Empires

Despite this increasing focus on hierarchies, the study of empires or World-Systems Theory has long been considered passé, also because of perceived normative biases. For at least the last ninety years, ‘empire’ has been a negatively loaded concept for describing what others do,Footnote ¹⁵ still resonating in arguments that ‘empire’ is bad because it is empire and not something else, like domestic rule or democracy.Footnote ¹⁶

Still, over the past decade, also the analytical study of imperial relations in international affairs has been revived, aimed at understanding rather than criticising empires. Attempts to define empires fall into three categories, focusing on attributes of empires, on dyadic interactions between states or polities, or on their configurational network properties. As I will show, the third approach is the most efficient, as it concentrates on how imperial orders differ from other governance arrangements, such as hegemonies, federations, or unitary states. However, all take core-periphery dynamics as the starting point. As we will see, this means that existing models cannot explain polities or states that display elements of both core and periphery.

In more traditional ‘realist’ accounts, ‘empire’ is often similar or equal to actors such as super- or hyper-powers, or hegemons, unipolar systems, or states with expansive foreign policies.Footnote ¹⁷ The presence of an empire leads to changes in the international system, not a change of the system.Footnote ¹⁸ The logic is still one of great powers rising and counterbalancing, with the tendency towards sameness.Footnote ¹⁹ Empire is a result of differences in capabilities among independent actors, where their position in any hierarchy is determined by their attributes. Much of the same goes for more pericentric theories that focus on attributes like imperial ideology or peripheral identities in explaining outcomes.Footnote ²⁰

David Lake is among the pioneers in the analytical study of hierarchies and empires in IR. He argues that theories of empire have tended to focus on the dispositional features of the core, on the properties of peripheries, or on capability aggregation and competition between great powers.Footnote ²¹ As opposed to the unspecific use of empire to describe any predominant actor, Lake employs a ‘relational contracting’ approach to hierarchies, whereby an actor chooses a relationship, a dyadic contract, ‘ranging from an anarchic alliance to a hierarchic empire’Footnote ²² along a continuum. It is not the properties of an empire, differences in capabilities etc., that do the explaining, but the costs, benefits, and trade-offs of particular ways of arranging governance relationships. What relationship is chosen is a function of the expected cost of opportunism (like defection, rebellion, and other self-regarding behaviour in partners), and the governance costs of managing relations (monitoring costs, side-payments to promote voluntary submission, safeguards, or coercion). The more hierarchical, the lower the risk of opportunism from the partners, but the more hierarchical the system, the higher the governance cost. The various forms of hierarchy are in turn distinguished on the basis of the amount of sovereignty or residual control transferred from subordinate to dominant states. In empires, control over resources is centralised in the core, unless it has specifically been reserved for a periphery through a contract.Footnote ²³

Two main points of critique can be levelled against Lake’s theory: (1) He does not separate between dyadic bargains and a broader governance structure, or logic. He thus cannot capture a central feature of empires, namely differentiated contracts; and (2) Lake assumes that governance costs and opportunism are two independent variables, and that governance costs deter states from more hierarchical relationships. However, given certain relational prehistories, they may co-vary and not be independent of each other. The first point is mended by existing structural models of empires. The concept of semi-cores mends the second problem, by emphasising how both opportunism and governance cost may decline with increasing hierarchy, because of precontractual properties. I will address these points in continuation.

Although opportunism and governance cost are pertinent variables, Lake’s theory has trouble distinguishing various hierarchical governing logics from each other. Even in explaining the rational choices made in establishing contracts, he does not distinguish between an overall imperial structure/order and specific dyadic relationships.Footnote ²⁴ The information we get from Lake’s dyadic theory cannot account for the dynamics or characteristics of particular overall structures of governance. Hierarchies are also different types of orders, like federations, hegemonies, or unitary states. Just as in empires, such different hierarchical orders might also involve transfer of residual control, but Lake is unable to distinguish between them. Lake is right that empire is a form of hierarchy, but in relying on dyadic contracts, the distinct logic of rule of empires on a structural level remains unexplored.Footnote ²⁵

This is addressed in other approaches that pay attention to the particular logics of rule and dilemmas created by an imperial network structure, relying on ideal-typical relational models to foreground empires as distinct political systems.Footnote ²⁶ Such models focus on imperial management, rather than on autonomous actors with special properties, or states making separate dyadic bargains.

These studies vary in scope and purpose, but they all see empires as consisting of cores and peripheries, with the relationships or contracts between them leading to certain particular structural properties. Johan Galtung’s classical study of imperialism has shown how empires are characterised by a combination of harmonic and conflictual relations involving an imperial core, ‘bridgeheads’ or intermediaries, and isolated peripheries.Footnote ²⁷ Empires as political systems, then, are ideal typically characterised by indirect rule through intermediaries, differentiated ‘contracts’ between the imperial core and the provinces, and top–down authoritarian control.

To reduce the costs associated with governing widespread and heterogeneous peripheries, the élites in the core govern indirectly through partners in the peripheral élites. These intermediaries ‘enjoy considerable autonomy within their own domains in return for delivery of compliance, tribute and military collaboration with the center’.Footnote ²⁸

These models also capture what escapes Lake’s theory of hierarchy in dyads: that the contracts within an imperial order differ across the core’s peripheries. The peripheries are walled off from one another, because any flow of communication has to pass through the core. This is a strategy for deterring unification amongst the ‘co-contractors’ in the system, to prevent opportunism or the possibility of coordinated resistance against the core. The core dominates and exploits peripheries, but it must also prevent ties from forming among them. Also within the provinces, such tactics are employed to segment various groups on the basis of characteristics like race, ethnicity, religion, kinship, or political attitudes, and then play them off against each other.Footnote ²⁹

This creates certain principal-agent problems for empires. Indirect rule may divert resources into the hands of the local élites who act as intermediaries, who in turn may then use their local power base to pursue their own interests and gain too much power relative to the core. This is often checked by rotating the offices of the intermediaries.Footnote ³⁰

Differentiation of contracts and divide-and-rule strategies may conflict with unification – to secure a common loyalty to the core across the peripheries. In core-periphery interactions, the core must therefore balance between binding strategies that seek to hold the empire together by creating common identification and loyalty, and pivoting strategies to triangulate among local actors to avoid the formation of independent coalitions within the periphery.Footnote ³¹ Binding strategies are less costly and simpler to apply, as it is easier to rely on one group than to be constantly forming new loyalties.Footnote ³²

Missing links

Such configurational models enable us to tease out the specific imperial logics of rule, and not only dyadic relationships or attributes. What all such approaches to empire have in common, however, is the simple dichotomy between core and peripheries. Governance structures are distinguished by their various forms of core-periphery relations. This binary opposition, core/periphery, is taken as sufficient to explain the structural workings of empires.Footnote ³³ But, as another theorist of empire, Joseph Schumpeter, has shown in the economic sphere, it is crucial to capture the relationship between the advantages of superior productivity in units, and the larger structure of capitalism. Structure and unit developments must be viewed together.Footnote ³⁴ The same, I contend, applies to empires. The need to go beyond static contractual properties is also underlined by Emile Durkheim’s observation that ‘in a contract, not everything is contractual’.Footnote ³⁵ Some pre-existing characteristics would be seen as necessary to perform the requirements of any given contract in the first place. Furthermore, contracts themselves can function as ‘institutional myths’.Footnote ³⁶ In functionally differentiated social systems, exchange relations are socially embedded as the dominant form of social interaction.Footnote ³⁷

Empires have encompassed an array of ‘traditional and differentiated political orientations, activities, and organizations … resulting in complex interrelations between political institutions and other parts of the social structure’; thus, the structural stability of empires has depended on the strength of social ties between groups and levels of cultural closeness as well as on territorial differentiation.Footnote ³⁸ In strategic studies, Paul MacDonald also emphasises the crucial importance of socially conditioned narratives of legitimation in shaping imperial network ties, while Alexander Wendt and Daniel Friedheim note how socialisation may constitute an independent factor in imperial dynamics.Footnote ³⁹ Considering this, the binary opposition between core and periphery seems to be a hitherto-unchallenged narrowness in existing models. Beyond the core-periphery model, there has been little talk about variations in kinds of hierarchical relationships within empires.

As Jack Donnelly has argued, in the study of hierarchies we can no longer be content with operating with simple dichotomies, like anarchy versus hierarchy or sovereignty versus empire.Footnote ⁴⁰ The same goes for cores versus peripheries. What is lacking is deeper study of structural combinations of territorial strain in provinces and strategies of unification in the core that may simultaneously affect the cost of governing as well as the risks of opportunism, mobilisation, or secession.Footnote ⁴¹

My point is not that the motivation of actors or the particular content of norms, relations, or identities in a given case can explain the generic structural properties of empires. Rather, the point is that the consequences of precontractual relational histories have been ignored, leading analysts to overlook the varying degrees of embeddedness present in differentiated imperial relationships that can affect structural dynamics. In a model, cultural content may be irrelevant for shedding light on isomorphic structural dynamics and dilemmasFootnote ⁴² – but the forms of historical cultural, intersocietal relations are not.

The challenge is to render such ‘cultural’ factors into formal arguments. This article represents a first cut here, by advancing the concept of the ‘semi-core’ within imperial systems. The concept of semi-cores addresses the second critique against Lake and existing theories of hierarchy, by capturing the precontractual aspects of imperial relations which are vital for unpacking imperial logics of rule.

Comparing the form of hierarchical polities

The closest we can come to such arrangements in studies of empires is the concept of semi-peripheries as originally used in the ‘world-systems’ literature. Focusing on functional roles within a capitalist world economy, substantially resting on production and trade patterns, semi-peripheries are said to fall between the dualisms of bourgeoisie–proletariat, and core-periphery. A ‘semi-periphery’ is a periphery for the core, and in part a core for some other peripheries.Footnote ⁴⁹ Semi-peripheries take advantage of their flexibility, and they are intermediaries, often in a bargaining position. They are exploited by the core, but are also often exploiters themselves. Functionally, however, semi-peripheries are still ordinary peripheries relative to the core, so this does not change the logic of hierarchical rule. Structurally speaking, the difference from a logic of indirect rule through imperial intermediaries is one of scale only (the world-system). Furthermore, it is doubtful whether this theory analytically addresses the distinctiveness of empire at all: it is more concerned with the overall global capitalist system, where countries as dissimilar as Norway, Iran, Nigeria, China, and Italy can all be conceptualised as ‘semi-peripheries’.Footnote ⁵⁰

It is more appropriate to take our cues from the comparative study of state formations and to contrast empires with other strategies of state formation or ways of arranging a polity.Footnote ⁵¹ Comparing empires with state-formations also makes sense because the distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ becomes increasingly blurry as the sovereignty-in-anarchy model wanes. By substituting a continuum of political orders for Lake’s dyadic continuum, we can move from ‘confederacy’ through ‘federation’ and ‘empire’ to ‘unitary state’ with increasing hierarchy. These differences in configurational network properties are shown in the simple network models in Figure 1.

Figure 1

Configurations of hierarchical polities

Strictly speaking, a confederacy, or organic federalism,Footnote ⁵² would not be a hierarchy at all.Footnote ⁵³ It would be polycephalic – with many different and co-equal cores, coming together to coordinate specific tasks and pooling resources based on functional differentiation.Footnote ⁵⁴

Federations, however, would have a core, as the central level of government. The two levels of government, the federal core and the federal provinces, are connected by shared rule and self-rule.Footnote ⁵⁵ The core governs the provinces indirectly, but the core acts on behalf of the federation as a whole. In a federation, ‘neither the federal nor the constituent units of government are constitutionally subordinate to the other, i.e, each has sovereign power derived from the constitution rather than from another level of government’.Footnote ⁵⁶ Neither can overrule the other, so a federation is a combination of union and accommodation.Footnote ⁵⁷

Empires, as defined above, have structural similarities with federations. They are not as centralised as a unitary state, where all provinces, notwithstanding their individual characteristics, are incorporated under one universal, standardised system. Like federations, empires are more accommodating than centralising. The distinction between federations and empires lies in the differentiated contracts or ties between each periphery and the core in empires.Footnote ⁵⁸ The model resembles a ‘rimless wheel’, where the peripheries talk to and through the core, but not directly with each other.Footnote ⁵⁹

To combine cultural distance with structural form, another layer can be added to the continuum from confederacy to unitary state: the degree of membership-space versus territorial-space.Footnote ⁶⁰ In unitary states, on the hierarchical end of the spectrum, territorial-space is predominant: the core expands, often through conquest, and gains control over new territories. This is followed by strategies of centralisation and political, cultural, and economical standardisation. On the other end of the spectrum, confederations are covenants where the definition of space relies almost exclusively on membership. Various local groups or societies come together, pooling their resources for specific political or economic purposes through agreement, often embodied in a constitution. To preserve this agreement is to preserve the membership-space of the component units, simultaneously conserving the polity.Footnote ⁶¹

At these opposing ends of the continuum, the core-periphery relationship is easily resolved.Footnote ⁶² With no other identities than that of the unitary state, and complete reliance upon territory, there would be no peripheries. All areas would be treated alike under an unambiguous core, politically, culturally, and economically. In an ideal confederacy, with complete reliance on membership-space, there would be not one but various cores, linked to different cultural identities. There would be complete institutional autonomy, residing in the constituent parts.

Between these extremes, there are many ways of resolving the core-periphery relationship with various combinations of membership and territorial-space.

Contrasted with the reliance on a core/periphery dichotomy, the study of federations has noted the difference between symmetrical and asymmetrical federations, acknowledging that it is not only the differentiated contents of the contracts that counts, but also how closely connected the units are to the core. Symmetry means that each unit in the system has similar relations – to the system as a whole and to the other component units.Footnote ⁶³ Asymmetry in federations, then, is ‘the extent to which component states do not share in the conditions and concerns common to the federal system as a whole’.Footnote ⁶⁴ In asymmetric federations, some provinces are closer to the core, and more privileged. The literature on asymmetrical federations further emphasises the need to turn to the precontractual conditions for contracts: preconditions for asymmetry concern cultural, economic, social, and political contexts.Footnote ⁶⁵

Semi-cores

Just as there are such variations in federal arrangements, we could expect to find similar differences within empires. Also in our models of empires, we need to combine information on the historical sources of strain in territorial relationships with information on the strategies of unification. Once we allow for membership categories or social identification, more structural options and variations emerge within imperial logics of rule as regards the various types of strains in what is taken as a given core-periphery dichotomy.

Such strains depend on sociocultural distance or closeness between core and periphery, as measured by, for instance, the grammatical structure of language, the ease or difficulty of communication between province and core (not only between provinces, as in the standard models), and the cost of élite integration across core/province communities.Footnote ⁶⁶

In an asymmetric federation (see Figure 2), one province (P) is closer connected to the core (C) than the rest, but there is no institutionalised differentiated contracting. With a semi-core (SC), the contractual arrangement between core and semi-core is similar to what could be expected in an asymmetric federation. However, and crucially, the overall structural arrangement is distinctively imperial: there are differentiated treaties and no connexions among the regular peripheries.

Figure 2

Asymmetric federative configuration vs semi-core

Figure 3

Semi-core (I1) in imperial relations

The semi-core, while part of the overall imperial structure, is differentiated by being closer to the core. Differences in ties are evident not only in the issues and content of rule in a specific area, but (as in asymmetric federations) also in how tightly connected the province is to the core. Semi-cores function like a federative arrangement within the larger context of an imperial order across provinces. In contrast to asymmetric federations, where tying one periphery closer to the core helps to accommodate differences and minority rights (etc.) in empires, this helps to differentiate the contracts across provinces (see Fig. 3). Some provinces are more equal than others; some differ by being close. This makes for some particular dynamics and relations.

First, a simple but crucial point is that semi-cores are separate entities, with limits or borders – territorial, political, and symbolical. This must be established empirically. This is also required analytically; since empires are assessed relationally, it is important to define semi-cores and their difference in terms of the relationships they maintain with other entities.

Secondly, membership-space overlaps this territorial division. The territorial, functional separation does not have a weighty role as regards identity. The ties between core and semi-core have a higher density of networks and degree of collective identification (see Fig. 3). Any strains in the relationship are caused more by external pressures (such as France’s support to the Jacobite cause and the Pretender, in the historical Scottish case) rather than by cross-pressures within the imperial configuration,Footnote ⁶⁷ the nature of the contractual relationship, or conflicts over different membership-spaces. Dual identities are possible: one may have a national identity, connected to one’s province, as well as an imperial ‘territorial’ identity, connected to the political system, without any contradictions between them. Similar to a federal relation where membership-space is more predominant, such cultural proximity makes it more advantageous to pool resources, rather than extracting them. This is contrary to existing approaches, where the core-periphery dichotomy assumes that dominance and compliance always equals tribute and extraction.

While it is easy to include the semi-core because of overlapping member-space, it is correspondingly more difficult to pivot by playing on differences and categorical divisions in the local population.Footnote ⁶⁸ There are fewer categorical differences to be exploited. Because of overlapping membership-space, the core cannot so easily rely on various and substitutable élites and threaten to switch their support to another segment: instead, it must rely on binding strategies, like directly incorporating the provincial élite into the core and making them rule from there (see Fig. 3).

Intermediaries in the semi-core also enjoy a high degree of autonomy. For élites in the semi-core, the possibilities for starting own political projects, even for constructing national identities, is greater – because this can be compatible with loyalty to the empire as political system. In other words, the intermediaries are loyal and can be nationally oriented at the same time. Not only is triangulation and pivoting difficult to pull off in semi-cores, but there is also less need to do so, given the low risk of opportunism. Open opposition to the core is infrequent, as the middlemen are privileged and integrated. By having such leeway, semi-cores can attain higher centrality than other provinces, with more connexions to other peripheries – for example by initiating, participating in, or maintaining their own colonial ventures. Scotland operated colonial projects in North and Central America,Footnote ⁶⁹ and was frequently seen as a metropolis and imperial core, second only to London. One can also observe interactions between different semi-cores in different empires, like the extensive interaction and exchanges between Norway and Scotland, for example through Danish, respectively Stuart, patronage.Footnote ⁷⁰

In sum, the semi-core is not equal to the core. It is governed differently, but it is still equal enough as not to require much effort to be included into the imperial configuration. In practice, where ‘thick’ ties and a history of interrelations (either peaceful or antagonistic) already exist, the chance of incorporation or conquest is higher. With the presence of standard social routines, established relations, histories of interactions, linguistic commonalities, and other precontractual relational properties, both the risk of opportunism and governance costs decline with increasing hierarchy, contrary to Lake’s hierarchical continuum. For example, in the case of Scotland, it can be argued that both opportunism and the need for safeguards and side-payments (for example, to avoid a Jacobite insurrection) were higher before formal incorporation into the empire.Footnote ⁷¹ What accounts for semi-cores, then, is not only the existence of isolated choice-situations with a trade-off between opportunism risk and governance costs, but erstwhile relational differences in the ‘ability to construct an accommodation with existing cultural schemas’.Footnote ⁷² Social conditions affect the strength of ties, and the degree of embeddedness has effects on the imperial structure.

In continuation, I will illustrate the usefulness of the category of semi-cores by examining two units whose status in relation to an empire has been unclear – Scotland and Norway. These cases are not familiar ones in the literature on empires – perhaps precisely because of uncertainty as to what kind of polities they were, and what role they played within empires. My purpose here is to show the analytical usefulness of the concept of ‘semi-cores’, and secondarily the substantial point that entities normally not considered imperial because of the core-periphery dichotomy may in fact have been part of an imperial configuration. The concept of semi-cores also expands the universe of cases in the study of imperial logics.

Territorial-space: Scotland as a separate imperial province

A major debate in Scottish historiography concerning the 1707 Union between Scotland and England is whether the arrangement was a result of the wishes of an independent Scottish parliament, or the result of coercive policies from England.Footnote ⁷³ My concern here, however, is to show how Scotland can plausibly be considered a separate territorial entity by virtue of its relations with England. Formally speaking, this was a fairly straightforward matter before 1707, as Scotland had its own governing parliament. Up until 1707, and unlike Wales, Scotland had clearly been a separate territorial space, although the precise borders were changing and blurry. Scotland had its own administration, and legal and ecclesiastical apparatus. Also after 1707, Scotland retained some of these core national institutions, like private law courts and the Church. This helped to maintain its territorial distinctiveness even after the Union,Footnote ⁷⁴ when Scotland became part of Greater Britain. In the Act of the Union, Scotland was formally denominated ‘Northern Britain’. As such, there was no Scottish state in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.Footnote ⁷⁵

Another indication of Scotland being a separate entity is the often antagonistic relationship with the English. Scottish history, from the medieval period onwards, has been marked by clan and tribal fights against the English aggressors. Only fifty years before the Treaty of Union, Cromwell had invaded the Scottish territories, subjecting them to a harsh military dictatorship. Furthermore, the most obvious solution in 1703, in the context of European international relations, was considered to be a separation of Scotland from England.

After 1707, the English threat was seen to be the English constitutional principle of the absolute sovereignty of ‘the Crown in parliament’, as the government of Scotland was merged with that of England.Footnote ⁷⁶ Scotland and England had dramatically different levels of parliamentary representation, which again could imply the imposition of unacceptable policies on Scotland.Footnote ⁷⁷ For example, even though the Church was allowed to remain independent after 1707, ‘the Patronage Act’ of 1712, restored the legal right of local patrons and landowners to appoint vacant offices in the Church.Footnote ⁷⁸ This act ‘confirmed unambiguously that the 1707 Treaty was not, as many Scots believed, an inviolate, fundamental and supreme law; rather it was one which could be altered by the whim of any electoral majority in Westminster’.Footnote ⁷⁹

England was increasingly seen as posing a threat also to the identity and special characteristics of Scots and Scotland. The Scots feared the ‘corrosive effect’ of being associated with the most powerful state in the world.Footnote ⁸⁰

Whether agency is put mainly on the Scottish or the English side, it is still important to bear in mind that England ‘has always been the senior partner in the relationship with the sovereign Parliament meeting in London as the seat of government and the political, social and cultural “establishment” of the United Kingdom also heavily concentrated in the south’.Footnote ⁸¹ Scotland was a separate province subject to the rule of the imperial core.

This shows how Scotland has been established and treated as a separate entity in the literature, mainly by distinguishing it from England – even after the Union of Parliaments. Still, there has been little or no discussion of Scotland’s role within the (eventually global) system of rule of which it was a part. In the literature, Scotland is seen as being in a ‘partnership’ with the British Empire, ‘participating’ in it, being ‘associated’ with it, having ‘connexions’ to it, from outside of the empire. The question remains: if this was a ‘partnership’, then of what kind? Moreover, Scotland is not so much talked about as is Scots in imperial service. One telling subheading reads ‘The Scots Contribution to the British Empire’. We read that ‘Scots found it possible to penetrate the English empire’.Footnote ⁸² Surely, Scots could ‘penetrate’ the empire, but the focus in this article is how Scotland was a unit in and a part of an imperial configuration.

Membership-space: Cultural closeness and dual identity

Scotland can be considered a separate entity based on its relations with England. If we consider Scotland a semi-core, how can we make sense of the formal and social properties of these relations? As seen, imperial provinces should be differentiated from each other and governed in separate ways. In semi-cores, differentiation from other provinces is achieved through ‘thick’ ties with the core. This was the case in Scotland – and, as we shall see, in the case of Norway as well.

As the jurist William Blackstone summed up the relationship between England and Scotland, after the union of the crowns Scotland

In way of comparison, it is worth noting how this distinguishes Scotland as semi-core from Ireland as a periphery. The situation of Ireland, with its colonial bureaucracy and frequent coercion from the core, shows that there were other alternatives available for England. Contrasting Scotland with Ireland, Blackstone pointed out how Ireland was ‘a distinct kingdom; though a dependent, subordinate kingdom … And as Ireland, thus conquered, planted, and governed, still continues in a state of dependence, it must necessarily conform to, and be obliged by, such laws as the superior state thinks proper to prescribe’. Other measures had to be taken to prevent opportunism. Blackstone laconically notes that as Ireland’s state of dependence was ‘almost forgotten, and ready to be disputed by the Irish nation, it become necessary some years ago to declare how that matter really stood’.Footnote ⁸⁴

In the Scottish case, therefore, instead of arguing that Scots penetrated the empire or the like, I suggest that the membership-space, or ingroup commonalities, overlapped the territorial core-province relations. There were different but complementary identities, and any existing social distinctiveness did not translate into political expression.Footnote ⁸⁵ Institutionally, this is manifested in how Scotland and England came to share an élite. Unlike the Irish case, accommodation was achieved through ‘the recruitment of and collaboration with regional élites who in turn were given representation in central institutions’.Footnote ⁸⁶ After 1707, England increasingly gave Scots access to imperial trade, the peerage, and to administrative careers in the empire. Much of the same happened in Ukraine’s relationship with Russia and, as we shall see, in Norway and Denmark. This élite integration in all three countries peeked in the late eighteenth century, strengthening the link between élite careers and Empire.Footnote ⁸⁷ For the Scottish élite, there were no barriers of entry into the imperial administration.

Because of primogeniture, the non-inheriting sons of the Scottish landed gentry were moving to London for imperial jobs both before and after the Union in 1707 – the ‘link between élite careers, empire and Union’ was strong.Footnote ⁸⁸ This trend steadily picked up the pace throughout the eighteenth century; as a parallel to the Norwegian case, in the 1760s ‘the number of Scots holding state office rose dramatically’.Footnote ⁸⁹ Members of the Scottish landed aristocracy intermarried with English élites and were ‘assimilated directly into the imperial élite’. Still, ‘the Anglicized Scottish patrician remained assertively Scottish. As stated in an 1887 letter to The Times, a Scot could have two patriotisms and “be sensible of no opposition between them”.’Footnote ⁹⁰

Scotland and the Scots possessed a dual allegiance – loyalty to Britain as the polity, and to Scotland as their native land.Footnote ⁹¹ Even if Scotland after 1707 was part of Greater Britain, interestingly enough, many Scots continued to refer to their state or polity not as such, but as ‘England’ and ‘English’. The predominant idea of the nation ‘was “England” and not “Britain”. Apart from the constitutionally-minded, there was a tendency to see Scotland as “incorporated” within the English state.’Footnote ⁹² The Scot David Livingstone frequently spoke on behalf of England in his diplomatic correspondence, and the colonial entrepreneur Kirk talked of the advantages for England. Parallel to this, however, ‘Scots would regularly partake in Burns Nights, St. Andrews Societies, Scottish New Year’s day celebration, and the like’,Footnote ⁹³ and Scots serving in the empire would normally use Scottish law for their wills.

Within the empire, however, their ‘Scottishness’ was emphasised. As will be seen in the case of Norway, such double identities and allegiances were common and, from an imperial perspective, unproblematic. Scottish (and Norwegian) identity rarely took the form of ‘nationalism’ as we think of it today. Asserting Scottish or Norwegian identity was not part of a clearly defined and enunciated set of political beliefs about nationhood.Footnote ⁹⁴ As such, semi-cores differ from the assumption that people and communities attached to a particular, local identity are more likely to resist imperial control fiercely.Footnote ⁹⁵ Semi-cores experience fewer rebellions and more stability, despite having particular local identities.

Pivoting, autonomy, and centrality

Pivoting strategies as a way of divide-and-rule is a standard option in the imperial repertoire. However, this is less useful in a semi-core. Although Scotland was an imperial province, the lack of pivoting within the semi-core is notable here (and also in Norway). In the period after 1707, the main element indicating this lack of pivoting is the simple fact that Westminster largely stayed out of Scottish affairs. Scots in parliament were identified as such, but had little to do with the management of Scotland.

After the Franchise Act of 1536, autonomous, territorial jurisdictions were abolished. Still, ‘the powers of English local officials, conferred by parliament and derived from Common Law, amounted to ‘self-government at the King’s command’.Footnote ⁹⁶ Before the eighteenth century, and particularly from 1560 to 1690, the burghs played an important role in Scotland. They were privileged communities and were granted rights of self-government and, after the Union of the Crowns, also constitutional representation. Their members had a sense of belonging to a ‘state within a state’.Footnote ⁹⁷ As happened elsewhere in Europe, processes of centralisation, in combination with the Union of 1707, put an end to this system and a more homogeneous élite emerged. This reduced the opportunity to play burghs off against each other. Ultimately, also the Church was ‘dragged into’ state patronage in the 1780s.Footnote ⁹⁸

Without internal pivoting, the autonomy enjoyed by imperial intermediaries in semi-cores is considerably higher than in regular peripheries. There is generally a single, local élite segment with close ties to the core. The option of triangulating between different élites and intermediaries is therefore not readily available, which leaves binding strategies as the most effective option. During the 1700s, there was little use of pivoting strategies within the province of Scotland.

Within the empire, Scotland was allowed to manage itself to a large degree. Instead of having occupying armies or imposing a colonial bureaucracy, as was the case in Ireland, England ‘reverted to a posture of benign neglect’.Footnote ⁹⁹ The absence of military occupation and coercive force does not imply that Scotland was not part of an imperial configuration. As a semi-core, Scotland could be granted such autonomy without increasing the risk of opportunism. There was little risk that this would lead to a dangerous nationalism. In fact, partially because of this autonomy, the middle classes in Scotland had fewer reasons for promoting parliamentary independence or for staging nationalistic uprisings.Footnote ¹⁰⁰

An instructive case of the close and yet autonomous relationship between the core and the semi-core is the relationship between the Earl of Islay and Prime Minister Robert Walpole. Islay, appointed by Walpole to manage Scottish affairs in exchange for Scottish stability and securing the Scottish votes in parliament, became the dominant figure in Scottish political life for four decades from the 1720s. He had such a degree of autonomy and influence that he became known as ‘the King of Scotland’, and King George II described Islay as his Scottish ‘Vice Roy’. Islay controlled patronage, and the entire civil administration. Churches, army, and universities were penetrated by his networks of clients. He ensured order and obedience by responding positively to Scottish local concerns. After the Union, Scotland was in practice governed almost as a separate entity, on the basis of institutions from before 1707.Footnote ¹⁰¹

Scots in parliament were led by a Scottish parliamentary manager. They were a separate group but their work had few practical effects for the governance of Scotland. The effective day-to-day management ‘was done by able deputies in the Edinburgh legal profession’.Footnote ¹⁰² Still, after 1707 law and order in Scotland were the responsibility of the English government. As opposed to the extensive clan-feuds, London had high standards as regards civil obedience, and more resources for enforcing it. Still, rather than having standing armies in the north, clans were enlisted as an efficient way of dealing with problems of social order, as they possessed legitimacy and local knowledge. However, this was managed in ways different from traditional divide-and-rule policies. After the 1745 Jacobite Rising, landowners’ private jurisdictions were abolished in 1747, as the culmination of a lengthy process of getting rid of what were regarded as archaic feudal powers (associated, of course, with Jacobitism).Footnote ¹⁰³ The focus was on how such systems tended to oppress tenants and the peasantry. The Scottish nobles, steadily becoming socialised into the British culture, were becoming increasingly aware of this. Standards of public justice were of the utmost importance.Footnote ¹⁰⁴ In short, England took a direct interest in the welfare of the population in the semi-core.

As we have seen, semi-cores are differentiated within the imperial structure by exploiting shared membership-space and cultural closeness, and binding them closer to the core. Less needs to be spent on preventing defection and opportunism, and more on directly ensuring the well-being of the population, to secure loyalty. This explains what may look like ‘altruistic’ actions with a structural imperative – the core does not want a rebellion on its doorstep that cannot be managed by traditional imperial divide-and-rule strategies. Discontents cannot be dealt with simply by changing one élite for another, or setting population groups against each other. Showing more direct concern for the population in the province is a way to reduce the risk of opportunism.Footnote ¹⁰⁵

In combination, the foregoing elements have an important effect also on the role of the semi-core in the overall imperial configuration. Provinces should be governed differently – but, ideally, they should also be isolated from each other. Semi-cores, however, have a higher degree of centrality than regular provinces because they possess many of the same characteristics as the core – tight connexions to it, little internal pivoting, and extensive intermediary autonomy. This can be seen clearly in the Scottish case, where Edinburgh operated as a semi-metropole, organising its own colonial ventures and, to an even larger degree, participating directly in the British Empire.

The Danish empire

The Danish composite state was the result of a policy of intermarriages stemming from mediaeval times,Footnote ¹⁰⁶ resulting in the Kalmar Union of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden in 1397. The Kalmar Union rested on two important documents. The ‘Coronation Document’ recognised Eric of Pomerania (Eric VII of Denmark/Eric III of Norway) and his right to rule the realm, in an essentially absolute way. The second document, the ‘Union Document’, aimed at creating a common ground for an agglomeration of various polities that also involved the strongmen and their local councils and laws. The document stated that the Union should have a ‘common king for all eternity’. The two documents reflect membership and territorial-space – an absolute monarch, combined with the pragmatic and indirect rule of various peoples.Footnote ¹⁰⁷ To rule heterogeneous polities effectively and legitimately, it was necessary to rule each realm separately according to local customs, and indirectly through their respective councils. Here we might trace some of the forerunners of a later imperial polity, albeit not institutionalised at this point. In 1442 came a further indication of the state of the polity, when the Oldenburger Christoffer III of Bayern took the title of ‘arch-King’ or ‘archirex’,Footnote ¹⁰⁸ a royal title not known from anywhere else.Footnote ¹⁰⁹ It indicates how he was the ruler of an extensive agglomerate, and not only king of three different countries; as the ruler of one of Europe’s largest polities, he found himself just below the level of the Habsburg Emperor (Keiser) himself.Footnote ¹¹⁰

During the eighteenth century, Denmark expanded territorially; by the end of the century Christian VII was king of Denmark and Norway, Iceland, the Faroe Islands, Greenland, colonies in the West Indies and India, a range of slave fortresses along the coast of present-day Ghana, and ruling Duke in Schleswig and Holstein. He had different contracts with each of these provinces. Different peoples inhabited separate spaces and could never coordinate in political action towards the Crown.Footnote ¹¹¹

Denmark and Norway remained in a personal union until the Treaty of Kiel in 1814, where Denmark was forced to cede control of Norway to Sweden, its arch-enemy and an ally of Britain. Resenting potential Swedish rule, Christian Frederik, heir-presumptive of Denmark, took the initiative in a popular insurrection that resulted in a Norway Constituent Assembly being convened to elect a king and draft a constitution, and Norwegian independence from Denmark.

In the following section, however, the focus is on how Norway was different in terms of its close connexions with the core.

Territorial-space: Norway as a separate imperial province

Danish state law established that Norway and Denmark were two separate realms. Norway was a rike (realm) of its own, which in turn implied that Danish and Norwegian law (Danskelov, Norskelov) were two separate systems, also as regards military organisation. In legal theory, then, the separation was clear enough. As seen also in the Scottish case, there was scant risk in having two parallel identities at the same time – the core even promoted such divisions and helped in the construction of national cultures.

Even if Norway’s relations with Copenhagen were consistently imperial within the larger configuration of the policy, such imperial dynamics with Norway approached those of a semi-core from the 1700s. The circulation of semi-feudal lords functioning as intermediaries had come to a halt by 1660, and further centralisation ensued from the late 1600s.

Membership-space: Cultural closeness and dual identity

With increasing centralisation during the eighteenth century, the rationalisation of the ruling core and its cultural expressions furthered identification with it, particularly amongst the steadily growing class of civil servants. Still, as GlenthøjFootnote ¹¹² points out, their allegiance to the polity was combined with distinct Norwegian and Danish identities. The idea that Denmark and Norway were in reality ‘twin kingdoms’ took hold: Norway should be put on a more equal footing with Denmark.

Nonetheless, it is abundantly clear that Copenhagen was still the core, as the imperial capital. There were no nationalisms in this period, but an awareness of a Danish and a Norwegian identity. Still, ‘[The Danish and Norwegian bourgeoisie was closely connected through culture, institutions, and family, which made the separation between a Danish and Norwegian nationality a blurry one…]’. As in the case of Scotland, such commonalities were used actively in the construction of a common Danish-Norwegian identity.Footnote ¹¹³ As we have noted, semi-cores are separate provinces, but at the same time part of a common membership-space that can be used for political purposes – or, more marginally, fought against.

The Norwegian ‘national’ form of patriotism was premised not on separatism or independence, but on the particularities of Norway as a part of the empire, and as such consistent with the imperial logic of managing diversity rather than assimilation. This kind of patriotism was not incompatible with a plurality of nationalities (German, Norwegian, Danish); and an awareness of the different national characteristics, traditions, and histories, was actually seen as part of the virtue of being an imperial citizen.Footnote ¹¹⁴ Awareness of one’s cultural particularities and special history was not a problem, as long as this was seen as an integral part of the empire.

The reference object for such patriotism was the ambivalent concept of one’s ‘fatherland’ (fædrelandet; Vaterland in German). Precisely because of an imperial feature, two parallel notions of a ‘fatherland’ existed:

In the late 1700s, the Danish and Norwegian identities had become so similar that attention was directed instead towards the increasing German influence. The imperial ‘politics of difference’ became diverted from the internal separation of Norwegians and Danes, and towards the distinction between what was internal and external to the empire.

A clear expression of this is found in a law from 1776,Footnote ¹¹⁶ stating that only those born within the realm of the Danish king could assume public positions.Footnote ¹¹⁷ According to this law, ‘[the Country’s bread is for the Country’s children to enjoy]’. Prior to 1776, an imperial civil servant’s country of birth was (at least juridically) irrelevant. The notion of the ‘fatherland’, including Norway, Denmark, and the German counties, became stronger. Danish-born and Norwegian-born citizens alike called themselves and each other ‘Danish’.Footnote ¹¹⁸

Within the imperial patriotism, Danish/Norwegian culture now held a privileged position. While Norwegian characteristics were seen as being the stamina of the people and a harshly romantic nature and climate, imperial patriotism included the same references, but to the Northern character in general. The celebration of ‘the North’ as a distinct cultural entity came from the state-builders of the empire, and not from Norwegian state-builders.Footnote ¹¹⁹ The differences were downplayed, and the cultural and linguistic borders separating the two were blurry. Some even suggested a new name for Denmark – Dannora, or Dannorig – and there were rumours, true or false, about possibly also substituting ‘northern Denmark’ for ‘Norway’.Footnote ¹²⁰ Despite the clear territorial division, Norway and Denmark increasingly came to share a membership-space.

Pivoting, autonomy, and centrality

In the late 1700s, therefore, the balance increasingly favoured a common identity and loyalty between Denmark and Norway, rather than any opportunities for pivoting or divide-and-rule strategies within Norway.

These developments had an impact on the King’s civil servants. A solid and stable social group of about 400 families made up an upper class connected to the core through its administrative practices. Intermediaries in Norway were therefore a direct, integral part of the central imperial administration. The civil servants were part of a structure that through their schooling in Copenhagen and formal hierarchy connected their work and their cultural horizon directly to the King’s Chancery.Footnote ¹²¹ Civil servants in Norway administered and enforced the rules from Copenhagen, and were a distinct and stable class (øvrigheten – ‘the authorities’) separated from the common Norwegian population (almuen – ‘the common people’).

Initially, most civil servants and their immediate subordinates initially Danish or German-born, recruited in Copenhagen. As in Scotland, however, more Norwegian-born men gradually came to serve as civil servants, and Danish and Norwegian civil servants identified as equals. By end of the 1700s, the majority of civil servants in Norway were Norwegian-born;Footnote ¹²² approaching 1814, the only position reserved for Danes or Germans was that of Stadtholder (or vice-Stadtholder). As in Scotland, Norway had ties to other provinces. Norwegians participated in colonial projects, even serving as colonial governors on behalf of the imperial core.Footnote ¹²³

As in Scotland, there was one single and integrated local élite, which reduced the opportunities for triangulation. The upper class in Norway emerged directly from the imperial core. Instead of divide-and-rule policies being applied to the intermediaries in classical imperial fashion, the relationship between the bourgeoisie and the state was organic. The two collectives – the state and the bourgeoisie – were constituted by the same families, and often the same people – in contrast to the case of France, where the bourgeoisie emerged in direct opposition to the state.Footnote ¹²⁴

In addition, ‘officials in Norway appear to have exercised greater local power than their colleagues in Denmark: “They took the initiative, and in conflicts between different groups they could successfully force through their own line of policy by using their mastery of the channels to the central government”.’Footnote ¹²⁵ This is parallel to the high intermediary autonomy in the Scottish case.

Eventually, this élite would become the governing stratum of the new state of Norway. After independence in 1814, these former imperial intermediaries took on a new role, as ‘the academically trained civil servants … emerged as the leading stratum. They held public offices, and they played for a while a leading role also in Parliament. They levied taxes and revenues, not least customs revenues, and distributed the state budget as they saw fit.’Footnote ¹²⁶ This was not necessarily because the civil servants became politicians, but because the previously imperial function of the civil service was elevated to the highest function in the new state.Footnote ¹²⁷ The independent Norwegian state is therefore described as a state of civil servants (embedsmannsstat)Footnote ¹²⁸ until the end of the nineteenth century. Interestingly, the overwhelming majority of laws remained exactly the same after independence as they had been under the empire.