As much as there is a renewed attention given to life in recent continental philosophy, for example with the development of biophilosophies and theories of biopower, the ontological interpretation of the phenomenon of life itself appears to play a secondary role in the thoughts of the major authors usually considered essential to any definition of this large part of today’s philosophical scene. Husserl’s focus on the streams of consciousness and intentionality, Heidegger’s human Dasein which is totally separated from all beings since he alone can open itself to Being, Sartre’s concept of freedom and reflective consciousness, Merleau-Ponty’s work on perception which relies on an interpretation of the lived body and its impacts on human consciousness, or Foucault’s theory of power through an interpretation of the shift from classical to modern exercise of violence, all seem to have scarcely anything to do with the phenomenon of life itself, and even less with the biological sciences. Relying essentially on the difference of human consciousness from anything biological, these philosophies may be said to postulate an unbridgeable gap between human and non-human, the latter being organic non-human life as well as inorganic beings. This is, I would argue, partially true, but it is also partially untrue—as Brett Buchanan’s book splendidly shows. The distinctive feature of this book, as exhibited in its title, is the fact that it traces back some of the works of three major continental philosophers, namely Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze, to the theoretical and experimental writings of German biologist Jakob von Uexküll. It thus argues that, though some theoretical difficulties are unavoidable when thinking the link (or the difference) of human being to animals (and by extension to all living beings), such an approach can nonetheless provide an interesting and new look on Heidegger’s conception of Dasein, Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of perception and the lived body, and Deleuze’s analysis of becoming and affects. It sheds a different light on the place of life in the conceptual frameworks defined by these authors.
Since Uexküll is not a common name in the curriculum of continental philosophy, nor of philosophy in general, Buchanan offers, in chapter 1, a brief though enlightening summary of both the ethologist’s main concepts and their status in the scientific landscape of his time, which is the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. As for the place and sources of Uexküll’s theories of life, there are two main biologists who defined his approach, Baer and Darwin. If Uexküll was not satisfied with Darwin’s mechanistic conception of life and evolution (being therefore closer to Baer’s approach), Buchanan strongly emphasizes that Uexküll’s aim was to navigate through the perils (for the explanation of life) of both mechanism and vitalism. Interestingly enough, we also learn that Uexküll was in fact greatly influenced by Kant’s philosophy. Drawing from the Copernican Revolution and its focus on the subject’s part in world forming, the German biologist intended to use the philosophical insights of Königsberg’s famous philosopher in order to properly understand the world (or should I say, the worlds) of animals: “Like Kant, Uexküll did not believe that we could get to a noumenal ‘thing in itself’; all that we have are phenomenal appearances” (p. 14). It is precisely this link with Kant that will lead Uexküll to see in behaviour the essential and defining characteristic of living beings. Living things, and especially animals, are in a constant interaction with their environments, their Umwelt as Uexküll puts it, and their relational existence must be clearly understood as such; moreover, they cannot be properly understood otherwise. The Umweltforschung, and correspondingly the ethology founded partly by Uexküll himself, indeed consider that the relational being of animals as exhibited in their behaviour toward their environments is the true feature of life. One can easily understand, right from the start in Buchanan’s description, that this feature will be extremely important for the elucidation of Uexküll’s import in Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze. Two images emerge from this picture of life’s entanglement with its environment: the soap bubble and music, more precisely both symphony and harmony. On the one hand, Uexküll argues that every animal has its own world, which is the surrounding beings that are significant to it – as in his famous example of the tick – and that this world is like a soap bubble around each animal. Clearly, as is highlighted by Buchanan, Uexküll did not have in mind a spatial soap bubble, but rather a delimiting bubble of significant (and non-significant) surrounding beings, according to each animal’s relationship to its world. On the other hand, Buchanan underlines the importance of music in Uexküll’s understanding of life. Relying on the “Chime and/or rhythm of cells”, “Melody of organs”, “Symphony of the organism”, “Harmony of organisms” and “Composition of nature” (cf. pp. 26-27), the analogy between music and life is both an interesting portrayal of what Uexküll calls nature’s conformity with plan and an image that will find its way into the philosophers’ thinking. Chapter 1 ends with a discussion of the place of Uexküll’s theories in contemporary biosemiotics. Even though Uexküll himself was not a “biosemioticist” (this approach was developed only many years after his death in 1944), Buchanan shows how his theories of life did act as a foundation for any interpretation of life as positing significance in the world. This link, which has unfortunately no real follow-up in the discussion of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze, is at the very least an interesting reading of Uexküll’s conception of life, that ought to be deepened.
Chapters 2 and 3 deal with Heidegger’s thinking and its relationship with living beings, especially animals, and biology as a science. The least we can say is that animals do not have a major role in Being and Time. It is actually in Heidegger’s 1929-1930 course “The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics” that Buchanan finds a lengthy account of life and biology. This is surely one of the highlights of this book. Through a precise interpretation of this text, Buchanan is able to provide an insightful reading of Heidegger’s conception of life (a theme that is so often neglected), and, I would add, he enables us to understand the basic problems of it. After an overview of Heidegger’s relationship with the basic biologists of his time, among which Uexküll is definitely a central part (cf. pp. 46-55), Buchanan interprets the famous distinction defended by Heidegger between beings present-at-hand which have no world, animals which are poor in world, and human Dasein who is world forming. As I have already outlined, the concepts of world and Umwelt were central to Uexküll’s theories of life. Buchanan thus really shows the parallels and differences between Uexküll’s and Heidegger’s approaches to these central concepts.
It is through the disruptive behaviour of the captivated animal that Heidegger wants to give biology and ethology their due, while keeping a sharp distinction between human Dasein and animals, since his existential analysis of Dasein is fundamentally based on the uniqueness of human being (Dasein) in the world. As Being-in-the-world, Dasein is, according to Heidegger, open to Being itself, and not only to beings as are animals captivated in their surrounding environments. If one can surely see here a framework which is common with Uexküll’s when commenting on a passage in Heidegger’s lecture where the German philosopher almost agrees that, as we have been accustomed to claim, animals have an environmental world, Buchanan nonetheless says: “Heidegger is not particularly recognized for going along with the ‘accustomed’ way of talking, so it should be with a bit of skepticism that we follow his adherence to the view that animals have an environment” (p. 73) (or a world, I would add). In fact, as is shown by Buchanan, Heidegger relies on a strict and sharp distinction between human comportment and animal behaviour (an understanding of behaviour that might have more to do with behaviourism than with Uexküll’s definition). Anyway, if Buchanan has the merit of exploring the difficult relationship between Dasein and non-human living beings in Heidegger’s thought, he also interestingly shows that this relationship is problematic. Putting aside the fact that part of the terminology used by Heidegger is inaccurate (cf. pp. 80-81), as well as I would say the fact that animals, plants, and rocks are assimilated to living beings, sometimes it is not clear if Buchanan himself does not agree with this view (cf. p. 55). This part of the book ends with an enlightening passage:
[F]rom early on, Heidegger shows a familiarity with biological writings – and a preference for Uexküll in particular – but though his analyses suggest a proximity to the key issue of the environment, his language says otherwise. … Animal behavior, as compared to human comportment, reveals the ontologically decisive measure by which the natural world is carved into human existence and animal life, with that ever so slight abyss gaping between them. (p. 113)
Buchanan thus clearly emphasizes that the question regarding animals’ existence remains a central, and unresolved, problem in Heidegger’s thought. This appears to be the reason why a thorough explanation of living beings’ existence is always postponed in the German philosopher’s writings (cf. p. 87).
The title of the fourth chapter reintroduces an important image laid down by Uexküll when trying to understand life, namely music. It does so in order to characterize Merleau-Ponty’s relationship to life. In The Structure of Behavior, his early writing, Merleau-Ponty establishes a fundamental link between the experience (and perception) of the lived body and the relational concept of behaviour that was central to Uexküll’s work. Buchanan highlights this fact by devoting a large part of his account of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of the organic (and thus of living beings) to the insightful claims one finds in his text (that may be said to be often overlooked). Relating the animal’s Umwelt, in Uexküll’s terms, to Being-in-the-world, partly as Heidegger defines it, Merleau-Ponty and his interpretation of the lived body both in his work on behaviour and in The Phenomenology of Perception may be read as a linking agent between the disincarnated Dasein and living beings. There is an important part of The Structure of Behavior that is focused on thinking an appropriate explanation of the organism, on making a clear link between organism and behaviour, according to which “the ‘immaterial’ aspect of the organism, if we may call it that, shows itself in the manner that living beings engage with their surroundings” (p. 127), although—as Buchanan quotes Merleau-Ponty from The Visible and the Invisible—“the problems posed in Ph.P. are insoluble because I start there from the ‘consciousness’ – ‘object’ distinction” (p. 117). As Buchanan straightforwardly puts it, in the work on behaviour and in the one on perception, Merleau-Ponty is in the end always interested in organic life, as it is perceived by human consciousness. That explains why here “we are no longer dealing with what might be an ontological interpretation of the organism and its inherent relation to an environment, but with how this relation is constructed out of our own perspective lives” (p. 128). If the framework established by these works to properly understand the lived body may lay an appropriate path to the understanding of life itself, and if this was partly what Merleau-Ponty wanted to do in The Visible and the Invisible, this project could never be completed because of his death in 1961. His lectures on Nature though, as shown by Buchanan, give an approximate idea of what an explanation of life itself should look like. Such explanation has a lot to do with movement and meaning, as those are intrinsically instituted by life. Uexküll’s image of life as music comes back to illustrate Merleau-Ponty’s claims (cf. p. 129). Relying on this image and on Merleau-Ponty’s programmatic notes on life, Buchanan gracefully shows that the French phenomenologist’s description of life as a pure wake and a quiet force in the flesh of the world, as well as his concept of interanimality, must be an essential part of a phenomenological interpretation of the animal’s existence and life in general.
The final chapter deals with Deleuze’s approach to these questions. Being reluctant to endorse the traditional definition of the organism, “the organism is the enemy” (p. 151) as Buchanan quotes Deleuze, he wants to stay away from both mechanism and vitalism. Becoming and affects are depicted as the essential concepts of Deleuze’s ontology of life. Drawing from Spinoza, we could argue, partly as Buchanan shows it, that Deleuze does not really make a clear-cut distinction between organic living beings and inorganic things. The affects, as Buchanan strongly emphasizes, establish an important link between Deleuze’s position and Uexküll’s works (cf. pp. 154-162). Notions like the rhizomatic Body without organs (BwO) are certainly analyzed by Buchanan as allowing us to understand the onto-ethology as it is defended by Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus. Once again, the image of the melody of life comes back, but this time in the figure of life as rhythm or rhythms (cf. p. 174). In the end, the becoming-animal, as entrapped in the image of the animal-stalks-at-five-o’clock, is equated to the Being-in-the-world that was once the privilege of Heidegger’s human Dasein. A problematic statement related to these notions must though be outlined: “[T]he animal-stalks-at-five-o’clock is about as precise as one can get in revealing the nature of an animal. Pure animality is liberated from the constraints of the organic to become inorganic or supraorganic” (p. 185). Is it that in the end animality should be understood separately from the organic – in which case there would be no point in making a distinction between animals (including humans) and everything else – and can we then think of an intrinsic relationship between the animal and its Umwelt, as was Uexküll’s basic idea?
Here are some of the questions that this book raises in its way through the difficult, neglected, but rewarding philosophical inquiry of life. I should mention that an author such as Hans Jonas, who is only quickly referred to in the book even though a large part of his work is explicitly aimed at the elucidation of the ontological significance of life itself, should have been a greater part of this picture of the animal environments in continental philosophy. One can nonetheless find in Buchanan’s book everything that is needed in order to acknowledge the importance of such inquiries.
