arguments in those works, notably Aristotle and Marx. At the same time he is anxious to situate Arendt's thinking in relation to other political thinkers, such as Montesquieu and Tocqueville, to whom she herself gave more limited, if respectful, attention. He concludes with an affirmation of Arendt's continuing relevance, in face of the unhealthy state of present-day (American) liberal democracy.
There are not many studies of Arendt in English that give comparably detailed and searching attention to Arendt's vexed and vexing remarks about Aristotle, or to her highly unusual reading of Marx. (There has been somewhat more extensive discussion of these matters on the part of scholars writing in French and in German.) The exposition of Arendt's own ideas is for the most part reliable, although somewhat marred by a certain looseness of paraphrase, which shows little apparent regard for the strenuous (though idiosyncratic) intellectual discipline that went into her every conceptual formulation. McCarthy is duly alert to the intricacy of Arendt's thinking, but somewhat incautious in the way he assembles and blends assertions of hers made in widely different contexts of argument. And when it comes to affirming Arendt's importance, he seems somehow reluctant to put too much weight on her theoretical intricacies. He chooses instead to stress what she has in common with other, “republican” thinkers from the past—whom he (misleadingly) calls “her true political mentors.” (The term “republican” is used capaciously enough to include not only Machiavelli and Jefferson, but also Montesquieu and Tocqueville.) In the end a skeptical reader might well wonder why Arendt should be worth all the trouble, if we might just as well take our lessons directly from those other well-known authors.
This book is clearly the product of long rumination, the work of a scholar who has spent many years in the company of Arendt's books. The author keeps aloof from recent scholarly commentary or criticism, referring to no books or articles about Arendt published within the last decade or so. With an author like Arendt, herself famously aloof from academic contemporaries, there is certainly something to be said for a commentator resourceful enough to go it alone without stopping for sidelong glances at current debates or opinions. Yet there are other ways, too, that the book can seem a bit out of date. McCarthy appears to take no account of any of the numerous texts by Arendt's own hand that have come into print in the past dozen years. In that time there have been three collections of writings previously unpublished or long unavailable, selected and edited by her sometime assistant Jerome Kohn—Responsibility and Judgment, The Promise of Politics, and The Jewish Writings. In German there has been the splendidly thorough critical edition of Arendt's notebooks—her so-called Denktagebuch—published by Ursula Ludz and Ingeborg Nordmann in 2002. McCarthy's study would have benefited considerably from attention to these texts, even though none are as important for understanding Arendt's thought as the books of hers that he focuses on. The fragmentary manuscripts collected in The Promise of Politics shed interesting light on some obscurities in the argument of The Human Condition, notably in relation to a matter of central concern to her political thought (and of central interest to McCarthy's study), the ancient Greek city-state. The lectures on moral philosophy printed in Responsibility and Judgment are similarly helpful, in that they provide a corrective to misleading impressions created by the better-known Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, to which many scholars (McCarthy included) have tended to give disproportionate weight. (The Kant lectures, too, appeared only posthumously.) And even more important as a resource for students of Arendt is the Denktagebuch, comprising dated notebook entries written over Arendt's last twenty-five years. The material is especially rich for the years leading up to and following the writing of The Human Condition, and offers a fascinating view to the genesis and development of her thinking during those fertile years following her completion of The Origins of Totalitarianism.
The study's last chapter is titled “The Discontents of Liberal Democracy and the Continuing Relevance of Arendtian Thought.” There the discussion of Arendt is accompanied by a lengthy, programmatic survey of ills and malaises besetting present-day American democracy. McCarthy fears that pervasive social anomie and persistent civic apathy may make for a crisis of political legitimacy; he warns that gross inequalities of power and wealth will grow ever more entrenched, owing to changes in the global economy. He makes no claim to any great originality in this diagnosis of our predicament, and draws freely on such writers as Charles Taylor and Michael Sandel; also William Galston, Robert Putnam, and Benjamin Barber. At the end he comes back to Arendt, whom he takes as an exceptionally vigorous exponent of the republican ideal of the active, vigilant citizen. Yet he also believes that her ideas would have to be significantly modified before they can speak usefully to the present situation as he sees it. Among other things, he regrets that she did not pay enough attention to matters of economics, or to questions of social justice, and he faults her for failing to attend more closely to Aristotle's notion of practical wisdom.
Even more than the rest of the book, this last chapter feels a bit dated—as if untouched by events of the past dozen years. No doubt the malaises of liberal democracy to which McCarthy adverts are still with us, now more than ever. But there is something odd, even disconcerting, in the way the discussion is framed, in a book which sets out to affirm Hannah Arendt's present-day pertinence. The chapter's topical subheads include the words “security” and “power”—the first referring to anxieties arising from economic uncertainty, the second to grievances over the global maldistribution of wealth. Those indeed are worrisome issues, deserving serious attention. And yet, the reader may feel something close to nostalgia, recalling an era when Americans’ worry over “security” was chiefly a question of economic prospects, or when worldwide discontent over America's disproportionate power had chiefly to do with the regulation of markets. Our times are darker than that—as Arendt's had been.
