From the opening scene of Plato’s Republic to the floor of the U.S. Senate, there has been a long debate about the use of majority rule to make decisions. Melissa Schwartzberg’s Counting the Many is a valuable contribution to this discussion. The book makes two main contributions. First, it traces the practice of counting votes in Athens, the development of decision rules in ecclesiastical elections of bishops and popes and Italian city-states during the Middle Ages, and the debate over unanimity versus majority rule in Enlightenment-era France. Second, Counting the Many analyzes and rejects classic arguments for supermajority thresholds and then makes the case for a simple majority process for amending constitutions.
The book focuses its attention on the use of supermajority rules for constitutional amendments, such as the United States’s requirements of a two-thirds majority in both chambers of Congress and then three-fourths of state legislatures. Footnote 1 Schwartzberg notes that this represents a “hard case” (p. 180) so perhaps the arguments against supermajorities for constitutional revision apply with equal or greater force in other settings. I thought the most interesting use of my space would be to provide a rationale for why parliamentary filibustering subject to a supermajority threshold is distinct from constitution-amending in ways that make supermajority decision-making more useful. Footnote 2
Filibustering-by-Attrition Gives Extra Weight to Intense Preferences
On many policy issues, some voters or legislators have a more intense interest in a question than others. Robert Dahl suggested that a special reason to respect political minorities is that they may have more intense preferences than an opposing majority, with the result that enacting the majority-preferred policy results in a net loss of social utility. Footnote 3 When Californians voted on a state constitutional amendment to prohibit same-sex marriage in 2008, for example, each voter had the same weight—from the homosexual couple denied the right to marry to those who were not directly affected.
While it would be difficult to weight citizens’ votes by their intensity, classic filibustering provided a means of accommodating differences in preference intensity in a legislative setting. In an attrition filibuster like the one depicted in the 1939 film Mr. Smith Goes to Washington, legislators can signal the intensity of their preferences on an issue by occupying the floor of their legislature. This required their time, their effort, and perhaps political and social costs as well. Opposing legislators could signal their own intensity by waiting; waiting meant wasting the time of the legislature and it meant remaining on or nearby the chamber floor while the filibuster was in progress. If the costs of waiting out a filibuster are comparable to the costs of filibustering, an indifferent majority will be likely to defer to an intense minority rather than force the issue to a vote.
This is not how filibustering works in the modern U.S. Senate, however. Since 1960, filibustering senators have rarely been forced to actually occupy the Senate floor in order to block a proposal. Instead, senators engage in virtual filibusters, in which the ability of each senator to filibuster is assumed and all other senators seek to accommodate or overcome a threatened filibuster. The Senate’s cloture rule (Rule 22) allows a supermajority of the Senate (currently three-fifths of the entire membership) to employ these virtual filibusters. Since filibustering is virtually costless, senators are much more willing to do so, and the overall number of filibusters in the Senate has increased dramatically. The result of this transformation is that the Senate has a de facto three-fifths decision rule for most legislation. Footnote 4
Some of the arguments for supermajority rules, however, apply equally or especially to the use of supermajority procedures in a legislative setting, the focus of my work. For that reason I will first discuss two issues pertaining to constitutional revision, then review arguments for filibustering and supermajority thresholds in a legislative setting.
Filibustering Preserves Legislative Deliberation
A second argument for supermajority procedures that is unique to a legislature is that the right to filibuster allows legislators to fight for their right to speak and offer amendments. This is “deliberation” in the limited sense that legislators can use their parliamentary rights to explain their views, propose their policy views in the form of amendments to bills, and obtain roll call votes on their proposals so there is a public record of legislators’ preferences. In a legislature in which the majority party has the power to frame policy proposals and set the terms for floor debate, the majority party may see little value in floor deliberation. Floor debate merely provides a forum for the majority party’s opponents to voice their criticism, while votes on amendments may provide fodder for future electoral challengers. Thus floor deliberation is often truncated in a majority-rule institution like the US House of Representatives.
On the other hand, if the Senate minority party (or any minority grouping on an issue) has the ability to block proposals unless they agree to the terms for floor debate, they are in a position to bargain for more floor debate and amendments.
One of the first major bills of the 114th Congress, for example, was a bill that mandated approval of the Keystone XL pipeline. The Senate debated this bill for three weeks and voted on 43 amendments offered by members of both parties. The House passed its version of the bill after one hour of discussion with a single opportunity for the minority party to propose a change in the bill. This is typical of House and Senate deliberation on other key bills like the 2009 Stimulus bill, the Affordable Care Act, and the Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation: far more discussion and amendments in the Senate than the House. This is not because senators are inherently more committed to the norms of parliamentary discussion than House members; it is because the Senate minority party can use the Senate’s supermajority requirements to bargain for more deliberation while the House minority party cannot.
Access to floor deliberation can make a difference in the quality of representation. Melissa Williams argues for the importance of legislators using their “voice” to share their perspective, using the example of female legislators in a male-dominated legislature. Footnote 5 And in practice female legislators are more likely to speak on the House floor. Footnote 6 Without obstruction, minority party legislators can be reduced to voting machines registering positions on bills written without their knowledge or input.
Majority Rule Empowers Minority Factions
Counting the Many discusses and rejects the argument that supermajority rules ensure that policy change is achieved by bipartisan majorities. While bipartisan coalitions suggest a high level of consensus and hence future policy stability, during periods of polarized politics the minority party may use a supermajority threshold to veto legislation that is both popular and in the national interest.
However, supermajority thresholds that implicitly force legislators to form bipartisan coalitions serve a special purpose in a legislature. A critical distinction between citizens and legislators is that the former are free to act on their own preferences while the latter must balance their own views against a complex set of principals: their constituents, the party loyalists in their districts and states, and donors. Footnote 7 The influence of party-affiliated voters, donors, and interest groups has increased over time, so when a legislator much choose between her own conscience or the interests of her average constituents and the preferences of party-affiliated actors, she is increasingly likely to side with her party.
By itself, party-dominated voting is not necessarily bad. Political parties can formulate policy agendas that advance the public interest and then induce their members to work for its adoption. American political parties, however, are complex coalitions of cooperating actors. Footnote 8 This means there are several actors or groups that most members of a party consider necessary to their reelection. For a Republican legislator this could mean Tea Party activists, an array of business interests, pro-life organizations, and individual conservative donors across the country. For a Democratic legislator this could mean labor unions, pro-choice groups, and environmentalists.
Under simple majority rule, a major group affiliated with the majority party can demand the passage of legislation that is unpopular, not in the national interest, or both. In such a case, a supermajority requirement helps protect members of both parties against this sort of domination by a party-affiliated group. A powerful interest group may be able to command the votes of an entire party based on sheer electoral influence, but a de facto requirement of bipartisanship helps to insure against the mischiefs of faction. This rationale for allowing filibustering was first articulated in 1915 when many Senate Democrats felt that President Wilson was trying to strong-arm Congress into passing a bill that they privately considered bad policy, but feared the penalties for publicly opposing their president. When the Senate adopted its first cloture rule in 1917, the concerns about the ability of parties to manufacture induced majorities motivated senators to adopt a supermajority threshold for cloture. Footnote 9
Supermajority Rules as a Lever for Policy Change
In Counting the Many, supermajority thresholds and vetoes are portrayed as roadblocks to policy change. This is a common conception of both constitutional thresholds and legislative obstruction. Keith Krehbiel’s Pivotal Politics, for example, posits the Senate filibuster as a veto akin to the presidential veto. However, the power to obstruct can also be used to promote policy change by hostage-taking: blocking proposals that are strongly preferred by agenda-setters so that the obstructionists can bargain to get their priorities on the policy agenda. Used this way, filibustering and supermajority rules help to diversify a legislature’s agenda and ensure that the institution is representing a broad array of interests.
Recent studies have suggested that the combination of a multi-veto legislative process—particularly the Senate filibuster—and a set of economic and social factors that “drift” toward growing inequality has led to a flaccid policy response to economic inequality in the United States over the last five decades. Footnote 10 While the evidence suggests that the net effect of obstruction has been used to preserve the status quo during this period, it is also possible for filibustering to promote a progressive agenda. In the late Roman Republic, Tiberius Gracchus used the tribune’s veto to shut down the nineteenth-century Britain, Charles Stewart Parnell drew attention to the plight of Ireland by obstructing the British House of Commons. Footnote 11 In the U.S. Senate, hostage-taking by Huey Long (D-LA) led to the enactment of bankruptcy protection for farmers during the Great Depression, while Democratic hostage-taking contributed to the passage of a minimum wage increase in 1996 (Koger Reference Koger2010, pp. 112–114). Footnote 12
More broadly, one of the potentially positive uses of supermajority rules in a legislative setting is to empower individual legislators and minority parties to weaken the majority party’s grip on the legislative agenda. This enables legislators to force votes on key issues and possibly enact policies that the majority party would have preferred to block.
In conclusion, Counting the Many is a valuable contribution to a long conversation about the uses and abuses of majority rule. This comment has added some perspective on how supermajority rules and filibustering can be of more value in a legislature than in other settings.
